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Summary 
This dissertation examines recurrent patterns in the interaction between psychiatric patients 
and the systems of knowledge an::! power that constitute them as patients. These patterns are 
traced both in the historical migmti::m of patients into and out of the asylum, and in the 
language used by doctors and patients to account for such migration. Transcripts of 
interviews with patients and case notes written by doctors are subjected to new forms of 
quantitative analysis and this is used together with qualitative interpretation to reveal the 
ways in which disciplinary power operates through confession and surveillance to constitute 
psychiatric subjects in the tensior. between freedom and incarceration. 
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Preface 
A visit to the aquarium 
I should have been a pair of ragged claws 
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas. 
- T.S. Eliot 
In an article in the British Journal ofMedical Psychology, Thomas Szasz (1993a), doyen of 
the anti psychiatry movement, writes: "It seems to me that no amount of reasoning or research 
can bridge the gap between tissue and talk, between cellular pathology and language 
pathology" (p. 65). Szasz's assertion is remarkable for two reasons. The first is that he 
should once again (cf, Szasz, 1967, 1978, 1993b) choose to build 1:-Lis critique on the use of 
language in schizophrenia, when schizophrenic speech, or crazy talk as Szasz would call it, is 
in fact rare. Leff(1993), for example, reports having encountered no more than 50 cases in 
over 1000 patients diagnosed as schizophrenic. The second is that, unlike what happened 
when he made similar claims in the 1960s, Szasz's article is almost certain to have no impact 
on psychiatric practice. 
Szasz's own explanation for his choice of crazy talk as key to the argument is that in 
the absence of real biological markers disordered language continues to be used by 
psychiatrists as a kind of pseudo-biological marker of thought disorder, which is then equated 
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with brain disorder1. Thus by rerr,oving 'disordered speech' as a legitimate part of the system, 
Szasz hopes to bring down the whole house of cards. To the extent that he theorises the 
puzzling ineffectiveness of this strategy, Szasz's reasoning can be summed up in two words: 
Medical hegemony. 
Mainstream psychiatrists themselves, if they could be bothered to take note of Szasz's 
work, would most probably find other explanations for his continued obsession with the issue 
oflanguage and for the negligible impact of his critique. Szasz, they might say, does not 
conduct proper scientific research on mental illness, and is therefore reduced to 
philosophising about language. Ee is no longer taken seriously both because of the 
disastrous consequences when his ideas were implemented in the 1960s, and because 
biological research on mental illness has progressed to the point where his brand of linguistic 
nitpicking has become irrelevant. 
In this dissertation I attempt to study the tension between language and biology from 
a position somewhere between the antipsychiatric (as exemplified by Szasz) and the 
mainstream psychiatric approach. Like Szasz I take language to be a key site of resistance, 
but unlike him I focus on the ordinary daily language of patients and physicians, rather than 
on crazy talk, as that which maintains the system of psychiatric illness. Like mainstream 
psychiatrists, I assume that patier.ts are to a large extent not free agents, . ut constrained in 
what they can say and do, but unlike them I view the constraints as discursive as much as 
biological, and as affecting the sane as much as the insane. 
The substantive problem to which I apply this approach is that of psychiatric 
An undated booklet (A member of your family suffers from schizophrenia) published 
by the Department of Health and Population Development neatly illustrates the process by 
which crazy talk is turned into di::Jrdered thinking: "Such a person may say things you do not 
expect or understand. He may talk a great deal or loose [sic] the trend of what he is saying. 
Sometimes it looks as though there are too many thoughts for him to cope with." (p. 3) 
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chronicity, which translates as rei-idmission in modem hospital psychiatry. My purpose is to 
demonstrate that chronicity has its own lexicon, syntax and semantics; that the walls of the 
asylum are fashioned in language, and are therefore susceptible to being linguistically 
breached, scaled, subverted and deconstructed. In the course of the dissertation I take two 
steps away from readmission as a problem of overt individual behaviour. First, I trace how 
chronicity can be viewed as a social construction with a particular contingent history, a 
history marked by oscillations between confinement and liberation, but more particularly by 
the increasing influence of'moral', rather than physical confinement. Second, I trace how 
this moral confinement becomes real not only in the movement ofbodies in and out of the 
psychiatric hospital, but in the minutiae of the everyday language used by psychiatrists and 
their patients. 
I start with a review of empirical research on readmission (Chapter 1) and suggest 
instead a possible historical structure (involving an oscillation between pessimistic somatic 
and optimistic psychosocial views) within which to understand the phenomenon (Chapters 2 
and 3). I elaborate this in an attempt to account for the somatic orthodoxy which currently 
holds sway in psychiatry (Chapter 4), evaluate criticisms of such accounts as being 
insufficiently data-driven (Chapter 5), and review the possible utility of techniques from 
corpus-based linguistics in responding to these~· iticisms (Chapter 6). I then apply newly 
developed techniques to transcripts of interviews with psychiatric patients (Chapter 7) and to 
psychiatric case notes (Chapter 8). Finally, I reconsider (Chapter 9) the implications of a 
discourse-based approach to mental illness. 
Methodologically, the dissertation attempts to draw on both quantitative and 
qualitative empirical enquiry, and to speak simultaneously in the idiom of objectivity and of 
constructionism. Of all academic disciplines, psychology is perhaps the most difficult to 
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assign to one or the other of what C.P. Snow (1959, 1964) called the "two cultures" of 
learning: Is it Mr Eliot the banker, the dull but reliable calculator of behavioural interest 
rates and cognitive amortization values, or Mr Eliot the poet, inventor and exposer of a more 
forbidding reality below the surface of our routine existence? Thus I am concerned with the 
cold surfaces of numbers in psychology and with the colder depths ofwords- and with 
deconstructing the distance which separates them. 
The materials I have used i.n putting together this dissertation are academic and other 
publications on topics such as the postmodern ferment in the social sciences, the history of 
psychiatry, the 'causes' of psychiatric readmission, and qualitative versus quantitative 
research; transcripts of interview:; with patients at a mental hospital; case notes from the 
psychiatric ward of a general hospital; and ethnographic observation over a number of years 
in and around South African psychiatry. I have tended to treat published texts with different 
degrees of piety, taking seriously both the rather bland (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and the 
more radical (Parker, 1989a, b) versions of discourse analysis practised by social 
psychologists interested in langua 3e; both mainstream (Kleinman, 1988) and critical (Singer, 
Baer & Lazarus, 1990) medical anthropology; as well as various other cultural, sociological, 
and political critiques of medicine and madness. However, texts of the sort that are published 
in psychiatric and clinic'" psychc!ogy journals I have not engaged on their 0\\'11 terms, using 
~~-, 
them instead as data for analysis. _£._y, ~ ~r, 
According to Gergen (1985), accounts of social constructionism, as this dissertation 
attempts to be, cannot be empirically warranted. Their success depends on the author's 
1 
r, ee! P u ( l£!'1re<1 ),,f/t r.,el ~ 
capacity to "invite, compel, stimulate, or delight the audience, and not on criteria of veracity" 
(p. 272). However, while these a!·e standards by which I would wish this dissertation to be 
judged, the empirical warrants offered (especially in Chapters 7 and 8) are not included 
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entirely for their entertainment value. At best the dissertation should evoke the same kind of 
response as would a casual visit to an aquarium, namely mild pleasure upon viewing each 
new exotic creature - Marble Hat.;het, Bleeding Heart Tetra, Kissing Gourami, Green Hi Fin 
Molly, or, Pair ofRagged Claws- together with a slight stimulation of interest in precise 
scientific nomenclature and muted scepticism about the degree to which each underwater 
display approximates imagined real aquatic ecologies. 
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Chapter 1 
Readmission: An overview of empirical research 
Myself when young did eagerly frequent 
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument 
About it and about: but evermore 
Came out by the same Door as in I went. 
-Edward Fitzgerald 1809-1883 
Psychiatry does not have a distinguished research tradition in South Mrica, qualifying for 
little more than a cursory mention in both Brink's (1988) and Malan's (I 988) histories of 
medical research. Although it could be argued that these histories are biased against 
psychiatry as one of the less glamorous medical specialties, empirical evidence on 
publication impact and frequency confirms South African psychiatry's relatively low research 
profile. While other branches of South Mrican medical research are highly regarded 
internationally - local work in 'General and Internal Medicine' ranks seventh in the world 
according to bibliometric and citation indices (Pouris, 1989) - psychiatry is listed among 
those scientific disciplines "in which South Mrica does not make any international 
contributions" (p. 625). Thus when the Medical Research Council (MRC) established its 
Clinical Psychiatry Research Unit in 1980 there was a considerable backlog of research and a 
need to identify the most urgent ::>riorities. Gillis (1987), who was appointed as first head of 
the unit, summarised the unit's research agenda as follows: "The areas which were selected as 
being of greatest concern were mental illness in the aged, the high readmission rate to South 
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African psychiatric hospitals (approaching 50% overall and rising), and substance abuse, 
particularly marijuana, as a concomitant or cause of mental illness" (p. 797). The importance 
of the readmission question was later endorsed in an official statement by the Society of 
Psychiatrists of South Africa (Ben-Arie & Nash, 1986). 
It is disturbing that in the race of issues such as the lack of recreation areas and poor 
sanitation in many South African psychiatric facilities (highlighted in a survey by Visser, 
Haasbroek and Bodemer, 1989), the mental health effects of poverty and apartheid, the. 
generally appalling conditions in psychiatric institutions for blacks and the extreme racial 
disparities in outpatient facilities (all ofwhich were highlighted in papers by amongst others 
Dommisse, 1987, and Jewkes, 1984), the MRC and the Society ofPsychiatrists should have 
opted for a relatively safe topic such as readmission. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of emulating a certain international research 
tradition, they chose well (as will :Je shown) in fixing on readmission as a priority area, and 
within five years of its founding the Clinical Psychiatry Research Unit was able to report 
(Gillis, Sandler, Jakoet & Dickman, 1985) on what it construed as an alarming rise in 
readmissions to South African psychiatric hospitals, with 45% of 1984 admissions 
nationwide being readmissions. In one study of patients in a mental hospital in Cape Town 
(Gillis, Sandler, Jakoet & Elk, 1986) it was found that 26.5% of white, 41~ :, of coloured and 
42% of black patients were readmitted within a year. 
What causes South African psychiatric patients to be readmitted so frequently? The 
answers thus far suggested by GiJ:is and his colleagues (Gillis eta/., 1985; Gillis eta/., 1986; 
Gillis, 1987, 1988; Sandler & Jakoet, 1985) invoke both general historical factors (which 
account for the overall rise in readmissions) and specific causal variables (which account for 
individual differences in readmission frequency). 
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The historical factors are explained as follows by Gillis (1988): "Major changes in the_ 
pattern of admissions, readmissions and community and outpatient attendances have occurred 
in the last I 0-15 years. Inpatient admissions have decreased to a remarkable extent and 
outpatient and community services have increased about 400%" ( p. 303). The result of this 
shift is that there are now upwards of half a million community and outpatient attendances 
per year as compared to around 30 000 inpatient admissions and, given this change of 
emphasis to community (as opposed to custodial) care, cases of relapse are now less likely to 
occur in the hospital setting and are therefore more likely to require (temporary) 
rehospitalisation. 
The process of deinstitutionalisation has been uneven in South Africa, with many 
facilities (particularly for Black patients) remaining essentially custodial in nature 
(Dommisse, 1987; Freeman, 1991 ). George ( 1988) reports that, despite continued population 
growth, there was a decrease in the number of patients resident in institutions financed by the 
state from 25 881 in 1975 to 19 576 in 1985. In the then exclusively white psychiatric 
hospital where the empirical study reported on in this dissertation was conducted, the number 
of hospital beds were reduced from 200 (Morass, 1969) to around 100 over a 25 year period. 
The Oranje Hospital in Bloemfontein, on the other hand, which caters mainly for Black 
patients, achieved a similar reduction (from 235 tu (00 beds) over a three year period from 
1985 to 1987 (Fourie & Gagiano, 1987t Taken overall, psychiatric inpatient numbers in 
South Africa appear to have start~d declining sharply from the second half of the 1960s. 
Between 1964 and 1976, inpatient admissions declined by 27%, while outpatient visits went 
up by 834%; altogether 8800 psychiatric inpatient beds were done away with between 1961 
1 According to Gagiano (1990) the reduction was from 415 to 100 inpatients between 
1985 and 1989, with a concomitant increase from 20 000 to 50 000 in patients being cared for 
in the community. 
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and I989 (Visser, Haasbroek & Bodemer, 1989). However, by the late 1980s South Africa 
was still lagging in terms of deinstitutionalisation with around one bed in a psychiatric 
institution for every I 000 population, compared to the WHO recommendation for Europe of 
I per 2000 population (Freeman, 1991). 
In terms of specific causal variables, Gillis and his colleagues ( 1986) were able in one 
study to isolate as significant readmission predictors (for white patients): Living alone, mixed 
substance abuse and having no supportive relationship, and (for coloured patients) being 
male and being diagnosed as schizophrenic. The only variable which was predictive across 
racial groups was having more than one previous admission in the past five years. Other 
factors which have been blamed for readmission in local research include job-related 
difficulties', lack of social contact, dependency on others, the effects of stigma, 
non-compliance with medication (Strong, 1987; Gillis, Trollip, Jakoet & Holden, 1987; 
Gillis, Koch & Joyi, 1989), and high levels of'expressed emotion' (Ben-Arie, 1988) or a lack 
ofunderstanding in patients' families (Moross, 1969). 
Although the MRC team suggested various steps which may be taken to limit 
readmission (more careful surveillance of outpatient compliance with medication, bolstering 
social support systems and so on), none of these interventions have been shown to have a 
major impact on readmiss~ •n (Ben-Arie, Koch, Weiman, & Teggjn, 1990). However, as 
Gillis eta/. (1986) are quick to point out, the failure of any intervention to prevent 
readmission should not necessarily be interpreted as an index of the inefficacy of psychiatric 
treatment, but may simply be due to the chronic and recurrent nature of mental illness itself 
The main themes characteristic of South African academic literature on readmission 
outlined above - contextualising the problem within an historical trend towards outpatient 
care for the mentally ill, a (usually unsuccessful) search for specific causal variables and 
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preventative interventions, and an attempt to normalise readmission as an inevitable part of 
mental illness - closely resemble similar trends in the international psychiatric literature, 
which is reviewed below. 
Deinstitutionalisation 
Although the term 'deinstitutionalisation' only came into use in the mid-1970s (Morrisey, 
1982), the ideal of phasing out mental hospitals started in the early 1950s and was already 
well under way during the 1960s. As in South Mrica, the readmission problem is 
internationally ascribed to this process (Dorwart & Hoover, 1994). Lehman, Possidente and 
Hawker (1986) report that "since deinstitutionalization began more than two decades ago, the 
inpatient census of public mental hospitals has been reduced by more than 70 percent." (p. 
901) According to Levine and P~~rkins (1987) there was a drop in the mental hospital 
population in the United States in Ihis period from 600 000 to 200 000, with a concomitant 
growth in cor.ununity mental hea!th centres from nil to around 750. Expressed in terms of 
'market share' (counted as care episodes), state mental hospitals in the United States have 
seen their share drop from nearly 50% in 1955 to only 9% in 1975, with resident patients 
accounting for 75'. ~of episodes in 1955, but only 29% in 1980 (Morrisey, 1982). The 
process of deinstitutionalisation, although a global phenomenon, varied considerably in 
precipitating factors and chronol<;gy. 
Krauss and Slavinsky (19i~2) attribute deinstitutionalisation to the discovery of more 
effective psychiatric medications : !1 the 1950s: "The widespread use of chlorpromazine and 
related neuroleptics was the single greatest contributor to a reduction in the number of 
patients residing in mental hospitals, to the shortened length of stay, and to a shift to 
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community-based care." (p. 74). Chien (1981) also endorses this view, pointing out that by 
the early 1980s more than 10 000 scientific papers had been published on psychotropic 
medication, and that the pharmaceutics industry which had arisen around psychiatry was 
already worth billions of dollars p;)r year. 
Mechanic (1986) disputes this view, arguing that economic, rather than scientific, 
factors were mainly responsible for deinstitutionalisation in the United States: 
Superficial historical overviews link the reduction of public mental health populations 
to the introduction of the phenothiazines in the middle 1950s, but in reality individual 
states varied significantly in the timing and rates of deinstitutionalization. Large scale 
relocation of chronic mental patients began only ten years later with the introduction 
ofMedicaid and improvements in the social welfare system (p. 892). 
Mechanic (1986) argues that expr.;:tations that outpatient care would be either cheaper or a 
less direct tax burden were the main driving force behind deinstitutionalisation, with 
American states shifting costs to federal programs by transferring patients from mental 
hospitals to alternate facilities such as nursing homes. 
A third precipitating factor, and one which is often invoked when discussing the 
undesirable consequences of deinstitutionalisation, is the ideological critique of institutional 
psychiatry developed by the anti-psychiatry movement (reviewed in Dain, 1989). 
Finally, explicit political initiatives, such as John F. Kennedy's 1963 address to 
Congress in which he called for a bold new approach' to mental illness and which resulted in 
the Mental Retardation facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 (Krauss 
& Slavinsky, 1982), also contributed to deinstitutionalisation. In Italy, which had perhaps the 
most radical approach to deinstit~Itionalisation (Basaglia, 1981; Crepet, 1990), Law 180 of 
1978 brought in sweeping changes aimed at the dismantling of mental hospitals, to be 
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replaced by mental wards in general hospitals and community care. According to Law 180 
there were to be no first admissions after May of 1978 and no new admissions after 
December 1981. Surprisingly, this has been largely complied with (although patients have 
sometimes been disguised as 'guests') and the mental hospital census in Italy is still dropping 
(Tansella & Williams, 1987). 
It appears that internationally the readmission crisis, which followed on 
deinstitutionalisation, set in almost immediately. Already in 1968 Crumpton could complain: 
Most admissions to psychiatric hospitals are discharged within six weeks. However, 
our problems now are not so much new admissions, but of readmissions (p. 15). 
In 1964 for every new schizophrenic patient admitted to a British mental hospital, two more 
were readmitted, and by 1968 patients who had been readmitted ten or more times were by no 
means rare (Crumpton, 1968). This state of affairs has been termed the 'revolving door' of 
psychiatric admissions and readmissions. 
Of course not all patients released from mental hospitals become part of the 'revolving 
door' pattern. Lerner, Popper and Zilber (1989) followed a 10% nationwide random sample 
(n=832) of all psychiatric patients hospitalised in Israel in 1980 over a four year period and 
found three main hospitalisation patterns: 50% were admitted for a single, short 
hospitalisation; 22% accumulated a year or more of hospitalisation over several 
rehospitalisations during the period; and 8% were admitted for one long hospitalisation of at 
least a year. The mean number ofhospitalisations during the four and a halfyears of follow-
up was 2.62. Some studies have reported a readmission rate as high as 64% (Schnur, 
Friedman, Dorman, Redford & Kesselman, 1986). 
Psychiatry is not the only branch of medicine to have had to contend with high 
readmission rates. According to Soeken, Prescott, Herron and Creasia (1991), reported one-
12 
year readmission rates range from 3% for surgical patients to 66% for patients with chronic 
congestive heart failure. As in other fields of medicine, however, it appears that there is a 
group of patients who are particularly prone to rehospitalisation, and the challenge becomes 
to empirically identify the distinguishing features of these revolving door patients, also 
known as 'new chronics' (Casper, Romo & Fasnacht, 1991) and heavy or frequent users 
(Casper & Pastva, 1990), in order to predict and possibly prevent future readmission. 
Predicting and preventing readmission 
A typical example of the kind of research conducted with this purpose in mind is a study by 
Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell and Folen (1990). They set out, in a sample of 246 psychiatric 
patients in!!. military psychiatric facility (mainly first admissions and mainly young males), to 
isolate those factors predictive of rehospitalisation within 90 days. Not having any particular 
theoretical perspective, and since a host of factors had been implicated in previous 
readmission research, they used no fewer than twenty independent variables (including age, 
sex, branch of service, rank, marical status, number of children, diagnosis, number of days 
hospitalised, past psychiatric adm:ssions and medication). Of these, four proved to be 
statistically significant in predictiag rehospitalisation; however, togl ~her these variables 
accounted for only about 10% of the variance in readmission outcomes. 
While these sorts of results are disappointing, it is through the accumulation of 
findings from such studies, so it is hoped, that a solid scientific understanding of the causes 
and cures for readmission will ari3e. Empirically-minded researchers will readily 
acknowledge that there may be technical difficulties in rendering findings from different 
studies comparable, for instance due to wide variation in sample composition and the ways in 
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which readmission is measured, b:..1t the specific facts yielded by each study are believed to 
add to the growing body of knowledge on readmission. The facts thus far accumulated are 
surveyed below. 
Demographic factors 
Anecdotally, revolving door patients tend to be young males (Bender, 1986), and 
demographic variables are therefore often seen as potential risk factors for readmission. 
Hughes, Joyce and Staley (1987) compared 110 readmitted psychiatric patients (ofwhom 19 
were multiple readmissions within one year) to 100 non-readmissions and found that there 
were no demographic differences between the two groups. In a much smaller sample (n=38) 
of depressed and non-depressed patients Hirschfeld, Klerman, Andreasen, Clayton and Keller 
(1986) similarly found that none of a range of demographic variables predicted readmission 
over a two-year period. However, in some studies particular demographic variables have 
been found to be statistically sign:ficant in predicting readmission. 
Gender, although not a significant predictor in Zeff, Annstrong, Crandell and Polen's 
(1990) study (which used a largely male sample), may have some predictive value. Both 
Colenda and Hamer (1989) and Zilber, Po.~- ·>er and Lerner (1990) found that male gender was 
predictive of low probability of readmission for first-time patients, although not for non first-
time patients, with first-time nonwhite females being at greatest risk in Colenda and Hamer's 
study. It is not clear how these findings relate to the stereotype of'new chronic' patients as 
consisting mostly of young males. 
There is some evidence tbt age may play a role (e.g., Kastrup, 1987; Hadley, 
McGurrin, Pulice & Holohean, 1990) with patients who over-utilise services tending to be 
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relatively young. However, in other studies (e.g., Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell and Folen, 
1990) age was non-significant. As with gender, age may be differentially related to 
readmission for first-time and non-first-time patients. Zilber, Popper and Lerner (1990) 
found that for patients hospitalised for the first time in their life, age was negatively 
correlated with probability of readmission (but not cumulative hospitalisation), but for 
patients who were not first-timers, age was positively correlated with cumulative length of 
stay. 
Similarly, Zilber, Popper and Lerner ( 1990) found that marital status was 
conditionally related to readmission in that being single was predictive oflong cumulative 
stay for non-first-time patients, b~Jt not for first time patients. Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell and 
Folen (1990) found marital status to be non-significant as a predictor ofrehospitalisation. 
Race may play a role in that Colenda and Hamer (1989) found that for first-time 
patients nonwhite females are at greatest risk. However for non-first-time patients race was 
not significant. Zilber, Popper and Lerner (1990) also found 'ethnic origin' to be unrelated to 
readmission for non first-time patients. 
Number of children has been investigated in a single study (Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell 
and Folen, 1990) and found to be non-significant. 
Diagnosis 
A considerable amount of work has been done relating psychiatric diagnosis to probability of 
readmission and to the related variable oflength of hospital stay (reviewed in Parks and 
Jose( 1997). Several studies have suggested that being diagnosed as suffering from a major 
mental illness (Colenda & Hamer, 1989; Hadley, McGurrin, Pulice & Holohean, 1990; 
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Kastrup, 1987) or the severity of the diagnosis (Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell & Folen, 1990) 
may be predictive of readmission. 
However, some authors h.:.ve found no differences in diagnostic category (e.g., 
Hughes, Joyce & Staley, 1987), while others (e.g., Bender, 1986; Paris, 1988; Zeff, 
Armstrong, Crandell and Folen, 1990) have suggested that a diagnosis of personality disorder 
is most predictive ofreadmission. Somewhat by contrast Zilber, Popper and Lerner (1990) 
found that (for first-time admissions) personality disorder patients have significantly shorter 
hospital stays than schizophrenics. Studies by both Grossman, Harrow and Goldberg (1991) 
and Mojtabai, Nicholson and Nees~ith (1997) found that patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia had much higher relapse rates, particular when compared to patients diagnosed 
with depression. Mojtabai, Nichc,~son and Neesmith (1997) also found differential 
readmission rates for patients diagnosed with personality disorder, with those diagnosed as 
schizoaffective most at risk and those diagnosed as suffering from adjustment disorder least 
at risk. 
A major problem with this research is the notorious variability of psychiatric 
diagnosis. Commenting on their chart review study of 99 readmitted psychiatric patients in 
San Francisco, Surber, Winkler, Monteleone, Havassy, Goldfinger and Hopkin (1987) write: 
"Even though the patients were a~most always diagnosed as having a major mental illness, 40 
percent were difficult to diagnose definitively from the records because they received 
multiple diagnoses or no consistent diagnosis over time" (p. 1113). In Kastrup's (1987) study 
which tracked all Danish psychiatric patients over a period of 10 years, only 43.5% kept their 
original diagnosis. Fennig, Craig and Tanenberg-Karant (1994) have shown that clinical 
diagnoses of psychiatric disorders frequently differ sharply from psychiatric disorders 
diagnosed by means of structured research interviews. 
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Length of hospitalisation 
The major characteristic of psychiatric hospitalisation in the post-deinstitutionalisation era is 
of course that it no longer consists of lengthy and continuous incarceration, but rather of one 
or more much shorter stays. Perhaps, so the argument goes, patients are discharged before 
they are quite ready for life outside the hospital, or before the hospital treatment has had an 
opportunity to exercise its beneficial effect. 
In their review of studies relating readmission to length of hospital stay, Caton and 
Gralnick (1987) differentiate between uncontrolled and controlled studies. Uncontrolled 
studies have mostly found no differences in outcome between long and short stays, except 
that short stays appear to be indicated for nonchronic, nonpsychotic patients. There have 
been six major controlled studies; five found no differences, while one found that short stays 
lead to more re-hospitalisation. 
De Francisco, Anderson, Pantano and Kline (1980), who in their study did find 
shorter stays to be related to more readmissions, explain the effect in terms of greater family 
involvement in the patient's treatment (since there is more time to involve the family), more 
family involvement in discharge p;anning, and better discharge planning generally for longer-
stay patients. Axelrod and Wetzler (1989) explain the possible beneficial effects of longer 
hospital stays as follows: "It appears that as patients remain in the hospital, they become 
better stabilized, develop greater insight into the need for aftercare, and become more willing 
to comply with recommendations for aftercare" (p. 400-401). Appleby, Desai and Luchins 
(1993) and Mojtabai, Nicholson and Neesmith (1997) suggest similar reasons for their 
findings that shorter stays are reLted to increased risk of readmission. 
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Taken to its extreme, the contention that longer hospital stays lead to fewer 
readmissions can of course not be other than true, in that those who are permanently 
incarcerated are at zero risk of readmission. 
Quality of aftercare 
As early as 1968 Crumpton blamed the high readmission rate on uncoordinated aftercare, and 
this continues to be a prominent theme in the literature on readmission. Mechanic (I 986) 
argues that greater co-operation between various agencies and better case management would 
help substantially in reducing the ·:eadmission rate. Empirically, almost any kind of aftercare 
seems to be effective in reducing relapse (Axelrod & Wetzler, 1989). In one study Bond, 
Witheridge, Wasner, Dincin, McRae, Mayes and Ward (1989) found that although there were 
no dramatic differences in the effectiveness of different forms of aftercare, hospitalisation 
could be 'deflected' in 68% of cases. It is now generally accepted that at least some of the 
blame for the rise in readmission rates can be attributed to inadequate aftercare (Hadley, 
Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997). This situation is similar to that obtaining for criminal 
recidivism where interventions aimed at altering prisoners' life circumstances outside the 
prison have met with some succe~,s (Bedell, Challis, Cilliers, Cole, C rry, Nieuwoudt, 
Phayane & Zachariades, 1998). 
As with length of stay, there is an inherent contradiction in using quality of aftercare 
as predictor of readmission. The nursing care residences into which many 
'deinstitutionalised' patients were 'transinstitutionalised' (Morrisey, 1982) in the 1960s and 
1970s, were no doubt very effective in preventing readmission, but were as confining and 
dehumanising as the mental hospit::>Js from which they were supposed to protect patients. 
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This point is further elaborated ir. Chapter 3. 
Medication 
Although patients in mental hospitals are notoriously unreliable at taking the medication 
prescribed for them (as many as 20% of inpatient schizophrenics avoid taking their 
medication), outpatients are even more unreliable, with up to 45% defaulting (Crumpton, 
1968). Axelrod and Wetzler (1989) found that greater compliance was related to continuity 
of treatment (particularly having the first outpatient appointment soon after discharge), more 
incidents of hospitalisation, longer hospital stays, less denial of the need for treatment, and 
greater perceived need for medication. 
Unfortunately, findings on the relapse-preventing properties of psychotropic 
medication are equivocal. With regard to antidepressant medication, Baldessarini (1989) 
contends that: 
Evidence for true prophylaxis against subsequent recurrences of major depression is 
still meagre. Although a few controlled, prospective follow-up studies of 1 to 3 years' 
duration indicate the TCAs and perhaps lithium may have a moderate preventive (or 
recurrence-aborting) effect in the trt. tment of recurrent depression, little is known 
about the optimal choice of drug or of dose or about safety or efficacy after several 
years of such treatment. Moreover, the average degree of benefit ofTCA and lithium 
treatment over a placebo is not impressive after the first 6 to 12 months (p. 124). 
Neuroleptic medication is not entirely unproblematic as a form of rehospitalisation 
prevention either. Commenting on the results of a study in which a group of schizophrenic 
patients had their dosage cut by half, Faraone, Cirelli, Curran and Brown (1988) write: 
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It is striking that 45% of our original 29 patients remained stable for three years on 50 
percent of their previous r_euroleptic dose considering that they had been treated for a 
mean of 23 years, that none were being treated with megadoses before the dose 
reduction, and that their current doses are in most instances below the usual 
therapeutic range. Clearly, a substantial subgroup of schizophrenic patients can be 
maintained on neuroleptic doses far below the current standard (p. 1208). 
Previous admissions 
In a much-cited paper, Rosenblatt and Mayer (1974) concluded that the number of previous 
admissions was the only variable '.;onsistently predictive of rehospitalisation in the studies 
they reviewed, and this appears still to be the case for more recent studies (e.g., Bond, 
Witheridge, Wasner, Dincin, McRae, Mayes & Ward, 1989; Buel & Anthony, 1973; Casper, 
Romo & Fasnacht, 1991; Casper & Pastva, 1990; Colenda & Hamer, 1989; Hughes, Joyce & 
Staley, 1987; and Zilber, Popper & Lerner, 1990). 
However, a single study (Zeff, Armstrong, Crandell & Folen, 1990) found number of 
previous admissions to be statistically unrelated to readmission frequency. 
The Family 
A patient's family inevitably plays a large role in the course of her illness, and is often the 
base to which she returns after hospitalisation. Even where a patient lives away from family, 
they may continue to exert a strong influence. In a study of 73 chronic patients living away 
from home, Wilk (1988) found that only 26% had not seen their families in the past two 
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weeks. 
Writing relatively soon after the initial wave of deinstitutionalisation, and at a time 
when antipsychiatric ideas still held some sway, Simmons and Freeman (1967) claimed that 
the clearest indicator of a return to hospital is a lack of family tolerance for deviance. More 
recently the literature has tended to emphasise not so much family members' acceptance of 
the patient's 'eccentric' behaviour, but rather their understanding of and cooperation with the 
official psychiatric constructions and management of the problem. 
Grunebaum and Friedman (1988) identifY four key areas for mental health 
professionals wishing to build 'col:aborative relationships' with families of the mentally ill: 
1. Give the family a chance to be heard. 
2. Impart information on the rules and structures ofthe mental hospital and the 
nature of the patient's illness (e.g., its prognosis and treatment). 
3. Help families deal with feelings arising from hospitalisation (e.g., guilt, fear, 
anger, and depres:;ion). 
4 IdentifY the family's coping pattern (e.g., denial, hypercontrol/intrusiveness, 
lack of distance/s(:parateness). 
5. Assist with the ethical dilemma of the family's versus the patient's needs. 
In a similar vein Jacob, Frank, Kupfer, Comes and Carpenter (1987) describe a day-long 
workshop for unipolar depressed patients and their families, the objectives of which were, 
inter alia, "to validate unequivoc<dly that major depression is a legitimate medical illness over 
which the patient cannot exercise voluntary control" (p. 969) and to inform patients and 
family "ofthe high likelihood (50 percent) of having a recurrence of depression within one's 
lifetime and of the exceptionally high recurrence rates (up to 80 percent) among patients who 
already had three episodes" (p. 970). 
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There is some empirical e' ·idence that such efforts to recruit families into psychiatric 
ideologies and treatment plans help to reduce the probability of rehospitalisation (Hughes, 
Joyce & Staley, 1987; De Francisco, Anderson, Pantano, & Kline, 1980). 
Expressed emotion 
Antipsychiatrists such as Laing and Cooper have long maintained that madness - when it is 
not "some sort oflost truth" (Cooper, 1967, p. viii)- must be the result ofthe duplicitous and 
disempowering ways in which society and the family communicate with those who become 
mad. This idea survives, in a reified and insipid form, in research on Expressed Emotion 
(EE) in families. Invented in the early 1970s by the group ofBritish psychiatrists around 
Vaughn and Leff(1976a, b), the degree ofExpressed Emotion in families, and in particular 
the number of critical comments aimed at the schizophrenic family member, has repeatedly 
been found to be predictive of relapse and readmission (reviewed in Leff, Berkowitz, Shavit, 
Strachan, Glass & Vaughn, 1989). What makes the EE concept particularly attractive for 
mainstream psychiatrists is that it may be useful in identifying that group of patients who are 
readmitted despite adequate medkation and compliance (Herz, 1984; Miklowitz, Goldstein & 
Nuechterlein, 1988; Schnur, Friedman, Dorman, Redford & Kesselman, 1986). 
However, the EE literature has also been strongly criticised. In their review Kanter, 
Lamb and Loeper (1987) point out that EE is only related to florid positive symptoms in 
schizophrenics (i.e., the kinds of symptoms which are likely to lead to rehospitalisation), not 
the more lasting negative symptoms such apathy, passivity, and withdrawal. The direction of 
causality in EE is also unclear - is it patients' impossible behaviour which causes families to 
become hyper-critical or are patit.·nts driven mad by hyper-critical families? Finally, EE may 
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actually be harmful because it ten, is to place the blame on families who may be innocent. 
EE has also been criticised for the unnecessary complexity of the construct and of the 
instrument (the Camberwell Family Interview) used to measure it. Hooley and Teasdale 
(1989) found that the single best predictor of relapse was not Camberwell Family Interview 
scores, but a patient's response to the simple question "How critical is your spouse of you?" 
Integrating empirical findings 
There are at least two mainstream psychiatric responses to the kinds of piecemeal findings 
relating to gender, age, marital status, race, number of children, diagnosis, length of hospital 
stay, medication, previous admissions, quality of aftercare, family involvement and expressed 
emotion presented above. 
The first is to pretend that, although as yet inconclusive, the findings will eventually -
and probably sooner rather than later- add up to something more substantial and coherent. 
Thus despite the rather dismal results of their review of studies relating to length of hospital 
stay and readmission (discussed above), Caton and Gralnick (1987) remained confident that 
"an empirically based policy on length of stay is within reach" (p. 862). Similarly, when all 
the variables (age, marital status, diagnosis, previous hospitalisations, ..;tcetera) in Zilber, 
Popper and Lerner's (1990) study accounted for only 14.7% ofthe variance in the mean 
duration of hospitalisation (in non-first-time patients) they did not conclude that the 
enterprise is hopeless, but suggested that "adding variables related to personality 
characteristics and availability of services would probably explain part of the residual 
variance" (p. 148). Such visions of an imminent (but somehow always deferred) resolution to 
empirical problems is typical of p3ychiatric research (and most probably of positivist research 
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generally) and is reviewed at grea.er length in Chapter 4. 
Steps may even be taken to hasten the hoped-for breakthrough, for instance by 
advocating the use oflarger sample sizes (Mojtabia, Nicholson & Neesmith, 1997) or 
quantitative meta-analyses ofprevious research. However, Kastrup's (1987) work with a very 
large sample (the entire population of Danish psychiatric patients) suggests that increasing 
the sample size is in itself not likdy to be a solution. Due to the large sample size virtually 
all variables (diagnosis, sex, age group, proximity to hospital, size of municipality, referring 
agency, discharge destination, marital status) were statistically significantly related to 
readmission. However, the amount ofvariance accounted for remained negligible. 
Although no quantitative meta-analyses of the psychiatric readmission literature 
appear to have been done, Soeken, Prescott, Herron and Creasia's (1991) meta-analysis of 44 
non-psychiatric readmission studies is suggestive of what sorts of results may be expected. 
They found that (among a host of other potential variables) medical readmissions were 
statistically significantly related only to diagnosis, age, length of initial hospital stay, and 
prior admissions. All relations were trivial in absolute terms. A meta-analysis of twelve 
intervention studies showed a non-significant overall treatment effect. Once again, despite 
these discouraging results, Soeken eta/. (1991) are upbeat in their conclusions: "If risk 
factors for readmission can be identified, thetJ 1roviders can focus on developing 
interventions aimed at reducing unnecessary and preventable readmissions" (p. 264). 
From readmission to chronicity 
A less charitable view would be that as findings accumulate, readmission research will 
become ever more fragmented (readmission is statistically related to factor x, but only for 
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young black male first-time patients diagnosed as schizophrenic) and ever more prone to 
circular restatements of the problC.!m: The longer patients stay in hospital, the smaller the 
probability that they will be readmitted; the more a patient has been readmitted, the more 
likely she is to be readmitted; the more community care comes to resemble hospital care, the 
more effective it will be in deflecting readmission. 
Although piecemeal empi1ical readmission research as such is not usually criticised in 
this fashion, there is an admission among psychiatric researchers that the problem itself needs 
to be retheorised. Not only is a theoretical model necessary if readmission research is to get 
anywhere (Hughes, Joyce & Staley, 1987), but it is argued that readmission should be 
accepted as an inevitable consequence of the nature of mental illness. Where readmission has 
in the past often been taken as sig:1. of failure and used to compare different institutions 
(Kastrup, 1987; Chambers & Clarke, 1990), it should now be realised that chronicity is part 
and parcel of mental illness (Mechanic, 1986). Mental health professionals should not blame 
themselves for failing to prevent readmission, but rather ask if deinstitutionalisation was a 
good idea in the first place (Gralnick, 1985). 
This movement, from considering readmission as an unfortunate and essentially 
preventable side-effect of deinstitutionalisation to being an indicator of an inherent 
psychiatric chronicity, nd thus of the need for large scale reinstitutionalisation, is described 
in greater detail in the next two chapters and contextualised within longer-term historical 
oscillations in psychiatric orthodoxy. 
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Chapter 2 
An archaeology of psychiatric readmission 1: 
The 18th and 19th centuries 
"I am not a professional historian; nobody is perfect." - Michel Foucault (Cited in 
Gutting, 1994) 
An article in the Johannesburg Stt1r, by health writer David Robbins (1994) features the work 
of South African psychiatric reformer Carlo Gagiano1. Gagiano has been credited with 
reducing the inpatient census at the Oranje Hospital in Bloemfontein by more than a thousand 
percent in ten years- from 1250 in 1984 to 108 in 1994. When Gagiano first arrived at the 
hospital as chief of psychiatry, he found patients crowding at the bars, pleading to be 
released; his response was to order the bars cut away. This is how Robbins (1994) has him 
describe what happened: 
As the hacksaws were busy at the main entrance to one of the wards the patients 
began to scream and rave inside. I told the warden to unlock the outer door. He 
demurred. I told him that I would take the consequer.ces. When the door was flung 
open, most patients in the ward surged out and disappeared. The staff wanted to give 
chase. I said let them go. 
"Amazingly," Robbins (1994) continues the story, "Gagiano's gamble paid off. Within 30 
Another version of these t.vents, as presented for scientific consumption, can be found 
in Fourie and Gagiano (1987). 
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minutes all the patients had returned" (p. 11 ). 
Without detracting from the authenticity of this account it is easy to recognise in it a 
reenactment of countless similar dramas performed over the past 300 years, in which the mad 
are set free so that they may present themselves voluntarily for readmission. In this and the 
following chapter I review such tales of madness rendered tractable through the paradox of 
liberation, and attempt to place these endlessly repeated readmission rituals in their historical 
context. 
In claiming to detect broad patterns from a jumble of chronological facts this kind of 
re-telling of psychiatric history inevitably classes itself with the numerous arbitrary forms of 
periodisation imposed on the development of the profession by psychiatric historians 2. What 
distinguishes the present account from such psychiatric histories is, firstly, its more modest 
scope. Relying in the main on secondary sources, I set out to tell not the story of madness or 
mad-doctoring, but one aspect of that story - the evolution of the discourse and practice of 
readmission. Secondly, unlike traditional psychiatric histories, which almost uniformly 
assume that psychiatry has benefitted from scientific progress, my account is inspired by the 
critique of scientific and human progress in medicine and psychiatry set out by Foucault 
(19673, 1973), and elaborated by the new generation of critical historians of psychiatry. 
Foucault divides the story of madness into three parts - the middle ages and early 
Renaissance when lunatics wandered freely from town to town (or later were set adrift on 
2 For example Howells' (1975a) assertion that "viewing the development of world 
psychiatry, it is possible to discern a series of eras, each dominated by a theme. There is a 
world wide movement through the eras in a predictable direction" (p. ix). Howells divides 
psychiatric history into six periods: Primitive, rational, religious, somatic, and holistic. In the 
next chapter other, equally self-serving, forms of periodization are reviewed. 
3 I consulted the English translation by Richard Howard, which is of a greatly abridged 
French edition of Histoire de /a folie a /'age classique. An English translation ofthe full text 
is said to be imminent (Gutting, 1994). 
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'ships of fools'), the Great Confinement of the 17th century, and thirdly the Moral 
Confinement of the 19th. Foucault's system represents a thorough-going reversal of the 
standard medico-psychiatric idea of a progression from cruelty to humanity and from 
incarceration to liberation, and it is at this level - as a manoeuvre in the battle for the status of 
the present - that his work should be understood, rather than as a dispassionate historical 
exposition4• The essence of Foucault's strategy consists of showing how the ostensible 
liberation of the insane has resulted in ever more aggressive forms of incarceration, or, put 
differently, to show how discharge has invariably been followed by readmission. 
In what follows I draw on Foucault's ideas to describe how physical release has 
resulted in a form of moral readmission (e.g., submission to the authority of reason, self-
normalisation, the silencing of madness), but also by actual readmission (either openly or 
covertly in the form of revolving door admissions and through transcarceration from one 
institution to another) and how this has been justified, either as a form of cure or as the 
inevitable consequence of chronic illness. My account is roughly chronological, trying to 
describe in sequence the journey of the mad as they were in tum admitted to and expelled 
from a variety of physical and mental structures. 
4 A useful distinction here is between 'histories of the past' which in medicine almost 
invariably speak of continuity and progress versus 'histories of the present' which do not treat 
their subject as a given (Butchart, 1998). In the case of psychiatry, histories of the past 
typically show how increased scientific understanding and humane management of mental 
illness lead up to the present, while histories of the present would show how mental illness is 
inconsistently and differently fabticated at different historical moments. 
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Free at first: Madness before the Enlightenment 
Foucault's ideas about the care-free and nomadic existence the insane enjoyed until the 
middle ofthe 17th century are often quoted as historical fact (e.g., Harland, 1987), and it may 
well be so. That the first Bridewell or house of correction (in which the insane were kept 
together with the indigent and criminal) was built in London long before the Enlightenment, 
as early as 1555, followed by numerous similar institutions throughout Europe during the 
next century (Scull, 1984), does not necessarily disprove Foucault's chronology and may be 
seen as a gradual erosion of freedom which culminated in the Great Confinement. Porter 
(1987b), while critical of the overly-romanticised presentation of the insane during the 
middle ages, concedes that during the 17th century their existence did become less free: 
We need not go all the way with [Foucault's] ... romantic primitivism. But we can 
accept his further contention that from the seventeenth century onwards movements 
were activated which led for the next three centuries to mad people increasingly being 
segregated from sane society, both categorically and physically. In particular, the 
institutionalization ofthe insane inexorably gathered momentum (p. 14). 
Foucault (1967) himself does not present the change from freedom to incarceration as being 
sudden, but rather as proceeding in a series of st ,ps from the image of the ship of fools, to the 
image of the madhouse, to the rea!ity of the Hospitaux Generaux in Paris, 1656. Once again, 
however, the historical detail is perhaps less important than the rhetorical intent of Foucault's 
argument. Traditional psychiatric histories paint the middle ages as a period of superstition 
and cruelty to the insane, against which is offset the various acts of psychiatric liberation: 
Johann Weyer's publication in 1563 of The Deception of Demons, with which he supposedly 
rescued witches from their non-scientific tormentors (e.g., Colp, 1989); Tuke and Pinel's 
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dramatic gestures (which are discussed in greater detail below); and the various more humble 
attempts since at emulating these examples. Contrary to this, Foucault draws the middle ages 
as a time of relative tranquillity for the mad from which they had no need to be liberated. 
Irrespective of whether Foucault's idyllic picture corresponds to any kind of objective 
fact, the concept of readmission (which, as will be shown, is central to both critical and 
mainstream constructions of psychiatry) clearly requires a primeval state of freedom which 
each readmission prevents the mad from returning to, and which has to be ruptured by some 
original act of incarceration. 
The Great Confinement 
Madness and civilization, in which Foucault (1967) sets out his contrasting scheme for a.'! 
early history of psychiatry, is in the English translation subtitled A history of insanity in the 
age of reason. It is in this period of Enlightenment thought and scientific discoverf (from 
about 1600 to 1815) that conventional histories of psychiatry also typically place the origin 
ofthe discipline. However, the difficulty for such histories is, as Porter (1987b) puts it: 
There was no Newton of insanity, no Copernican revolution in psychiatry discovering 
the secrets withirt i:he skull. The real watershed in attitudes towards, and the 
treatment of, the mad came rather from a long-term shift in policy towards those 
displaying delinquent and dangerous traits: the rise of exclusion (p. 13). 
s To give some idea ofthe intellectual and scientific flavour of the time: Plater's 
Practice of Medicine, Observations of Diseases Injurious to Body and Mind (the first natural 
science-style medical text) appeared in 1602, Harvey's Motion of the Heart (describing the 
circulatory system) in 1628, Descartes' Discourse on method in 1637, Newton's 
Mathematical principles of natural philosophy in 1687, and Locke's Treatise on Civil 
Government in 1690. 
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This is what Foucault (1967) calls the Great Confinement, when all over Europe the poor, 
mad and criminal - all those who were perceived as a menace to the new age of reason - were 
cast into prisons, hospitals, converted leper colonies, madhouses, houses of correction, poor 
houses, workhouses and houses of industry. At the height of the Great Confinement, 
according to Foucault, 1 in 100 inhabitants of Paris were confined. Thus what Foucault 
shows is that it was not prejudice and superstition which imprisoned the insane in the Dark 
Ages, but science and rationality in the Age of Reason. 
In England the Poor Law Act was passed in 1601 compelling parishes to act against 
vagrancy and begging, and to put the poor (including lunatics) to work (Allderidge, 1990). 
The same Act enabled parishes to levy special taxes to pay for the inevitable cost of such an 
enterprise (Scull, 1984). The Act was followed in 1691 by the Bristol Poor Act, which 
allowed for the joining together (as the Corporation of the Poor) of several parishes, an 
example which was followed elsewhere in England, and which led to the creation of 
numerous workhouses so that by the 1760s few of the larger British towns were without their 
own workhouse. For the next 100 years, "wherever workhouses, poor-houses, or houses of 
industry were set up, these were the most usual places to be used for the accommodation of 
pauper lunatics" (Allderidge, 1990, p. 38). Despite these developments, however, there is 
. '~ttle evidence from this period for anything like a Great Confinement in England comparable 
in scale to what Foucault describes for France (Porter, 1987a). For England, at least, 
Foucault's chronology appears to be out by between one and two hundred years, and the 
Great Confinement did not get fully underway until the 19th century. 
Nevertheless, the period from 1650 to 1800 clearly did see some significant 
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expansion in the technology6 and bureaucracy of physical incarceration in England and its 
colonies: Numerous new prisons were built- 27 public and 125 private prisons in London 
(Scull, 1984) in the early 1700s - and workhouses and almshouses spread rapidly (Scull, 
1984), with the first lunatic admitted to the original Bristol workhouse in 1707 (Allderidge, 
1990). A rash of American almshouses were constructed (Scull, 1984)- in Boston, 
Philadelphia (1731), New Orleans (1734) and New York (1736). Although large-scale 
centralised incarceration of the insane did not occur in Great Britain and its colonies, as 
Foucault describes it in France, many insane were accommodated in these decentralised and 
often privately run institutions, a situation allowed for in common law for several centuries 
before being taken up in a 1714 Act (Porter, 1987a). 
Some provision was also being made specifically for t':le mad, such as the hospital for 
the insane built at Norwich in 1713, the oldest outside London (Allderidge, 1990), and the 
special ward for Lunatics established at Guy's hospital in 1728. There was a multiplication of 
private madhouses- 15 in London alone (Howells & Osborn, 1975)- and such local 
enterprise has been described as "the hallmark of hospital development in the 18th century" 
(Allderidge, 1990). In South Africa (then still a Dutch colony) a separate apartment was built 
for lunatics at the Cape Hospital in 1711 (Kruger, 1980; Moyle, 1987; Vitus, 1987) and the 
first lunatic was confined to Robben Island as far back as 1718 (Kruger, 1980). 
The picture that emerges for the English speaking world is therefore not of a totalising 
Great Confinement, but perhaps rather of a heterogenous 'little confinement'. As Porter 
(1987a) describes it: 
Many possibilities were tried including domiciliary care, boarding out in the 
6 It is also perhaps worth noting that the straight-waistcoat was introduced, as a more 
humane alternative to chains, in the early 1700s (Ingram, 1991 ). 
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community, sending the insane to stay with a clergyman or physician, placing them in 
private asylums, applying to Bethlem7, or, particularly if violent, securing them in 
houses of correction. Better-off patients often lived with their own personal attendant 
(p. 278). 
Although it would probably be incorrect to assume that the mad were permanently and 
continuously incarcerated in these various general and specialised structures, the question of 
cure and readmission, as it exists today, apparently did not at first arise. 
Curing the insane 1: The eighteenth century 
However, according to Porter (1987b), "increasingly, from perhaps the mid-eighteenth 
century, the case for segregating the insane was reinforced by a new faith in therapy and the 
dream of curing" (p. 17). This change is well illustrated in the difference between the 1714 
Act for the More Effectual Punishing such Rogues, Vagabonds, Sturdy Beggars, and 
Vagrants, and Sending them Whither They Ought to be Sent, among whom were included the 
'furiously mad or dangerous', (Porter, 1987a) and the 1774 Act for Regulating Private 
Madhouses, "which stressed that inmates of asylums were to be 'cured'; they were no longer 
regarded as hopeless incurables t0 be incarcerated for the protection of s'- .:iety" (Howells & 
Osborn, 1975, p. 192). Although it could be argued that i) this latter act licensed abuses, 
rather than prevented them (Porter, 1987a); ii) it applied only to madhouses within a seven-
mile radius ofLondon (Ingram, 1991); and iii) it excluded pauper lunatics sent to madhouses 
by their parishes (Allderidge, 1990), it clearly signalled a change in the management of the 
7 The small but notorious public madhouse in London that had been in operation since 
the middle ages. 
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insane- in Foucaultian terms a m';ve from sovereign power (which operates through 
punishment and exclusion) to disciplinary power (which operates through knowledge 
dissemination). 
The Act came in the wake of a long period of increased public concern about the 
conditions in which the insane were kept, and about callous assumptions regarding their 
incurability. In 1763, under public pressure, a parliamentary Select Committee was 
appointed to investigate the affairs of public asylums (Howells & Osborn, 1975) and it is 
from the deliberations of this committee that the 1774 act followed. Accordingly, in the face 
of public suspicion and exposure of cases of illegal confinement in the 1760s (Porter, 1987a), 
the more astute madhouse keepers took pains to present an image of humane treatment and 
efficacy in bringing about cures. The following pamphlet, published in 1779 (quoted in 
Porter, 1987a, p. 143), is a case in point: 
Cure LUNATICS 
WILLIAM FINCH of MILFORD, near Salisbury, [has] for many years had great 
success in curing people disordered in their senses ... the many cures he has 
performed on Lunatics ... can be attesteC: iy the greatest satisfaction he can say, that 
every person he has had charge of, has, with the blessing of God, been cured and 
discharged from his house perfectly well. The friends of such unfortunate persons 
who are committed to his care, may depend on their being treated with the greatest 
tenderness and humanity, by their faithful humble servant, 
WILLIAM FINCH, Milford 
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Nor was the enthusiasm for cure limited to small private asylums. Already in 1851 William 
Battie had founded St Luke's Hospital for Lunaticks in reaction to what had come to be seen 
as the scandalous treatment meted out to the mad at Bethlem (Allderidge, 1990~ Crammer, 
1994; Howells & Osborn, 1975). Unlike Bethlem, where it was more or less assumed that 
nothing could be done about madness, St Luke's claimed two cures in three (Porter, 1987a). 
Similar results were achieved at other hospitals modelled after St Luke's, such as the 
Manchester Lunatic Hospital, opened in 1766, and the York Asylum opened in 1777 (Porter, 
1987a). Meanwhile madness was touted as a curable condition in Battie's Treatise on 
Madness of 1758, Bejamin Faulkner's Observations on the General and Improper Treatment 
of Insanity of 1785 and (in France) Joseph Daquin's Treatise (Warner, 1994). 
Although Monro, superintendent at Beth! em, tried in his Remarks on Dr Battie's 
Treatise on Madness (1758), to justify his harsher treatment of the insane and more 
pessimistic view of their prognosis (Ingram, 1991 ), public viewing at Bethlem was stopped in 
1770 (Porter, 1987b ); in 1815 th·~re was a Commons enquiry into the institution (revealing 
amongst other atrocities the case of one James Norris, "confined for eighteen years in a 
grotesque custom-built harness made of chains and rods, preventing virtually all movement"; 
Porter, 1987a, p. 124); and in the same year it was closed down and moved to a new location. 
Elsewhere in Europe, cu~. )dial ism was also being replaced by reform and a belief in the 
curability ofinsanity, some examples being the reforms instituted in 1787 by Joseph Daquin 
at the Chambery Hospital in Italy (Mora, 197 5) and at the Bonifazio hospital in 1789 by 
Vincenzo Chiarugi8 (Mora, 1975; Warner, 1994). 
What were the reasons fer this newfound enthusiasm for curing the insane, this 'little 
liberation' after the 'little confinement'? Warner (1994), who interprets the various 
8 Vincente Chiarugi according to Fleck ( 1990) 
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oscillations between incarceration and decarceration in the care of the insane in economic 
terms, ascribes it to the increased need for labour sparked by the American Revolution of 
1776 to 1783 and the British Industrial Revolution of the 1780s. Foucault (1980) would 
ascribe it to the rise of disciplinary power. 
Whatever the reasons, the events of the second half of the 18th century in many ways 
prefigured the larger scale movements of the insane which were to follow in the 19th and 
20th. One similarity is that some of the cures turned out to be temporary, and as a 
consequence periodic readmission was common (Allderidge, 1990). Another pattern 
established as early as the 1750s was that readmission (with its implication of failed cure) 
was disguised by means of transcarceration. In particular, dischargees from St Luke's 
(Battie's show-piece public asylum) often landed up in his private asylum, "the public asylum 
providing a 'feeder' to the private" (Porter, 1987a, p. 131). 
Turning the subject: George III and the mad-doctors 
In November of 1788, only months before the start of the French revolution, George III of 
England lost his senses. As Ingram (1991) describes it: 
In the early hours of the morning of Friday, 7 November 1788, after two days of 
delirium, George III aros~ from his bed and walked into the next room to find a 
conference ofhis sons, his physicians, his equerries and his pages. He expressed 
amazement and constern<ttion. He demanded to know the meaning ofthe gathering. 
He grew angry, and publicly berated his personal physician, Sir George Baker, 
penning him into a corner and calling him an old woman whose advice he never 
should have followed. No one had the temerity to intervene until at last one of those 
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present, a Mr Fairly, took him by the arm and got him back to bed (p. 1 ). 
Despite the king's protestations of sanity ("I am not ill, but I am nervous: if you would know 
what is the matter with me, I am nervous"; Ingram, 1991, p. 3), it soon became evident that 
his delirium was ongoing and beyond the control of the royal doctors. In desperation Francis 
Willis, a flamboyant mad-doctor who, bettering Battie's two in three recovery rate, claimed 
nine in ten (Porter, 1987a), was sammonsed. Unlike the king's own doctors, Willis had no 
hesitation in applying the strait-waistcoat and other harsh measures to establish his dominion 
over the king, while at the same time making it quite plain that these were contingent on the 
king's behaviour, so that "when George rattled on, Willis would warn the obstreperous King 
that he was talking himself into restraint"9 (Porter, 1987b, p. 48). When the king behaved in 
an acceptable manner, however, Willis "equally boldly- most thought rashly - allowed the 
King a razor to shave himself, as a way of demonstrating confidence in his royal charge" 
(Porter, 1987a, p. 209). Whether the king was cured is equivocal (he had relapses in 1801, 
1804 and 1810, from which last rout he never recovered10), but he was back to normal by 
1789, in time to learn of the revolution in France and to forestall the Regency Bill in England 
(Porter, 1987b ). 
George's case neatly illustrates the moral subjugation of the mad, set free to negotiate 
an implacably reasonable (but not to be reasoned about) system of rewards and punishments. 
When Willis spoke to the king it was to lecture, and when he tri.ed to speak back he was 
gagged, so that "mad language, if it has any sense, goes into retreat in the face of sane 
9 As a consequence, when t!1e doctor was out of the room George "rambled wildly on 
various subjects, but when the doctor returned he turned the subject, played his cards better 
and talked more cautiously" (Greville, quoted in Porter, 1987b ). 
10 It has been suggested that the cause of George's erratic behaviour was actually 
porphyria. 
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treatment" (Ingram, 1991, p. 43). Willis's speciality was "fixing patients with the eye" 
(Porter, 1987a, p. 209; Ingram, 1991 ), and there are countless descriptions of raving lunatics 
rendered manageable by this method. Dr William Pargeter, a close associate of Willis', 
describes one incident where he used the technique (quoted in Porter, 1987a, p. 210): 
When I was a pupil at St Bartholomew's Hospital employed on the subject oflnsanity, 
I was requested ... to visit a poor man ... disordered in his mind ... The maniac was 
locked in a room, raving and exceedingly turbulent. I took two men with me, and 
learning that he had no offensive weapons, I planted them at the door, with directions 
to be silent, and to keep out of sight, unless I should want their assistance. I then 
suddenly unlocked the door - rushed into the room and caught his eye in an instant. 
The business was then done - he became peaceable in a moment - trembled with fear, 
and was as governable as it was possible for a furious madman to be. 
It was in 1791, three years after George III's first brush with insanity, that Jeremy Bentham 
published his Panopticon; or, the Inspection-House: Containing the Idea of a New Principle 
of Construction Applicable to Any Sort of Establishment, in which Persons of Any 
Description Are To Be Kept under Inspection, a device used by Foucault (1980) to symbolise 
the transition from sovereign to disciplinary power; from power as the exercise of the will of 
the powerful over the powerless, to power as "the invitation that modern :·iscourse makes to 
us to assume full responsibility for our acts and intentions" (Parker, 1989a, p. 62). By 
subjecting the king to the kind of surveillance needed for this form of power to work, by 
fixing him with the eye, Willis was able to remove him from the straight-waistcoat, even 
allow him a razor, confident that he would exercise his sovereignty in a reasonable manner. 
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Breaking their will: Pinel ~wd the liberation of the insane 
On 21 February 1793 Philippe Pinel11, as a member ofthe National Guard, witnessed the 
execution of another king (Birley, 1990). In the same year he was appointed as physician at 
the Bicetre, the men's hospice near Paris, and struck the chains from the madmen kept there 
(Moyle, 1987; Pelicier, 1975); in 1795 he was put in charge of the Salpetriere (Allen & 
Postel, 1992), the women's prison, "and here too he adopted the same generous attitude" 
(Pelicier, 1975, p. 125). Or at least so the official version goes. 
If not 'wholly fictitious' (Scull, 1991 a), these events are no longer believed to have 
occurred in quite such a straight-forward manner. Although Pinel was appointed to the 
Bicetre in 1793, and took a special interest in the several hundred madmen in Ward 7, he 
'kept a low profile' (Allen & Postel, 1992) during the 19 months he stayed there, busying 
himselfwith work on the classification of mania (Weiner, 1992). Amongst other similar 
cases, in Ward 7 were three patients shackled for 15, 25 and 45 years respectively. Pinel 
made no attempt to remove the shackles or even to replace them with strait-waistcoats. It 
was in fact the non-medical director ofthe Bicetre, Pussin, who initiated such reforms in 
1797, followed three years later, in 1800, by Pinel at the Salpetriere (Weiner, 1992). 
Despite the inaccuracies in the account of ~'inel's actions at the Bicetre, he served as a 
prototype for numerous strong, male, medically-qualified reformers during the succeeding 
two centuries, who are ritualistically described as being outraged at the condition of the 
insane at some institution to which they had been newly appointed, and as instituting far-
reaching reforms almost immediately. I have already mentioned the case ofGagiano in 1984. 
Other examples are Langermann, who is said to have freed the insane in Germany shortly 
11 Emile Pinel according to Fleck ( 1990) 
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after Pinel (Fischer-Homberger, 1975); Baron Pisani who took charge ofthe Real Casa de 
Matti in Palermo in 1824 and "in less than three years ... abolished the systems of restraint 
then in use" (Mora, 1975, p. 66); Dr James Barry12 who exposed the filthy conditions in 
which lunatics were kept in the Old Somerset Hospital at the Cape (Hurst & Lucas, 1975; 
Moyle, 1987); the Belgian psychiatrist Guislain who in 1826 "denounced the abuses 
perpetrated in psychiatric institutions'' (Pierloot, 1975, p. 144); Dr Sabler who in 1828 in the 
Moscow hospital saw to it that "chains were abolished, occupational and recreational activity 
introduced, case histories utilized. and annual reports published" (Howells, 1975b); Mihaly 
Viszil.nik, the Hungarian-born chief physician of the Narrenturm ('Tower of the insane') in 
Vienna who "had to remove a considerable number of chains still binding the patients there 
as late as 1839" (Honinszky, 1975); John Conolly, who became resident physician at Hanwell 
Asylum in the same year and promptly set about instituting a system of non-restraint13 (Colp, 
1989; Crammer, 1994; Howells & Osborn, 1975); and H Campbell Hyed who exposed 
conditions at the Pak Klong Sam mental hospital in Thailand where as late as 1910 patients 
were "chained to the floor like fierce animals" (Sangsingkeo, 1975, p. 652). 
Another famous example of this genre is Henry Cotton who in 1907 became 
superintendent at Trenton State Hospital in New Jersey, where patients were kept in 
deplorable conditions, rna ·Y being restrained for years without anyone knowing why. 
"Within two months, he had eliminated all mechanical restraint, freeing 96 patients from their 
12 Ironically, Barry was later the subject of scandal when it was discovered, post 
mortem, that she was a woman. 
13 Connolly also published a book The treatment of the insane without the use of 
mechanical restraints in 1856. Instead of mechanical restraint he used whirling chairs, 
spinning beds, purging, emetics, bleeding, the douche and so on (Wing, 1990). 
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shackles, and tossing aside more than 700 restraining devices"I4 (Scull, 1990, p. 147). 
Despite the flaws in the odginal historical account ofPinel's activities, he is not 
totally unworthy of being regarde.d as the model upon which these men patterned their lives. 
This is particularly so with regard to his invention of traitement mora/Is, which he described 
in his Memoir on Madness, presented in 1794 to the Society for Natural History in Paris. The 
society, rather appropriately, voted to forward the memoir to the revolutionary Committee for 
Public Safety (Weiner, 1992). Pinel's methods of taming madness are remarkably similar to 
Willis', including a belief in its curability, an unwillingness to listen to mad-talk, and reliance 
on a mixture of kindness and intimidation- and the doctor's all-seeing eye. 
As regards cure, Pinel (1794I6) was pleased'to report that "I had the satisfaction of 
seeing 25 of200- that is 118 of them- recover" (p. 728). Although an even larger number 
(28) died in the time Pinel was at .. he Bicetre, and these figures are paltry compared to the 
two in three or nine in ten claimed by Battie and Willis, they represent a considerable 
achievement given the kind of long-term inmates Pinel was dealing with. Along with the 
need to bring about cure, there is, as in Willis, an impatience with the ravings of the insane: 
"The exalted imagination of poets also leads sometimes to madness, and I am often 
importunated by a confabulator who urges me to read his productions, while I see only the 
urg~ at need to subject him to treatment for madness" (p. 728). 
And what does moral treatment actually consist of? In essence, it is the careful 
titration of confinement and liberty in the quantities demanded by the particular case: "I mean 
I4 The alternate regime to which Cotton subjected these patients is discussed later. 
Is Usually translated as moral treatment in English, although more accurately translated 
as psychological treatment. 
16 All extracts are from Weiner's (1992) reprinting ofPinei'sMemoir. 
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a kind of supervision adapted to the nature of their madness, the prevention of dangerous 
consequences of their impetuous .Jutbursts without any mistreatment, a timely deprivation of 
liberty, or permission to move about freely within the hospice" (p. 731 ). 
Pinel's (1794) description of what to do should things go wrong bears a close 
resemblance to the Willis method of'catching the eye', backed up by physical force: 
If a madman suddenly experiences an unexpected attack and arms himself with a log, 
a stick, or a rock, the director [Pussin] - always mindful of his maxim to control the 
insane without ever permitting that they be hurt - would present himself in the most 
determined and threatening manner but without carrying any kind of weapon, so as to 
avoid additional vexation. He speaks with a thundering voice and walks closer 
toward the maniac in order to catch his eye. At the same time the servants converge 
on him at a given signal, from behind or sideways, each seizing one of the madman's 
limbs, an arm, a thigh, or a leg. Thus they carry him to his cell while thwarting his 
efforts and chain him if he is very dangerous or merely lock him up. That is how one 
dominates agitated madmen while respecting human rights (p. 731 ). 
Here, in its earliest (and therefore most easily recognisable) form, is the dual nature of 
modern subjectivity, which has "allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the 
mechanisms of discipline in such J. way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of 
domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the 
sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights" (Foucault, 1980, p. 105). 
Or, in Pinel's words: 
One of the fundamental piinciples of the conduct one must adopt toward the insane is 
an intelligent mixture of affability and firmness. When they are obstinate one must 
sound totally superior and unshakable so as to convince them to bow to the will of the 
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directors. But one must avoid any unnecessary constraints and use only enough force 
to restrain them (Pinel, 1794, p. 731). 
Sometimes, in the interests of the patient, it may of course be necessary to extend 
intimidation into the realms of terror: 
Thus one of the major principles of the psychologic management of the insane is to 
break their will in a skilfully timed manner without causing wounds or imposing hard 
labor. Rather, a formidable show of terror should convince them that they are not free 
to pursue their impetuous willfulness and that their only choice is to submit (Pinel, 
1794, p. 732). 
Having been freed of their chains, the mad are thus subjected to "the lucid firmness of Pinel, 
who masters in a word and a gesture the two animal frenzies that roar against him" (Foucault, 
1967, p. 242). Expelled from a state of pure brutish insanity, they are reinducted into a form 
of psychological imprisonment. 
Madness reduced to silence: The York Retreat 
In 1790 a Quaker woman, Hannah Mills, died under suspicious circumstances at the York 
Asylum- one of the model asylums constructed some twelve years earlier m~Jer Battie's 
influence. When the church elders investigated, they were appalled at the conditions. In 
179617 William Tuke18, a prominent Quaker, founded, at the age of 64, a competing 
institution- the York Retreat (Howells & Osborn, 1975; Moyle, 1987; Porter, 1987a; Kaplan 
17 The date is often given as 1792 (e.g., Bebbington, 1987; Warner, 1994; Wing, 1990), 
but it appears that this is the year that planning for the Retreat started (Birley, 1990). 
18 James Tuke according to Fleck (1990). 
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& Sadock, 1981). Designed for no more than 30 patients, the Retreat was everything the 
Asylum was not: Spacious grounds, comfortable rooms, individual attention and a general air 
of tranquillity, described by Foucault (1967) as "the patriarchal calm ofTuke's home, where 
the heart's passions and the mind's disorders slowly subside" {p. 242). Every effort was made 
to remove any impression of incarceration or restraint, and even "the iron sashes of the 
windows were disguised to look like wood" (Warner, 1994, p. 103). Patients were treated 
like children in a family. "They would be resocialized into the ways of Quaker fellowship 
through walking, talking, and taking tea with the superintendent and his family" (Porter, 
1987a, p. 223). 
The Foucaultian interpretation of the Retreat is the same as for Pinel's reforms: "The 
Retreat could do away with manacles of iron, because it was enclosing patients in manacles 
of mind; internalized control of patients' consciences through creating guilt was so much 
more thorough, silent, and far less scandalous" {Porter, 1987a, p. 225). As with Willis and 
Pinel, the Tukes were not interested in the nature of their patients' delusions, or in talking to 
them about the details of their madness (which they dismissed as 'dialogues of delusion'); 
rather, the intention was to distract with exercise, walks, conversation, reading and other 
recreation - "the business of the Retreat was not analysing insanity but restoring normality" 
(Porter, 1987a, p. 232). This is a sentiment which \ ,ould continue to echo through the history 
of psychiatry, leading Benjamin Rush (the 'father of American psychiatry'), for instance, to 
comment that for the sake of good manners "it will be necessary for a physician to listen with 
attention to [the patient's] tedious and uninteresting details of his symptoms," but that these 
could in no way influence the treatment (Alexander & Sheldon, 1966, p. 163). Foucault 
(1967) formulates it thus: "Madness is responsible only for that part of itself which is visible. 
All the rest is reduced to silence. Madness no longer exists except as seen" (p. 250). 
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Foucault (1967) closes his account of madness at this point, with the insane 
everywhere silenced and in psychic chains. Unfortunately, however, this is not where it 
ended. Given the apparent efficacy of releasing the insane from one method of control while 
readmitting them into another, wl.at more could possibly be required to make a perfect 
world? The answer explicitly stated at the end of Pinel's Memoir, and implicit in the success 
of the Retreat, was: More, and better asylums. 
Asylum-building in the nineteenth century 
Foucault's main argument is that in the late 18th and early 19th century the mad progressed 
from physical to mental imprisonment. He also points out that physical incarceration 
continued: "It is within the walls of confinement that Pinel and nineteenth-century psychiatry 
would come upon madmen; it is there - let us remember - that they would leave them, not 
without boasting of having 'delivered' them" (Foucault, 1967, p. 39). In this section I will 
show that it is not only that the mad were left in a state of incarceration, but that many, many 
more were recruited to join their ranks and that the nineteenth century in many ways came 
closer to Foucault's idea of a Great Confinement than did the eighteenth. Where asylum 
building in the 18th century .vas tentative and sporadic, in the 19th it was unbridled. 
According to an 1807 Commons Committee enquiry there were 45 registered 
madhouses then operating in England and Wales, mostly small private institutions (Crammer, 
1994). These were however thought to be insufficient, especially in terms of caring for 
pauper lunatics. Accordingly, the 1808 County Asylums Act (also known as "Wynn's Act"; 
Smith, 1994) was framed, authorising (although not yet compelling) justices of the peace in 
every county to borrow money over a 14 year period to build an asylum for the lunatic poor 
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(Crammer, 1994; Howells & Osborn, 1975, p. 193). By 1827, 2719 of the 52 counties had 
done so (Porter, 1987a). Maintenance money for these asylums came from local taxes, while 
food and personal requirements were paid for by each lunatic's parish (Crammer, 1994). The 
Act was partly aimed at desegregating the poor and the insane, and the first madhouses to 
open "were in rural districts wher~ pauperism was severe and subsistence farming declining" 
(Warner, 1994, p. 108). 
Although most of these institutions started out on a small scale, by the mid 1840s 
their average size had grown from 115 to 300 (Barham, 1992). This growth, which often led 
to overcrowding, may have been the impetus for the 1845 Lunacy Act, which established the 
'Commissioners in Lunacy' with jurisdiction over the whole of England and Wales- no 
longer London only (Crammer, 1994; Howells & Osborn, 1975) - and "made compulsory the 
provision of asylums by counties and boroughs" (Howells & Osborn, 1975, p. 194). As it 
was markedly more expensive to 1-touse lunatics in such asylums than in workhouses, the Act 
was seen as a philanthropic move, but "the reality almost immediately betrayed the hope" 
(Bebbington, 1987, p. 12). Despite the large-scale building programme which resulted from 
the Act, rather than relieve the pressure on asylums and workhouses, after 1845 
overcrowding and understaffing simply built up even further (Crammer, 1994), so that by 
187 I each asylum contained on average 542 lunatics, and 961 by 1900 (Barham, 1992). By 
1854, the dream of small, curative asylums was dead, and Thomas Kirkbride's On the 
Construction, Organization, and General Arrangements of Hospitals for the Insane became a 
blueprint for building large, centralised asylums (Morrisey & Goldman, 1980). 
In France the equivalent of the 1845 Act was an 1838law creating a lunatic asylum in 
every departement. According to Colp (1989) Germany built even more asylums than 
19 18 according to Allderidge (1990). 
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France. Elsewhere in Europe numerous asylums were opened. A 300 bed mental hospital 
was built in Portugal in 1848, with two more in 1893 and 1895 (Lopez Ibor, 1975). The first 
private mental hospital was foundr:!d in Hungary in 1850, followed in 1868 by a state mental 
hospital, which soon proved too small for the demands made upon it, so that another, larger, 
hospital had to be founded in 1883 at Angyalfold. However, even this proved insufficient, 
and in 1896 an old public building was adapted to provide another even larger mental 
institution (Honinszky, 1975). In Italy, the number of mental hospitals grew from 21 in 1840 
to 35 in the 1870s, to 50 in the 1880s (Mora, 1975). 
In America asylum building also surged ahead. Starting with the Friends' Asylum in 
Pennsylvania in 1817 (Warner, 1994), the second oldest in the USA and the first where 
chains were not used (Zilboorg k Henry, 1941 ), innumerable asylums, penitentiaries, 
workhouses, orphan asylums and juvenile reformatories were founded in the course of the 
century (Scull, 1984; Warner, 1994)- six private asylums between 1820 and 1870 in New 
York alone (Johnson, 1990). Originally small and based on principles ofnon-restraint- such 
as Bloomingdale Asylum in 1821 and the Retreat at Hartford in 1824 (Warner, 1994)- these 
asylums soon grew to massive proportions and frankly custodial intentions, for example the 
Willard Asylum for the Chronic Insane established in New York in 1865 for 1500 patients 
(Morrisey & Goldman, 1980). By 1890 there were 120 public and 40 private asylums in the 
United States, containing a total cf 91,152 patients (Scull, 1984). 
In South Africa asylum building also progressed inexorably, although at a more 
modest pace. The first civilian hospital at the Cape, known as the Hospital and Lunatic 
Asylum, or Baily's Hospital (later Somerset Hospital) was built in 1818 (Hurst & Lucas, 
1975; Kruger, 1980; Moyle, 1987) and accommodated an increasing number oflunatics. In 
1834 this hospital started serving the interior as well, with 10 lunatics transported overland 
47 
from Gramhamstown (Moyle, 1987). In the same year slavery was abolished in the Cape, 
and the Slave Lodge was turned i'lto an alms house for paupers, including lunatic paupers 
(Moyle, 1987). 
In 1843 the rather ingenious 'Montagu Plan' was accepted for turning Robben Island 
into an asylum for lunatics, lepers, paupers, and the chronically sick, while at the same time 
making the convicts until then kept on the island available for an ambitious programme of 
road construction. In this way B:dn's KloofPass, Mitchell's Pass, and Sir Lowry's Pass, 
amongst others, were built, while the pressure on the Somerset hospital was relieved by 
moving the lunatics to the former convict station on Robben Island - where they were kept 
until 1863 when Somerset hospital was reopened (Moyle, 1987~ Visser, Haasbroek & 
Bodemer, 1989). By 186820 it was clear that the Somerset hospital had become too 
overcrowded to serve the interior and the Town Hill asylum was founded in Pietermaritzburg 
(Vitus, 1987), followed in 1875 by the Grahamstown Lunatic Asylum and Sick Hospital, 
located at the Fort England barracks (Hurst & Lucas, 1975). In 1889 another mental asylum 
was founded at Port Alfred (Hur:;t & Lucas, 1975; Moyle, 1987). These Eastern Cape 
asylums were all for whites only, so that in 1894 it became necessary to build an asylum for 
blacks in Fort Beaufort (Hurst & Lucas, 1975; Moyle, 1987; Swartz, 1994a) 
Despite these asylum-builrJing efforts in the interior the demand for ac... ommodation 
for the insane in Cape Town cominued to grow, resulting first in plans to extend the asylum 
on Robben Island (Cape of Good Hope, 1863), and later in the appointment of a 
parliamentary commission on the best means of closing the asylum and establishing a larger 
facility on the mainland (Cape of Good Hope, 1880a, 1880b). The recommendations ofthis 
commission were finally given et:ect in 1891 when Valkenberg Asylum was founded (Hurst 
20 1875 according to Moyle (1987) 
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& Lucas, 1975~ Vitus, 1987). Initially for whites only, it was only in 1916 that a 'black side' 
was added to the asylum (Swartz, 1994a). By the end of its first year of operation, 
Valkenberg was filled to capacity (Moyle, 1987) so that in 1898 a new building was added 
with facilities for 310 patients (Moyle, 1987). 
The Boer republics were also facing an increasing accommodation crisis for the 
insane. In 1875 the Orange Free State Volksraad gave the president powers to have lunatics 
taken to Bloemfontein, where provision had been made for them to be kept in a government 
building (Moyle, 1987; Vitus, 1987). By 1881 the building was overcrowded and the 
Bloemfontein Kranksinnigengesticht was opened in 1883 (Moyle, 1987), later to be known as 
the Oranje Hospital21 (Hurst & Lucas, 1975). In 1890 a section for black inmates was added 
(Moyle, 1987). 
In the Transvaal Republic lunatics were at first held in the Pretoria jail (Moyle, 1987), 
until the Weskoppies asylum, officially known as De Kranksinnigengesticht te Pretoria, was 
founded in 1892 (Hurst & Lucas, 1975; Vitus, 1987). Before the asylum opened, there had 
been 25 mental cases in various jails in the Transvaal; by the end of the year the asylum held 
29 patients, ofwhom 15 were white (Minde, 1975). By 1897 Weskoppies had become very 
crowded, and by 1898 it was so crowded that no further male admissions were accepted and 
some patients were again being confined in jails (Minv \ 1975). 
This catalogue of asylum building is of course scarcely different from what one would 
expect for any other kind of institution - whether hospitals, schools or prisons. The growth in 
institutional provision for the insc.ne could thus be explained simply in terms of population 
growth and urbanisation. The Enslish population, for example, doubled in the second half of 
the nineteenth century (Barham, 1992) and, as Bebbington (1987) puts it: "The most salient 
21 The same hospital from which Gagiano freed the insane a hundred years later in 1984. 
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demographic feature of 19th ce-ntury Britain was the speed ofurbanization22" (p. 12). 
Alternately, the increase in the number and size of asylums could be taken to support 
Foucault's (1967; 1980) ideas about the rise of a 'carceral principle' not limited to insanity. 
One example of this kind of process is the case of habitual alcoholic inebriation, which in 
terms oftwo British Acts in 1878 and 1879 became grounds for compulsory detention 
(Berridge, 1990). 
However, the case of insanity does appear to be special. In 1807 a Commons 
Committee found that there were 1765 pauper lunatics in Poor Houses and Houses of 
Industry in England and Wales (Allderidge, 1990), but by 1844 the number of certified 
lunatics had increased to 20 80923 and to 117 200 by 1904, representing a fivefold increase 
over the second half of the century alone (Barham, 1992). Thus, where "around 1800, no 
more than a few thousand 'lunatics' were confined in England in all kinds of institutions; by 
1900 the total had skyrocketed to about 100 000" (Porter, 1987a, p. 2). 
Even when expressed as a proportion of the population (see Figure 2.1), the number 
of insane in public asylums in England and Wales increased sevenfold between 1850 and 
1930- from 4.03 per 10 000 to 30.14 per 10 000- dipping only briefly during the first world 
war (Scull, 1984). 
22 In 1891 for first time the Ptajority (53.6%) of the population in England and Wales 
lived in cities of 20 000 or more (Scull, 1984 ). 
23 Crammer (1994), quotes the following figures from the 1844 Commissioners in 
Lunacy reports: 3 579 lunatics in public asylums, 2 559 in licensed houses, 4 080 in 
workhouses and 3 940 at home or with friends. 
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Figure 2.1. Patients in public asylums in England and Wales, 1850-1930 
(source: Scull, 1984) 
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Some Victorian doctors argued that the increasing numbers of institutionalised insane was 
due to a real increase in the incidence of insanity (Porter, 1987a). This is a theme which has 
recently been resurrected by Hare (1982, 1990), who believes that there was a 'slow 
epidemic' of schizophrenia. Tuke (1878) had a different explanation, which is however 
equally favourable to the profession of psychiatry: 
The same number of persons may have annually become deranged fifty years ago as 
in 1877, and yet if of the former a larger proportion were neglected and died, the 
existing number of lunatics would vary greatly in the two periods. This is what has 
actually happened. The insane succumbed in large numbers from neglect or cruelty 
half a century ago~ now they live on to a fair age, some of them to very advanced life 
(p. 49). 
Tuke's (1878) argument rests on ~'YO implicit and by then relatively uncontroversial claims: 
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That the mad received more humane physical treatment than they had in the past, and (as will 
be shown in the next section) that their madness was itself not amenable to treatment. 
Foucault's inversion of the former claim has already been discussed, but the latter is more 
puzzling. As has been shown, the asylum-building spree of the nineteenth century received 
its initial impetus from the belief that moral treatment cured insanity and that what was 
therefore needed was more and better asylums. How did the belief in curability become 
transformed into its opposite, and how did it affect the programme of asylum-building? Both 
these questions, I will try to show, can be addressed with reference to the concept and 
practice of readmission. 
Curing the insane II: The nineteenth century 
It is generally agreed that the nineteenth century started with a firm belief in the curability of 
madness, specifically through moral treatment in asylums. Thus asylums, according to 
Barham (1992) "were not intended as repositories for the excommunicated. Far from it; in 
their original purpose and design they were seen as reformatories through which the wayward 
and unproductive could be brought into more promising and acceptable lines of 
communication" (p. 72). 
This optimism was particularly prevalent in the United States, where enthusiasm for 
the new technology of mental treatment was combined with the general spirit of evangelical 
reform which preceded the Civil War (reflected, for instance, in the various movements for 
temperance, women's rights, publi~.:: education, the rights of the poor, the abolition of slavery) 
to produce greatly expanded facilities for the insane (Grob, 1980; Luchins, 1992). 
The spirit prevalent in the mad-business in the early years of the century has been 
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called a 'cult of curability' (Luchins, 1992; Schneck, 1975), and examples are often quoted of 
the apparently inflated cure-rates claimed by asylum supervisors. Schneck (1975), for 
instance, mentions the case ofWilliam Maclay Awl whose claims were so extravagant that he 
came to be known as Dr Cure-all Awl. Other examples include the Hartford Retreat where 
"within four years of establishment, its report for 1828 made the remarkable announcement 
that about ninety per cent of the patients admitted that year had been cured" (Shryock, 1940, 
p. 17); the Worcester State Hospital, where Woodward in 1840 published recovery rates since 
1833 ofbetween 82% and 91% (Grob, 1980; Schneck, 1975; Warner, 1994); and the Eastern 
Virginia asylum, where John Galt in 1842 claimed cure rates of between 53% and 92% 
(Warner, 1994). Typical of the times is the opinion expressed by Amariah Brigham of the 
Utica State Hospital that "no fact relating to insanity appears better established than the 
general certainty of curing it in its early state" (Warner, 1994, p. 122). 
In England the 1845 Lunacy Act, which was intended as "a mechanism for providing 
the mentally ill with the early treatment thought necessary for cure" (Bebbington, 1987, p. 
12), reflected the continuing prevalence of similar sentiments. 
Statistics compiled under the influence of the cult of curability were used to great 
effect by the American reformer Dorothea Dix in her campaign to establish more public 
mental hospitals, which resulted in the founding of more than 30 such institutio1 .; (Morrisey 
& Goldman, 1980; Warner, 1994 ). In South Africa most asylum building occurred in the 
second half of the century, by wbch time the American and English 'cult of curability' had 
already subsided. Nevertheless Greenlees (1895) presents, with evident satisfaction, a 28% 
recovery rate for 'native' patients (plus 16% 'relieved')24 at the Grahamstown Asylum, 
compared to the 10% then being achieved at the Somerset hospital and the 3% at Robben 
24 The figure for 'European' patients was even better. 
53 
Island (Moyle, 1987). It was partly in response to such figures that the Valkenberg asylum 
was founded in Cape Town in 1891, as an institution specifically for curable cases of 
insanity. (As it turned out, however, only 3 of the original 36 patients ever recovered, 
compared to 24 who died in the asylum after an average stay of 14.4 years; Swartz, 1994a). 
How real were the high cure rates at first reported, especially at American asylums? 
Warner (1994) has argued that cures were indeed being achieved due to the special nature of 
the early asylums which were small enough and sufficiently well staffed to facilitate 
recovery. It is only as asylums became larger and more overcrowded that the cure rate 
started dropping off. A very careful follow-up study conducted late in the 19th century by 
Park suggested that 58% of those discharged as recovered from Worcester never had a 
relapse (Grob, 1980). 
However, it has also long been claimed that the figures were skewed because first 
admissions and readmissions were not distinguished (Shryock, 1940) and thus cure rates 
were "artificially exaggerated by repeated recovery ofreadmissions" (Schneck, 1975, p. 
445). Morrisey and Goldman (1980) quote Park's 1879 observation about cure rates at 
Worcester as follows: 
It is a sad and almost cruel blow to the worth of the earlier tables of this Hospital, 
which gave 70, 80, and even 90 per cent ofrec, veries, to know ... that many a patient 
who helped to swell the tables of recoveries to the large per cent mentioned, returned 
again and again to this Hospital, and finally died here; the many more, after repeated 
admissions to this and other hospitals, died in the town or city almshouse (p. 60). 
Psychiatric recidivism, like its criminal equivalent, thus almost immediately started eroding 
the new institutions' claims to efficacy. As Foucault (1980) describes it: 
The prison was meant to he an instrument ... acting with precision upon its individual 
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subjects ... The failure of the project was immediate and was realised virtually from 
the start. In 1820 it was already understood that the prisons, far from transforming 
criminals into honest citizens, served only to manufacture new criminals and to drive 
existing criminals even deeper into criminality (p. 40). 
In the psychiatric context readmi2.sion soon became evident even at the two original sites 
where moral treatment was practised. Prichard (1837) claims that 105 of the 334 patients 
admitted to the York Retreat between 1812 and 1833 relapsed and were readmitted, while 68 
ofthe 546 admissions to the Bicetre and Salpetriere up to 1834 were readmissions. One 
person was admitted as many as 14 times. 
The high point in using readmission figures to debunk the 'cult of curability' came in 
1876 with the publication ofPliny Earle's The Curability of Insanity (Overholser, 1940), in 
which, with reference to the Worcester figures, he "made much of the fact that the same 
patient may be counted as "recovered" after every relapse and that percentages of recoveries 
were calculated on the basis of those discharged, not on the numbers admitted" (Warner, 
1994, p. 124). It has since been shown that counting the readmissions properly would have 
made a difference ofless than a quarter percent to the Worcester cure rate, and follow-up 
studies in the 1890s and 1950s have tended to confirm the germineness of the cures (Warner, 
1994). However, irrespective • fthe statistical accuracy of the reported cure rates, it is 
evident that readmission was rhetorically very effectively deployed to counter the idea of 
curability. Whether as a self-fulfilling prophecy or for one or more of a host of other possible 
reasons, it is in any case true that cure rates did start declining from the 1830s onwards, 
dropping particularly sharply in the second half of the century (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of admissions discharged as "recovered" from the Worcester 
State Hospital (sc,urce: Warner, 1994) 
Percentage cured 
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Readmission in the nineteenth century is therefore in the first place a symbol of the 
ineffectiveness of treatment, and thus of the in curability of insanity. However, just as in the 
eighteenth and twentieth centuries, readmission should be seen not purely as an oscillation 
between freedom and incarceration, but as part of a larger pattern oftrans-carceration. In 
both England and America the insane were continually on the move between families, private 
and pu; ;ic asylums, and instituti011s for the indigent poor. 
Scull (1991a) describes the tensions which developed between asylum and workhouse 
superintendents in America as the former transferred some of the insane to workhouses and 
the latter some of the poor to asylums. A favourite ploy was to move 'incurables' out of 
asylums and into almshouses: "If a patient had not improved enough to live with his own 
family, it was thought that perhaps he could get along in the almshouse" (Hamilton, 1940, p. 
88). By 1856 superintendents of almshouse~ had had enough of the situation and asked to be 
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relieved ofthe insane, with the result that in 1869 the Willard Asylum was built for 1500 
patients, followed by numerous similar institutions for the incurable (Hamilton, 1940}. New 
York State passed an Act in 1890 formally transferring the mentally ill from county 
almshouses to state hospitals, and in the decade following the state hospital census rose from 
5402 to 21 815. The New York model made it possible for counties to shift costs to the state 
level and was copied throughout the United States, eventually leading to the end of 
almshouses by 1920 (Johnson, 1990). Apart from almshouses and asylums, around 30% of 
mental patients were still being c3red for at home or in private institutions towards the end of 
the century (Howells & Osborn, 1975). 
Thus what distinguished a reformer such as Dorothea Dix is not so much that she 
either freed or incarcerated the insane, but that she imposed coherence on an otherwise 
chaotic pattern of admissions, readmissions and transfers. Under Dix's influence the insane 
were shifted "from the small, inadequate quarters of the almshouses and jails ... to small local 
institutions, then to county hospi~als newly constructed, and finally to the larger state 
hospitals that replaced them" (Sclmeck, 1975, p. 446). 
In England, too, the insane were shunted from pillar to post, and there was an 'element 
of rivalry and contempt' between the Poor Law Commission and the Commissioners in 
Lunacy (Crammer, 1994). In South Africa it has already been shown how lunatics migrated 
back and forth between the Somerset Hospital and Robben Island. The same happened with 
the new asylum at Valkenberg. Of the 36 'curables' initially admitted, 8 were transferred to 
other institutions, ofwhich 3 were sent back to Robben Island (Swartz, 1994b}. In the 
interior, Greenlees (1895) accom!ted for many of the non-recoveries at the Grahamstown 
Asylum by noting that they had been discharged to "other institutions" (Greenlees, 1895, p. 
73). 
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The terrifying system 
What characterised the system of care from which the insane were continually being 
discharged and readmitted in the course of the 19th century, was its growing rationalisation 
and efficiency. A person who indulged in insane behaviour around 1800 was inducted into a 
legal and professional structure far less sophisticated and consolidated than would her 
equivalent around 1900. Along with the endless list of asylums built in the 19th century goes 
a series of legal reforms. In England we have, amongst others, the Criminal Lunatics Act or 
"Act for the Safe Keeping oflnsane Persons charged with Offences" of 1800 (Porter, 1987a); 
the Act to Regulate the Care and Treatment of Insane Persons of 1828 which established the 
Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy and made it compulsory for private madhouses to 
appoint doctors for weekly visits (Crammer, 1994; Porter, 1987a); the New Poor Law Act of 
1834 (Bebbington, 1987; Porter, 1987a); and the Lunacy Act of 1890 which provided for a 
rigid system of certification and required asylum superintendents to be medically qualified 
(Allderidge, 1990; Crammer, 1994; Walk, 1990). 
In South Africa an equivalent set of reforms was enacted, for example the instructions 
promulgated by the Burger Senate in 1825 which prohibited the flogging of lun~.tics (Moyle, 
1987) and various ordinances of 1833, 1837, 1879, 1891 and 1897 which culminated in the 
Mental Disorders Act of 1916 (Hurst & Lucas, 1975; Swartz, 1994b; Vitus, 1987). 
These legal structures were designed to guard against human rights violations in terms 
of both unjust incarceration and ir:humane treatment. Thus there are a series of legally-
instigated scandals in the course of the century, such as the report of the British committee of 
enquiry into private and public madhouses of 1815 (Howells & Osborn, 1975); the 1844 and 
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1847 reports of the British Commissioners in Lunacy (Crammer, 1994); and the 1859 
parliamentary Select Committee report (Walk, 1990). In South Africa there is the official 
report of 1826 revealing that patients were being tied up and flogged at Somerset Hospital 
(Hurst & Lucas, 1975; Moyle, 1987); the parliamentary Select Committee report of 1855 
which found Somerset Hospital to be beyond repair (Moyle, 1987); and the 1861 commission 
of enquiry into conditions on Robben Island (Moyle, 1987). 
Even as these legal measures helped to prevent the abuse of power, they facilitated 
the deployment of a different form of (disciplinary) power which further entrenched madness 
as a condition defined by the tension between freedom and incarceration. Hand in hand with 
this went the emergence of the profession of psychiatry, which "could flourish once, but not 
before, large numbers of inmates were crowded into asylums" (Porter, 1987b, p. 17). Thus in 
the course of the century "insanity was transformed from a vague, culturally defined 
phenomenon affiicting an unknown, but probably small proportion of the population into a 
condition which could only be authoritatively diagnosed, certified, and treated by a group of 
legally recognised experts" (Scull, 1991b, p. 149). Apart from asylums, psychiatry set up for 
itself an entire professional infrastructure. Professional journals started appearing such as the 
Magazin for psychische Heilkunde in 1805 (Colp, 1989); the American Journal of Insanity 
(forerunner of the American Journal of Psychiatry) in 1, -14 (Schneck, 1975); the Allgemeine 
Zeitschrift for Psychiatrie in the same year and the Annales Medico-Psychologiques a year 
later (Colp, 1989; Schneck, 1975); the British Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental 
Pathology in 1848 (Rollin, 1991 ); and the Asylum Journal of 1853, which became the Asylum 
Journal of Mental Science in 185 5 and the Journal of Mental Science in 1858 (Rollin, 1991 ). 
Professional associations were founded, such as the British Association of Medical 
Officers of Asylums and Hospita~s for the Insane formed in 1841, reactivated in 1845 (Walk, 
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1990), and later to become the Royal College of Psychiatrists (Rowels & Osborn; Walk, 
1990); the German association of Directors of Lunatic Asylums founded in 1844 (Rollin, 
1991); and the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the 
Insane (renamed the American Medico-Psychological Association in 1892 and the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1921) founded in the same year (Grob, 1980; Johnson, 1990; 
Schneck, 1975). 
Specialist courses in psychiatry were started for medical students, for example in 
1843 at the University ofVienna (Honinszky, 1975) and in 1870 in England and Wales 
(Crammer, 1994); as well as courses for psychiatric attendants, for example in 1891 in 
Britain (Nolan, 1991 ). Textbooks were published, such as Bucknill and Tuke's 1858 Manual 
of Psychological Medicine (Colp. 1989; Crammer, 1994); and Kraepelin's 1883 Lehrbuch 
which went through nine editions until 1927 (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). Pelicier's 
(1975) remarks about Kraepelin's text can equally be applied to all these moves towards 
professionalisation: 
Within the first edition of his handbook of psychiatry in 1883 and the edition of 1896, 
Kraepelin enclosed European psychiatry in a terrifying system: every clinical picture 
had its place, every patient's destiny was predetermined. The psychiatric hospital was 
like the firmament ofKc 'ier in which the position and movement of the stars and 
planets are determined (p. 132). 
What was this 'terrifying system' which had closed over the insane even as it promised to 
restore their human rights? The 19th century started of course with moral treatment, that 
careful mix of paternal charisma and individual accountability which replaced physical 
restraint, and this is the system at first used by Woodward and his contemporaries - together 
with a considerable reliance on narcotics such as morphine and opium "to quiet the patient 
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and thus make him amenable to moral treatment" (Grob, 1980, p. 26). What psychiatry, as 
Foucault leaves it at the start of the 19th century, thus at first represents is the triumph of 
modernity in which social order is guaranteed not through the exercise of repressive power, 
but through classification, surveillance and the doctrine of free will. Early 19th century 
psychiatry demonstrates that even raving lunatics can be tamed by the doctor's eye, and even 
those who have lost their senses can have their individual accountability restored to them. 
Hill (1839; quoted in Bebbington, 1987, p. 12) explains the system as follows: 
But it may be demanded, What mode of treatment do you adopt in place of restraint? 
How do you guard against accidents? How do you provide for the safety of 
attendants? In short what is the substitute for coercion? The answer may be summed 
up in a few words, viz - classification - watchfulness - vigilant and unceasing 
attendance by day and night (p. 12). 
Connolly describes the essential conditions needed for this form of power to work in similar 
terms: 
One of the first of these is, a properly constructed building, in which the patients 
enjoy the advantages of light and air, and a cheerful prospect, and ample space for 
exercise, and for classification, and means of occupation and recreation. The next is 
:,e constant and watchful superintendence ofhumane and intelligent officers, 
exercising full but considerate and just control over an efficient body of attendants 
(Connolly, 1846, p. 9). 
Connolly's system still held some currency in South Africa in 1864 when the new 
superintendent of Robben Island expressed his opposition to mechanical restraint (Moyle, 
1987), and this was the case even as late as 1894. In this year the medical director of 
Weskoppies, a Dr Smeenk, esper;any imported from Holland, wrote in his first report under 
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'dwangmiddelen': "Deze zyn door my niet toegepast, aangezien ik het 'no restraint' stelsel 
volg" (Minde, 1975, p. 368). [Coercive measures: These are not permitted by me as I follow 
the 'no restraint' system.] Ironic proof that Smeenk must indeed have used moral treatment 
comes from an 1899 pamphlet by a former Weskoppies inmate, F.B. Higginson, in which "Dr 
Smeenk is accused of personally ill-treating Higginson. He glared at him through thick 
spectacles and threatened to lock him in his cell 'day and night', and to feed him on bread and 
water" (Minde, 1975, p. 368). 
The Quarterly Reports of the official visitors to Grahamstown Lunatic Asylum for 
1892/93 (Cape of Good Hope, 1893) indicate that there too every effort was still being made 
to ensure humane treatment for patients (including good heating, ventilation and so forth), 
together with careful observation and classification, albeit with a South African racial 
inflection: 
A subject which we desire to bring very strongly to the notice of Government is the 
classification, or rather w<~nt of proper classification, of patients. In this Asylum are 
patients of all classes and colours; there are ladies and gentlemen who pay for their 
accommodation and care, and there are patients of the very lowest class of Native and 
European. At night and at meals these people are separated, but during the daytime 
they mix together in the airing yards. This is not a state of matters to be continued, 
and we would ask that something should be done to ensure an entire separation of 
Europeans from Natives ::sa first measure, with a view to having, in the near future, 
classification according to condition of life and mental state (Cape of Good Hope, 
1893, p. 5-6). 
In America, however, moral treatment was by the rnid-1840s already an anachronism. In his 
reports Connolly (1845, 1846) makes repeated reference to sceptical visitors from America 
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and when Henry Tuke visited America in 1845 he "was troubled by much that he saw" 
(Hamilton, 1940, p. 109). Far from practising moral treatment, American psychiatrists such 
as Benjamin Rush (the 'father of American psychiatry') had become convinced of the 
inaccuracy of the original cure rat0s and had turned to advocating the healing value of 
restraint instead. Even in England, moral treatment had started to lose its meaning before 
mid-century. Prichard (1837), who was one of the Commissioners in Lunacy, discusses 
moral treatment under four heads: 
1. seclusion and confinement (almost invariably depicted as a good thing); 
2. "other means of abstracting them from the morbid impressions and associations" (p. 
205) - such as travel, exercise, walking, gardening and embroidery; 
3. moral discipline and personal control, which is described as "a union offirmness in 
determination with the gr{'atest gentleness of manner" (p. 216), although "it is often 
necessary to confine violent patients with the strait-waistcoat" (p. 216) while 
"occasionally it is better to confine them by straps round the legs, fastened down in an 
arm-chair, or shut up in their rooms, according to circumstances" (p. 218); and 
4. "treatment of their understandings in relation to their illusions" (p. 205), which 
involves playing tricks of deception. 
Similarly in Belgium Leuret published in 1840 Du Traitement moral de /a folie i. which he 
described an evolved version of Pinel's method, involving coercion, pain and terror 
(Vandermeersch, 1991). 
By 1884, when Daniel Hack Tuke visited America, the mood had shifted sufficiently 
in England that he was much less displeased with the various paraphernalia for restraint -
straitwaistcoats, cupboard showers, covered hot baths to tranquillise excited patients - than 
his grandfather had been forty years earlier (Hamilton, 1940). In his 1885 book T11e Insane 
63 
in the United States he even went so far as to defend these various forms of mechanical 
restraint, secure in the knowledge that many British mad-doctors in any case saw Connolly's 
views about non-restraint as 'pious opinion' (Schneck, 1975). 
It is not, however, that restraint came to be seen as a better form of cure than moral 
treatment, but that the idea of cure was, especially from 1850 onwards, abandoned. Released 
from the obligations of moral treatment, patients were recruited back into an ideology of 
prognostic pessimism (Digby, 1987; Porter, 1987b; Scull, 1991a), so that by the mid-1850s 
almost all American asylum superintendents had come to believe in the incurability of 
insanity (Cockerham, 1981) and even in Britain by 1877, after Connolly's death, "the 
pretensions of the asylum to curir1g inmates had gone" (Bebbington, 1987, p.12) and "the idea 
that insanity was largely incurable was divested of its controversial or contestable aspect and 
taken very much for granted" (Barham, 1992, p. 75). 
This pessimism was related to a growing belief, especially in the second half of the 
century, that insanity was a physical rather than a mental affliction. Griesinger published his 
Mental Pathology and Therapeulics in 1845, which proclaimed psychiatry as a medical 
specialty focused on the brain and which "became the authoritative text for a generation of 
psychiatrists" (Colp, 1989, p. 2138). From 1857 onwards Morel propagated a similar somatic 
line, suggesting that insanity is a !orm of hereditary dege, ~racy (Scull, 1991a): "Inheritance, 
incurability, physical types; these were the dominant notes of his findings, confirmed in his 
travels and through contacts with the directors of the most prestigious European hospitals" 
(Huertas, 1992, p. 393). Morel's theory of degeneration was further popularised in Germany 
by Kraffi-Ebing, in France by Magnan and Esquirol, in Italy by Lombroso, and in England by 
Maudsley (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966; Huertas, 1992; Mora,1975; Pelicier, 1975). Even 
where environmental factors were admitted, these were always in interaction with genetic 
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predisposition, and the outcome r.~mained inevitable. In Maudsley's (1899) words: 
Were all the circumstances, internal and external, scanned closely and weighed 
accurately it would be seen that there is no accident in madness; the disease, whatever 
form it had, and however many the concurrent conditions or successive links of its 
causation, would be traced as the inevitable consequence of its antecedents, just as the 
explosion of a train of guepowder may be traced to its causes, whether the train of 
events of which it is the issue be long or short. The germs of insanity are most often 
latent in the foundations of the character, and the final outbreak is the explosion of a 
long train of antecedent p:eparations (Maudsley, 1899, p. 140). 
This move towards somatic aetiology occurred not only in response to the apparent failure of 
moral treatment, but also in the context of rapid scientific progress in biology, medicine and 
neurology. To name but a few: Darwin published his Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection in 1859; Lister introduced the practice of antisepsis in the 1860s; Broca discovered 
cerebral localisation in 1861; Dax demonstrated the left lateralization of language in 1863; 
Lombroso published his 'discoveries' on the hereditary nature of genius and insanity in 1864; 
Wernicke published his work on aphasia and brain dominance in 1874; Koch discovered the 
causative micro-organism of chol~ra in 1883; Korsakov described alcohol-induced psychosis 
in 1890. 
Given this intellectual climate, it is therefore scarcely surprising that in 1893 Dr 
Smeenk, the medical officer ofV\reskoppies, should report: "Ik het waargenomen dat 
erfelykepredispositie prima facie, de grootste bron van geesteskrankheid in de Z.A. 
Republiek is"25 (Minde, 1975, p. 369). Greenlees ofthe Grahamstown asylum also found 
2s "I have observed that hereditary predisposition is prima facie the greatest source of 
mental illness in the South African Republic." 
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heredity to be a leading cause of insanity, although "the statistics for white and black patients 
differ strikingly, with many more white than black patients being said to have inherited their 
predisposition to insanity" (Swartz, 1994a, p. 1 0). 
In the course of the nineteenth century asylums therefore lost their curative function 
and became "a convenient apparatus allowing for the collection of dead souls in a network of 
cemeteries for the still-breathing" (Scull, 1991a, p. 161). Hamilton (1940) provides a 
poignant description of what had oecome of the insane liberated by Pinel a hundred years 
earlier: 
Utica had a one-story ward for disturbed men who were kept in restraint all day. 
They were seated in large and fairly comfortable chairs and fastened there. The hands 
were confined to the chair arms and the knees could not be raised very high, leaving 
an opportunity merely to swing the feet back and forth; on the floor of this ward are 
slight depressions worn by swinging feet prior to 1890 (p. 1 07). 
Where at the start of the century the practice of mad-doctoring was in the vanguard of 
modernity, helping to demonstrat:! the practicability of the new forms of social control, by the 
end of the century it had come to represent the dark, more overtly coercive, side of power. 
Thus the 'terrifying system' into which the institutionalised mad had been readmitted in the 
course of he century consisted in the first place of somaticism in aetiology, pessimism in 
prognosis and custodialism in therapy. However, at the same time psychiatry was starting to 
venture beyond the walls of the asylum: 
The rigid and pessimistic !>C'maticism which increasingly pervaded psychiatric 
discourse provided a powerful rationalization for the profession's dismal therapeutic 
performance ... But psychiatry simultaneously sought to transform the failure to 
redeem its therapeutic promises into the basis for obtaining a wholly new importance 
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in the battle to contain social pathology and to defend the social order. The march it 
now undertook into the 'borderlands of insanity', its embrace of the 'demifous', the 
neurasthenic and the hysteric marked the opening shots of a campaign to secure an 
'awesome extension of the medical role' in policing the boundaries of society, and in 
the regulation of asocial b~haviours (Scull, 1991 a, p. 159). 
Now comes the era of neurasthenia, invented by Beard in 1868, and hysteria, invented by 
Charcot in 1871, and of the various cures for these afflictions- the rest cure, the talking cure, 
animal magnetism. These patients, of whom there were potentially many more than those 
until then incarcerated, were far more likely to prove amenable to treatment. It has been 
suggested that it is for this reason rather than any other that Freud's ideas became popular. 
Forrest (1973), for example, claims that "it seems to us that his theories began to gain 
acceptance because his therapy offered hope rather than because they were effective" (p. 8), 
while Hays (1964) suggests that "his work by promising some hope of a cure in a field where 
no successful treatment was possible or in sight, produced some much-needed optimism" (p. 
27). 
However, Foucault (1967) as usual has a more sinister interpretation of what 
psychoanalysis was really up to: 
It would be fairer to say that psychoanalysis doubled the absolute observation of the 
watcher with the endless monologue of the person watched - thus preserving the old 
asylum structure of non-reciprocal observation but balancing it, in a non-symmetrical 
reciprocity, by the new stmcture of language without response (p. 250-251). 
In psychiatry the nineteenth century therefore starts and ends with cure. Between these two 
poles the insane, whose ranks are continually swelled by new recruits, are admitted, 
discharged, readmitted, transferP~d within an ever-more sophisticated system of professional 
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care. 
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Chapter 3 
An archaeology of psychiatric readmission II: 
The 20th century 
Scull (1990) describes psychiatry at the start of the twentieth century as being in desperate 
straits: "Presiding over a ramshackle and decaying empire of ever-more over-crowded and 
run-down institutions, and swamped by legions of the poor, the aged, and the chronically 
disabled, institutional psychiatrists could do little more for their charges save to provide a 
dubious haven from a heartless world" (p. 144). In Europe Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic 
and in America Adolf Meyer's 'psychobiological' approach pointed the way to an alternate 
practice which, while continuing to pay lip service to the primacy of the biological 
component of mental illness, made possible a psychological technology for dealing with non-
incarcerated patients. 
Those who followed Freud and Meyer did not attempt to reform the asylum, but set 
up parallel structures in private consultation rooms, outpatient departments and child 
guidance clinics to deal with and forestall the growing assembly of neurotic disorders. At the 
same time the numbers of those incarcerated in asylums continued (until the mid-50s) to 
grow steadily, even exponentially, although (at least until the mid-30s) institutional 
psychiatry continued to be characterised by neglect and apathy (Cunningham Dax, 1975). 
Outside ofthe asylum, Kovel (1981) has depicted 1905-10 as a 'critical period' in the 
psychologisation of society, in which people "are no longer undesirable, bad, mad or 
possessed: they are sick" (p. 82). Particularly significant in this period is the founding, under 
69 
Meyer's direction, of the Mental Hygiene Movement in 1908, which on a practical level 
helped set up sites for psychiatric practice outside the asylum, and on the level of ideology 
served to objectify the notion of mentality, linking mental health to the removal of psychic 
dirt. 
Scull (1990) tells the horrifying tale ofHenry Cotton, a protege ofMeyer's, who, as 
superintendent of the Trenton State Hospital, took these ideas quite literally and waged a 
decades long battle against 'focal infection' - localised infections which supposedly spread to 
the brain and cause mental illness. Like so many before and after him, Cotton was concerned 
to bridge the gap between psychiatry and mainstream medicine, hankering like the rest of the 
medical profession to have illness spread out before the clinical gaze (Foucault, 1973), and 
visible in the depths ofthe physical body. From 1916 to the late 1950s thousands upon 
thousands of infected teeth and tonsils were removed at Trenton and elsewhere, together with 
massive colonic irrigations and 'reconstructive surgery' of the stomach, duodenum, small 
intestine, gall bladder, sinuses, wcmb, appendix, colon, and the genito-urinary tract. For 
some of these operations the mmtality rate was as high as 25%, while independent studies 
(which Meyer helped to suppress) showed their worth in curing or preventing madness to be 
nil. 
It is however another protege of Meyer's, Clifford Beers, who became the o.ffi" al 
hero of the Mental Hygiene movement. Beers had been a mental patient at, amongst others, 
the Hartford Retreat, one of the asylums famed for its high cure rates in the 1820s. There he 
was subjected to the alternate regime which had long since replaced moral treatment: The 
straitjacket, force-feeding and for ~ed medication. On his recovery, Beers started writing a 
book to expose these malpractices, but under Meyer's influence he gradually abandoned this 
project and when A mind that found itself appeared in 1908 it was more a testimony ofthe 
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power of positive thinking than an expose of institutional psychiatry. In the same year Beers 
helped found the National Commi!tee for Mental Hygiene, with Meyer as one of the charter 
members, followed by an International Committee in 1919 (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). 
Working with luminaries such as Meyer, William James and Weir Mitchell (the inventor of 
the rest cure for neurasthenia), Beers' committee was little concerned with patients' rights26, 
and responded in a lukewarm manner to appeals for intervention from incarcerated 
individuals (Porter, 1987b ). Rather, Mental Hygiene "was a creed for psychological success. 
Under its umbrella, books were published with titles like Understanding Yourself, a self-help 
of the psyche advocating a sort of mental keep-fit, jogging for the mind" (Porter, 1987b, p. 
197). Mental Hygiene was about personalising health, about recruiting individuals into 
taking responsibility for their own personal sanitation. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
committee hosted, in 1909, a visit by Sigmund Freud and (despite Freud's radically less 
optimistic view ofthe psyche) helped to popularise a version of his ideas in America. The 
American Psychoanalytic Society was founded two years later in 1911 (Davies, 1990). 
Mental Hygiene societies were subsequently also founded in several other countries, 
such as the Social Hygiene Council in England (Porter, 1987b ); the National League for 
Mental Hygiene in 1924 in Italy (Mora, 1975) and the Hungarian League for the Protection 
ofthe Mentally Ill in the same ye~·r (Horimszky, 1975). Ment~ Hygiene committees were 
also formed in Canada, Australia, France and Belgium (Vitus, 1987). In South Africa the 
Mental Disorders Act was passed in 1916, in terms of which a Commissioner for Mental 
Hygiene was appointed (Minde, 1975), and in 1920 the National Council for Mental Hygiene 
26 Ironically Beers himself died in an asylum, in 1943, all the while protesting that the 
doctors assigned to his care were 'impersonators' (Porter, 1987b ). 
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and for the Care of the Feeble-minded was formed (Hurst & Lucas, 1975~ Vitus, 1987)27• 
Meyer's intention with Mental Hygiene was both preventive, and to ensure that where 
psychiatric hospitalisation did occur it would be followed by adequate aftercare - thus 
forestalling the need for further readmissions. "Originally envisioned as a kind of friendly 
visiting, the aftercare model was soon defined as an important adjunct to a psychiatrist's 
treatment, in which the social worker not only helped the patient adjust after discharge but 
also modified the home environment that had provoked his symptoms in the first place" 
(Johnson, 1990, p. 13). Meyer's wife, a social worker, was active in instituting aftercare, and 
several Child Guidance Clinics (mostly funded by private philanthropies) were founded, as 
was also the case in South Africa (Vitus, 1987), but the envisaged ties to state mental 
-hospitals never fully materialised, so that these for the most part continued to exist as purely 
custodial institutions parallel to, but largely uninfluenced by, psychiatric social work and the 
activities of the Child Guidance Clinics (Johnson, 1990). 
One hospital, the Worcester state hospital, is repmied as having introduced reforms 
such as liberalised discharge and visiting policies, and the use of social workers, as early as 
1912 (Morrisey & Goldman, 1980), but this appears to have been the exception rather than 
the rule. The following description of Worcester hospital in the 1930s illustrates the extent to 
which asylums had remained worlds "' tto themselves: 
The hospital was located on a 350-acre tract ofland on the eastern edge of the city, 
removed from the major residential areas. It had its own radio station~ 200 acres of 
farm land with facilities fer processing and canning the produce; prize herds of cattle 
and swine; a security force; staff dormitories and recreational facilities; medical-
27 In this country mental hygiene often translated into racial hygiene (Swartz, 1994a), as 
also at times in the United States where Congress instituted immigration quotas in the 1920s 
(Johnson, 1990). 
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surgical services for staff as well as patients; a chapel; and libraries for staff and for 
patients (Morrisey & Goldman, 1980, p. 82). 
In the Soviet Union an integrated system similar to what Meyer had in mind, involving 
supported home care, outpatient clinics, day hospitals, and custodial hospitals, is reported 
actually to have been instituted shortly after the 1917 revolution (Howells, 1975). Although 
the Mental Hygiene movement never achieved this kind of success, there was a gradual 
progression in Western countries between the two wars towards the boundary between 
mental hospital and society becoming more permeable. Of those discharged as disabled from 
the U.S. Army in the first world war, 20% were for reasons of mental illness (Johnson, 1990), 
although most of these were not candidates for long-term confinement, often suffering from 
the newly-invented and more-or-less transient syndrome of'shell shock' (Howells & Osborn, 
1975). In the United Kingdom the Mental Treatment Act of 1930 for the first time allowed 
for voluntary admissions (Howells & Osborn, 1975) and provided for the creation of 
outpatient clinics (Barham, 1992). Thus from the mid-1930s British mental hospitals began 
to be inhabited by a new population which both came and went more freely, leading to a 
steady rise in first admissions and readmissions (Barham, 1992). 
Contemporaneously, the growth of non-institutional psychiatry led to "a paroxysm of 
experimentaL m among institutional psychiatrists with various forms of physical therapy" 
(Scull, 1991a, p. 165): Metrazol and insulin shock treatment in 1933-35 (Alexander & 
Selesnick, 1966; Colp, 1989); leucotomy in 1936 (Schneck, 1975); electric shock in 1938 
(Mora, 1975). These developments are discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
With the advent of the Second World War there was again an influx of new 
psychiatric cases, this time suffering from 'battle fatigue', 'combat neurosis' and 
'demoralisation' in addition to 'shell shock'. Of the 15 million men examined by the US army, 
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856 000 were judged to be mentc>.lly ill, and 700 000 mentally retarded. What these men 
often seemed to require was brief hospitalisation (Johnson, 1990), thus further eroding the 
custodialism of the mental hospital. In South Africa a military hospital with a psychiatric 
section was built at Potchefstroor1 in 1942 to deal with World War II psychiatric casualties. 
After the war the officer commanding, H.J. Moross, founded Tara hospital in Johannesburg -
the first in South Africa for non-certified patients (Min de, 197 5; Reid, 1986). 
In the United States, the Veterans Administration began in 1945 "the largest hospital 
program in American history: the construction of 69 general hospitals, each with a 
psychiatric unit, and 16 mental hospitals" (Colp, 1989, p. 2141). These psychiatric wards and 
hospitals differed significantly from the custodial institutions which preceded them and 
although some of their inmates received the dreaded diagnosis of schizophrenia, "the 
proportion of schizophrenic peopl.e out of hospital at follow-up increased significantly from 
around 50 or 55 per cent before 1 940 to more than 70 per cent in the immediate postwar 
period" (Warner, 1994, p. 74). 
In Europe there occurred at this time a "social psychiatry revolution" (Fleck, 1990; 
\Varner, 1994), also contributing to the softening ofthe stark boundaries between mental 
hospital and community, with hospitals set up as miniature 'therapeutic communities' (Arthur, 
1971; Jones, 1968; Warner, 1994) in order to ease the transition from community to hospital 
and from hospital to community. 
In 1949, at Dingleton Hmpital in Scotland, George Bell, like so many psychiatrists 
before and after, unlocked (or perhaps more accurately gave orders to unlock) the doors of all 
the wards, heralding an Open Door Movement which gained numerous adherents throughout 
the West (Warner, 1994, p. 86), with at least seven British hospitals reinstituting an open-
door policy between 1949 and 1956 (Colp, 1989). 
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It is during the war years and in the immediate post-war period that Mental Hygiene 
was rechristened Mental Health, which could be interpreted as a further move from 
repressive sovereign power (as is still partially implicit in the idea of policing the public's 
mental hygiene) to constructive discipline. In the United States in 1946 Congress passed the 
National Mental Health Act, establishing the National Institute of Mental Health, which 
opened in 1949 (Colp, 1989; Morrisey & Goldman, 1980). In South Africa the National 
Council for Mental Hygiene became the National Council for Mental Health in 1943 (Vitus, 
1987), spawning a number of local mental health societies. The World Federation for Mental 
Health was formed in 1948, with the South African council as an affiliate (Vitus, 1987). 
In the United Kingdom the National Health Service Act of 1946 laid the foundations 
for the National Health Service which came into operation in 1948. In terms of this Act 
mental hospitals received equal benefits to general hospitals, and psychiatrists were for the 
first time put on a par with specialists in other fields (Howells & Osborn, 1975). The 
National Health Service epitomises the rise of the welfare state in the post-war West, 
characterised by social pensions, unemployment and sick benefits, and free compulsory 
education (Wing, 1990). Warner ( 1994) argues that it is this safety net of social services 
which made it possible to start releasing the insane, who would otherwise often not have been 
able to fend for themselves. The era of the psychiatric social worker, foreshadowed by 
Meyer, had thus finally arrived. In 1953 the California health department took the innovative 
step of employing 120 social workers to serve 10 000 psychiatric patients on 'convalescent 
home leave' and in 1954 the first major conference of American psychiatric social workers 
was held, allowing for the discus3ion of topics such as job placements for patients, family 
involvement, community residences, and recreation programmes (Kanter, 1991). 
The process of decarcerat:on thus set in motion can be illustrated with reference to 
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Worcester hospital, described earlier as the epitome of a self-sufficient asylum cut off from 
the broader social world. In 1949 psychiatrists (several of whom were ex-military) started re-
assessing each chronic patient at Vvorcester with a view to reducing the census. Between 
1950 and 1955 a 6% decline in the hospital population was achieved, while annual 
admissions went up by 13%. "Whereas the number of first admissions remained relatively 
constant during this period (at about 618 per year), the annual number of readmissions had 
more than doubled (from 241 to 568)" (Morrisey & Goldman, 1980, p. 87). 
However, despite the example of a few hospitals like Dingleton and Worcester, the 
emptying-out of the asylum was at first a slow process, and world-wide the number of 
psychiatric patients continued to rise. The high point in the mental hospital population in 
England and Wales- 148 100 patients or 33.45 per 10 000 (Scull, 1984)- was reached in 
1954, with the high point in the USA- 558 900 patients- following a year later (Barham, 
1992). In South Africa the mental hospital population is said to have peaked at about 3 5 000 
in the late 1960s (Gillis, 1970; Vitus, 1987). After this the mental hospital population 
dropped sharply, both in absolute terms (Figure 3.1) and relative to the population (Figure 
3 .2). The long process of incarcerating the insane had finally come to an end. 
Deinstitutionalisa tion 
The probable reasons for the sudden decline in psychiatric inpatient numbers after 1954 have 
already been briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. They are: 
Ideological. Starting witP Mary Ward's The Snake Pit in 1946 and Albert Deutsch's 
The Shame of the States in 1948 (Johnson, 1990) and reaching a peak in the 60s with the 
publications of Szasz (1967), Cooper (1967) and Goffman (1961 ), the decades after the war 
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were marked by a strong resurgence of critiques of institutional psychiatry. 
Figure 3.1 State mental hospital census in the United States of America (source: 
Barham, 1992; Scull, 1984) 
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Economic. Warner (1994) is a strong advocate of the notion that psychiatric patients could 
only be released once the National Health Service (in the UK) and Medicaid (in the US) were 
in place. Using historical data he shows how before this, admission rates to mental hospitals 
had regularly increased during pe:iods of economic decline since the mid-18th century. In 
Warner's (1994) view, "rather than psychiatric treatment having a big impact on 
schizophrenia, both the course of the illness and the development of psychiatry are governed 
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by political economy" (Warner, 1994, p. 75). 
Technological. Chlorpromazine, the first of the antipsychotic drugs, was 
experimentally used by Delay and Deniker in the University Clinic of Paris in 1952 
(Alexander & Selesnick, 1966; Colp, 1989; Pelicier, 1975) and introduced to the United 
States (as Thorazine) in 1954. It was at first seen primarily as a medical and surgical drug, 
with only 39 of the 563 journal articles published about Thorazine until1956 concerned with 
its role in psychiatry (Johnson, 1990). However, within eight months of the initial three 
uncontrolled211 psychiatric studies (involving a total of243 patients) in 1957, it had been 
given to two million patients (Johnson, 1990). Although this is well after the trend towards 
deinstitutionalisation had begun, Fleck (1990) is no doubt correct in arguing that "with the 
impact of psychopharmacological treatments and the ensuing accessibility of many patients 
for therapeutic and rehabilitative work, or at least the docilization through these agents, a 
more optimistic and therefore also more therapeutic atmosphere began to prevail in many 
hospitals" (p. 51). 
Explicit political initiatives. In the United Kingdom the 1959 Mental Health Act 
allowed for "more diversified community service embracing a range of agencies" (Barham, 
1992, p. 11). A year later the then Minister of Health, Enoch Powell delivered his famous 
'water-towert ~ 1eech to the Natiorral Association ofMental Health: "There they stand, 
isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over by the gigantic water-tower and chimney 
combined, rising unmistakable and daunting out of the countryside - the asylums which our 
forefathers built with such immense solidity" (quoted in Barham, 1992, p. xi). Inspired by 
this the Ministry ofHealth in 1962 published its 'Hospital Plan' setting out a programme for 
the deinstitutionalisation of the mentally ill (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994). 
28 The first double-blind study of chlorpromazine occurred only in 1964 (Colp, 1989). 
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Figure 3.2. Mental hospital population in England and Wales as a proportion of the 
total population (source: Barham, 1992) 
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In the United States the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health in a 1961 report 
titled "Action for Mental Health" recommended that state hospitals should convert from 
custodial to treatment centres (Morrisey & Goldman, 1980). The year after, Kennedy made 
his "bold new approach" speech condemning "cold custodialism" and calling for 
comprehensive community care. In the same year he signed the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act (Colp, 1989~ Morrisey & Goldman, 1980) which, as was the case with child 
guidance clinics at the start of the century, set up parallel institutional structures, largely 
unconnected to the mental hospital system, but radiating the disciplinary power of psychiatry 
into increasingly intimate and decentered spaces. 
In South Africa, the revised Mental Health Act of 1973 resulted in a greatly increased 
focus on voluntary admissions (Vitus, 1987). 
As significant as the drop in the inpatient census brought about by 
deinstitutionalisation was the steep rise in admission rates, for example from 78 586 per 
annum in 1955 to 170 527 per annum in 1968 in England and Wales and from 185 000 per 
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annum in 1956 to 393 000 per annum in 1970 in the United States (Scull, 1984). In South 
Africa, admissions rose by 40% between 1964 and 1989, while the number of mental hospital 
beds declined by 8 800 (Visser, Haasbroek & Bodemer, 1989). As was the case in the 1750s 
and the early 1800s, this rise in admissions was in large measure due to readmissions rather 
than first admissions. According to Warner (1994) "about half the patients released from U. 
S. psychiatric hospitals in the early 1970s were readmitted within a year of discharge" 
(Warner, 1994, p. 90). Where patients were not readmitted to a mental hospital, some other 
institution often served the same purpose so that, again as before, deinstitutionalisation often 
turned out to be little more than transinstitutionalisation. Despite the sharp decline in mental 
hospital patients in the United States in the early 60s, the number in nursing homes increased 
to such an extent that the total institutionalised population was actually higher in 1969 than in 
1963 (Warner, 1994). Not only were nursing homes cheaper9, but where state governments 
had to pay for those in state mental hospitals, the costs of private nursing home care could be 
billed to Medicaid or Medicare, which are mostly funded by the federal government (Warner, 
1994). 
Nursing homes, board-and-care residences and the like have been severely criticised -
Scull (1984) describes them as "a poor alternative to living" (p. 165) - although it is a 
common finding that residents view them more positively than they do the supposedly l .tter 
equipped mental hospitals (Lehman, Possidente & Hawker, 1986; Lehman, Slaughter & 
Myers, 1991). 
Together with this by now familiar pattern of an increase in admissions, readmissions 
29 In 1973, with the United Kingdom's inpatient population shrunk to a fraction of its 
former size, 300 million pounds were still being spent annually on inpatient care, compared 
to only 6.5 million on residential and day care (Scull, 1984). In South Africa in the late 80s, 
82% of the mental health budget still went on hospital care, and only 7% on outpatients 
(Visser, Haasbroek & Bodemer, 1989). 
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and transfers, there has also been an enormous increase in psychiatric 'care episodes' at sites 
other than the traditional mental hospital. In the United Kingdom, day hospitals have become 
common (Warner, 1994), and even where full hospital admission occurs, 33% of these were, 
already by 1977, to psychiatric units in district general hospitals rather than to mental 
hospitals (Barham, 1992). At the same time the archetypal form of psychiatric incarceration, 
compulsory admission, has steadily declined. In the United Kingdom one in four admissions 
in 1955 was compulsory, dropping to one in five in 1964 and one in eight in 1974 (Kruger, 
1980). In South Africa many of the worst aspects of incarceration are still in place, for 
instance at the privately run and notoriously under-resourced Smith-Mitchell institutions, 
which in 1986 housed 9 500 involuntary patients (Haysom, Strous & Vogelman, 1990)30. 
However, since the 1960s there has been a large increase in voluntary admissions and 
outpatient treatments (Vitus, 198 7), with psychiatric outpatient attendances increasing by 
834% between 1961 and 1989 (Visser, Haasbroek & Bodemer, 1989). 
Again, as in the previous century, changes in psychiatric incarceration mirrored 
changes in the criminal justice system, where "from the late 1960s onwards, probation began 
to be used in an historically unprecedented way" (Scull, 1984, p. 47) as part of a move to a 
community-based correction system. 
The fact that deinstitutionalisation occurred on such a la. ~e scale suggests that yet 
again the beliefhad arisen that the insane could be cured and released into the community. 
As Barham (1992) puts it: "The 'community' came to possess a null value- it was not seen as 
30 Several exposes during the 1970s and 1980s revealed abuses at these centres, 
including excessive drug use and patients being admitted for not carrying pass books or for 
arguing in public. Connie Mulder, minister of information in the apartheid government was a 
director of several of the institutions (Theil, 1997). The institutions were later renamed 'Life 
Care' centres and are, ironically, now part-owned by the black empowerment group, Real 
Africa Investments (Hess, 1997). 
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a therapeutic site or as the arena for an interrogation of the moral crisis in the relations 
between people with mental illness and the larger society, but just as the place to which 
people were to be sent back after medicine had cured them" (Barham, 1992, p. 14). 
The end of deinstitutionalisation 1: Lost to aftercare 
As happened to the previous 'cult of curability' in the 1800s, dissenting voices soon arose. 
Bachrach (1987) produces evidence that warnings of the possible adverse effects of 
deinstitutionalisation and the too-easy glorification of the community concept were published 
from 1964 onwards. An example of such early critiques is a paper by Dunham (1967) who 
lampooned the community approach and argued that there was no reliable information on its 
enabling the prevention of psychiatric disorders nor on how psychiatric disorders could be 
treated through community interventions. This kind of critique has gathered momentum over 
the past three decades so that the term 'deinstitutionalisation' is now used almost exclusively 
in a pejorative sense; and there is general agreement that since the mid-80s we have been in a 
post-deinstitutionalisation era (Shadish, Lurigio & Lewis, 1989). 
The backlash against deinstitutionalisation has taken two forms. In this section I 
review more extreme reactions, which eS~~ntially advocate a return, in one form or another, 
to the asylum. The more 'humane' (and therefore probably more lasting) option is reviewed in 
the next section. 
By the early 70s resistance to the community approach had started to create 'moral 
panics' with exemplary tales told in the media of violence committed by ex-patients and of 
the bad conditions in which the deinstitutionalised were accommodated (reviewed in Scull, 
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1984) 31 • "Often," so the story went, "they [hospital administrators] do not even know where 
those they have dumped back on the rest of us are to be found" (Scull, 1984, p. 1). The idea 
of madness being indiscriminately dumped, in a flagrant reversal of mental hygiene, occurs 
again and again (e.g., "many severely and chronically disabled patients have been 'dumped' in 
the rooming houses and decaying hotels ofinnercity areas": Morrissey, Goldman, & 
Klerman, 1980b, p. 3) as does the alarmist notion that the mad may have escaped beyond the 
reach even of surveillance: 
In November 1986 the National Institute ofMental Health admitted that the 
whereabouts of 58 per cent of people with a history of schizophrenia was unknown. 
As many as 937 000 had been lost to aftercare, and only 17 per cent were in receipt of 
outpatient care (Barham, 1992 p. 1 07). 
In South Africa accusations of dumping the mentally ill on society have also gone hand in 
hand with tales of their spectacular violence. Health Department plans to start a programme 
of community care in accordance with the White Paper on Health (1997), have been 
described as a scheme "to shunt thousands of mental patients out of state- run institutions and 
into the care of their families and friends" (Hess, 1997), and lurid accounts have been 
published of patients released from V alkenberg hospital killing seven people, including two 
children (Duffy,c 998). The head ofValkenberg's forensic unit explains the situation as 
follows (Duffy, 1998): 
Either we've got to watch them closely, or someone else must, but we have great 
31 Monahan and Shah (1989) review the voluminous literature which has since arisen 
around the perceived dangerousness of psychiatric patients. Two of the highlights of this 
research are that psychiatrists habitually over-predict dangerousness and that patients are far 
more likely to be dangerous to themselves than to others. Monahan (1992) nevertheless 
cautions against completely denying the modest empirical relationship between madness and 
violence. 
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difficulty keeping an eye on everyone. The only way we can keep control of them is 
to keep them in our walls. 
Coupled with these concerns and fears is a strong resurgence of official sympathy for the 
'plight of the mentally ill': "Thousands of'deinstitutionalized' patients", wrote Morrissey, 
Goldman and Klerman (1980b), "have been returned to communities only to encounter 
hostility and rejection by citizens and the new community centers alike" (p. 3). The 
'homeless mentally ill' are endlessly dissected ( cf Bachrach, 1988; Cohen & Thompson, 
1992; Morrison, 1989; Mulkern & Manderscheid, 1989; Santiago, Bachrach, Berren & 
Hannah, 1988; Torrey, 1988)- how many of them are there, what should be done with them, 
how should homelessness be defined? 
One implication ofthis combination of loathing and sympathy is that the mad should 
be humanely disposed of When in October 1939 Hitler decreed that patients with incurable 
diseases should be done away with, medical personnel arranged for 270 00032 mental patients 
to be killed (Colp, 1989). Displaying an attitude which has been described as t6dliches 
Mit/eid (deadly compassion), psychiatrists saw to it that patients were discreetly collected for 
this purpose in grey vans purport~ng to be from the Community Patients' Transport Service 
(Barham, 1992). While, thankfully, the likelihood of such events being repeated in the 
modem world seem remote, there is a recognition that perhaps a more pem1anent solution 
than community care may now be required. As Minkoff(1987) argues, "some patients are 
simply too sick or dangerous to ever leave the hospital" (p. 948), and even where this is not 
the case "a longer initial hospitalization can serve as a watershed experience that facilitates a 
more stable lifelong adaptation to illness" (p. 948). 
Thus we see patients beir:g collected from their 'rooming houses and decaying 
32 
'Upwards of100 000' according to Barham (1992). 
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innercity hotels', if not by grey vans then by ideologies of dangerousness, inability to cope, 
and chronicity, and returned safely to the asylum. There they find that the 'therapeutic 
community' has long since closed down and in its stead have come aggressive new somatic 
therapies (reviewed in the next chapter), consisting chiefly in the various forms of 
medication, but not excluding old favourites such as restraint and seclusion. 
Way and Banks (1990) in a survey of23 adult psychiatric hospitals in New York state 
found that between 0.4% and 9.4% of patients were secluded or restrained at some point 
during their stay. Norris and Kennedy (1992), sensitive to psychiatry's long-fostered 
tradition of liberating the insane, point out that although "empirical evidence has supported 
the use of seclusion for managing out -of-control psychiatric patients ... the act of forcibly 
locking a patient in a room generally leaves the staffwith unsettled, uncomfortable feelings" 
(p. 7). One of the ways of dealing with these unsettled and uncomfortable feelings is to 
ensure that the patients are at least settled and comfortable, even to the extent of gathering 
patient 'input' on the preferred temperature, colour of the walls and attitudes of the nurses 
whilst in seclusion (Norris & Kennedy, 1992). Thus one should 'plan carefully' for seclusion 
(Kendrick & Wilber, 1986), giving due consideration to difficult questions such as whether 
seclusion rooms should be visible to other patients or not (Wise, Mann, Leibenluft, Goldberg 
& McElvain, 1989). 
The argument, in summary, is therefore that deinstitutionalisation has perhaps gone 
too far (in Krauss and Slavinsky's, 1982, words: "an overreaction to bad care in bad 
hospitals", p. 84) and that many patients may in fact need to be more-or-less permanently 
readmitted to protect them from the c~elty, exploitation, stress, pauperism, isolation, self-
harm and harm to others which only the mental hospital can provide (Wing, 1990). 
However, the opposite argument, that deinstitutionalisation has not gone far enough, is heard 
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even more frequently- a view which (as will be shown) does not differ as fundamentally as 
might be imagined from that calling for reincarceration. 
The end of deinstitutionalisation II: The timeless trajectory 
Deinstitutionalisation was never simply an effort to do away with the mental hospital, but 
rather to reposition it in a larger network of psychiatric services. In South Africa, Morass 
(1969) was already emphasising the importance of involving the patient's family in aftercare 
and of getting former' patients to visit out-patient clinics. Reid ( 1986) quotes a 1963 
promotional movie, This is Tara, about the hospital where Morass was superintendent as 
follows: 
... And so today there is a new way of thinking ... not the patient coming to Tara, but 
Tara going to the patient. This is the forward trend (p. 14}. 
Thus the patient need no longer experience the inconvenience and stigma of spending time in 
hospital, but can receive psychiatric services 'in the community', while the ex-patient can 
continue to enjoy the care and sense of belonging which the mental hospital provides without 
the need for an actual readmission: 
There is also a Tara Social Club to which ex-patients beloi.g, and which preserves the 
link between patient and hospital after active treatment has ended. Ex-patients have 
regular meetings in Johannesburg, organise excursions together, and come to Tara at 
the weekend for sport and social activities (Minde, 1975, p. 373). 
A clear-cut distinction can no longer be made between hospitalisation and ordinary life: One 
is no longer either ill and in hospital or well and out of hospital. Or such, at least, is the ideal. 
The majority of critiques of the present era of community care do not call for whole-sale 
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rehospitalisation, but simply complain that not enough is being done to create a properly 
integrated system and to make community care more like hospital care. 
The problem, as Johnson (1990) sees it, is that if experts on mental illness from 
another planet were to visit the Uaited States they "would see a big, chaotic system, 
uncoordinated and incoherent, one that utterly fails to fulfil its mission, which is the ongoing 
care and treatment ofthe mentally ill" (Johnson, 1990, p. 180). Words and phrases like 
'fragmented' (Bachrach, 1989; Dill & Rochefort, 1989; Hadley, Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 
1997; Shadish, Lurigio & Lewis, 1989; White Paper, 1997), 'lack of integration' (Hadley, 
Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997) and 'disorganisation' (Dill & Rochefort, 1989) leap out at 
one from the literature on post-deinstitutionalisation; against these are ranged the desiderata 
of'coordination', 'continuity' and 'effective management' (Dill & Rochefort, 1989; Hadley, 
Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997; White Paper, 1997). It is argued that Community Mental 
Health Centres should have established more formal linkages to state hospitals (Morrissey, 
Goldman, & Klerman, 1980b ); more places should have been provided in local authority 
hostels (Barham, 1992); perhaps those who refuse treatment should be issued with 
Community Treatment Orders, the equivalent of certification ( cf the discussion in Barham, 
1992; Lawson, 1988); psychiatry should abandon the acute care model and develop a 
longitudinal perspective (Mechanic, 198~. ·; and patients should be trained in community 
living before release (Gittelman & Freedman, 1988). 
In short, community care should "attempt to provide for its patients the full range of 
functions that are associated with institutional care, namely: long-term care; asylum or place 
of refuge; accommodation and food; medical treatment; social and vocational help; 
supervised accommodation (custody) for those who have broken the law or engage in 
behaviour which will not be tolerated elsewhere; a comprehensive service; and secure 
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employment for professionals" (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994, p. 30). 
Exemplifying this notion of turning the community itself into an institution, Ekdawi 
and Conning (1994) discuss the idea of'hostel-wards', a cross between hospital wards and 
community hostels located on the edge of hospital grounds and providing graded community 
accommodation: "This arrangement should allow [for] ease of movement into and out of the 
Community and facilitate continuity of care by maintaining contact with those who move out 
of the Community" (p. 120). One such service in London "looks after approximately 350 
long-term patients, and yet has only 34 hospital beds" (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994, p. 121). 
Although complaints about the inadequacy of community care continue unabated, it is 
clear that much has been done recently to bring about this kind of utopia for everybody, with 
two thirds of community residential programs for the mentally ill in the United States having 
been established since 1980 (News and Notes, 1989), and more than 1000 partial 
hospitalisation programmes operating in America by the end ~f the 1980s (Parker & Knoll, 
1990). A 1984 survey in 16 American states showed that 93 353 'chronics' were being 
served, of whom 91% had at some point been in hospital, and 87% were on psychotropic 
medication. Although 75% were unemployed, very few were homeless or in prison (Mulkern 
& Manderscheid, 1989). 
Yet the lih ature abounds with appeals for even greater integration, communication, 
collaboration and liaison between hospital and community psychiatric staff ( cf. Hadley, 
Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997). In South Africa, the White Paper on health makes repeated 
mention of the need for psychiatric services to become more 'coordinated' and 'integrated', 
with greater emphasis on 'intersectoral coordination', even going so far as to recommend that 
'collaboration' with traditional healers should be explored (White Paper, 1997). 
In a fully integrated syste:n, readmission to a hospital is no longer to be considered a 
88 
sign of failure (Simpson, Seager & Robertson, 1993), since "even the most intensive 
programs cannot eliminate the intermittent necessity of psychiatric hospitalization" (Kanter, 
1991, p. 34). Thus, in their programme evaluation of a day hospital, Ferber, Oswald, Rubin, 
Ungemack and Schane (1985) do not use its capacity to deflect full-scale hospitalisation (the 
original purpose of such hospitals) as an outcome measure, but rather evaluate its efficacy in 
recruiting and maintaining patients in the psychiatric world: 
This high retention rate appears to result from the day hospital's focus as the entry 
point to a large and flexible network of long-term services in the same location and 
with familiar staff ... Because patients may need treatment and other support services 
' 
indefinitely, the day hospital often is the first stage in a long process of working with 
the patient (p. 1297-1298). 
It is in this context that Ferber et al. (1985) can use the fact that 62% ofthe day hospital 
patients ("far above the national average") remained in long-term treatment six months after 
the acute intervention (and that 50% were still receiving services two years later) as an index 
of success rather than failure. 
The name most commonly given to this new therapeutic ideology is rehabilitation -
not in the old-fashioned sense of restoring sanity, but of restoring to and maintaining at the 
optimal level of functioning allowed for by the degree of unalterable mental impairment. 
According to Mechanic (1986), "good rehabilitation treats acute psychiatric episodes, ensures 
appropriate medication monitoring, maintains nutrition and general health, makes provision 
for shelter and reasonable levels of activity and participation, provides crisis support, and 
builds a patient's personal capacities through continuing educational efforts" (p. 892). In 
terms of the rehabilitation ideology, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and 'related psychoses' 
have biological aetiologies and "treatment, therefore, involves both psychopharmacologic 
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interventions to control the primary symptoms and psychosocial interventions to assist the ill 
person to acknowledge, bear, and accept the illness" (Minkoff, 1987, p. 947). Like those 
suffering from diabetes or chronic heart disease, mentally ill people must be taught to accept 
that they have a life-time illness and to value the help they are offered (Barham, 1992; 
Minkoff, 1987)- "the challenge is to preserve function and limit disability" (Minkoff, 1987, 
p. 894). 
Uys (1991) identifies various eras in the development of psychiatry, and labels the 
current one the rehabilitation era: "Just as it suddenly was realized that institutions were not 
necessarily therapeutic, we now realize that simply moving the patient into the community 
does not necessarily increase the quality oflife or level of health" (p. 1). Outcome measures 
of the success of rehabilitation are functional status (the patient's 'daily living ability'), 
severity of symptoms, 'quality oflife', and hospitalisation - with the latter, as we have seen, 
no longer interpreted simply as readmission frequency (Uys, 1991). It is fully accepted that 
"there is an increasing number of disabled people who, until the 1950s, would have been 
continuously hospitalized for many years but who are now either not admitted to hospital or, 
alternatively, have brief multiple admissions" (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994, p. 3). 
Rehabilitation efforts have been shown to reduce readmission frequency (Belcher, 
1993; Hadley et a/., 1997), but -
Hospitalization, however, should not be taken at face v"Jue as denoting failure of 
rehabilitation ... In some cases, the purpose of planned hospital admissions is to 
provide respite and to forestall crises and they may therefore indicate a positive rather 
than a negative outcome (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994, p. 136). 
According to Johnson (1990), one of the most important things chronically mentally ill 
patients should be given "is permission to regress occasionally in the course of treatment and 
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the ability to be rehospitalized at once when they need it" (Johnson, 1990, p. 185). In fact, it 
is often the health care professional's task to get the patient into the hospital rather than keep 
her out: 
[The community mental health care nurse] must be sensitive to changes in behavior 
that signal that the patient is decompensating psychiatrically ... and possibly arrange 
for early rehospitalization. Such foresight can result in a shorter acute hospital stay, 
and the nurse can then continue support in helping the patient to readjust, once again, 
to community living (Hellwig, 1993, p. 22). 
The kind of chronicity thus constituted is not at all like the static (or slowly deteriorating) 
institutional chronicity encountered at the end of the previous century. Rather, it is a 
chronicity which is always on the move without ever going anywhere, a 'timeless trajectory' 
(Rawnsley, 1991): 
The crises requiring hospitalizations are followed by periods of stabilization of 
varying duration ... exacerbations and remissions; difficulty distinguishing between 
the effects of the disorder and the effects of the interventions; temporary comebacks, 
but no restoration ... The circular weave of psychosis diffuses direction (Rawnsley, 
1991, p. 209). 
Yet the new chronicity is also not at all like the mobile curability "' •ich came about at the 
end of eighteenth century. Where in the days of moral treatment the mad-doctor stood at the 
centre of the patient's therapy, this position has gradually been eroded, so that in the 
rehabilitation era the psychiatrist (however much he or she continues to be the titular head of 
the mental hospital ward) ha~ come to occupy a somewhat peripheral role in the overall 
treatment system. 
In the place of the psychiatrist stands the therapeutic tearn, involving not only 
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psychiatric nurses, psychologists, social workers and other para-medical personnel, but also 
the family, because, as everyone agrees, one "should include them in the loop of service 
delivery" (Belcher, 1993, p. 22). Far from being the cause of mental illness, "there has been 
an increasing recognition that relatives could be a positive resource in the management of 
patients when given the opportunity of information, training and support by the psychiatric 
services" (Ekdawi & Conning, 1994, p. 6). The consensus is overwhelming: Families should 
be 'engaged' in therapeutic programmes to a greater extent, family interventions should be 
'integrated' with rehabilitation programmes, there should be more 'co-ordination', 'continuity' 
and 'liaison'. Families should be recruited at ;multiple entry points', for example "acute 
admission units, out-patient and maintenance medication clinics, day centres, and voluntary 
groups" (Smith & Birchwood, 1990, p. 658) in order to set up an 'informed partnership' 
(Smith & Birchwood, 1990) between professional care givers and the family. 
In South Africa, where psychiatrists have often invoked the idea of an organic Mrican 
essence which is contaminated by contact with Western culture (Laubscher, 1937; Swartz & 
Foster, 1984) the need for engaging with the family is given an ethnic twist: 
Until recently the majority of psychiatric patients were contained and treated within 
the community, unless their behaviour represented a major threat to the social order of 
that community. With the graducLc -tcceptance of the Western concept of 
institutionalization, however, increasing numbers ofNguni patients are being 
admitted to psychiatric hospitals. These hospitals are usually far away from the 
patient's home; the close family ties, generally regarded as prerequisites for successful 
rehabilitation, are disrupted, and this often leads to rejection of the patients by the 
family (Cheetham & Griffiths, 1980, p. 168). 
Given that the links have been broken it is now incumbent on mental health workers to 
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restore them. The name of the gahte is case management (that is, doing a lot of engaging, 
integrating, coordinating and liaising on behalf of the patient), and the case managers are 
typically social workers, psychiatric nurses or 'mental health workers', frequently working 
together as a team (Minkoff, 1987; Hadley, Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997; White Paper, 
1997). In the United Kingdom the National Health Service and Community Care Act 
provides for the appointment of such case managers, who identify people in need of care, 
assess individual needs, "act as brokers in the planning of care" (Barham, 1992, p. 133), and 
so on. Although case management services were by the mid-90s only provided upon 
discharge from one in four Amerkan hospitals, the practice is becoming increasingly 
common (Dorwart & Hoover, 1994). 
Case managers and case management teams are encouraged to engage in what is 
called 'assertive community treatment' (Bond, McDanel, Miller & Pensec, 1991; Santos, Deci 
& Lachance, 1993) or 'aggressive outreach' (Hadley, Turk, Vasko & McGurrin, 1997). In this 
new dispensation, one can expect not only to visit one's case manager at the outpatient clinic, 
but also to have her pay a visit to one's home or place of work. Ekdawi and Conning (1994) 
describe how when a group of chronic ex-patients are visited by their psychiatric nurse at 
their place of employment she would "discreetly slip into the rest room to give the injections" 
(Ekdawi & Conni1 g, 1994, p. 32). Not all case managers are that discreet: "Aggressive 
outreach, as it is called, means aftercare staff have to call the errant patients up or even go 
visit them when they do not show up" (Johnson, 1990, p. 185). What becomes important 
when first encountering a patient in such a system is no longer merely to find out about her 
symptoms, social background, family history and so on, but also "relevant chronological 
details of the individual's past treatment and contact with psychiatric services including 
hospital admission are documented, together with reported factors which may have a bearing 
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on the course of illness and the frr::quency of contact with services" (Ekdawi & Conning, 
1994, p. 38). 
Hadley et al. (1997) describe a highly sophisticated and effective case management 
system instituted after the closure of the Philadelphia State Hospital. The system is aimed at 
'empowering' clients by focusing on their "strengths, abilities, vision for the future and 
aspirations, while also being keerJy aware of the medical/psychiatric issues which impact on 
the client' (p. 81-82). The system makes use ofTeam Leaders (minimum qualification 'a 
degree' with three years mental health experience) who supervise Case Managers, whose job 
it is to draw up 'personal plans' for clients. Case Managers also supervise Case Manager 
Technicians who provide "hands on assistance to the consumer such as going to the bank, 
shopping, teaching mobility traini.ng and implementing the details of the client's personal 
plan" (p. 85). In no instance does the time between contacts with clients exceed two weeks. 
Standing to the side of this is the psychiatrist, who merely provides periodic medication 
reviews and is 'available for consultation' should the need arise. 
The case manager's task is to find the right balance between improving the life quality 
of the chronic patient and minimising costs while helping clients to "negotiate the maze of 
community services" (Belcher, 1993, p. 21). Two models of case management are brokering 
(where the mental health worker acts as a kind of recruiting agent for psychiatry by putting 
up to 1.00 clients in contact with community and hospital services), and clinical case 
management, where the mental health worker looks after 10 to 20 clients more intensively, in 
which case "chronically mentally ill clients often use case managers as an auxiliary ego" (p. 
22). It is to this 'auxiliary ego' that the patient may confess the contours of her timeless 
trajectory. One approach is the use of time lines and life lines, the purpose of which is to 
"reframe experiences in a more positive way and to reconstruct memories that reflect the 
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accomplishments rather than the disappointments in one's life" (Quam & Abramson, 1991, p. 
28). The procedure is to 'facilitate' the construction by the patient of a chart on which events 
are chronologically plotted, positive events above a dividing line, negative events below, thus 
two-dimensionalising experience on a plane described by the axes of time and affect (Figures 
3.3 & 3.4). 
Figure 3.3 A life line (from Quam & Abramson, 1991) 
Positive events 
9 
Negative events MoU1er 
died 
25 
Was 
hospitalized 
32 
~.'oved to 
apartment 
45 
Uved wtm 
sister 
57 
Uved in 
grouo 
home 
I 
I 
53 
Was 
hospitalized 
Not surprisingly, apart from the obligatory reference to family and employment history (and 
the very occasional mention of symptomatology), these life lines trace the extended slow-
motion dance between the chronic patient and the psychiatric care system which has created 
her. Admissions, readmissions, residence in group homes, participation in sheltered 
workshops - these are the stuff a life is made of Hospital admissions and readmissions have 
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a particularly interesting role in this confessional. Although still plotted at the extreme 
negative end of the scale, they almost invariably represent a turning point for the good. As 
Quam & Abramson (1991) helpfully speculate, "perhaps a late-life hospitalization may lead 
to a more stable community placement" (p. 31). 
Figure 3.4. Life line of a 65-year-old male (from Quam & Abramson, 1991) 
Celebrated 65th birthday Age 65 
lvloved to a new group home Age 56 
"'"' '" ,~,"~'lAo"' 
lvlo:herd1ed -~Ao•~ 
Was hospi~lized Age 40 
Lived in group home I Age 38 
Participated in sheltered workshop ~Age 37 
Divorced -------1- Age 33 
Entered state hospital ----+-Age 30 
Fought with employ_e_r -----+-~: AAggee 2267 fv'.arried/Had child . -
Took first job------l-Age 25 
Graduated from college Age 24 
Was ftrs! hoSPitalized ----+-Age 16 
Heard voices Age 15 
Father died ------+-Age 11 
Had problems at schoo: Age 10 
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Conclusion: Free at last 
Arguing for an end to racial disparities in psychiatric service provision, Dommisse (1987) 
quotes Nelson Mandela's 1964 Rivonia trial speech, prior to his incarceration on Robben 
Island, as follows: 
Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa ... Above all, we want equal 
political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent (p. 756). 
Although the equal rights agenda has not been fully achieved in either the political or the 
medical field, there is now for the first time the prospect of steady progress in establishing a 
human rights culture in South Africa. Although this is without doubt cause for celebration, it 
is also certain that as the mechanisms of overt repression are removed, South African society 
will be subjected to ever more sophisticated mechanisms of disciplinary power. 
In this and the previous chapter I have tried to show how this process of 
modernisation has proceeded in Western psychiatry over the past three centuries. Through 
endlessly repeated cycles of discharge and readmission more and more individuals have been 
recruited into and confirmed in their status as psychiatric subjects until finally their 
disabilities have indeed become permanent - not in the sense that they suffer from real 
chroPJc illnesses (this may or may not be the .;ase), but in that for many there is no longer any 
(real) prospect of an existence outside the world of psychiatry. 
I would argue, along with Rose (1986a), that "rather than seeking to explain a process 
of de-institutionalization, we need to account for the proliferation of sites for the practice of 
psychiatry" (p. 83). This proliferation is clearly evident in the briefhistorical overview 
presented in this and the previous chapter, even though my focus has for the most part been 
limited to practices in some way linked to the psychiatric hospital. Also evident is a 
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consistent movement, despite frequent oscillations between therapeutic optimism and 
pessimism, towards a socialising and softening of coercive practices. At least since Pinel, 
psychiatry has struggled to recognise the 'human rights' of its subjects while maintaining an 
appropriate degree of control. Today even institutional psychiatry functions by talking of 
patients as 'clients' and 'consumers', by 'empowering' patients through the drawing up of 
'personal plans', by giving them 'permission to regress', by asking for 'patient input' on the 
colour of the walls in seclusion rooms, and by encouraging patients to narrativise their lives 
in terms of individualised scripts. It is easy to expose such tactics as threadbare attempts at 
respectability from what remains essentially a coercive discipline, but this is so perhaps 
purely because institutional psychiatry has set itself the task of managing and reproducing 
difficult-to-manage individuals. The system of surveillance, confession, human rights and 
free choice within which the rest of us become subjectified operates with almost seamless 
coherence, and it is only at the outer limits of its effectiveness (such as when dealing with 
serious 'mental illness') that one c~n begin to recognise its inherent contradictions. 
Outside the institution, beyond the reach even of the numerous tentacles that extend 
from the institution into the community, psychiatry and its allied disciplines have in the 
meantime found innumerable new sites of practice where they can operate in an economy of 
free choice and wit: .)Ut so much as a hint of scandal: 
One can point, on the one hand, to the proliferation of the psychotherapeutic 
technologies of marriage guidance, child rearing, sexual difficulties, and the problems 
of everyday life and, on the other, to the ever-increasing demand for pharmacological 
products to assuage personal unhappiness. The contemporary psychiatric system 
operates predominantly through free choices made in the personal domain, in which 
mental health is both a private objective and a personal responsibility; the promotion 
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of the self is conducted through the voluntary enlistment of help from skilled 
technicians. Opposition to the 'coercive' aspects of psychiatry has been central to its 
modernization (Rose, 1986b, p. 213). 
99 
Chapter 4 
Poised on the brink: 
The social construction of a New Biological Psychiatry 
You know the difference between a real science and a pseudoscience? A real science 
recognizes and accepts its own history without feeling attacked. 
-Michel Foucault (1988)1 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I reviewed historical oscillations in the practical and ideological 
management of the insane, showing how they have been repeatedly expelled from and 
reinducted into an ever-more encompassing system of psychiatric care. In this chapter I 
consider one aspect of the 'moral confinement' into which psychiatric patients have currently 
been readmitted, namely the presumed somatic aetiology of the major disorders. In particular 
I attempt to characterise the way in which present-day psychiatrists who subscribe to this 
ideology position themselves between past and future. 
It is common cause that the past two decades have seen the rebirth in psychiatry of an 
enthusiasm for somatic explanations and the pharmacological management of mental 
disorders. The first of the new drug treatments came on the market in the late fifties, by the 
mid seventies 25% ofNational Health Service prescriptions in Britain were for psychiatric 
medications (Rose, 1986a), and by the early eighties, faced with the apparent success of drug 
therapies academic psychiatry had fully embraced a new biological orthodoxy. 
Light ( 1982) describes how "within a short time the leading departments of psychiatry 
In Martin (1988, p. 12) 
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left their imitators and camp followers behind as they forged a new professional identity 
around advances in biopsychiatry" (p. 43), while Cockerham (1981), writing at about the 
same time, states: "Bolstered by recent biochemical discoveries, a current view in psychiatry 
is that the discipline is entering a new era, possibly making psychiatry one of the most 
scientifically precise of all medical specialties and ending its traditional dependence upon 
subjective judgments of and insights into the human mind" (p. 79-80). A review (Pincus, 
Henderson, Blackwood & Dial, 1993) of research articles published in the two leading 
American journals of general psychiatry, The American Journal of Psychiatry and Archives 
of General Psychiatry, showed that by the early nineties Clinical Psychobiology had become 
the largestl2 content category (25%), having risen sharply from 14.4% in 1969-70, while 
Social Science (12.8% to 10.2%) and Psychosocial Treatments (3.1% to 3.6%) remained 
more or less static. 
Even psychiatrists who are not positively inclined towards biopsychiatry 
acknowledge its increasing predominance. Arthur Kleinman (1988), an anthropologically 
orientated psychiatrist, portrays the eighties as a "period of biological revanchism in 
psychiatry - when many psychiatrists seem[ ed] to believe that understanding the biological 
basis of mental disorders is, if not around the comer, at most two or three streets away, and 
that such knowledge will be all the clinician needs to know to treat p.. ients with 
schizophrenia and depression" (p. xi). He goes on to speak of how psychiatry "has been 
overtaken in the 1980s with a fervor for biological explanations" (p. 1) and complains that 
"academic psychiatry aims to become a version of high-technology internal medicine" 
(p. 140). The nineties, designatd the 'decade of the brain' in psychiatry (Wallace, 1997), has 
32 The second largest category was Diagnosis/nosology at 21. 7%, with 
Psychopharmacology third at 17.1 %. 
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been dominated by biological research and therapy, and there is widespread agreement that 
there has been a rapid expansion in understanding of the neurochemistry of the brain 
(Meador-Woodruff & Watson, 1997). Even at the start ofthe decade the American 
Psychiatric Association (AP A) president already felt unsettled by "continuing excellent but 
unbalancing advances in brain biology" (Hartmann, 1992, p. 1137}33. 
These authors for the most part seem to assume that scientific advances constitute the 
driving force which has catapulted biopsychiatry into its currently 'unbalancing' preeminence. 
This is typical of 'insider' accounts of the development of science. Insiders tend to place much 
emphasis on the way in which scientific progress occurs through a process of verification, 
with incorrect theories replaced by correct ones on the basis of empirical evidence. Thomas 
Kuhn (1962), whose Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been enormously influential in 
casting doubt on such views, describes them as follows: 
If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts, 
then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or 
another element to that particular constellation. Scientific development becomes the 
piecemeal process by which these items have been added, singly or in combination, to 
the ever growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and knowledge. And 
history of science becomes the discip~. 1e that chronicles both these successive 
increments and the obstacles which have inhibited their accumulation (p. 1-2). 
33 As early as the mid-sixties Alexander and Sheldon (1966) complained ofthe rising new 
biologism: "The role of the devil now has been taken over by brain chemistry. No longer a devil 
but a deus ex machina, a disturbed brain chemistry rather than the person's own life experiences, 
is responsible for mental illness. Whatever the cause of faulty brain chemistry may be, the new 
conviction is that the disturbed mind can now be cured by drugs and that the patient himself as 
a person no longer needs to try to understand the source of his troubles and master them by 
improved self-knowledge" (p. 14). From the late sixties the National Institute of Mental Health 
started targeting biopsychiatric research for nearly all its funding (Light, 1982). 
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The kind of historiography which Kuhn seeks to debunk has been labelled Whig history, after 
a phrase used by the British historian Herbert Butterfield to satirise the tendency of some 
English constitutional historians to portray their field in terms of the continued broadening of 
human rights resulting from the struggle between forward-looking liberals and backward-
looking conservatives (Brush, 1974). In medicine, Mishler, AmaraSingham, Osherson, 
Hauser, W ax.ler and Liem ( 1981) describe Whig histories as follows: 
Many discussions of the history of medicine center ... on the history of ideas or on the 
history of people and events; they view medicine ... as the evolution and advance of 
important concepts and theories or as the product of key discoveries by researchers . 
. . . These approaches tend to stay within medicine; in them its development is isolated 
from significant social forces outside the profession. Their implication is that the way 
medicine developed is the only way in which it could have developed, and - 'should' 
replacing 'could' - that medicine has been a constant advance of 'better' theory and 
practice (p. 244-245). 
Since Kuhn, many philosophers, sociologists and historians of science have been active in 
criticizing such justificatory histories and substituting more 'accurate' accounts oftheir own 
(cf Woodward, 1986; and, for psychiatry, Allderidge, 1990; MacDonald, 1990; Miller, 1986; 
Scull, 1991 b; V ande1 ~ teersch, 1991 ), but perhaps more interesting and logically prior to 
identifying the forces which 'really' shape science, is simply describing the rhetorical and 
other devices used by scientists themselves to construct the unfolding of their disciplines 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Doing just that, Scull (199lb) describes the general form ofWhig 
histories in psychiatry as follows: 
Psychiatric history was here cast as a morality tale, a. movement from the dark period 
when lunacy was not seen as a condition requiring medical treatment, through a 
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drawn-out struggle in which the steady application of rational-scientific principles by 
people of good will produced halting and irregular but unmistakeable evidence of 
progress towards humane and effective treatments for those afflicted with the various 
forms of mental alienation - a process supposedly culminating in our present state of 
grace (p. 240). 
The philosophical implications of describing science, and particularly psychiatry, in such 
constructivist terms will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. This chapter has 
the more limited aim of appraising the ways in which biologically oriented psychiatrists view 
the past and future of their profession. To distinguish the biopsychiatric movement which 
has flourished since the late fifties from previous periods of biological dominance in 
psychiatry, I label it the New Biological Psychiatry (NBP) and identify three distinctive 
features of the NBP's emerging historiography: 
I. Scientific discovery is viewed as the primary mechanism ofhistorical progression; 
2. Psychiatry is presented as having only recently emerged from a period of superstition; 
and 
3. The NBP has strongly millenarian overtones. 34 
The first characteristic is shared with science and medicine in general, while the 
second and third appear to be specific to the NBP. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the prospects for a new anti-biopsychiatry. 
34 Birley (1990) labels the current somatic phase 'optimistic' or 'manic' organic theory, 
and cautions that it is liable to be followed by a pessimistic or depressive side. 
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'Specific questions of fact': The logic of scientific discovery in psychiatry 
In a lecture at London's Maudsley hospital35, provocatively titled "Biological Psychiatry: is 
there any other kind?" Samuel Guze (1989), senior professor at a leading American medical 
school, spelled out the credo of the New Biological Psychiatry: All good psychiatry is 
necessarily biological. "Psychiatry, " said Guze, "is a branch of medicine, which in tum is a 
form of applied biology. It follows, therefore, that biological science, broadly defined, is the 
foundation of medical science and hence of medical practice" (p. 319). Political, religious 
and philosophical objections to this kind of reductionism are easily dismissed because they 
are not scientific and, in any case, can themselves be reduced to biology. "I believe," said 
Guze, "that continuing debate about the biological basis of psychiatry is derived much more 
from philosophical, ideological and pc!itical concerns than from scientific ones ... We will 
increasingly be thinking and discussing specific questions of fact and their interpretation 
rather than argue about ideological matters as substitutes for scientific discourse" (p. 322). 
Thus in the minds of some biopsychiatrists at least philosophy is lumped together with the 
presumably equally subjective and wordy enterprises of religion, ideology, politics and 
psychology, and opposed to the 'specific questions of fact' which is the realm of science. 
This is Whig history at its best, and if it differs from scientific and psychiatric 
historiography in general, it is perhaps only in degree. In essence the story remains a 
tributary of the main medico-scientific tale in which enlightened doctor-scientists gradually, 
through the painstaking accumulation of facts, overcome the forces of intolerance and 
superstition. Classics of psychiatric historiography such as Zilboorg & Henry (1941) and 
Alexander & Sheldon (1966) give dramatic accounts of that great, mythical, upward sweep of 
Later reprinted in Psychological Medicine. 
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humanism and science with which psychiatry has always wished to align itself The New 
Biological Psychiatry simply believes even more firmly that an adherence to medical and 
scientific principles can guarantee for the discipline an ever-upward trajectory from past to 
future. The word 'progress' leaps out at one from the pages ofbiopsychiatric texts; it is used 
no fewer than five times on the first page of Trimble's (1988) authoritative handbook of 
biological psychiatry. 
The irony is that biological psychiatry, perhaps more so than most branches of 
medicine, has progressed not through rational enquiry and evolutionary growth, but as a 
result of serendipitous discoveries. The following is an incomplete list of somatic treatments 
which, by common consent, were arrived at serendipitously: 
Electroconvulsive treatment was introduced by Cerletti and Bini on the apparently 
mistaken theoretical grounds that psychosis and epileptic convulsions are mutually exclusive. 
Only when the treatment failed with schizophrenic patients, did they extend their trials to 
include those with affective disorders. 
Cade (who afterwards styled himself as 'a little known psychiatrist with no research 
training'36 ) stumbled on lithium treatment for mania in the course of testing his theory that 
manic patients are intoxicated by an excess of naturally-occurring substances (such as 
lithium) in the body. On observing lithium's sedative effects, Cade reve1 ,ed his theory, now 
speculating that mania is caused by a lithium deficiency. However, this theory appears also 
to have been wrong, and as with electroshock, "the mode whereby it exerts its effects in 
psychiatry remains unknown" (Kiloh, Smith, & Johnson, 1988, p. 69). Colp (1989) tells 
another version of the story, narr.ely that Cade thought mania was caused by an excess of 
natural metabolites (such as urea and uric acid) and that since lithium had been used in 
36 As quoted in Kiloh, Smith and Johnson (1988). 
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medical conditions in which these metabolites were elevated, he speculated that it might also 
help for mania. It was only when he injected guinea pigs with lithium that he noticed that it 
produced drowsiness and might for that reason be useful in mania. Cade (1949) himself said 
he wanted to see if uric acid would enhance the toxicity of urea, which he had injected into 
guinea pigs, apparently with the purpose of bringing about convulsions in the course of 
research on epilepsy. "The great difficulty was the insolubility of uric acid in water, so the 
most soluble urate was chosen- the lithium salt" (p. 350). 
Chlorpromazine (CPZ), the first major anti-psychotic, was first synthesised in 1883 
by a chemist analysing chemical dyes, rediscovered in 193 7 in the course of searching for a 
synthetic antihistamine to counteract allergic shock, tested in 1944 as an antimalarial drug, 
and in 1951 as a tranquilliser for surgical patients (where it was thought to induce "artificial 
hibernation"; Johnson, 1990). In 1952 Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker reported that CPZ 
affected mood, thinking processes, and behaviour in psychotics. It was consequently tried 
first on manic, and later on agitated schizophrenic patients. Iproniazid, the first of the 
monoamine oxidase inhibitors was initially used in the treatment of tuberculosis, where it 
was noticed to have mood-elevating properties. Imipramine, on the other hand, being an 
analogue of chlorpromazine, was on theoretical grounds expected to have value as an 
antipsychotic, and only when its clinical effect., were found to be different from 
chlorpromazine was it tried on depressed patients. Moprobamate (Miltown), the first of the 
now notorious minor tranquillisers such as Librium and Valium, was stumbled upon in the 
course of animal-testing for new antibacterial drugs, where it was observed to relieve tension. 
And so on. 
Of course attempts at linking the history of biological psychiatry to the logic of 
scientific enquiry differ in sophistication. Kiloh, Smith and Johnson's (1988) historical 
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introduction to their standard text on physical treatments in psychiatry is possibly the most 
detailed account yet given by biopsychiatrists of the historical development of their 
discipline. Their technique is first to describe with great candour the various inhumane and 
senseless treatments which have been the province ofbiopsychiatry, and then to point out 
how each became discredited through rational scientific research. 
Thus their readers learn how "the most pervasive and dangerous aetiological 
invention of the twentieth century" (p. 6), focal infection, and its treatment by the removal of 
teeth, tonsils, reproductive organs etc. reigned supreme until Kopeloff and Kirby 
demonstrated in a controlled study that more of the controls survived37• Similarly, the insulin 
therapy vogue held sway, one is told, until Ackner and his colleagues published their 
double-blind controlled trial which showed that insulin coma was no more effective than 
barbiturate-induced coma. Acetylcholine treatment was long administered to schizophrenic 
and later neurotic patients, but fortunately Pare and others eventually carried out controlled 
trials in which they demonstrated that equal numbers improved on active treatment and 
placebo. Carbon dioxide was used in neuroses, anxiety states and hysteria with initial 
positive results, but "it was left to Hawkings and Tibbets ... to conduct a clinical trial" (p. 10) 
in which they demonstrated equal efficacy for inhalations of compressed air. 
Another examr..; ~ ofthis kind of presentation is Colp's (1989) version ofhow 
chlorpromazine got to be an accepted drug: "In 1964, a double-blind study by the National 
Institute ofMental Health, which compared the clinical effects of placebos, chlorpromazine, 
and two other antipsychotics, wh~n each was administered to hospitalized patients, 
scientifically demonstrated the effectiveness of the anti psychotics and established guidelines 
:n In fact contradictory findings were repeatedly ignored or suppressed. See Scull 
(1990) for a detailed history. 
108 
for the future clinical evaluation of psychoactive drugs" (p. 2141). However, Johnson (1990) 
has shown that the drug came to be used on a massive scale before any controlled studies had-
been done. Moreover, in their re,·iew, Wyatt, Apud and Potkin (1996) could find only nine 
studies that had ever been done comparing first hospitalisation schizophrenic patients given 
antipsychotic medications with a control group given other treatments. Even among these 
studies many were not carefully c.ontrolled and only two of the nine "found that patients 
initially given antipsychotic medications did significantly better than those given nonsomatic 
treatments" (Wyatt, Apud & Potkin, 1996, p. 362). 
Kiloh, Smith and Johnson (1988) admit that scientific refutation was not always 
immediately followed by the clinical abandonment of a treatment (as for instance with the 
hard-to-eradicate treatment of focal infection) and that treatments may also have been 
abartdoned simply because more convenient or apparently better treatments came along (as in 
the case of insulin coma treatment which got overtaken by reserpine and chlorpromazine). 
However, the overall implication is that it was primarily rational scientific research which 
has weeded out useless and harmful treatments. 
This dressing up of the facts encourages practising psychiatrists to assume that 
convincing scientific refutation of the efficacy of any currently used treatment or theory will 
soon enough result in its abandonment by the psychiatric establishment. This is so not only 
for 'true believers', but also for those such as Charlton (1990) who are higWy critical of the 
New Biological Psychiatry. Charlton believes that biological psychiatry is poised on the 
brink of a paradigm crisis: "when inconsistencies begin to build up, when good predictions 
are not forthcoming: when, in other words, things are not working as well as they used to" (p. 
6). While there inevitably will be inconsistencies and failed predictions in the biopsychiatric 
literature, there is little evidence ~hat this is leading to a loss of nerve. 
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An example is Mellon's (1989) review of genetic linkage studies in bipolar disorder. 
Once the great hope ofbiopsychiatric research, linkage studies have increasingly run into 
difficulties, leading Mellon to conclude that "after 20 years and approximately 30 studies, the 
status of the bipolar linkage field has not changed much" (p. 155) and that "lack of 
replication in the field has contributed to a growing skepticism about the usefulness and 
reliability of the linkage study approach in psychiatric illness" (p. 154). However, despite 
these devastating conclusions Me!lon does not hesitate to add: "Yet it still holds great 
promise for answering basic questions of etiology and diagnosis" (p. 155). 
Similarly Murray, KeiWin and Nimgaonkar (1988) suggest, from their review ofthe 
biology of schizophrenia, that "the reader may conclude that the neurochemical findings we 
have reviewed represent a meagre reward for 25 years of effort" and that the last decade has 
seen nothing more than "modest progress in understanding the biology of schizophrenia" 
(p. 176). Nevertheless they remain hopeful that the apparent confusion in the theorising 
about the neurochemistry of schizophrenia will soon be resolved by the discovery of "some 
primary but unknown abnormalit)" (p. 176) in the neurochemistry of schizophrenic brains. 
·wyatt, Apud and Potkin's ( 1996) review of the treatment of schizophrenia is equally 
unenthusiastic about the current state of play (treatments are 'at best palliative', genetic 
findings are 'tentative' and 'nonspecific'), but hopeful for the future: "Our knowledge 
continues to grow ... Improved care is on the horizon" (p. 366-367). 
A final example: When Harrow, Goldberg, Grossman and Meltzer (1990) found that 
one of the most taken-for-granted 'facts' in psychiatry, the supposed prophylactic efficacy of 
lithium carbonate in mania, could not be demonstrated in clinical practice, they did not 
consider it necessary to question the idea of mania as a condition amenable to biological 
management or to suggest that the neurochemical theory (such as it is) of mania needs to be 
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revised. Instead, their proposals were limited to practicalities: The use of alternate drugs 
such as carbamazepine should be explored and blood lithium levels should be monitored 
more assiduously. 
In a closely argued and carefully documented study suggestively titled The structure 
of psychopharmacological revolt. lions, Healy ( 198 7) demonstrated that "the 
catecholaminergenic hypotheses of depression and dopaminergenic hypotheses of 
schizophrenia38 appear irrefutable. While apparently testable, negative evidence to date has 
had little effect and there is almost infinite scope to resist refutation" (p. 367). Much research 
in the field appears to operate on "the assumption that amines will be found to be deranged in 
the affective disorders despite the evidence ... that the original pharmacological basis for the 
expectation no longer warrants an exclusive focus on amines" (p. 359). He concludes that, 
like the Oedipal hypothesis in psychodynamic psychiatry, these hypotheses will never be 
refuted, no matter how overwheh~1ing the weight of contradictory evidence, but will at best 
fade away as psychodynamic psychiatry faded away when research interest moved on to 
other fields. 
'A strange antirational period': Discounting the recent past 
A catalogue, such as that presented above, of how biological psychiatry has remained 
unmoved by 'specific questions of fact' prompts a sceptical response to claims by Guze 
(1989) and others that psychiatry has loosened itself from the fetters of philosophy and will 
henceforth operate along strictly scientific lines. A tendency to oversell the internal 
coherence of research work is not however by any means unique to biological psychiatry, and 
38 Wallace (1997) terms it "the hallowed dopamine hypothesis" (p. 93). 
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equally damaging accounts have 1:>een given for instance of biology (Meyers, 1990) and 
physics (Gross, 1991). 
Like other scientific historiographies, that constructed to explain and justify 
biopsychiatry also locates speculative, philosophical and superstitious behaviour in the 
discipline's past, with rational and scientific approaches supposedly becoming more 
prominent as one approaches the presene9• Critical historians of science have argued that 
"preconceptions of science as necessarily antagonistic to superstition [have] resulted in a 
misperception ofhistorical data" (Kirsch, 1980, p. 359), and that the passage of time has 
rendered practices such as a belief in demonology and witchcraft sufficiently exotic that it is 
easy to forget that they were once considered established fact by such scientific luminaries as 
Copernicus, Kepler, Napier, Boyle and Newton. 
What is rather special about the New Biological Psychiatry, however, is that it places 
the era of superstition not in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, but only two or three 
decades away. The culmination of these superstitious tendencies was, so the story goes, the 
deinstitutionalisation debacle of the 1960s and 70s. Cancro ( 1989) speaks of "this strange 
antirational period of massive denial and grandiose expectations" (p. vii) and of the "near 
delusional beliefs" of those psychiatrists who participated in it. Deinstitutionalisation's failure 
appears to represent a powerful warning that to , ivialise mental illness as anything other than 
a serious biological disease is to advocate the gross neglect of psychiatric patients. Thus 
Trimble (1988) feels compelled to explicitly warn fellow biopsychiatrists against again 
becoming "submerged and lost in a quagmire of new, old or revived psychological 
theorising" (p. xii). 
39 As Colp (1989) puts it: "One comes away with a fresh appreciation ofthe great 
differences between ancient and modern- notably, the recent dramatic progress in the 
diagnosis and treatment ofmost psychiatric diseases" (p. 2143). 
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To make things worse, psychiatry is presented as having lost its head not only for a 
decade or so after the 1960s, but ror the better part of a century. The trouble started, as 
Trimble (1988) explains, with "psychological theorizing, which arose on the neoromantic tide 
of the tum of the century. This culminated in the psychoanalytic movement, which for a 
considerable time became synonymous with psychiatry" (p. xi). This 'considerable time' 
lasted from the 1920s until well into the 1970s, a fact which historians ofthe New Biological 
Psychiatry believe should be seen in the context of a much longer period of relative sanity: 
"this era has provided psychiatry with a legacy that it does not deserve, the main trend of the 
tradition for over 2000 years being medical and neuropathologically based" (Trimble, 1988, 
p. xi-xii). It is doubtful if any other scientific discipline, medical or otherwise, has had to 
admit to such a sizeable recent dip in what is usually presented as the steadily rising line of 
scientific conquest, and in this respect the New Biological Psychiatry clearly differs from 
psychiatry in general. 
Another curiosity is that the main physical treatments in psychiatry, the treatments 
which have given biopsychiatry s.1ch a central place in everyday psychiatric practice, were 
instituted not before or after the 'strange antirational period', but while it was still in full 
swing: Electroshock in 1938, lithium in 1949, chlorpromazine in 1952, and imiprimine in 
1958. Cancro (1989) eh. ·lains this anomaly by presenting biopsychiatric research as an 
ongoing enterprise which, although periodically repressed, continued with the painstaking 
task of scientific knowledge accumulation: 
The period was primarily dominated in America by psychoanalytic thinking. 
Biological studies were g::.>ing on, but they were not in the mainstream. It was not 
until the mid-1950s, with the introduction of pharmacologically effective compounds, 
that American psychiatry began to move into the pantheon of medicine. Despite this 
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scientific movement ofthe 1950s, the exuberance of the 1960s swept much ofthe 
previous rational enquiry and evolutionary growth aside (p. vii). 
Is it true that psychiatry has just returned from a half-a-century long psychoanalytic detour in 
the course ofwhich it lost contact with the grand old traditions of its biomedical past, or are 
both the detour and the grand old traditions New Biopsychiatric inventions? 
That psychoanalysis had a certain prestige in psychiatry in the period from the 1920s 
to the 1970s, and that it in turn conferred a degree of prestige on the psychiatric profession, 
cannot be denied. However, it is clear that somatic views of mental illness were by no means 
discounted. Among the more horrific treatments advocated and administered by 
biopsychiatrists during the 'neoromantic' period are pre-frontal lobotomy, of which over 50 
000 had been performed by the mid-fifties and hydro-therapy, which (in one of its variations) 
required that patients be kept tightly cocooned for up to four hours in sheets which were 
regularly drenched, first with cold and then with hot water. Then as now, it was only a small 
minority of hospitalised patients who were ever psychoanalysed. For the vast majority of 
hospitalised patients the facts of psychiatric life revolved around closed wards, restraint, and 
somatic treatment. 
Two textbooks for lower-level psychiatric personnel published on the eve of 
<.: jnstitutionalisation are suggestive of the things omitted from biopsychiatric accounts of 
what we are asked to believe was a neoromantic/psychoanalytic interregnum. Rodeman 
(1956) starts her guide for American psychiatric aides with the following confident assertion, 
so very reminiscent of latter-day biopsychiatric statements: "The history of the care and 
treatment of psychiatric patients r~veals that this care has progressed from abuse and 
punishment in the early days to the present-day care and treatment based on scientific 
knowledge and understanding of human behaviour" (p. I). She goes on to advise aides to 
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bear in mind that psychiatric patients perspire more than ordinary people, to never show 
either approval or disapproval of patients' behaviour ("remember always that he is ill and that 
his behaviour is a symptom of his illness"; p. 13), and so on. Much attention is given to the 
mechanics of preparing patients for insulin coma therapy and hydro-therapy, and aides are 
repeatedly urged to "reassure the patient and emphasize that this is a treatment," (p. 44) and 
to "avoid any details of the treatment which might frighten the patient" (p. 98). In case there 
are some aides who harbour doubts of their own, Rodeman is quick to reassure them: "It is 
not yet known how the insulin coma produces improvement in the patient, but improvement 
occurs in all aspects of his personality" (p. 97). 
The second textbook, by Houliston (1955), matron at Crichton Royal Mental Hospital 
at Dumfries, was written for British psychiatric nurses, but the picture she paints is very 
similar. Confinement, seclusion, supervision of patients with 'tendencies to wander or escape' 
- these are presented as the stock in trade of a nurse's life in a mental hospital. Psychotherapy 
gets just more than a page, in which the reader is informed that it has two varieties: 
Suggestion and Persuasion. Ali-in-all Houliston is as confident as Rodeman that science is 
still carrying us all upwards and forwards and that things are much better now than they were 
in the bad old days: "The modern treatments available to mentai patients include such things 
as electro-shock, insulin therapy, prolonged narcosis, hydro-therapy, occupational and 
recreational therapy, the various forms of psychotherapy, and prefrontalleucotomy, the brain 
operation recently introduced in psychiatry with success" (p. 7). 
Rodeman and Houliston's textbooks were chosen for purposes of illustration, but are 
not unique. A similar ethos for instance pervades Ingram's (1949) Principles of Psychiatric 
Nursing and Altschul's (1957) Aids to psychiatric nursing, although Trick and Obcarskas' 
(1968) more recent Understanding Mental Illness and its nursing is perhaps not quite in the 
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same category. A somatic orientation towards mental illness during the 'necromantic' period 
is not confined to nursing texts ei·cher, as is demonstrated by the preface to the sixth edition of 
Henderson & Gillespie's (1944) Text-book of psychiatry in which they state that: "The 
dramatic successes attained by methods of physical treatment, such as those conducted by 
chemically or electrically induced convulsions and by surgical division of the white matter of 
the frontal lobes, have prompted us to add a special chapter on these triumphs of empiricism" 
(p. vii). 
Interestingly, both Rodeman and Houliston have historical introductions in which 
psychiatry's imagined progression from superstition to science is mapped out. Houliston's 
historiography is particularly interesting in that she divides psychiatric history into various 
eras ('demonological', 'political' and so on), locating the then present firmly in the scientific 
era. Ironically this era is said to have started with the dawn of the twentieth century, just at 
the precise moment that Trimble (1988) sees the 'necromantic tide' coming in. 
If the story about psychiatry's necromantic aberration is illusory, what then about the 
grand-old-tradition story? The short answer to this question is that, with the ex(:eption of 
clearly organic brain syndromes such as Alzheimer's disease and General Paralysis of the 
Insane (cerebral syphilis), which as early as 1822 was understood to be a physical disease 
and by 1909 "had moved from the stormy waters of psychiatry into the sa ~ harbor of 
neurology" (Gilman, 1988, p. 211 ), the neurological basis of mental illnesses remains 
unexplicated. Similar views have been expressed by Kleinman (1988) and Kleinman and 
Cohen (1997). Kleinman (1988) states the case quite biuntly: 
There is still, after more than 30 years of intensive biological investigation, no 
clear -cut understanding of the biology of schizophrenia ... This does not deter 
psychiatrists and those who write the advertisements for drug companies from 
116 
asserting without any hesitation that schizophrenia is a biologically based disorder. 
This belief is a central tenet of professional orthodoxy (p. 188). 
Trimble (1988) is probably correct in stating that the main trend in psychiatry over the past 
2000 years has been neuropathological, but unfortunately there is little in this tradition, 
except for its general sentiment, which is of much use to modern biopsychiatry. Hippocrates 
and Galen may have set an example in their insistence that mental illness has a somatic 
origin, but their aetiological ideas concerning the correct mixture of phlegm, bile and so on 
now seem fanciful. The same goes for the seventeenth century British biopsychiatrist 
Thomas Willis, the details of whose theory relating to animal spirits circulating through the 
cortex are of course no longer accepted. The list goes on: Griesinger (insanity is caused by 
changes in circulation, nervous irritation or disturbed nutrition); Morel (insanity is a 
hereditary form of'degeneration'); Foville (neuroses are localised nervous system diseases). 
It is instructive to look at the original texts of some of these great figures from the 
prehistory ofbiopsychiatry, for instance that of James Prichard (1837). Prichard is mainly 
famous for creating the now-defunct disease of moral insanity "consisting in a morbid 
perversion ofthe natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral dispositions, 
and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing 
and reasoning faculties, and particularly without, 1y insane illusion or hallucination" (p. 16). 
The great danger in moral insanity is that "persons labouring under this disorder are capable 
of reasoning or supporting an argument upon any subject within their sphere ofknowledge 
that may be presented to them; a:·1d they often display great ingenuity in giving reasons for 
the eccentricities of their conduct, anq in accounting for and justifying the state of moral 
feeling under which they appear to exist" (p. 21). A typical example of moral insanity would 
be a previously submissive adolescent girl who runs away from home or a housewife who 
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questions her husband's authority; and for many decades after the publication of Prichard's 
book the concept of moral insanity was referred to by psychiatrists making commitment 
decisions. 
Although it was accepted that social and psychological factors could play a role in 
moral insanity, at root it always had a physiological cause: the person's inherent 
'temperament', a 'natural predispo:;ition', or perhaps "some disorder affecting the head, a 
slight attack of paralysis, a fit of epilepsy, or some febrile or inflammatory disorder" (p. 21 ). 
And what is to be done about insanity, moral or otherwise? Prichard endorses the whole 
plethora of what now appear to be wilfully cruel and senseless treatments: bleeding, cold 
showers, purgatives ("no fact in medical practice has been longer established than the utility 
of purgatives in madness"~ p. 195), emetics, digitalis, opium, mercury and the rotating chair. 
'A thing of the past': Millenarian qualities of the New Biological Psychiatry 
In his foreword to Kaplan and Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry Robert 
Cancro (1989) refers to "this brief historical summary" (p. vii). However, the preceding two 
paragraphs are historical only in the sense that they rehearse the by now familiar idea of an 
irr~concilable difference be.. ween 'theological' intuition and rational science. Instead, pride 
of place goes to Neural Science (Chapter 1) and Neurology (Chapter 2), with history 
relegated to the last 21 pages of tr.e two volume work. 
This was not always the case. Stepping back a mere decade one finds that the third 
edition, published in 1980, openeJ with a lavishly illustrated historical chapter by George 
Mora, spread over 94 pages. By the fourth edition, five years later, this had been cut to 20 
pages and moved to the end of the book, although the opening chapter still tackled 
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'theoretical trends' in psychiatry. The fifth edition, as mentioned, gets straight to business 
with Neural Science and Neurology~ and the history chapter at the end, no longer by Mora, 
has degenerated into a lack-lustre catalogue of great men and their achievements. The most 
recent, seventh edition of Kaplan & Sadock (Kaplan, Sadock & Grebb, 1994) has no separate 
history chapter and opens with a full-colour guide to commonly prescribed drugs. 
Why have history's shares, as reflected in the 'bible' of American psychiatry, dropped 
so precipitously over the past two decades40? At one level it is no doubt simply a matter of 
space. To accommodate the ma~s of new material being produced in fields such as brain 
imaging and neurochemistry it is only natural that 'old-news' items such as history and 
philosophy should be jettisoned. At another level it is an ideological shift which requires that 
psychiatry distances itself from aspects of its own history in order to 'make itself anew'. This 
is essentially the same conclusion as that arrived at by Foucault (1980), who asks: 
Why should an archaeology of psychiatry function as an 'anti-psychiatry', when an 
archaeology ofbiology does not function as an anti-biology? Is it because of the 
partial nature of the analysis? Or is it not rather that psychiatry is not on good terms 
with its own history, the result of a certain inability on the part ofpsychiatry, given 
what it is, to accept its own history? (p. 192) 
T~ :! gradual silencing of history's voice in the halls ofbiopsychiatry is not due to a loss of 
faith in the essentials of psychiatric historiography (progress through rational scientific 
discovery), but to a certain discomfort with regard to that history. There is little that the NBP 
can do with psychiatric history before 1955, except to warn against the dangers of 
40 As reflected also in psychiatric training: "The subject has been largely dropped from 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists' examination curriculum, has no academic base within the 
psychiatric establishment, and little following among the younger generation of more 
'scientific' psychiatrists" (Turner, 1990, p. viii). 
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unscientific theorising, or to show that for a very long time psychiatrists have believed in 
organic aetiologies and treatments of one sort or another despite the lack of empirical 
warrant. 
For biopsychiatry the past is shrinking while the future is looming ever larger. The 
little history chapter at the end of the fifth edition of Kaplan and Sadock is called 
"Psychiatry: Past and Future", and from the 'future' section we learn: 
The good news is that, because of progress both in scientific understanding and in 
clinical practice (all ofwh!ch is likely to continue at the present brisk pace), the 
public will increasingly see mental illness as illness and psychiatrists as physicians 
who treat mental illness - more and more effectively. The stigma that was once 
attached to the psychiatric profession is likely to become, fairly soon, a thing of the 
past (Pardes, 1989, p. 2157). 
Pardes may well be right. Popular magazines such as Time and Scientific American and 
television programs such as Beyond 2000 increasingly reproduce biopsychiatric orthodoxies 
regarding the aetiology and treatment of syndromes like schizophrenia and the major 
affective disorders. They also reproduce the promissory notes which biopsychiatrists almost 
routinely append to the end of their research reports. This is how, for example, Gershon and 
Rieder (1992) conclude their Scientific American article: "We expect our understanding of 
the biology of schizophrenia and mood disorders to expand dramatically, fuelled by the 
impressive advances in neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and genetics" (p. 95). 
Similar expressions of ho_;Je and expectation are very common in the professional 
literature. Some examples from .senetic studies: "There is good evidence, especially from 
studies of twins and adopted chilJren, that genetic factors are important in minor psychiatric 
disorders ... the recent tentative lt)Cation of genetic sites associated with manic-depressive 
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psychoses gives hope that such sites may also exist, and be found, for the cyclothymic and 
dysthymic traits" (Hare, 1991, p. 44). "Once a gene is identified a whole new era will begin" 
(Mellon, 1989, p. 155). "It seems likely that if major genes operate on schizophrenia, these 
will be identified in the next few years" (Murray, Kerwin & Nimgaonkar, 1988, p. 176). "We 
can be confident that, if genes of major effect are involved reasonably commonly in the 
aetiology of schizophrenia, they will be detected and localised during the next few years" 
(McGuffin, Owen & Farmer, 1995, p. 681). 
Despite the passing of each successive 'next few years' the putative genetic 
mechanisms behind schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders continue to remain elusive, 
and much the same is true concerning a viable theory of the neurochemical mechanisms 
involved, and ofthe effects of psychotropic medications (Wyatt, Apud & Potkin, 1996). 
Ingleby (1981) speaks of"the myth which helps to keep orthodox psychiatry on the move: 
the belief that what we need are simply more 'findings'- that round the comer lies some vital 
new fact which will settle the arguments once and for all" (p. 23). While persuasive evidence 
may yet become available in the 'next few years' (for instance from the human genome 
project), the New Biological Psychiatry has manoeuvred itself into a position where a post-
millenarian scenario, in which it becomes evident that the arguments will not or cannot be 
settled, is at least conceivable. 
'More than a science': The new anti-biopsychiatry 
At the start of the chapter it was mentioned that not all psychiatrists and other mental health 
workers are equally comfortable with biopsychiatry's successes. In an article in the British 
Journal of Psychiatry Robert Cawley (1993), emeritus professor of Psychological Medicine 
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at the University of London, argttes that psychiatry is more than a science- more even than 
an applied science - and that certain aspects of the assessmeht, management and prognosis of 
mental illness can therefore not be reduced to (or deduced from) scientific findings. Like 
other practitioners of a possibly embryonic new anti-biopsychiatry Cawley is circumspect in 
his criticism. A formula commonly used in this emerging literature is to start by 
acknowledging the achievements ofbiopsychiatry up front. Thus already in the second 
paragraph Cawley (1993) talks of "the neurosciences, in which we have seen staggering 
advances in the last couple of decades" (p. 154). Similarly, Gabbard (1992) in his rear-guard 
defence of psychodynamic psych: a try refers in the first sentence to the "remarkable 
discoveries from the neurosciences [which] fill the pages of our journals" (p. 991 ); Person 
(1989) starts his argument against mindlessness in psychiatry by admitting that 
"psychoanalysts cannot ignore the biological revolution that has occurred in academic 
psychiatry" (p. 182); Hartmann (1992) refers to "continuing excellent but unbalancing 
advances in brain biology" (p. 11J7); while Wallace (1997) speaks of the "gargantuan 
literature" in the field ofbiopsychiatry and the "tremendous scientific and clinical fruit" (p. 
92) borne by this branch of the discipline. 
Such attempts to downplay differences occur throughout nominally critical texts now 
found in psychiatric journals. Cawley ( 1993) read; " admits that psychiatry is a science, 
asking only that we don't forget that it is also more than a science, while Gabbard (1992), 
who argues not against biopsychiatry, but against "the 'either-or' polarization of the 
psychodynamic and the biological" (p. 991), strenuously attempts to blend the discourses of 
neuroscience, psychodynamics and behaviourism, as exemplified by the following: 
Painful events, such as separations and losses, early in life may sensitize receptor 
sites, leading to vulnerability to recurrent depression in adulthood ... ideas and images 
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associated with depressive states could ultimately act as conditioned stimuli capable 
of eliciting a major depressive episode without a concrete loss or external stressor in 
the environment (p. 992). 
While speaking of subjective early childhood experiences and receptor sites in one breath 
may at first seem strange, it is a distinct possibility that an amalgamation ofbio- and psycho-
jargon may become common in psychiatric circles, with the language of neurology gradually 
taking on metaphorical meanings, particularly if a hard scientific understanding of mental 
disturbance continues to elude researchers. 
Sensitive to the requirements ofthe times, Shevrin (1988) attempted to imbue 
psychoanalysis with neuroscientific respectability, and neuroscience with psychoanalytic 
meaning, using what might previously have been seen as absurd methods such as event-
related potentials to prove the existence of the unconscious. Another example in this genre is 
Post's (1992) work, which attempts to straddle the gap between the literatures on 
psychosocial stress and neurological deficits in affective disorders, with formulations such as 
the following being common: "[social] stressors and the biochemical concomitants of the 
episodes themselves can induce the proto-oncogene c-fos and related transcription factors, 
which then affect the expression of transmitters, receptors, and neuropeptides that alter 
responsivity in a long-lasti. ~fashion" (p. 999). 
Abroms (1993) describes at length how he reconciles psychodynamic and biological 
approaches in his psychiatric practice, devoting entire chapters to topics such as "staging the 
treatment" and the "dynamics of drug therapy", pointing out, in terms reminiscent of moral 
treatment, that "therapists may h<ive to work hard to become better attuned to the patient's 
special needs, to provide the support and tenderness that enlists cooperation, and the caring 
firmness that curbs rebellion" (p. 160). According to Abroms, without such precautions drug 
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treatment may fail due to psychodynamic factors such as 'performance anxiety', 'castration 
anxiety', 'oral rage', the 'incest tabrJo', and 'fear of penetration'. A case study of"Carla, the 
lonely, divorced patient" ends as follows: 
Her psychotic mother was so poisonous that Carla regarded all gifts of food or 
medicine emanating from a parental figure as bad milk. After much reassurance and 
insight, she was finally able to swallow her antidepressant and let it work (p. 169). 
While most biologically oriented psychiatrists would perhaps balk at using this kind of 
formulation, they are happy to concede that the giving of medication has to be seen in a 
psychological and social context: "We are fully aware that current biological treatments work 
best when they are combined with psychosocial intervention, and expect that future 
biological treatments will also involve appropriate nonbiological considerations" (Wyatt, 
Apud & Potkin, 1996). In addition to suggesting that therapy might help pills to work, it is 
equally commonly suggested that the relationship between the two modes of treatment runs 
the other way around. Cooper (1989), for example, says that "in instances in which an 
underlying biologic malfunction is suspected, there is powerful warrant to attempt a biologic 
intervention that may then facilitate psychological interventions" (p. 209). Alternately a 
peaceful coexistence may be achieved by carefully demarcating separate professional and 
phii. sophical territories for mind and brain: "Psychoanalysis is a powerful instrument for 
research and treatment, but not if it is applied to the wrong patient population" (Cooper, 
1989, p. 216). 
Where the new anti-biop~.ychiatry offers alternatives to hard-core biopsychiatry these 
tend to be quite low-key and bland, a far cry from the strong medicine once prescribed by 
antipsychiatrists. Cawley's (1993) list of those aspects of psychiatry which are beyond 
science include, for example: ind;viduality, subjectivity, self awareness, interpersonal 
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processes, empathy and communication. Since, according to Cawley, thes~ are the "six, and 
only six, crucial aspects of our di~·cipline which are in principle unrelated to the basic 
sciences and yet are central to what we are doing" (p. 155), one must assume that such stocks 
in trade of antipsychiatry as free will, morality, and creative deviance are amenable to 
scientific treatment, not crucial aspects of psychiatry, or not central to what psychiatry is 
doing. 
It may in fact be overstating the case to claim that such a thing as the new anti-
biopsychiatry exists, even in embryonic form. The impression of important scientific 
advances having been made in the last three decades, and of even more important advances 
being imminent and inevitable, is · .. o strong that all can now afford to be magnanimous in 
allowing diverse views a place in the psychiatric sun. 
American Psyciatric Association (AP A) president Hartmann's ( 1992) appeal for a 
return to Engel's (1979) biopsychosocial model is perhaps more typical ofthe discourse one 
can continue to expect from psychiatry than the Guze's (1989) polemical biologism. Joseph 
English (1992), then APA president-elect, called for balance and tolerance in the mind-brain 
debate and praised the average p:>ychiatrist as "the most tolerant of medical specialists" (p. 
1142). This is the kind of middle-ground discourse where psychiatrists and psychiatric 
commentators have long been acc'Jstomed to meet. Both Arthur Kleinman (1988) and 
Sander Gilman (1988), neither of whom are anywhere near the psychiatric mainstream, can 
for instance be seen to be calling for much the same thing as the AP A president: "The 
extreme relativism of some anti psychiatry anthropologists is as outrageously ideological as is 
the universalistic fundamentalism of some card-carrying biological psychiatrists" (Kleinman, 
1988, p. 33)~ "I find the middle ground - where culture and biology reciprocally interact - the 
best vantage point from which to make sense of the cross-cultural data base and to avoid the 
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excesses of its extremist neighbors" (Kleinman, 1988, p. 187). Or Gillman (1988): 
Such writers as Thomas S,::asz and R.D. Laing began to see mental illness as an 
artifact of society. Then the resurgence of a biologically oriented psychiatry in the 
past decade has led to the illusion that mental illness is simply an artifact of biology. 
Both views ignore the fact that the idea of mental illness structures both the 
perception of disease and its form (p. 18-19). 
To the extent that a new anti-biopsychiatry might therefore exist, it is at most an attempt to 
tone down the shrillness of extreme biological positions, and to ensure that the baby is not 
thrown out with the bath water. At the same time, it provides a back door for psychiatry 
should the strong biological programme not deliver on its promises. Rather than a millennial 
religion, prone to falling apart when its prophesies are not fulfilled, the New Biological 
Psychiatry may have the capacity to expand back into psychosocial territory should this 
prove necessary. Wallace (1997) explains how such a feat could be justified: 
A species-specific physiology, ethology, and ecology of Homo sapiens must 
encompass the image- and symbol-laden dimensions of both personal experience/ 
behavior and its sociocultural surround. In short, the naive and energy-wasting 
warfare between "biological" and "psychosocial" psychiatrists is founded on a 
breathtakingly constricted construct ofhuman biology and on an una. <nowledged 
"mind" - "body" split (p. 90). 
Drob (1989) identified six possibl~ ways for psychiatry to deal with theoretical diversity, of 
which three seem to describe the positions reviewed in this chapter: Relativism ("The 
emergence of a single dominant paradigm for psychiatry, if it occurs at all, will be 
determined by historical, economic, sociological, and other nonscientific factors", p. 63 -i.e., 
the traditional outsider historiographical position), commensurability (the best theory will 
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win- i.e., the 'hard' biopsychiatric position) and reductionism (different modes of 
understanding can ultimately be translated into each other- i.e., the new anti-biopsychiatry or 
the 'soft' pro-biopsychiatric position). 
A new scientific language for psychiatry, which may create the conditions for using 
apparently hard-edged neuroscience terms as metaphorical codes for mental concepts, is 
being forged not only as a by-product of projects such as Post's (1992) stress-deficit work, 
but also quite consciously in DSM-IV. Spitzer, First, Williams, Kendler, Pincus and Tucker 
(1992) describe their proposal fo~ doing away with the term "organic mental disorders" in 
DSM-IV, arguing that psychiatry has now superseded the Cartesian mind/body duality, 
formerly reflected in "the two grc:tt divergent trends in psychiatry during the later part of the 
nineteenth century" (p. 240), viz. 'brain psychiatry' and psychodynamics. While the inclusion 
of'organic mental disorders' in DSM-III and DSM-III-R may not be meant to imply that the 
other disorders are non-organic, Spitzer et al. are seriously concerned that such connotations 
may nevertheless exist: 
The connotative meaning of the word 'organic' always returns to its historical roots, 
which imply a functional/structural, psychological/biological, and mind/body dualism 
... These original dichotomies may have been valuable when we had little 
understanding of how the CNS functions, bu, they are at variance with the growing 
body of evidence of the importance of biological factors in the etiology of the major 
'nonorganic' mental disorders (p. 241 ). 
Spitzer eta/. 's proposed solution is a trichotomy, classifying all disorders as either primary 
(e.g., schizophrenia proper), secondary (i.e., secondary to some non-psychiatric medical 
disorder, e.g. dissociative disorder due to epilepsy) or drug-induced (e.g., cocaine-induced 
erectile dysfunction). The beauty of this system, now by and large implemented in DSM-IV 
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(which no longer uses the term "organic mental disorders"; Kaplan, Sadock & Grebb, 1994), 
is that it eliminates any remaining suggestion that the major psychiatric disorders are 
nonorganic, without on the other hand explicitly identifying them as necessarily organic. 
DSM-IV, as the official style manual of psychiatric discourse, has yet again moved along 
with the new biopsychiatric fashion, without having committed itself to an extreme biological 
view which may eventually prove untenable. 
Throughout its history psychiatry, more so than the rest of medicine, appears to have 
been unable to operate without a'1 attendant anti-psychiatry. As Dain ( 1989) points out, 
hostility to psychiatry even predates the establishment of psychiatry as a profession in 1844, 
and has often come from psychiatrists themselves - sometimes taking on a relatively benign 
(although influential) form as was the case for the group of psychiatrists around Clifford 
Beers at the tum ofthe century, and sometimes involving a thorough-going rejection of most 
of psychiatry's scientific and institutional basis, as was the case more recently with Szasz, 
Laing and company. As Rose (1986b) has argued, opposition to psychiatry has in fact been 
central to its modernisation. 
From the current evidenc-;: it seems likely that the future new anti-biopsychiatry, if it 
is to be led by psychiatrists, will be of the Beers rather than the Szasz variety. However, it 
remains possible that the nh •e radical challenge from outside psychiatry, particularly from 
ex-patient groups and their allies, may gain in power. According to Parker and Burman 
(1993), who have worked extensively with groups critical of psychiatry, such groups are 
currently defining community-based treatment of mental illness as a thinly disguised device 
for regulation and control, much as has been done in Chapters 2 and 3, and the concerned 
academic's job should therefore be "to publicize the analyses presented by these groups rather 
than expropriate them, rather than presenting them as if they were ours" (p. 165). 
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Unfortunately, some patic:nt and family lobby groups, such as SANE (Schizophrenia -
A National Emergency), seem at present as likely to adopt conservative positions41 . Dain's 
(1989) gloomy prognosis perhaps best summarises the state of play: 
What form both psychiatry and anti-psychiatry will take in the future is unclear. It is 
probably safe to say that short of achieving definitive knowledge about mental 
disorder and how to treat and prevent it and without the public will to care adequately 
for mentally disabled persons, both psychiatry and anti-psychiatry do have a future 
(p. 19). 
41 A spokesperson for SANE is quoted (by Barham, 1992) as follows: "Never in the 
history of research into the workings of the brain has there been such hope that the cause or 
causes of this illness will soon be discovered. What is known is that schizophrenia is most 
likely to be a biochemical disorder of the brain". The advantages for patients and families in 
having conditions such as schizophrenia accepted as a 'real' disease are obvious. 
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Chapter 5 
Beautiful and inexorable systems: 
The discourse of discourse analysis 
So much depends 
upon 
a red wheel 
barrow 
glazed with rain 
water 
beside the white 
chickens. 
- William Carlos Williams, Red wheel barrow 
Jonathan Swift tells of a country where the inhabitants for the sake of unequivocal 
communication resolve to use objects rather than words, each object corresponding to a 
particular concept. The problem is that intellectuals soon find themselves burdened down 
with the weight of their ideas while their less intellectual (but more brawny) rivals are able to 
support arguments of considerable complexity. God, as we see around us every day, is not 
subject to the same constraints in terms of either brains or brawn, and has consequently 
allowed his or her vocabulary to grow to universal proportions. 
There is however a certain moral ambiguity in coming to understand the everyday 
solidities of our existence as mer:.; hieroglyphs in a more profound system of discourse~ an 
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ambiguity which is perhaps present in one form or another in all attempts at turning things 
into talk or talk into things. On the one hand the mundane is imbued with meaning - God 
speaking in the exact juxtaposition of wheel barrow, rain water and (white) chickens~ on the 
other that which was substantial, immediate and particular is devalued - a mere token which 
derives currency from its place in an abstract system, but in itself is worthless. 
However, the disconnection between language and reality which is the basis of Swift's 
satire is, according to Benjamin Who 1956)\. y no means ubiquitous. He claims that "the 
""'--~/ 
idea, entirely unfamiliar to the modern world, that nature and language are inwardly akin, 
was for ages well known to various high cultures whose historical continuity on the earth has 
been enormously longer than that of Western European culture" (p. 249). 
~who is unjustly remembered for helping to formulate the discredited Sapir-
Whorfhypothesis (that, crudely put, individuals in certain cultures are unable to think of 
certain concepts because their language does not encompass these), was ~ven to seeing_!~~ 
"skull beneath the skin"2 ofhumaJtd~ He speaks of"the PREMONITION IN 
------------------~---·----- -·--··--·-~-------·-· 
LANGUAGE of the unknown, vaster world- that world of which the physical is but a surface 
or skin, and yet which we ARE IN, and BELONG TO" (emphasis in original, p. 248). 
Whorf describes language as follows: 
It is as if, looking at a wall covered with fine tracery of lacelike desi~ we found that 
this tracery served as the ground for a bolder pattern, yet still delicate, oftiny flowers, 
and that upon becoming aware of this floral expanse we saw that multitudes of gaps in 
it made another pattern like scrollwork, and that groups of scrolls made letters, the 
All references to Whorf a1 e from his collected works edited by Carrol (1956). 
2 Webster was much possessed by death i and saw the skuil beneath the skin.- T.S. 
Eliot, Whispers of immortality 
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letters if followed in proper sequence made words, the words were aligned in columns 
which listed and classified entities, and so on in continual cross-patterning until we 
found this wall to be- a great book of wisdom! (p. 248) 
It is said that William Durant, the founder of the General Motors empire, cribbed the well-
known Chevrolet symbol from the wallpaper of a motel room. It is debatable who 
experienced the more intense 'epiphany upon gazing at wallpaper' (Whorf sitting at his desk, 
or Durant reclining on his motel room bed), but we do know that Durant, at least, realised his 
epiphany in the form of the Chevrolet motorcar while Whorf never got beyond talk. 
The relation between Whorfs sublime speculation and Durant's functional machine is 
the same as that between the exquisitely wrought but apparently ineffectual 'talking cure' of 
psychoanalysis and the crude but apparently efficacious psychopharmacology which has now 
largely replaced it. However, just as psychoanalysts' talk about talk must ultimately emanate 
from mindless electro-chemical artivity taking place in their brains, brain biologists' talk 
about real things must inevitably be constrained by the 'prison house oflanguage' within 
which they are forced to conduct their investigations. 
After demonstrating that there are definite rules for generating English-like syllables, 
Whorf observes: 
It is as if the personal mind, which selects wo, is but is largely oblivious to pattern, 
were in the grip of a higher, far more intellectual mind which has very little notion of 
houses and beds and. soup kettles, but can systematize and mathematize on a scale and 
scope that no mathematic= an of the schools ever approached ... And now appears a 
great fact of human brotherhood- that human beings are all alike in this respect. So 
far as we can judge from the systematics of language, the higher mind or 
"unconscious" of a Papuan headhunter can mathematize quite as well as that of 
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Einstein; and conversely, scientist and yokel, scholar and tribesman, all use their 
personal consciousness in the same dim-witted sort of way, and get into similar kinds 
of logical impasse. They are as unaware of the beautiful and inexorable systems that 
control them as a cowherd is of cosmic rays (p. 257). 
To decode the 'beautiful and inexorable systems' oflanguage, to achieve communion with the 
'higher, far more intellectual mind' which steers our thinking, and which in the end is 
'inwardly akin' to the physical realities of our being - this is the vision of mystics such as 
Whorf. Others, while sharing his conviction that we are caught in a relentless but invisible 
linguistic grip, are less convinced that when the code of language is finally broken we shall 
find it to be a 'great book ofwisdom'. Rather than a font of wisdom, language is suspect- at 
best a vulgar plagiarism of the Durant variety, at worst a methodical conspiracy to naturalise 
and legitimate particular relations of power. 
The critique of the new biological psychiatry presented in Chapter 4 belongs to this 
latter category, attempting as it does to show that there is something shady about the way 
biopsychiatrists use and are used by their discourse. In what follows I present an overview of 
the work of some of those who have articulated "the belief that underneath what is said and 
done in modem Western states, there is something -dis;~~~tabl~~aitin~~~-~~-:~:sked;,-zjr} )cEl,O 
~---~---------------------------- ----------- tl httlk 
(Minogue, 1989, p. 139): Stc- 'ting with a brief recapitulation of the role oflanguage in 
critiques of psychiatry, I successively broaden the focus to include medicine in general, 
linguistics, post-structuralism ~nd discourse analysis in social psychology. 
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'Stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax': The language of 
psychiatry 
As already suggested in the preface, the idea of madness has always been closely linked to\ 
that oflinguistic disorganisation (cf, Berenbaum, 1992; Gilman, 1983, 1988; Lidz, 1968)~ 
Biological psychiatrists may ascribe the bizarre speech of schizophrenia to brain dysfunction 
while anti psychiatrists may frame it as the communication of unacceptable ideas in an 
unusual idiom, but all are agreed that there is something special and different about the way 
psychiatric patients talk, a strangeness which has been duly inscribed in the DSM diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia. Yet, as Kleinman (1988) observes, "the entire cultural apparatus of 
language, symbols, and interpretations is a source of great ambivalence for the contemporary 
psychiatric researcher." (p. xi) In part this is due to modern biopsychiatry's general distaste 
for philosophical and ideological discourse, but in part it may stem from an awareness that 
not only the mentally ill, but also those who attempt to heal them, can become linguistically 
entangled. 
The danger occurs when researchers turn away from patients, and start recording the 
healers' talk. Just as patients construct delusional systems, so "the silent master builder, 
psycluatry ... constructs the house oflanguage, metaphor, and culture in which the drama of 
parents, sp')uses, friends, and other social control agents coping with emotionally troubled 
individuals takes place" (Light, 1982, p. 33). Light describes how 
Residents learn to characterize the whole patient by his or her diagnosis, so that the 
patient does not have paranoid schizophrenia but is a paranoid schizophrenic. This is 
a fundamental change from medical diagnosis and the rapidity with which residents 
incorporate this perspective is startling (p. 40). 
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It could be argued that other phy.3icians do much the same thing, as in surgeons talking 
among each other of "the ruptured spleen in bed 1 03 ", but it does appear as if in psychiatry 
the linguistic identification of the patient with her diagnosis is more frequent and pervasive. 
Virtually every aspect of psychiatry is susceptible to this kind of switch of research 
interest from patient to doctor. Rather than the aberrant speech of mentally ill women, one 
may investigate the way psychiatrists talk about women, discovering for instance that despite 
the fact that the majority of psychiatric patients in almost all settings are women, they are 
almost invariably referred to in the abstract as 'he' (Allen, 1986). Similarly in researching the 
history of psychiatry one may change from a literal marshalling of the facts of the Zilboorg 
and Henry (1941) variety, to a realisation that: 
The gauze oflanguage, woven on a loom of convention by people whose concerns 
were different from ours, inevitably distorts our vision of past reality. To understand 
anything at all about the history of madness, we must examine first the patterns 
formed in the records themselves and the people and institutions that created them ... 
In other words, historians of insanity do not in the first instance study the insane at 
all: they study observations of the insane (MacDonald, 1987, p. 209-210). 
Perhaps the most far-reaching and subtle critique of the strangeness of psychiatric language 
was that invented by Foucault (1967) which served as inspiration for the historical account of 
readmission given in Chapters 2 and 3. Paired with Foucault's conception of the need for a 
'Great Confinement' which arose with the Enlightenment, is that of a radical break between 
the languages of madness and reason. Since its inception, mad-doctoring has been concerned 
with talking about rather than to mad men and women; and rather than champions of humane 
treatment of the mentally ill, figures such as Pinel and Tuke further entrenched this tradition: 
As for a common language, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no such thing 
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any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the end of the 
eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as 
already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words 
without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness and reason was made. 
The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been 
established only on the basis of such a silence. I have not tried to write the history of 
that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence (Foucault, 1967, p. xii-xiii). 
Later Foucault (1980) would say of this enormously influential 'archaeology of silence', and 
of his subsequent works: 
I am well aware that ~ ha\ e never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, 
however, that truth is therefore absent ... One 'fictions' history on the basis of a 
political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existence on the 
basis of a historical truth (p. 193 ). 
Gordon (1980) explains what appears from the viewpoint of conventional 'histories of the 
past' as a lack of concern with historical veracity thus: 
We can say that the objec·~ of Foucault's critique is the status of the present. If 
Foucault poses a philosophical challenge to history, it is not to question the reality of 
'the past' but to interrogate the rationality of 'the present' (p. 242). 
Whether one is willing to accept this kind of justification or not, the danger for psychiatry 
once it declares itself willing to enter the domain of language is that it may be overcome by 
the onslaught of the likes of Foucault who writes "faster than we can read him" (Minogue, 
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1989, p. 138)3• 
'To penetrate the veil while retaining its hallucinatory quality': The 
language of Medicine 
Although perhap~ a special case, psychiatry is hardly the only social or professional 
institution or scientific discipline to be made the target 9f linguistic criticism. In this section 
the critique of psychiatry is contextualised within a broader critique of medicine, while in the 
following sections the context is extended even further to encompass critical language studies 
in general. 
As in psychiatry, any study of the role of language in medicine is likely, at least in the 
first place, to focus on the linguistic deficiencies of the ill person, rather than those of the 
physician. In an early study of this sort Redlich (1945) asked 25 patients to define 60 
medical terms4• His rather predictable findings were that: 
Two-thirds of the 25 patients knew too little about medical matters, their illnesses, 
and the implications of their illnesses. A small group possibly knew 'too much', but 
their knowledge was rather erratic, poorly integrated, and often quite irrational. Both 
groups might be helped considerably by sensible information (p. 447). 
This kind of study embodies what Barthes ( 1973) called "a terror which threatens us all, that 
3 Since Foucault's original work, there has moreover been a proliferation of texts 
equally concerned with the history of discourses of insanity, and of insane discourses, but 
presented in a more conservative idiom and making use of the usual convention of close 
reference to sources of evidence (cf, Ingram, 1991; Porter, 1987a; Porter, 1987b; Scull, 
199lb; Turner, 1990). 
4 Including a few now outmoded psychiatric terms such as functional, organic and 
nervous disease. 
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of being judged by a power which wants to hear only the language it lends us" (p. 46). 
However, as with psychiatry, the way in which physicians themselves use language 
soon enough became the target of research. A typical example is Anspach's (1988) study of 
the language of case presentation. While the ostensible purpose of a case history is 
informational, in fact "it is an arena in which claims to knowledge are made and 
epistemological assumptions are clisplayed, a linguistic ritual in which physicians learn and 
enact fundamental beliefs and values of the medical world" (p. 357). Anspach identified 
vruious features of medical language in case presentation (such as using the passive voice and 
account markers to emphasise the subjectivity of patients' accounts), pointing out, for 
instance, that: "Physicians 'note,' 'observe,' or 'find'; patients 'state,' 'report,' 'claim,' 'complain 
of, 'admit,' or 'deny' " (p. 368). 
A very prolific area of research with regard to language and medicine concerns the 
interaction between doctor and patient. Here too, the doctor is often cast as the villain. 
Hauser (1981) summarised the literature as follows: 
Two themes are interwoven and frequently alluded to in the studies oflanguage ... 
The findings describe physicians as ( 1) narrow in their sensitivity to patients' feelings 
and more subtle requests for help, and (2) withholding in their disclosure of relevant 
medical information (p. 114). 
Many of these sorts of studies (e.g., Fisher & Todd, 1983; Marshall, 1988; Mishler, 1984; 
West, 1984) substantiate their findings by means of highly detailed sample transcripts of 
medical interviews, complete with paralinguistic information such as chair noise, uhm, hh, 
hm hm, and uh:m, and time indications like 1'25', but fail to indicate to what extent the 
identified phenomena are representative of the sample as a whole. There are, however, some 
exceptions, as in West's (1983) study in which she reports that of773 questions in her 
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transcripts of21 doctor-patient exchanges, only 9% were patient-initiated. Patients were also 
more likely to respond to questioris (98%) than were doctors (87%). 
Criticism of this sort, although perhaps unpalatable, is in fact useful to medical 
practitioners, for instance in providing suggestions on how to reduce misunderstandings 
between doctor and patient. Although through the centuries doctors have perhaps always 
given more weight to what they learn from listening to the heart or palpating the abdomen, 
they are not unaware of the importance of conducting their verbal investigations in such a 
way as to obtain the most accurate information possible, and modern textbooks of clinical 
medicine place a strong emphasis on how to 'take a patient's history' (Butchart, 1998). 
However, despite its potential utiEty linguistic research poses a serious threat to medicine in 
that, at least implicitly, it tends to invalidate the bodily realities which are medicine's reason 
for existence. The implication is that language not only provides a pathway to the non-
linguistic reality of the patient's iliness, but that the illness is itself in some sense constituted 
in language. As Mishler (1981) observes: "The implications of constructivism are profound 
and far-reaching because its theorists propose that reality is constructed through human 
action, and does not exist independently of it" (p. 141). Some attempts to deal explicitly 
with medicine as a social construction are briefly reviewed below. 
In the post-communist world it is easy to forget the academic prt ~tige until recently 
accorded Marxist analyses. Although perhaps often obfuscatory, materialist critiques of 
fields such as medicine helped to refocus attention away from a purely technical, 
individualising approach to disease, discovering its origins instead in political and economic 
iniquities. Early Marxist thinkers such as Engels, Virchow and Allende did much to trace 
poor health to class oppression, economic underdevelopment and imperialism (Waitzkin, 
1981 ), but more than the political economy of medicine, Marxism also tackled its ideological 
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(and therefore linguistic) presuppositions. 
Althusser (1971) in particular helped to steer Marxism away from an exclusive focus 
on the economic to the ideological reproduction of capital and labour in Western economies. 
According to Althusser modem Western democracies are kept in place not only by 
Repressive State Apparatuses (government, administration, police, courts, prisons), but also 
by Ideological State Apparatuses (churches, schools, the family, the press, the medical 
profession), because "the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its 
skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order, i.e. a reproduction of a submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, 
and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of 
exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling 
class 'in words' " (p.127-128). Althusser along with other post-Marxists emphasised the 
importance of mere words: 
Why does philosophy fight over words? The realities of the class struggle are 
'represented' by 'ideas' which are 'represented' by words. In scientific and 
philosophical reasoning, the words (concepts, categories) are instruments of 
knowledge. But in political, ideological and philosophical struggle, the words are 
also weapons, explosives or tranquillizer::. -ind poisons. Occasionally, the whole class 
struggle may be summed up in the struggle for one word against another word. 
Certain words struggle amongst themselves as enemies. Other words are the site of 
an ambiguity: the stake in a decisive but undecided battle (p. 24). 
Apart from those inspired by Marxists ideas, there has also been a proliferation of other 
critical approaches to medicine since the 1970s. These include Kleinman's (1988) cross-
cultural psychiatry; the 'New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry' (Littlewood, 1990; Littlewood & 
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Lipsedge, 1987); critical medical anthropology (Lazarus & Pappas, 1986; Scheper-Hughes, 
1990; Singer, 1989, 1990; Singer, Baer & Lazarus, 1990); Foucaultian accounts of medical 
history (Armstrong, 1995; Butchart, 1996, 1998); and Taussig's (1980, 1987) socialist-
anarchist engagement with the healing process in which he attempts to "penetrate the veil 
while retaining its hallucinatory quality" (Taussig, 1987, p. 10). 
Despite bitter in-fighting among the different approaches, they have in common a 
critique of biomedicine which draws attention away from disease as a physical reality, to the 
ways in which it is socially constructed. There is considerable variation in the degree of 
conviction with which the constructionist agenda is pursued, with Butchart (1998), for 
example, accusing all non-Foucaultian constructionist approaches to medicine of somehow 
still preserving a space for the 'real' world and 'real' diseases. Methodologically, 
constructionist methods in medicine most commonly rely for data on archival material and 
participant observation, the latter ranging from Kleinman's professional respectability to 
Taussig's immersion in South American revolutionary politics. Analysis typically takes the 
form of scholarly explication. 
A constructionist orientation to medicine and psychiatry is part of a much wider shift 
towards a social understanding of language and a linguistic understanding of society. The 
constructionist idea that reality is in some sense a facsimile oflanguage (rather than the other 
way around) has its roots in antiquity, and it would be impossible to give a definitive account 
of how it has come to occupy such a prominent place in academic thought, but an attempt is 
made to trace a few of its origins in brief outline below. 
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'Neither difficult nor contentious': The language of linguistics 
The linguistic origins of structuralist and post-structuralist critiques of modernity are usually 
traced from De Saussure ( 197 4 ), who in conceptual ising language as a system of differences 
without any posit~ve terms (in which signifier and signified are arbitrarily related), glimpsed, 
like Wharf, the possibility of a linguistic order more basic than, and prior to, the apparent 
solidity of'houses and beds and soup kettles'. From Saussure the argument is taken via other 
structuralists in linguistics, anthropology (Levi-Strauss, 1961), politics (Althusser, 1971) and 
'semiotics' (Eco, 1986, and the early Barthes, 1973) - all intent on mapping the systems of 
meaning which produce society and subjectivity - and on to figures such as Lacan (1977) and 
Foucault (1967, 1973, 1979, 1980) and their more unequivocally post-structuralist brethren 
(Derrida, 1976; Kristeva, 1982; Deleuze & Guattari, 1977; Buadrillard, 1983) who forsake 
the promise of an eventual scientific blueprint of the social superstructure for the more 
immediate pleasures of intellectual guerilla warfare. In this narrative, continental 
philosophers are concerned to show how the discourses of modernity have carved up reality 
for us in advance, starting with the ubiquitous binary opposition between objective facts and 
subjective experience, while their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, by contrast, are usually shown 
to be obsessed with the idea of language as a representation of reality, concentrating (as in 
Swift's satire) on how words are used to substitute for ideas and things. 
It nevertheless seems worth maintaining a space of legitimacy for lesser figures from 
the English-speaking world who, albeit in a small way, contributed to the constructionist 
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approach to language5• One such is J.L. Austin who, like Saussure, never published his 
magnum opus, but had it reconstructed from a series of lectures, delivered at Harvard in 
19556. Austin's opening remark- "What I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor 
contentious; the only merit I shall claim for it is that of being true, at least in parts" (p. 1)- is 
richly ironic given the polemical content of the lectures and the greatly diminished role they 
accord issues of truth in the study oflanguage. The impetus for Austin's work came from a 
concern with the descriptive fallacy, or what he termed the constative fallacy. Starting with a 
distinction between constatives (which are true or false) vs performatives (which are happy 
or unhappy), Austin gradually worked to the view that in general all utterances have both 
happiness/unhappiness and truth/falsehood. Although many of Austin's examples illustrating 
the shaping function oflanguage involve ceremonial acts ("I name this ship the HMS 
Bounty"), he firmly established the principle that language should be seen in its social 
context where it not only describes (truly or falsely) a pre-existent reality, but acts to 
constitute social reality (happily or unhappily). 
I.R. Searle (1969), a student of Austin's and later professor oflinguistics at Berkeley, 
did much to systematise and formalise Austin's work and to extend it to everyday contexts. 
In his book on Speech Acts, he asked the question which in one way or another also plagued 
Swift, Whorf, Foucault and the various students oflanguage, medicine and psychiatry 
s Van Dijk ( 1987b) also attempted the impossible task of sketching the rise of the 
discursive approach in the social sciences without reference to continental linguistics and 
philosophy: "Structural and generative grammars in the 1960s and 1970s have been busy 
developing formal systems of analysis, in which language users and social contexts were 
nearly fully ignored. Pragmatics introduced the notion of speech act, and thereby came a step 
closer to the study of social interaction, but its approach remained fairly philosophical and 
abstract. Textlinguistics and more generally discourse analysis (including conversation 
analysis) broke the rigid sentence boundary of current grammars, and focused on the more 
natural units oflanguage use and communication, viz. text and talk" (p. 15). 
6 Published posthumously in 1975. 
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discussed above: 
How do words relate to the world? How is it possible that when a speaker stands 
before a hearer and emits an acoustic blast such remarkable things occur as: the 
speaker means something; the sounds he emits mean something; the hearer 
understands what is meant; the speaker makes a statement, asks a question, or gives 
an order? (p. 3) 
Although he did not pretend to be able to answer the question, Searle argued with Austin that 
in getting closer to an answer linguists should take the minimal unit of communication not as 
the word or sentence, but rather as the speech act. 
Speech acts, also called 'locutionary acts', are not as easily defined as words or 
sentences (Searle's, 1969, p. 16, rather vague definition is "the production or issuance of a 
sentence token under certain conditions"), but numerous taxonomies of speech acts have 
been proposed (e.g., Searle, 1976; Hancher, 1979; Stiles, 1981) and it has been suggested 
(Fashold, 1990) that there may b~ a nested hierarchy, ranging from specific speech acts (such 
as jokes), through speech events (such as conversations) to speech situations (such as a 
party). Although rather insipid compared to the more sociopolitically aware continental 
attempts at delineating the localities and technologies of discourse, it is evident that, at some 
level, the impulse is the same. The crucial difference would appear to be t, 11t the Anglo-
Saxon speech-act theorists still think of the individual subject as a relatively unproblematic 
entity who goes about emitting 'acoustic blasts' to achieve certain concrete ends, while the 
structuralist and post-structuralist position is founded upon the recognition that the individual 
subject is itselfboth produced by and productive of the system of'acoustic blasts'. 
Fashold (1984, 1990) reviews various aspects of linguistics which have been 
influenced by speech act theory, !ncluding the ethnography of communication, linguistic 
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pragmatics and discourse analysis. The latter ("possibly the field within sociolinguistics that 
has undergone more research activity in recent years than any other"; Fashold, 1990, p. 65) to 
an extent overlaps with a methodology of the same name in social psychology (which usually 
traces its roots not to speech act theory but to structuralism and post-structuralism). Before 
discussing discourse analysis in more detail, the following section presents an overview of 
\, 
the larger social contexts within which such methodologies have come to flourish. 
'A bit like a whale': Postmodernity 
Foucault (as presented in Parker, 1989a) claimed that Western discourse since the 
Renaissance can be divided into epistemes lasting roughly 150 years each. These were the 
Renaissance period from about 1500 to the middle of the seventeenth century when all 
attention was directed at recovering the true voice of God; the Classical Age lasting until the 
end of the eighteenth century which was characterised by an obsession with rationalism, 
natural science and mechanism; aad the modern period which created the individual subject 
and which is possibly now being replaced by postmodernity. In this view both psychiatry 
and psychology are still largely in thrall to modernity "in which the world is experienced by 
people as tied together by stories of humanized scit.tce, progress, and individual meaning" 
(Parker, 1989b, p. 2). This modernist belief in progress "promises to release us from modem 
times while actually shackling us to them" (p. 12). 
Postmodernity is both a critique of modernity and a condition of existence. As a 
critique of modernity, Errnarth (1992) describes it as follows: "Across a broad range of 
cultural manifestations a massive reexamination ofWestem discourse is under way: its 
obsession with power and knowledge, its constraint of language to primarily symbolic 
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function, its ethic of winning, its categorical and dualistic modes of definition, its belief in the 
quantitative and objective, its linc."r time and individual subject, and above all its common 
media of exchange (time, space, money) which guarantee certain political and social 
systems" (p. 6-7). 
As a condition of existence, postmodernity decentres the individual subject and 
instead gives priority to the texe. Human subjectivity, if it exists at all, finds its expression in 
a shifting zone of intertextuality. Table 5.1, adapted from Brooker (1992t details some of 
the contrasts between modernity and postmodernity. Where modernity believes in the 
possibility of a unifying synthesis, postmodernity playfully exposes as sham the apparent 
coherence in scientific or political programmes, works of art and texts of all sorts. 
Structuralism and post-structuralism (and the 'method' of deconstruction) represent a 
kind of thinking which has only become possible with the advent of the postmodern era. In 
its search for the underlying structures of meaning which operate regardless of individual 
intentions, and its insistence that "individuals do not speak language but that language speaks 
through them" (Tallis, 1989, p. 20), structuralism repudiates what Shetter and Gergen (1989) 
call the 'single dominant text' of modernity, which tells ofthe centrality and sovereignty of 
the individual. In its contention that truth is "a product, not a discovery, of the method that 
produces it" (Berman, 198:: p. 46), post-structuralism aligns itselfwith the postmodern idiom 
which thrives on chance, anarchy and play and relies on gadgets such as Derrida's sous rature 
(placing under erasure) to signal that what is being said and the way in which it is said is 
7 There is, however, considerable controversy about the role of text among theorists 
who could broadly be described as 'postmodern'. While some give priority to language and text 
as conventionally understood, others merely wish to interpret social practices and institutions as 
if they were texts, while yet others consider the postmodern emphasis on textuality a distraction 
from researching the concrete practices and effects of power. 
1 Who took it from Hassan (1985). 
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merely a temporary device to move the discussion forward. "Thus, we must use the terms that 
we believe to be inaccurate and iii.appropriate, under erasure, in order to reveal their status as 
useful, necessary and wrong" (Sampson, 1989, p. 7). 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of Modernity versus postmodernity (adapted from 
Brooker, 1992) 
Modernism 
Purpose 
Design 
Hierarchy 
Mastery 
Art Object/Finished Work 
Distance 
Synthesis 
Presence 
·Centering 
Genre/Boundary 
Semantics 
Depth 
Narrative 
Master code 
Origin/Cause 
Postmodernism 
Play 
Chance 
Anarchy 
Silence 
Process/Performance/Happening 
Participation 
Deconstruction 
Absence 
Dispersal 
T extllntertext 
Rhetoric 
Surface 
Anti-narrative 
Idiolect 
Trace 
Postmodem academic discourse, whether of the structuralist or post-structuralist variety, is of 
course not without its critics. Cox (1989) calls it "an astonishing exhibition of coyly 
'te.. weal' nouns and adjectives, falsely dramatic verbs, and sentences that have lost track of 
their insides" (p. 73) and is at best willing to admit that it might be a "species of poetry". 
Minogue ( 1989) also complains of the lack of clarity and decries the excessive piety with 
which the texts of 'Continental Gurus' such as Sartre, Lukacs, Bloch, Gramsci, Habermas, 
Derrida, Lacan and Foucault are treated. 
Foucault (1980), demonstrating both the convoluted prose and the poetic charm that 
Cox speaks of, admits: 
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For my part, it has struck me that I might have seemed a bit like a whale that leaps to 
the surface of the water di-:iturbing it momentarily with a tiny jet of spray and lets it be 
believed, or pretends to believe, or wants to believe, or himself does in fact indeed 
believe, that down in the depths where no one sees him any more, where he is no 
longer witnessed nor controlled by anyone, he follows a more profound, coherent and 
reasoned trajectory (p. 79). 
Behind the displeasure with post-structuralist or structuralist style lie substantive concerns 
about the subjectivity and extreme abstraction of the methods employed, and the radical 
constructionist conclusions drawn from them. Given Foucault's (1980) admission that he 
'fictions' history, why should we believe that a new discursive episteme suddenly came into 
being just at the time that Pinel freed (or did not free) the insane? Should we put equal store 
in another writer of fiction's claim that "in or about December, 1910, human character 
changed" (Virginia Woolf, quoted in Brooker, 1992, p. 5)? As Tallis (1989) cuttingly 
observes: "With only an infinitely pliable logic and their intuitions to guide them, the 
structuralists' journey into or away from truth is quite unfettered" (p. 26).9 
A related problem is how seriously to take claims that reality is constructed in or from 
language. Cox (1989) is of the opinion that "just as we are unlikely to mistake a mime's 
self-conscious artistry for a plausible argument against our ability to speak, so we are 
unlikely, once we discover the artificiality of the Derridean method, to find in it a plausible 
argument for the referential inadequacy of language," (p. 66) while Tallis (1989) states: 
9 The extent to which such critiques talk past the structuralist/post-structuralist 
enterprise is illustrated by Foucault's (1980) remark about truth as itself a construction: "We 
are subjected to the production of the truth through power and we cannot exercise power 
except through the production of truth ... we must speak the truth~ we are constrained or 
condemned to confess or to discover the truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its 
inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its 
pursuit. In the last analysis we rr.ust produce truth as we must produce wealth." (p. 93) 
148 
No one would wish to challenge the obvious truth that language is implicated in the 
construction of reality. What is at issue, however, is the extent to which reality is 
intra-linguistic and langua:;e the agent or medium in virtue of which reality is 
structured or constituted; more particularly, the radically nominalist assumption, 
common to many ... critics, that the traffic is all one way: that language structures 
reality but reality does not influence the structure, the system of differences, that is 
language (p. 13). 
Anglophone lucidity is not however in itself an adequate antidote for continental 
grandiloquence. As Berman (1989) observes, "all this enviable clarity yields no more 
consensus than does the most vexatious and cumbersome prose of philosophers elsewhere; 
and it certainly cannot (and some say it is not supposed to) yield 'truth'. Issues are never 
resolved, only perpetually reopened" (p. 46). 
What is needed, perhaps, is for the theory to be fortified with a leavening of concrete 
demonstration. Although the works of some post structuralists (such as Foucault, Barthes and 
Baudrillard) draw on richly detailed historical and cultural material it often appears as if this 
material is forced into predetermined theoretical patterns. Other poststructuralist works (such 
as by Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari) seem curiously empty and self-referential. In the words 
of Cox (1989): "These salt-flats of abstraction inspire one with a new respe 't for all the 
beautiful specifics of culture, specifics of which deconstruction takes notice only while trying 
to shove them into its theory" (p. 73). 
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'The knowledge that one seeks to disinter': The language of discourse 
analysis 
The term discourse analysis refers to something both very specific and very nebulous. As a 
social constructionist approach introduced into social psychology in a 1987 book and British 
Journal of Socia~ Psychology article (both with Jonathan Potter as first author), discourse 
analysis has a quite specific identity, at least in terms o(the leading players: the group of 
British social psychologists around Potter, Wetherell, Reicher and, more recently, Burman 
and Parker~ with Van Dijk and his associates as somewhat more distant European relatives. 
As Parker (1989b; 1992) describes it, discourse analysis rides on the back of a series 
of'crises' in social psychology periodically announced by academics (Billig, Gergen, Hare, 
San1pson, Shetter, Urry) disillusioned with the artificiality and triviality oftraditional social 
psychological methods and topics. Tracing its roots to the structuralist and poststructuralist 
movements outlined above, discourse analysis shares in their agenda, particularly in the drive 
"to displace attention from the self-as-entity and focus it on the methods of constructing the 
self" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 102). Exactly how it differs from these or from other 
current approaches going by the name discourse analysis is not however always clear. The 
term has been current in sociolinguistics for a consiaerable time (Cicourel, 1980), where it is 
also used quite loosely to refer to approaches as diverse as speech act theory and 
conversation analysis. 
Van Dijk (1987a, 1990) points out that discourse analysis, by virtue of its diverse 
origins and wide applicability, will of necessity be a cross-discipline, involving linguistics, 
sociology, social psychology as well as law, history and political science, all of which are 
"beginning to recognize that texts, documents, talk or other discursive practices constitute the 
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central object and data of their fidds" (Van Dijk, 1990, p. 6). 
While it is easy to dismiss discourse analysis in psychology as faddish and ill 
defined, there can be no doubt that it has made a strong impact on how language is viewed in 
the discipline. A volume published just on two decades ago and purporting to deal with 
'language and social psychology' (Giles & StClair, 1979) illustrates the freshness of the ideas 
discourse analysis brought into the discipline. In the introductory essay, Giles (1979) 
justified social psychology's role in language studies as follows: "If we are going to 
understand why individuals acquire, use and react to language and its varieties in the way 
they do, we require a greater understanding of the dynamics of attitudes, motivations, 
identities and intentions, that is, social psychological phenomena" (p. 2). Social psychology 
itself is defined as "the study of an individual's behaviour in his or her social context" (p. 2). 
Contrast this to Parker's ( 1989b) book on social psychology, which appeared a decade later, 
and in which the uncritical acceptance of the individual subject as psychology's proper object 
of research is itself the main topic of discussion. 
Where traditional social psychology produces information on the attitudes, 
motivations and intentions of individual subjects, what (apart from a critique of traditional 
social psychology) does discourse analysis produce? Potter and Wetherell's (1987) initial 
answer - interpretive repertu · ~'es - may at least in part explain why discourse analysis has 
aroused so much interest in such a short time. An interpretive repertoire is "basically a 
lexicon of terms and metaphors crawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events" 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 138). Interpretive repertoires are typically "organized around 
specific metaphors and figures of speech" (p. 149). A repertoire relating to the term 
community in radio, television and newspaper reports on, as well as eyewitness accounts of, a 
'race riot' in Britain is presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 The community repertoire (from Potter & Reicher, 1987, p. 32) 
Paradigmatic alternatives 
Local residents or local residents with specific social organisation 
Black community or White community or Mixed community 
Currently exists or Existed in past or May exist in future 
Sample predicates 
Friendly 
Warm 
Happy 
Harmonious 
Close-knit 
Integrated 
Tight 
Mature 
Grows 
Evolves 
Acts 
Knows 
Feels 
Metaphors (where relevant) 
Spatial 
Organic 
Agency 
What made Potter, Wetherell and Reicher's work special is that, despite the fact that they 
drew their ideological inspiration from structuralist and poststructuralist sources (as reflected 
among other things in the fact that their object of interest is the language being used, not the 
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characteristics of the language users), they collect, analyse and present data in a format which 
is intelligible to traditional positivist researchers. Unlike 'hard-core' deconstructionists such 
as Derrida, they therefore (at least minimally) wish to create the impression that their 
'findings' are of the same order as that produced by hard-nosed empiricists in the social 
sctences. 
The idea of constructing such repertoires is not new. Black (1962) in his classic work 
on metaphors, for instance calls for the identification of 'archetypies' in bodies of speech or 
writing. By archetype he means: 
a systematic repertoire of ideas by means of which a given thinker describes, by 
analogical extension, some domain to which those ideas do not immediately and 
literally apply. Thus, a detailed account of a particular archetype would require a list 
of key words and expressions, with statements of their interconnections and their 
paradigmatic meanings in the field from which they were originally drawn (p. 241 ). 
Although the exact nature of the discourse analytic product is somewhat in contention, it is 
certainly more tangible than merely a philosophical critique of modernity. Rather than an 
interpretive repertoire, Parker (1989a) wishes to expose discourses. A discourse is "a system 
of statements which constructs an object. This fictive object will then be reproduced in the 
various texts written or spoken within the domain of discourses" (p. 62). Gilbert and Mulkey 
(1984), on the other hand, produce interpretive devices, such as the TWOD (Truth Will Out 
Device) often used in scientific w;iting (and of which numerous examples were cited in 
Chapter 4). Wetherell and Potter (1992), in some of their later work no longer speak of 
interpretive repertoires, but of'maps', which (much like repertoires) refer to the organisation 
of discursive "practices, arguments and representations" (p. 1 ). 
There are also relatively specific descriptions of how to arrive at these repertoires, 
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maps, discourses or devices. Pot~er and Wetherell (1987) offer ten steps to discourse 
analysis; Parker (1989b) explains ~:ow to deconstruct a text in three steps; and again (Parker, 
1990a; 1992) how to analyse discourses in twenty steps. Although these steps are not 
formulated as techniques that can be mechanistically implemented, they are clearly a far cry 
from the Foucaultian whale. Potter & Wetherell (1987) expressly acknowledge that one of 
the weaknesses of earlier approaches, such as ethnomethodology is that "the reader of the 
ethnographic report of this kind is dependent on the researcher's description both for what 
they know about the data and for their evaluation of the researcher's conclusions" (p. 30), 
while Gilbert and Mulkey (1984) emphasise the importance of providing "closely 
documented descriptions" (p. 14) of whatever features are identified in texts. 
Discourse analysis and the dangers of reification 
Even as they have moved away from the 'salt flats of abstraction' towards the 'beautiful 
specifics of culture', discourse analysts seem to be gripped by a fear that they will reinstate a 
regime of truth as oppressive as the subjectifying empiricism they are trying to subvert. Thus 
to counteract any negative side-effect of his 'three steps', Parker (1989b) warns that "it might 
be tempting to think of deconstruction merely as a method." (p. 58) and, agai~ that his 
'twenty steps' do not "constitute a method" (Parker, 1992, p. 5). Even as he generates more 
detailed methodological specifications, Parker (1992) protests more and more vehemently 
that he is not advocating a method, e.g., "discourse analysis is not, or should not be, a 
'method' to be wheeled on and applied to any and every topic" (p. 122). To use Parker's own 
methodology, this is clearly a case of a putative 'discourse analysis discourse', meeting 
criterion 6 (steps 11 and 12) for official certification- that is, employing disingenuous 
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reflexive strategies of the 'don't get me wrong' variety. 
OfPotter and Wetherell's ten steps, Parker (1989b) says that they "can be taken with a 
pinch of salt, but ... can be used as part of the presentational rhetoric to get through 
institutional barriers" (p. 160). Potter and Wetherell for their part (Potter, Wetherell, Gill & 
Edwards, 1990), accuse Parker of having an overly reified vision of discourses, describing his 
position rather graphically as "endorsing something akin to the geology of plate tectonics-
great plates (discourses) on the earth's crust circulate and clash together; some plates grind 
violently together; others slip quietly over top of one another; volcanoes burst through while 
massive forces work unseen below" (p. 209). Perhaps for the same reason they reject the 
reifying obsession with sampling which traditional empiricist research supposedly suffers 
from. 
In the post-structuralist v.·orld the sin of reification is of course a grievous one, and 
even Foucault (1980) at times feared that he might succumb: 
And after all, is it not perhaps the case that these fragments of genealogies are no 
sooner brought to light, that the particular elements of the knowledge that one seeks 
to disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the risk of 
re-codification, re-colonisation? (p. 86) 
It can however be argued that no degree ofloosenes!) :n one's methodology can protect one 
against this sin, as the loos(:"!ness itself soon enough becomes a reified article of faith. 
Burman (1991) argues that although discourse analysis as currently practised has helped to 
draw psychology's attention to how language "produces and constrains meaning, where 
meaning does not, or not only, n:side within individuals' heads" (p. 327), it does not hold the 
monopoly on 'progressive' research. Although the application of a particular methodology 
may be radical and politicising, the method itself may be as open as any other to being used 
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in a falsely value-free way. 
Discourse analysis and the danger of subjectivity 
Not only does indifference to traditional research concerns such as sampling issues not 
guarantee an escape from reification, it invites the usual positivist criticisms of subjectivity 
and lack ofreplicability. That this is not a trivial issue is demonstrated by two book-length 
publications produced in the discourse analytic spirit. 
Salomon Rettig's (1990) Discursive Social Psychology of Evidence illustrates just 
how seriously things can go wrong when Potter and Wetherell's ( 1987) instruction to 
underplay sampling issues is followed. Rettig's book consists of 40 pages of theory, followed 
by 160 pages of transcription and (very minimal) analysis of half a dozen or so conversations. 
In case one mistook this for any form of serious research, Rettig (1990) is quick to point out 
that: 
There is no claim to unive;sality, nor to scientific rigor. There is, however, a claim to 
the authenticity of the material. I hope that the reader will enjoy the material as much 
as those of us who participated in its production, for it has been a very satisfying 
human enterprise, in~. ed (p. vi-vii). 
As one may expect from contexts in which authenticity and enjoyment are privileged over 
rigour, there are numerous factual errors of the most elementary kind, such as a claim (p. 83) 
that three participants in a convefsation about the sex of a particular participant in another 
(transcribed) conversation all agreed that she was a woman, when the transcription indicates 
that one thought she was a man a;1d another was uncertain. 
The second example, Labov and Fanshel's ( 1977) classic analysis of a therapeutic 
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encounter, although published long before discourse analysis came on the scene, and not 
prone to the same sorts of infelicities as Rettig's (1990) work, also helps to illustrate the 
importance of attending to sampling issues. Just the opposite of Rettig's, theirs is a 361 page 
analysis of 15 minutes (8 pages transcribed) of a therapy session. Their central concern is to 
explicate "the sequencing rules [which] operate between abstract speech actions" (p. 350) and 
in order to do this they have to ar:.alyse exchanges in microscopic detail. In part Labov and 
Fanshellimit themselves to 15 minutes from a single conversation for purely practical 
reasons (15 minutes each from 100 conversations would presumably require an impossible 36 
100 pages ofanalysis)10, but additionally they rely on an assumption that the kinds of 
sequencing rules they will discovi.:r operate in other conversations as well. This assumption 
simply does not hold for the discourses or interpretive repertoires with which discourse 
analysis wishes to work, and larger (and more diverse) samples are in fact better, as Potter 
and Reicher (1987) and Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue in drawing their texts from a range 
of sources such as broadcast med;a, Hansard, newspapers and interviews. Parker (1992) also 
emphasises (in step 11) the importance of finding and describing a discourse as it occurs in 
more than one kind of text. This does not mean that these analysts necessarily see 
individuals as the source oflanguage or wish to relate linguistic features to the characteristics 
of in<i: .ridual subjects. 
To gain respectability within the current status quo, which may be necessary if it is to 
have a real impact on psychologi :-al research, discourse analysts therefore have to pay some 
attention to traditional signs of scientific rigour, such as using representative sampling 
10 One suspects that practical considerations are also in part behind Potter and 
Wetherell's (1987) argument, as is evidenced by their observation that the ratio of recorded to 
transcribed time is easily 1:10. Some suggestions for overcoming this difficulty are 
presented in the next chapter. 
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strategies, replicable analyses, and succinct modes of reportage. This is exactly the kind of 
call that has long been made by others involved in 'qualitative' data analysis, such as Miles 
and Huberman (1984) and Kirk and Miller (1986) who are adamant that qualitative research 
"does not imply a commitment to innumeracy" (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p. 10). 
Discourse analysis: Variation and commonality 
Despite its genuflections to methodological rigour, discourse analysis has thus far certainly 
succeeded in avoiding becoming a mere methodology. A survey of the discourse analytic 
studies published in Burman and Parker (1993) reveals a reasonable degree ofheterogeneity. 
Although the data source for these studies were almost invariably interview transcripts11 
(Gill, 1993~ Macnaghten, 1993; ~farks, 1993; Marshall & Raabe, 1993~ Moir, 1993; Stenner, 
1993~ Widdicombe, 1993), the number of people interviewed varied from unspecified 
(Widdicombe, 1993) to ten or fewer (Gill, 1993; Marshall & Raabe, 1993~ Stenner, 1993) to 
40 (Moir, 1993), while the type of person interviewed included students ~.1oir, 1993), people 
classed as conservatives or liberals on a psychometric measure (Marshall & Raabe, 1993), 
disc-jockeys (Gill, 1993), members of the 'gothic' subculture (Widdicombe, 1993), a married 
couple (Stenner, 1993), and helping professionals (Marks, 1993). 
The aim of these analyses seem to be twofold: 1) To identify the kinds of socially 
conditioned repertoires or discourses used by and reproduced in the interviews~ and 2) to 
show haw these are used, together with other conversational and textual techniques or 
gambits, to achieve purposes such as coherence or the silencing ofless powerful participants. 
11 Showing perhaps the extent to which these authors, despite their professed allegiance 
to post-structuralism, are still subject to phonocentric biases. One exception is Macnaghten 
(1993) who also uses official documents. 
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In Widdicombe's (1993) formulat:on, "the object of analysis is to explicate the culturally 
available resources and tacit reasoning procedures which seem to inform what is said, and to 
identify the nature of the interactional tasks thereby addressed" (p. 97). However, what 
counts as 'culturally available resources' and 'interactional tasks' vary widely. Some of the 
'culturally available resources' identified in these studies are sexist constructions of women's 
capacities and men's willingness to listen to women (Gill, 1993); the different ways in which 
nature can be depicted (Macnaghten, 1993); the 'subject positions' available to men and 
women (Stenner, 1993); and the therapeutic and reflective obligations of professionals versus 
the 'needs' of clients (Marks, 1993). The 'interactional tasks' that these are used to address 
include justifying the small number of female DJ s (Gill, 1993 ); justifying or opposing a new 
land-fill site (Macnaghten, 1993 ); making the adoption of 'gothic' style appear as an authentic 
individual choice (Widdicombe, 1993); making the choice of a particular career appear 
authentic (Moir, 1993) and deflecting talk from interprofessional conflict (Marks, 1993). 
Most commonly, deductions are warranted by means of short illustrative extracts 
from interview transcripts (e.g., Gill, 1993; Macnaghten, 1993; Moir, 1993; Stenner, 1993), 
and sometimes by the device of presenting a close reading of a single longer extract 
(Widdicombe, 1993). Apart from discourse theory, eclectic reference is made to a variety of 
other approaches, such as Holland's occupational types (Moir, 1993), feminist. (Gill, 1993), 
sociological and social psychological work on youth subcultures (Widdicombe, 1993) and 
action research (Marks, 1993). 
Similarly, South Mrican discourse analytic studies- such as the collection of studies 
in Levett, Kottler, Burman and Parker (1997) and papers by amongst others Dixon, Foster, 
Durrheim and Wilbraham (1994), Durrheim and Dixon (1998), Duncan (1996), Durrheim 
(1997), Kaminer and Dixon (1995), and Wilbraham (1996)- also show considerable variation 
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in analytic methods and products. 
It should not however be thought that discourse analysis is nothing more than a 
particular ideological orientation with no specific methodology. Two aspects distinguishing 
discourse analysis as a methodology stand out. The first, which has already been alluded to, 
is that, to a far greater extent tha~ the philosophical movements from which it draws its 
inspiration, it relies on traditional empiricist distinctions between theory, method and data. 
Discourse analysts, despite all they may say against positivism, feel compelled to back up 
their claims about how people use language and language uses people with the kind of 
evidence recognisable to empiricists as 'data'. The second distinguishing feature is that in 
discourse analysis a conscious attempt is made to work 'from the bottom up', that is, to derive 
theoretical insights from data rather than to impose theoretical systems on the data. Although 
most pronounced in 'Grounded Theory' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), this is a common theme in 
most forms of qualitative research. Thus Gilbert and Mulkey (1984) call for discourse 
analysts to stay 'close to their data': "Instead of applying an abstract, preconceived language 
to our data in order to show how discourse arises from and reproduces complex social 
structures, we ... begin with an examination of those terms and interpretative features which 
seem to arise naturally in the course of participants' own discourse ... " (p. 16) 
This principle is sometimes presented in disco .. ,·se analysis as entailing having to stay 
near the surface of the data. PotL!r and Wetherell (1987), for example, call for researchers to 
'range over' rather than penetrate texts, saying that "we do not intend to use the discourse as a 
pathway to entities or phenomena lying 'beyond' the text" (p. 49). It can be argued that 
analysts such as Potter and Wetherell do indeed wish to discover entities 'beyond' the text, 
and that these entities are merely of a different sort from that typically discovered by for 
example psychologically oriented content analysis - that is, trans-personal discourses rather 
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than individual attributes. Although the surface-depth distinction may therefore be suspect, 
the principle is clear - discourse analysis is in the first place concerned with understanding 
how language itself works, rather than treating it as a window onto some other reality. In 
Gilbert and Mulkey's (1984) phrase, accounts are treated as "topic instead of resource" (p. 13) 
- it is discourse which is of intere~t, rather than the individual actors through whom the 
discourse speaks. 
Discourse analysis: Quantity and quality 
As currently constituted, discourse analysis is a qualitative approach. This is so for both 
historical and methodological rea:3ons. Historically, quantitative positivist research has 
dominated the social sciences, and discourse analysis is therefore 'naturally' allied with the 
various qualitative approaches whch have been formulated in opposition to this hegemony. 
Methodologically, quantitative research has been perceived as imposing preconceived 
categories on data as, for example, in quantitative content analysts counting the number of 
words showing 'negative affect' in a text. This is clearly incompatible with the 'bottom-up' 
discourse analytic approach discussed above. However, imposing versus discovering 
categories in data is clearly a i• atter of degree, and it is possible to imagine quantitative 
approaches that approach the discourse analytic ideal of letting the data speak for itself The 
advantage of incorporating quantitative techniques into the discourse analytic repertoire 
would be that this would help dis,,ourse analysis escape from the unproductive quantitative-
qualitative dichotomy into which it has been historically interpellated. 
One possible source of quantitative techniques which can be applied to language is 
the discipline oflinguistics. Currently available highly structured, automated and 
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computational approaches to linguistic analysis are therefore reviewed as a possible tool for 
discourse analysis in Chapter 6; and in the following chapters new techniques developed 
from these are applied and evaluated. The dissertation concludes, from a methodological 
point ofview, with an assessment of the extent to which the adoption of such techniques 
leaves discourse analysis vulnerable to reification and "recuperation12 by positivist research" 
(Burman, 1991, p. 334). 
12 A Marxist term, meaning to render opposition harmless by recruiting it back into 
the political mainstream. 
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Chapter6 
Objective tools for analysing linguistic structures 
Each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling. 
- T.S. Eliot, East Coker 
Despite all that has been said in the previous chapter about language fabricating reality, it is 
perhaps nevertheless most easily imagined as some kind of message delivery apparatus: 
Words and sentences trundling back and forth like cocopans on the overhead rails of an 
automated office mail system, transporting the ore of meaning from 'sender' to 'receiver'. 
Whether language really functions as a message carrier, or has a more sinister purpose, it 
should in principle be possible to draw up a blueprint showing the exact arrangement of 
gears, pulleys, springs, counterweights, and so on which keeps the system moving. 
Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, language does not come with a user's manual 
and more indirect methods have had to be resorted to to expose its inner workings. The 
problem with many of these methods (some of which were reviewed in the previous chapter) 
is that they are themselves constituted in language. The reflexive absurdities which result are 
aptly described by Richards (1989): "trying to see what 'see' means, trying to hold onto the 
meaning of'hold', looking for the meaning of'look', following the meaning of'follow' round 
in circles" (p. 61 ). While it would be naive to imagine that some kind of artificial language 
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could be invented to analyse 'natural' language (perhaps using physical tokens as in Swift's 
satire), it is not unreasonable to assume that there may be some utility in surveying language 
by fitting an intentionally synthetic grid over it. This is indeed precisely what structuralist 
and post-structuralist authors do, for example Derrida's sous rature, Lacan's bogus algebraic 
formulas involving combinations of signifier and signified, or Deleuze and Guittarri's 
proliferating neologisms. 
In this chapter I evaluate a number of more traditional quantitative approaches to 
language analysis in linguistics and psychology with particular emphasis on the automation 
of procedures, and conclude with an assessment of their implications for a proposed 
quantitatively informed discourse analysis. Despite the technical and hyper-quantitative 
nature of the material in his chapter, the intention is not to propose quantitative language 
analysis as a substitute for qualitative analysis, but to ask how quantification may be used in 
conjunction with what must necessarily remain an essentially qualitative enterprise. 
Corpus studies 
Perhaps the most obvious empirical approach to language studies is to examine, 
quantitatively, the frequencies and patterns of occurrence of various linguistic fea.Jres in 
large samples (or corpora) of speech or writing. The purpose of this, to revert to structuralist 
terminology, is quite simply to study langue (the structure oflanguage) through redundant 
patterns in parole (actual utterances) (Engwall, 1994). Zipf(1935)1, one of the earliest 
proponents of what later came to be called corpus linguistics, described the impulse behind 
Illustrating the difference in mentality between discourse analysis and corpus 
linguistics, Miller (1965) says ofZipfthat "he was the kind of man who would take roses 
apart to count their petals" (p. v). 
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corpus work as follows: 
It occurred to me that it might be fruitful to investigate speech as a natural 
phenomenon, much as a physiologist may study the beating of the heart, or an 
entomologist the tropisms of an insect, or an ornithologist the nesting-habits of a bird. 
That is, speech was to be regarded as a peculiar form of behavior of a very unusual 
extant species; it was to be investigated, in the manner of the exact sciences, by the 
direct application of statistical principles to the objective speech-phenomena (p. xi). 
At the most superficial level this kind of approach may do little more than confirm already 
known facts, such as that 'e' is the most frequent letter in the English language or that the 
word 'shall' is now virtually exiinct in Australian English (Collins, 1991). However, by 
calculating exhaustive statistics not only on the frequency of various linguistics categories, 
but also on their patterns of co-occurrence, corpus linguists hope that a more profound 
understanding of how language works may emerge. 
In Johansson's (1994) wide definition, a corpus is "a body of texts put together in a 
principled way1, often for the purposes of linguistic research" (p. 3), and can refer to virtually 
any collection of writing (or transcribed speech), such as the psychiatric textbooks or set of 
interview transcripts used in this dissertation. The term now most often refers to a large 
collection of texts and transcripts captured into a compu. ~r database. The earliest and best 
known computer corpora are the Brown corpus (Francis & Kucera, 1964) which contains just 
over a million words of American English extracted from sources such as newspapers, 
magazines and books, and the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (Svartvic & Quirk, 
Engwall (1994) details criteria which should be used in collecting corpus material, 
placing particular emphasis on careful sampling from text category (e.g., literary, scholarly, 
newspapers, conversations), genre (e.g., imaginative prose, drama, scientific texts, dialogue), 
and period (e.g., diachronic or synchronic). 
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1980), which consists of approximately haifa million words transcribed from radio 
broadcasts, surreptitiously and openly recorded telephone conversations, and the like. 
However, there has since been a proliferation of corpora, with Taylor, Leech & Fligelstone 
(1991) listing no fewer than 36 English corpora, ranging from the relatively tiny.Corpus for 
Dialectometry (3 8 000 words) to the over 5 million words of the American Heritage 
Intermediate Corpus. The total number of words in the corpora listed by Taylor eta/. is of 
the order of 45 million, and a single corpus currently under development by the Longman 
group is set to double this figure. Edwards (1993) lists projects intent on establishing corpora 
of 1 00 million words each. 
Computer corpora vary considerably in the purposes for which they were originally 
intended and the format in which they have been captured. Many make use of standard 
English orthography augmented by minimal text markers indicating the source of each text 
fragment, its date of recording and so on. Others have been extensively tagged or annotated 
to identify features such as voice pitch (Whichmann, 1991 ), grammatical categories and the 
like. 
The number of ways in which corpora can be annotated2 is endless. The three basic 
components oflanguage identified by Longacre (1976) -texis, grammar, and phonology- are 
each imperfectly represented in ~. tndard orthography and special markers have to be added 
to the text to signal the occurrence of particular lexical, grammatical or phonological events. 
2 I use 'annotated' here interchangeably with 'coded', or 'tagged' to refer to any system 
for marking up text so as to identify features not visible in the surface orthography. As is 
typical of linguistic research in general, there is a proliferation of mark-up conventions, some 
of which are reviewed in Edwards and Lampert (1993). One of the oldest and most common 
formats is the COCOA format, which is similar to Standard Generalised Markup Language 
(SGML), the most widely accepted current convention and the one on which Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML), the de-facto standard for internet documents, is based 
(Johansson, 1994). 
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One may for instance wish to tag different 'case roles' (agent, goal, instrument, location, 
patient; Starosta, 1978) or lexical categories such as Human Noun, Concrete Noun, Motion 
Verb, Physical Verb and Locative Verb (Longacre, 1983) or stative, action and process verbs 
(Gervasio, Taylor & Hirschfield, 1992). Another approach is participant indexing (Grimes, 
1975) which is used to identify the characters in a story or the participants in a conversation. 
Phonetic markers of varying complexity can also be added to texts. 
Whatever theoretical perspective a linguist or social scientist may adopt towards 
language, there is usually an abundance of classification schemes which can be used for 
coding purposes. An example is Austin (1975) and Searle's (1969) work on 'speech acts', 
which helped popularise the idea that language is not only descriptive but also a form of 
action. Apart from Austin and Searle's own taxonomies of speech acts (Searle, 1969, 1976), 
rival taxonomies have been suggested by at least five other theorists (reviewed in Hancher, 
1979; Stiles, 1981 ), and there is thus no shortage of coding schemes which may be used by an 
analyst wishing to annotate texts in terms of speech act theory. 
According to Longacre (1976), language has deep structure and surface structure in 
its lexical, grammatical and phonological components3 (see Figure 6.1), and it is probably 
accurate to say that text annotation is in essence an attempt to move beyond the surface 
phenom\; .a to the deep structure. In the lexical field, for instance, one finds the phenomenon 
that an elaborated vocabulary including words such as 'saunter', 'amble' and 'trot' all belong to 
the more basic meaning category of walk/run. Much also depends on the size of the textual 
chunks which one uses as unit of analysis - vastly different deep and surface structures exist 
3 In this Longacre draws, of course, on Chomsky (1957). However, Chomsky's work 
on formal linguistic transformation rules, which relied heavily on contrived examples and 
artificially limited domains, contributed to the waning of interest in corpus linguistics during 
the 1960s and 1970s. This interest has only fully revived since the 1980s (Ide & Veronis, 
1998). 
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at different levels such as phoneme, sentence, plot or dialogue (what Longacre calls 
'repartee'). 
The types and complexity of deep and surface structures which can be identified are 
virtually limitless, depending as much on the kinds of phenomena of interest to different 
researchers as on objective qualities oflanguage. As Simons and Versaw (1992) point out, 
ordinary English orthography tends to mislead one into thinking that text is a 
one-dimensional string of characters, while in fact it could more accurately be viewed as a 
string of (more-or-less) 'ordinary' orthography, plus "a multidimensional set of annotations 
provided by the analyst" (p. 1.3), the 'analyst' being not necessarily a linguist, but also, for 
example, an ordinary person engaged in conversation. 
Figure 6.1 Surface structure and deep structure for three components of language 
(from Longacre, 1976) 
'\ l 
DEEP PHONOLOGY 
I 
Surface Structure 
PHONEMES & 
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However, hand-annotated texts are not cheaply or easily produced. A grammar tagging 
project initiated by Leech & Garside (1991) illustrates the difficulties encountered when 
extensive annotation of a large corpus is attempted. Although the authors based their work 
on a simplified phrase structure grammar, automated several aspects of the annotation 
process, and set up a "grammar factory" of more than 15 highly trained individuals to parse 
sections oftext, the project repeatedly floundered under. the sheer volume ofwork. So time-
consuming is the task of even relatively simple annotation, that projects such as these often 
seem to lose sight of the original purpose for which the annotations were required (such as to 
generate a probabilistic grammar of spoken English), and are presented in academic forums 
as if the act of annotation were in itself a sufficient achievement. 
The effort involved in coding is one reason why the proportion of corpora containing 
text annotations is likely to remain small. Another is that the production, distribution and 
consumption of large bodies of computer text is increasingly in the hands of individuals other 
than professional linguists. With the advent of CD-ROM drives for microcomputers, CDs 
containing several million words of copyright-free corpus material are now available at very 
low cost to researchers (Atkins, Levin & Zampoli, 1994). There is also a growing library of 
encyclopaedias, technical reference books and even magazines available in machine-readable 
format to the 'ordinary' user. Market forces have ensured that the volume of texts -1vailable 
from these sources has become far larger than the corpora painstakingly assembled by 
linguists over several decades. In addition to commercially available sources of machine-
readable texts, the now almost complete computerisation of office work means that large 
corpora can be collected with little effort from newspaper offices, schools, hospitals and 
other large and small bureaucracies. One of the text samples used in this dissertation comes 
from such a source. 
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Finally, the advent ofthe internet has now made literally billions of pages of 
machine-readable text available to virtually anybody. 
Carefully constructed and thoroughly annotated corpora will no doubt remain much 
sought-after commodities (Ide & Veronis, 1998), as will corpora containing transcribed 
speech. However, social scientists interested in language are increasingly finding themselves 
awash in machine-readable texts with no hope of even the tiniest proportion of these ever 
being hand-annotated. If, as post-structuralists claim, "the reality that any individual inhabits 
is a vast inverted pyramid of discourse poised on a tiny apex of experience" (Tallis, 1989, 
p. 13), then the availability of machine-readable texts in large quantities opens up hitherto 
unheard of possibilities for exploring that reality. These possibilities can however only be 
realised if ways are found to extract anything but the most trivial information from 'plain-
English' texts. Although techniques from corpus linguistics have not progressed far beyond 
the trivial (Church, Gale, Hanks, Hindle and Moon, 1994, compare a lexicographer to "a 
person standing underneath Niagara Falls holding a rainwater gauge, while the evidence 
sweeps by in immeasurable torrents", p. 153), their combination with discourse analytic 
methods could enrich both approaches. 
Three broad classes of techniques used in automated analysis of unannotated texts can 
be identified. These are word frequencies and type-token ~tios; concordances and 
collocations; and automated tagging. 
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Word frequencies and type-token ratios 
The most obvious way of processing machine-readable text is simply to count words. Thus it 
may be of some academic interest that the total number of words in an earlier version of the 
previous two pages was 677, that 343 unique words were used, and that the most frequently 
used word (n=37) was the, as indeed it is in the Brown corpus where it occurs more than 68 
000 times (Hofland, 1991). A sorted list of words from the two pages in question (Table 6.1) 
may seem to provide extremely trivial information compared to an actual reading of the 
pages. However, faced with the task of reading the 3 500 or so pages of the Brown corpus 
one may well be grateful for such scraps of information as can be revealed by frequency 
counts. 
Table 6.1 Sample word frequency list from two pages of text 
N % Word N % Word 
0037 5.26 THE 0034 4.84 OF 
0019 2.70 TO 0016 2.28 AND 
0015 2.13 IN 0013 1. 85 IS 
0012 1. 71 AS 0011 1. 56 A 
0007 1. 00 TEXT 0006 0.85 BE 
0006 0.85 SUCH 0006 0.85 THAT 
0005 0.71 CORPORA 0005 0.71 OR 
0005 0.71 WHICH 0005 0.71 ARE 
0005 0.71 ANNOTATION 0005 0.71 ONE 
0004 0.57 LEXICAL 0004 0.57 DEEP 
0004 0.57 TEXTS 0004 0.57 FOR 
0004 0.57 DIFFERENT 0004 0.57 STRUCTURE 
0004 0.57 LARGE 0004 0.57 ON 
0004 0.57 SURFACE 0004 0.57 WORK 
0003 0.43 SOURCES 0003 0.43 FROM 
0003 0.43 THESE 0003 0.43 EVEN 
Note. The table has been truncated 
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Comparative counts may be particularly informative. Thus the fact that shall occurs 0.9 
times for every 10 000 words in an Australian corpus compared to 4.2 in the Lancaster-
Oslo/Bergen corpus of British English (Collins, 1991) is more interesting than the Australian 
data alone. Similarly, the fact that the word corpora occurs five times in the two sample 
pages from this dissertation, but not once in the Brown corpus, does give some idea of the 
nature of the discourse produced on these pages. Words such as text, annotation and lexical 
also appear much more frequently in this chapter than one would expect from their 
prevalence in other general English texts. 
Methods of comparing texts in terms of word frequency vary in sophistication. A 
typical example is the work ofKukulska-Hulme (1992) whose comparison between 
frequency word lists (function words removed) from a data security handbook and a user's 
manual for a particular computer system reveal a low degree of overlap or 'hit rate' (20% ), 
from which he concludes that the handbook would prove confusing to many users. However 
useful word frequencies may prove for particular purposes, it is hard to escape the impression 
that for the most part the inferences which can be drawn will remain inconsequential. One 
attempt to use word frequencies in a more sophisticated manner is the so-called type/token 
ratio. 
'Tokens' refer to the total number of words in a section of text, while 'types' are unique 
words. The type/token ratio is therefore quite simply "the number of different words as a 
ratio ofthe total number of running words" (Butler, 1985, p. 14). What the type/token ratio 
reveals is 'vocabulary richness' and it is for instance used to compare different authors' 
writing styles. Together with other stylistic 'fingerprints' such as word and sentence length, 
vocabulary richness can, an1ongst other things, help settle questions of disputed authorship. 
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A major drawback of the type/token ratio is that it depends not only on the author's 
style, but also on text length: The longer the text, the smaller the ratio. Thus the very high 
type/token ratio of 0.51 (343/677) for the two sample pages taken from this dissertation says 
as much about the shortness ofthe sample as about the richness of the vocabulary. Ifthe size 
of the sample is doubled, the ratio drops to 0.44, while in a 30-page sample it is 0.32. If the 
type-token ratio at different points in a discourse is graphed, a parabolic curve such as that in 
Figure 6.2 is produced as the writer or speaker gradually 'uses up' the vocabulary available to 
him or her in the particular context. Despite this drawback, type/token ratios may have some 
I 
utility, provided that care is taken to keep text length constant when different corpora are 
compared. 
Figure 6.2 Sample type/token graph 
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Another disadvantage of type/token ratios is that a single index can hardly be expected to 
provide an adequate summary of an entire body of text. This problem is addressed to some 
extent by an extension to the type/token ratio, the Vocabulary-Management Profile (VMP), 
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introduced by Youmans (1991). The VMP involves plotting a curve which shows the 
number of new types over a moving interval thirty-five tokens long. According to Youmans, 
peaks and valleys in VMP curves are closely related to constituent boundaries (such as 
breaks between paragraphs and chapters) and 'information flow' in works of fiction. One 
would expect similar peaks and valleys in accounts by psychiatric hospital patients, 
corresponding, for example, to the initial admission, an induction phase, discharge and so on. 
Concordances and collocations 
While counting word frequencies and computing type-token ratios could be compared to 
trawling for fish and using the catch to estimate the variety and number of species present in 
a particular area, concord;~nce building is an attempt to describe the kinds of ecological 
interdependencies which exist among the different species. 
A concordance is essentially an indexed word list indicating the location of words in a 
text, in terms firstly of formal positional markers (such as Act and Scene in a play) and 
secondly in terms of the surrounding text (Klein, 1991 ). An excerpt from parts of a 
concordance (Wright, 1893) for the King James Bible dealing with the words word and fish is 
reproduced in Table 6.2. The table has been re-arranged to be similar to the popul.~ r KWIC 
(Key Words In Context) format for concordances which prints key words in a column down 
the centre of the page with sections of surrounding text on either side. 
Constructing a concordance by hand, as Wright (1893) and others have done for the 
bible, requires years of painstaking work, and it is therefore not surprising that concordance-
building was one of the first literary and linguistics tasks to which computers were put. 
Computer-generated concordances are less prone to clerical errors than their manually 
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produced counterparts, but usually require some manual editing to make them suitable for 
publication. The earliest concordance programs were the COCOA (word COunt and 
COncordance on Atlas) package and the Oxford Concordance Program (Hockey & Marriott, 
1979), and most programs for analysing text corpora now include concordance building as 
one of their standard features. The indexing facilities available in high-end word processing 
and desk top publishing programs can also produce output similar to standard concordances. 
Table 6.2 Part of a concordance for the King James Bible4 
Deut 4.18 likeness of any fish in waters 
Eccl. 9.12 fish taken in an evil net 
Hab 1.14 makest men as fish of the sea 
Matt 7.10 if he ask a fish? 
Matt 17.27 take up the fish that first cometh 
Lk. 24.42 piece of broiled fish 
John 21.9 they saw fish laid 
1 Cor 15.39 shall fish them 
Matt. 4.4 every word of God 
Rom. 10.8 the word is nigh 
Job 38.3 darkeneth council by word 
Ps 19.14 let the word of my mouth be acceptable 
Prov. 15.11 a word fitly spoken 
Ps. 68.11 the Lord gave the word 
Is. 29.21 an offender for a word 
Dan 7.25 speak great word against the Most High 
Jer. 18.18 nor shall the word perish 
Where type/token ratios represent the quantitative pole of automated textual analysis, 
concordances represent the qualitative pole. Wright's (1893) biblical concordance entry for 
4 This extract from Wright (1893) is based on what remains the standard concordance 
compiled by Alexander Cruden (1700-71). Cruden's other notable publication, in 1739, is 
The London-Citizen Exceedingly Injured or A British Inquisition Display'd in an Account of 
the Unparallel'd Case of a Citizen of London, Bookseller to the late Queen, who was in a 
most unjust and arbitrary Manner sent on the 23rdMarch last by one Robert Wightman, a 
mere Stranger, to a Private Madhouse. Cruden was repeatedly confined in Bethlem and 
elsewhere for disruptive behaviour consequent upon religious fanaticism (Porter, 1987a). 
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fish is certainly useful in forming an impression of the kind of submarine ecology within 
which the word thrives, but this information remains essentially qualitative. Unlike the 
type/token ratio, which purports to summarise a central feature of a text in a single number 
(or a series of numbers in the case ofthe VMP), a full concordance is more bulky than the 
text itself, leading Brodda (1991) to suggest that one should limit a concordance to between 
500 and 1000 'relevant' words. Deciding relevancy is of course not an easy matter. One 
strategy, that of including the most frequent words, certainly will not work, as high frequency 
words, such as the, of and in are often semantically the least interesting. 
A derivative ofthe concordance idea but which is somewhat more quantitative in 
flavour is the tabulation of word collocations, that is, words that habitually occur together. 
The term 'collocation' was popularised in 1951 by Firth (quoted in Ide & Veronis, 1998), who 
explained it as follows: "One of the meanings of ass is its habitual collocation with an 
immediately preceding you silly ... " (p. 19). Similarly, the collocations of sin in the Bible are 
all those words which occur within a span of a certain number of words of sin. In effect 
collocations are multiple word frequency lists, with a separate list computed for each key 
word. The list of collocates for sin may for instance include fathers, deadly, and repent as 
relatively high frequency items, while ass is most likely a low frequency collocate, or not a 
collocate at all. 
The assumption behind the idea of collocation is that words are not evenly distributed 
through semantic space, but clump together in more or less distinct constellations separated 
by lesser or greater tracts of meaninglessness (or unsaid meaning), and furthermore that the 
force with which words attract and repel is reflected in their relative distance in spoken or 
written language. Unlike the stars, however, which (as the King James tells us) have been 
'set in the firmament' (Gen. 1.17), the ways in which words are constellated may vary from 
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one discourse to another. 
That words do tend to fall into each other's gravitational fields is supported by the fact 
that "roughly 70% of the running words in the London-Lund Corpus form part of recurrent 
word combinations of some kind" (Johansson & Stenstrom, 1991, p. 5). However, the forces 
which impel words to come together or propel them away from one another are not all of a 
purely semantic nature. As a weakly inflected language English, as an example, relies 
heavily on word order to differentiate between the functional elements in a sentence, and the 
grammatical constraints thus placed on the co-occurrence of words are of a different order 
from the more abstract semantic similarities and differences which cause words to repel and 
attract. In general it is likely that the sorts of results obtained from a collocational study will, 
amongst other things, depend on the distance allowed between collocates (e.g., adjacent 
words only or all words within a span of say 15 words) as well as on the boundaries which 
are set (e.g., all collocates, or only those occurring in the same sentence or paragraph). 
Unfortunately there is currently no consensus on the optimal size of the span of words to use 
for different purposes, and the value fluctuates among different studies "more or less 
arbitrarily" (Ide & Veronis, 1998, p. 19). 
Automat. d and semi-automated tagging 
Accepting that annotated text is in principle more informative than 'plain English' as it allows 
glimpses into lexical, grammatical and phonological'deep structure', one may ask if the task 
of text annotation itself cannot somehow be automated. To an extent this is indeed possible, 
and in many cases a thorough automated analysis ofunannotated text can be thought of as 
proceeding in two passes: First, automated tagging of particular features of the text; second, 
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automated analysis based on the higher-level units thus identified. 
Before discussing the successes so far achieved in the automated tagging of texts, it is 
important to acknowledge that automation is not necessarily an all or nothing affair. 
Although more reliable than hand-annotation, automated annotation is, due to the 
deterministic nature of computer algorithms, incapable of assigning correct codes to text 
sequences not explicitly provided for in advance. Thus the output from automated tagging 
programs often has to be manually checked and adjusted (e.g., Leech & Garside, 1991) 
before being submitted to further analysis. Another strategy is to start by annotating the text 
manually, but with gradually increasing automated assistance. Simons & Versaw (1992) 
have developed a method where the analyst assigns codes to text strings (e.g., synonyms in a 
dictionary project), which are then suggested as possible cod·~s by the computer program 
when similar instances occur. As the analyst works her way through a text she will therefore 
start by having to type in most of the codes herself, but eventually reach a point where, for 
the most part, she simply has to indicate acceptance of the codes suggested by the program. 
Moving from computer assisted to more fully automated text annotation, progress has 
been made in phonological, grammatical and lexical tagging, of which only the latter two will 
be discussed here5. In the field of grammatical tagging, Gervasio, Taylor and Hirschfield 
(1992) describe a system which assigns a grammatical class to each word in a sentence with 
an accuracy of more than 80%. This is done without recourse to a large dictionary, but rather 
by deducing each word's class from its position relative to a small number of 'function' words 
(articles, auxiliary verbs and prepositions). Words are also automatically grouped into 
s Details of the tagging process are also omitted. Thus the first step in an automated 
analysis is usually text normalisation (Brodda, 1991), i.e., removal of'noise' such as control 
characters and (in some cases) punctuation, the expansion of abbreviations and (in some 
cases) converting the text to upper case. 
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phrases and clauses with a high degree of accuracy. The frequency of different verb types 
identified by the system has been used to track changes in the language used by patients and 
therapists in the course of psychotherapy, and to study the impact of assertiveness training. 
DeRose (1991) describes a stochastic tagging system which achieves an even higher 
accuracy level (96%) in assigning grammatical classes to words. DeRose's system is based 
on conditional probabilities derived from the Brown corpus. Thus in the sentence To 
everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven (Ecclesiastes 3 .1 ), 
time would be judged a noun both because articles are far more likely to precede nouns than 
verbs (collocational probability) and because time occurs 1000 times more frequently in the 
Brown corpus as a noun than as a verb (absolute probability). The system determines word 
class by assigning a 30-35% weight to absolute probabilities and a 65-70% weight to 
collocational probabilities. 
Automatic tagging of grammatical categories is valuable (amongst other reasons) 
because of the increased fidelity of word frequency, collocational and other analyses 
preformed on tagged texts. Roughly 11% of word types and 48% of word tokens in the 
Brown corpus belong to more than one grammatical category, depending on context 
(DeRose, 1991). Even at the most simple level, frequency or collocational information on a 
word such as swallow in any particular text (such as a therapy transcript) would tht· ~fore be 
more accurate if reported separately for its different grammatical senses - according to the 
dictionary, a verb meaning "to make or let pass down one's throat" or a noun meaning "a kind 
offork-tailed swift insectivorous bird". 
Unfortunately grammatical category is not the only source oflexical ambiguity, and a 
word may not only belong to several grammatical categories, but also have several different 
possible meanings within a particular category. The word parade, taken as a noun, is for 
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instance given six different meanings in the Little Oxford Dictionary (Ostler, 1969), ranging 
from "muster of troops for inspection" and "ground used for this" to "public promenade". 
Fortunately the various meanings of a word within a particular grammatical category are 
often related - even if only metaphorically - so that misclassification only becomes an issue 
in circumstances, such as automated translation, where finer distinctions in meaning are 
important. This is not however by any means always the case. For example: Like swallow, 
the word hawk may refer either to a kind of bird or to an action performed by the human 
throat (depending on whether it is used as a noun or a verb), but as a verb it also has.another 
quite unrelated meaning, namely "to carry about for sale". 
The phenomenon of one word form having several different meanings may be due to 
a variety of factors, including homophony (similar-sounding but different words), 
homography and homonymy (words ofthe same form but different meaning), and polyseml 
(identical words with related but different meanings, e.g., head of a body and head of an 
organisation). The resulting lexical ambiguity is, according to Brekke (1991), "an all-
pervasive phenomenon in Modem English" (p. 83). Brekke points out that "the common core 
vocabulary ofEnglish contains hundreds ofhigh frequency items like board, stamp and wall, 
which in isolation carry no clue as to which of their specific meanings is intended" (p. 83). 
In ordinary language use humans perform very rapid disamt, ~ation of such words by 
referring to the context, but (as Brekke demonstrates for the word wall) this is not an easy 
process to simulate by means of computer algorithms. 
As if the problem of single word forms having multiple meanings were not enough, 
natural language is also plagued by the opposite phenomenon of synonymy - apparently 
6 Lacan of course claimed that such quirks ofianguage constituted not a problem of 
disambiguation, but a model for the workings of the unconscious. 
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different words having closely related or identical meanings. In highly inflected languages 
this is a particularly common problem. The German verb aujnehmen for instance appears in 
over 30 different forms, while the Finnish verb ottaa appears in about 60 forms (Butler, 
1985). Often the underlying lexical unit, called a lexeme or lemma, is of more interest than 
its various forms. Thus one may wish to know the frequency and collocations of the lexeme 
LOVE, rather than of love, loves, loved and loving separately, or of BE rather than of be, is, 
am, are, was, were, been and being. 
The process of grouping together the forms of a lexeme, called lemmatisation, is 
according to Butler (1985) difficult to automate, because "the rules for recognising a form as 
an instance of a particular lemma are complex and have not been specified in a completely 
explicit way for any language" (p. 14). An additional difficulty is that the nature and degree 
of lemmatisation required may differ from application to application. In certain 
circumstances it may be important to consider word forms entirely separately, while in others 
very loose semantic groupings (such as all colour terms) may be treated as if they formed a 
lemma. The principles governing depth of lemmatisation, that is, the choice of which 
thesaurus to use to sort words into semantically related groupings, have not been explicated. 
Automated tagging can be conceptualised as the implementation of rewrite rules 
(Brodda, 1991), that is, applying a~. (of rules to a text so as to produce a systematically 
transformed version of the text as output. A rewrite rule concerned with lemmatisation of BE 
will thus produce output in which all instances of be, is, am and so forth have either been 
changed to be or marked as belonging to the same lemma. The rules which have been 
discussed thus far apply to the traditional linguistic categories of grammar and texis, but 
rewrite rules are of arbitrary complexity, and may be set up to identify and transform any 
kind of language unit, including those used in content analysis. 
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Content analysis 
Where the kinds of automated and semi-automated linguistic analyses discussed thus far 
originate from linguistic and literary studies, content analysis historically very much belongs 
to the social sciences, especially psychology. Now often referred to as a qualitative 
technique, content analysis in fact straddles the divide between numerical and scholarly 
approaches, and thus may provide some clues for developing a quantitatively informed · 
discourse analysis 
Berelson (1952), one of the early developers of the technique, defined content 
analysis as the "objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest con£ent of 
communication" (p. 18) - hardly the kind oflanguage that one would normally associate with 
a qualitative procedure. A decade or so later Stone, Dunphy, Smith & Ogilvie (1966) had 
dropped quantitative from their definition, but stayed with systematic and objective: "Content 
analysis is any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifYing specified characteristics within the text" (p. 5). A more recent review of content 
analysis studies (Viney, 1983) seems to veer back towards the quantitative, focusing mainly 
on content analysis scales, and discussing these in terms of psychometric properties such as 
correction fa~tors, reliability and validity. 
However, despite its claim to core scientific characteristics such as being objective, 
systematic, and even quantitative, content analysis also has inescapable qualitative elements. 
In part this is perhaps simply because it deals with qualitative data (relatively unstructured 
samples of speech or writing), rather than with discrete physiological, psychometric or 
behavioural indices. Equally importantly, however, content analysis is partially qualitative 
because inferring content categories from a sample of text and subsequently identifYing 
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category instances in other samples is a subjective rather than an objective enterprise. The 
use of multiple raters and reporting of inter-rater reliability coefficients serve to underscore 
rather than diminish this point. 
Attempts have been made to apply computer techniques to improve content analysis 
as a tool both for discovering appropriate classification schemes to describe texts and for 
applying these schemes to other texts. Brown, Taylor, Baldy, Edwards and Oppenheimer 
(1990) describe a system designed to assist in the qualitative exploration of textual data, 
similar to a manual system which involves the sorting and grouping of index cards. The 
advantage of the Brown et a/. method is that a particular section of text can conveniently be 
related to more than one classification scheme at the same time, instances of any category can 
be automatically retrieved, while hierarchical and other relations among categories are easily 
represented in the system. Many of the popular computer-aided qualitative analysis 
techniques such as Atlas and Nudist (reviewed in Kelle, 1995) work along the same 
principles. 
Rather than assisting in the induction of classification schemes, Gottschalk and 
Bechtel's (1982) system is aimed at automating the parsing of texts in terms of predetermined 
classification schemes. Many such schemes (also known as content analysis 'scales') have 
been developed. Viney (1983) mentions scales for anxiety, hostility, sociability, locus of 
control (the origin and pawn scales), hope and positive affect; Schnurr, Rosenberg and 
Oxman (1992) refer to scales measuring pessimism, optimism, rumination and helplessness; 
and Peterson, Bettes and Seligman ( 1985) describe a scale for measuring causal attributions 
to negative events. Gottschalk and Bechtel's (1982) program is based on the well-known 
Gottschalk-Gieser anxiety scale, which produces scores for death anxiety, mutilation anxiety, 
separation anxiety, guilt, shame and diffuse anxiety. The Gottschalk-Gieser method of 
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analysing transcribed speech involves three steps, of which only the second and third have 
been computerised by Gottschalk and Bechtel. They are: Dividing the text into grammatical 
clauses (defined as language structures which contain an active verb); scoring each clause for 
the presence (and in some cases intensity) of a particular construct; and applying correction 
factors to the summed scores to adjust for text length. 
Identification of scoreable instances is achieved by checking each phrase against 
dictionaries containing key words and word combinations thought to be indicative of the 
different kinds of anxiety. Content scoring of this sort is therefore an exact analogy of 
lemmatisation, although a lemma such as DEATH ANXIETY would no doubt appear rather 
strange to classical linguists. Gottschalk and Bechtel (1982) do not report any attempt to 
resolve the lexical ambiguity problem which inevitably limits the success of any 
lemmatisation attempt. Nevertheless, correlations between hand scoring and machine scoring 
range from .58 to .92 with a mean of .85 (although machine scores are consistently lower). 
Towards a quantitatively informed discourse analysis 
It would be difficult to imagine a body of work more clearly different in temperament from 
discourse analysis than that reviewed in this chapter, yet it seems possible that discou. se 
analysis could benefit from borrowing some of the principles and techniques of corpus-based 
linguistics and content analysis. The two major shortcomings of discourse analysis as viewed 
from a traditional empirical perspective (insufficient concern for sampling and subjective 
analysis) are both to a greater or lesser extent addressed in corpus studies. 
Corpus studies could represent something of a model of how discourse analysts could 
go about ensuring more adequate sampling. Potter and Wetherell's (1987) bald statement that 
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"for discourse analysts the success of a study is not in the least dependent on sample size" (p. 
161) was probably provoked by a desire to distance themselves from the kind of social 
science which takes the individual as its basic unit and considers studies employing more of 
these units as (potentially) superior. However, as has been shown in the previous chapter, 
there is nevertheless an effort to sample texts for diversity of origin. Likewise, the 
constructors of linguistic corpora, while usually quite unconcerned with sample size and 
composition in the social scientific sense, also make use of such (at least minimally) stratified 
random sampling techniques to select textual fragments for inclusion. There appears to be a 
tacit consensus that a 'good' corpus (from the point of view of sampling) is one that a) 
includes texts from a variety of different sources (oral and written, published and 
unpublished, dialogues and monologues, spontaneous and prepared, formal and informal); b) 
clearly identifies the nature and source of each fragment as well as the overall proportions of 
different kinds of fragment in the corpus; and c) is large. The immense diversity in language 
use, even in terms of narrowly defined syntactic features, makes it imperative that large, 
well-structured samples oftext should be studied. The question is not if the sample is 
representative of a population of individuals, but if it adequately represents a certain kind of 
language situation (e.g., British written English in general or British tabloid newspaper 
reportage on the royal family during the 1990s)7• 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an issue which is related to that of the initial 
sample selected is the extent to which it is exhaustively surveyed in the course of the 
analysis. Unlike some discourse analytic studies which quote selected illustrative examples 
in corroboration of whatever inferences are made, corpus studies and content analyses are 
7 However, in the conclusion to this dissertation I reconsider the implications of 
specifying the boundaries of textual data sets. 
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explicitly concerned with systematically parsing the entire text, and presenting results in the 
context of their frequency in the text as a whole. While type/token ratios, collocational 
frequencies or content analysis scale scores may not contain quite the sorts of information 
useful from a discourse analytic perspective, similar kinds of indicators can, as will be shown 
below, be developed. 
In terms of subjectivity, discourse analysis could also benefit from the relative 
success of attempts at automated analysis reviewed in this chapter. While one has to bear in 
mind warnings by Potter and Wetherell (1987) and other discourse analysts (reviewed in the 
previous chapter) against an overly mechanical application of analytic techniques, it is 
difficult to see why at least certain aspects of the process could not be executed by means of 
objective algorithms. The product of a discourse analytic study of the Potter and Wetherell 
variety is an 'interpretative repertoire' which is "basically a lexicon ofterms and metaphors 
drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events" (p. 138), and "often a repertoire 
will be organized around specific metaphors and figures of speech" (p. 149). Potter and 
Reicher (1987) return to the same theme in their definition of a discourse as "terms which are 
used with stylistic and grammatical regularities, often combined with certain metaphors" (p. 
To identify a discourse, or a " •tegory in a discursive repertoire, one therefore has to 
identify certain lexical terms, metaphors, figures of speech, and stylistic and grammatical 
regularities. At least at face value this seems rather similar to the application of rewrite rules 
in content analysis or lemmatisation studies, and may be equally susceptible to automation. 
One could, for example, imagine discourse studies that not only identify discourses in texts, 
8 The reader may recognise that this and the next paragraph themselves contain phrases 
recycled from previous chapters of the dissertation, thus demonstrating the emergence of a 
discursive repertoire in the current text. 
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but that report on the frequency and distribution of previously identified discursive elements 
in different textual situations, in the same way as different sorts of content analytic studies 
are concerned either with developing novel content categories or with applying previously 
developed content analytic scales. 
This kind of scenario of course immediately raises the spectre of reification, precisely 
the issue which is the main bone of contention in the debate between Potter, Wetherell, Gill 
& Edwards (1990) and Parker (1990a, 1990b) reviewed in the previous chapter. The moment 
we give discourses and technologies for discovering their presence in texts explicit definition, 
we may have created a pseudo-scientific regime every bit as totalitarian as the one currently 
set up to detect and describe individual subjectivity. A partial rebuttal to this argument is 
contained in the observation that reification is inevitable, even desirable, and that the 
question is rather one of degree: Not if discourse analysis should create reified objects, but 
for how long it should leave them standing. This issue is returned to more fully below. 
Apart from the obvious danger of reification, there is also another reason why 
discourse analysts have avoided adopting more explicitly structured techniques. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this has to do with discourse analysis' identity as a 'bottom-
up' qualitative technique. The objects discovered by discourse analytic research differ from 
those of, for t, ample, quantitatively oriented content analysis not only in their theoretical 
underpinning, but also in how they are constructed. While the latter are often deduced from 
psychological constructs (such as depression or anxiety) and then rediscovered in individual 
texts, the former are supposed to emerge directly from the texts, remaining as far as possible 
at the level of describing how texts are organised. 
Rather than the dictionary approach used in lemmatisation studies or automated 
content analysis (i.e., matching textual fragments to predetermined categories), a 
187 
quantitatively informed discourse analysis should therefore ideally approach texts without 
any preconceived ideas as to the entities which will be found there. This almost a-theoretical 
posture is not unlike that adopted in collocational studies, which seek to describe the internal 
ecology of texts from the point of view of nothing more complex than the co-occurrence of 
lexical items. Potter and Reicher's (1987) definition concerning "stylistic and grammatical 
regularities, often combined with certain metaphors" (p. 27) as well as similar definitions 
quoted earlier suggest that the idea of collocation may be the minimum ingredient for a . 
quantitatively informed version of discourse analysis. 
One way of using techniques from corpus linguistics in discourse analysis while 
maintaining the latter's identity as a 'bottom-up' and qualitative technique, is to start the 
analysis using linguistic techniques for purposes of gaining an overview of the text and then 
to use this information to guide more in-depth qualitative analysis. This progression is the 
reverse of that commonly found in discourse analytic studies, in which the units of interest 
are first determined qualitatively, followed, in some cases (e.g., Gilbert & Mulkey, 1984; 
Levett, 1988; Van Dijk, 1987a) by tabulation of the frequency with which the different units 
are found in the text. Content analytic studies similarly follow a progression from 
qualitatively (or 'rationally') derived content categories to quantitative frequency counts and 
content scales (e.g., O'Dell & Weideman, 1993; Laffal, 1990; Schnurr, Rosenberg & Oxman, 
1992). More generally, the idea that qualitative analysis precedes and prepares the ground 
for quantitative analysis, that it is good at identifying which questions to ask but less so at 
providing definitive answers to these questions, is intuitively appealing and often stated (e.g., 
Kirk & Miller, 1986; Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
The inversion of the qualitative-quantitative sequence, although a significant 
departure from the norm, has a similar purpose as most attempts to combine quantitative and 
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qualitative methods, namely to render the analysis more rigorous while retaining flexibility 
and richness of detail. The reason why such an inversion is worth exploring relates to the 
issue of representativeness, which is often identified as the achilles heel of qualitative 
research9. 
Qualitative research not infrequently makes strong claims with regard to 
representativeness, such as the discourse analytic assertion that the phenomena it identifies 
somehow emerge spontaneously from the text rather than being imposed on it, but as often 
has difficulty in demonstrating such representativeness when reporting on the results of an 
analysis. An apparent lack of representativeness may manifest on at least three levels, each 
of which is sometimes addressed by recourse to quantitative data, although in each case at the 
risk of reification. 
The first level at which qualitative research may appear unrepresentative, which is the 
level Miles and Huberman (1984) appear to be alluding to, is when there is the possibility 
that instances are incorrectly or arbitrarily assigned to categories, i.e., when there is the 
suspicion of inadequate inter-rater reliability. As has been shown in the proliferation of 
computer-based content analytic scales, the appearance ofunrepresentativeness is perhaps 
most easily overcome at this level. However, although it is always possible to devise a 
perfectly consistent classification algorithm, the categories used may themselves lack 
adequate justification, and it can be argued that content analytic researchers (like 
psychometrists) have been quick to find solutions for what are essentially trivial 
measurement problems, while ignoring more fundamental theoretical questions with regard to 
what they are measuring. As has often been stated, objects such as 'authoritarianism', 
9 An example is Miles and Huberman's (1984) warning: "Avoid the 'sprinkling' of 
vivid or interesting examples to spice up the narrative. Rather, look for genuinely 
representative exemplars of the conclusions you are presenting" (p. 213). 
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'depression' or 'anxiety' easily acquire a spurious substantiality by virtue of the reliability with 
which they can be identified. 
The second level at which qualitative research may appear to lack representativeness 
is where there is no indication of the frequency with which particular phenomena occur in a 
text. An example is Potter and Reicher's (1987) 'discursive repertoire' which details the kinds 
of metaphors used to construct the idea of community in various accounts of a 'riot', but does 
not reveal the relative frequency of the different elements of the repertoire. Again, this 
problem is relatively easily overcome. Some discourse analytic studies, such as those of 
Levett (1988), Van Dijk (1987a) and Gilbert and Mulkey (1984), take care to report the 
frequencies of the different discursive phenomena they identify so that it is possible to gauge 
the relative importance of each. Thus the racist themes 'They have a different mentality' 
(N=20) and 'They do not respect women' (N=15) can be seen to be much more frequent in the 
discourses about 'our neighbourhood' analysed by Van Dijk (1987a) than, for instance, the 
theme 'They steal, are dishonest' (N=7). 
The third level at which qualitative research may appear to lack representativeness 
concerns the ubiquitousness of the identified categories in the text as a whole. Not only 
would it be interesting to know how frequent the metaphors in Potter and Reicher's (1987) 
community repertoire are relative to each other, but also how 1 equent they are relative to the 
total volume of talk. Did Potter and Reicher have to sift through piles and piles of transcripts 
before coming up with the occasional nugget, or were community metaphors relatively 
common in talk about the riot? Did Van Dijk's (1987a) field workers have to plough through 
hours and hours of conversation before racial issues were introduced by their respondents, or 
was this one of the main themes when people were asked to talk about the neighbourhood? 
Even if Van Dijk's textual universe is limited to those extracts which deal with racial issues, 
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there is the suspicion (particularly in the absence of a catch-all 'other' category) that the racial 
sub-themes he identifies may cover only part of a larger, less easily organised, domain of talk 
about race. 
The danger of reification at this level of reporting compounds that found at the 
previous two: Not only is the implication that the identified phenomena stand out as definite 
topographical features above the general textual landscape, but that the text studied is itself a 
representative sample of some naturally demarcated region of discourse. Content analytic 
scales again provide the most obvious example. These usually report on the frequency of 
particular content categories as a ratio of the total text (measured either in words or phrases) 
produced by an individual - the unspoken assumption being that individuals are the source of 
meaning and that the natural fault lines in discourse run between individuals, rather than, for 
instance, between discourse situations, between different strata of social power or between 
different discourse communities. 
What such quantitative adjuncts to qualitative research appear to have in common is 
that they tend to be introduced after the fact, as a means of minimally demonstrating the 
extent to which the illustrative examples provided represent a larger collection of similar 
instances. The proposed use of corpus linguistic techniques in discourse analysis is also 
concerned ·with representativeness, pru. •cularly at the third level discussed above (i.e., the 
prominence of the identified phenomena in the text as a whole), but rather than as a post-hoc 
check it is intended as a tool to help ensure from the outset that the overall features of the text 
are used as the ground against which more specific elements are selected for discussion. 
Thus quantitative information about the text is used to guide qualitative analysis, not to 
summarise qualitative information. 
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Corpus linguistic techniques adapted for discourse analysis 
In this section I discuss specific ways in which corpus linguistic techniques can be applied as 
a precursor to qualitative discourse analysis. Seven kinds of techniques are discussed here: 
lemmatisation, manual mark-up, frequency counts, target-word collocations, collocation 
counts, contextual markup and lexical nets. Of these, the first four are essentially the same as 
those commonly used in corpus linguistics, as reviewed above, while the last three constitute 
elaborations on corpus linguistic techniques. The use of these techniques in actual analysis is 
demonstrated in the next two chapters. 
Manual annotation 
The corpus linguistic technique of manually annotating texts using the COCOA (word COunt 
and COncordance on Atlas) markup scheme, the most commonly used standard (Butler, 
1985), can be useful in preparng texts for further analysis. Although complex markup of 
syntax is probably oflittle use in discourse analysis, more basic annotations labelling 
particular sections of text is helpful in later isolating these sections for further analysis. 
Markup is don ' by enclosing in angle brackets an identifier or category, followed by a space 
and then the actual identification. Some typical examples are: <ACT III>; <AUTHOR 
SHAKESPEARE>; <SOURCE BROADCAST>. 
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'Root form' and 'Parts of speech' lemmatisation 
As discussed above, in principle any text consists not only of a one-dimensional string of 
orthographic markers, but also of a multi-dimensional set of implicit 'annotations'. One way 
in which textual analysis can be facilitated is by making such annotations explicit, thus 
identifYing diverse linguistic forms as belonging to a smaller set of lemmas. While the 
overly psychologistic types of assumption involved in content analytic lemmatisation may be 
unacceptable from a discourse analytic perspective, more 'neutral' linguistic lemmatisation 
could be useful. 
Although numerous exceptions and special cases had to be provided for, I found it 
possible to write a relatively simple computer program to strip away several word suffixes 
without altering the root form. The program does this with a greater than 90% degree of 
success. This was the case both for suffixes with a largely grammatical function - the final 
's from most words (which has the effect of converting nouns from plural to singular and 
verbs to their infinitive form) and the present participle (-ing) and past participle ( -ed) from 
verbs (which also converts to the infinitive)- as well as suffixes which form nouns (-ness), 
adjectives (-able) and adverbs (-/y). Other suffixes which can in certain cases be stripped 
away are -a/, -able, -ance, -ment, -ive, and -ion. 
The effect of stripping away suffixes is to greatly reduce the degree of (possibly 
spurious) variation in a text at the cost of giving up some finer distinctions between word 
forms. Thus act, active, actively, activist and activity would all be lemmatised as ACT; 
emotion, emotional and emotionally would become EMOTION; and sociable, sociably, 
social, socialise and socially would become SOCIAL. Apart from the information which is 
lost, this form oflemmatisation is of course also rather inconsistent. The past tense form of a 
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regular verb, e.g., passed, would for instance be changed to the infinitive, while an irregular 
past tense form such as could remains as a separate type. 
Root-form lemmatisation of this sort was, after much experimentation, not used in the 
studies reported on in the next two chapters on the grounds that it tended to obliterate too 
much of the rhetorical and stylistic texture of the texts. Once tokens were reduced to their 
root forms, there appeared to be little that could be done with the text other than counting of 
content categories as is done in computerised content analysis. There may however be types 
of text other than verbal transcripts for which this may be the most sensible option, and the 
relative ease with which the kind of automated root-form lemmatisation outlined above was 
possible, suggests that it may yet prove a useful aid in certain analyses. 
Another form oflemmatisation, based on parts of speech, also proved practicable and 
was eventually used. The procedure is primarily aimed at differentiating grammatical from 
lexical words10. Grammatical words identified by the program are articles (a, an and the), 
auxiliaries (can, could, have, has, had, may, might, must, should, would, ought and in some 
cases be, being, been, is, am, are, was, were, shall, will and do, did, doing, done, does), 
conjunctions (after, and, because, but, for, however, since, until, till, yet, while, although, as, 
moreover, either, so, only and also), prepositions (about, above, across, after, against, along, 
amid, around, at, before, behind, below, beneath, beside, between, beyond, by, down,·~ ccept, 
for, from, in, inside, like, near, of, off, over, since, through, till, to, toward, under, until, up, 
upon and with) and pronouns(/, me, my, mine, myself, you, your, yours, yourself, yourselves, 
he, him, his, hers, himself, she, her, herself, it, its, itself, we, us, our, ours, ourselves, they, 
10 Grammatical words are words such as articles, auxiliaries, prepositions and 
exclamations which seem to carry less semantic weight than, for instance, main verbs and 
nouns, which are lexical words (Butler, 1985). The proportion of lexical words in a text is 
termed the 'lexical density'. 
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them, their, theirs, themselves, who, this, that, these, those, such, what, whose and which). In 
addition, a list of colloquial and contracted forms provided by Butler (1985) which may be 
considered as grammatical words are coded as such, supplemented with additional South 
African colloquial forms (Table 6.3). Ambiguous words are coded as grammatical rather than 
lexical. 
Lexical words are semantically richer than grammatical words and a frequency list of 
lexical words provides a good initial overview of the basic content of a text. 
Table 6.3 Grammatical and ambiguous words (adapted from Butler, 1985) 
didn't i've not there why no 
or very all that's some uhm 
any gomg yes one more when 
other can't whether then want nothing 
go there's outside anything couldn't everybody 
less wasn't OK haven't ag uh 
something weren't if anyway where you're 
they've shouldn't within whatever i'd i'll 
both everyone isn't that'll what's aren't 
mmm oneself many mustn't put than 
they're how oh few everything gonna 
doesn't having should've never i'm don't 
here it's Ja 
Frequency counts 
Frequency counts constitute the most obvious means of summarising a text and can be used 
in discourse analysis to provide an initial overview of the material prior to more detailed 
analysis. Counts can be given of all types, and oflexical types only. The former tend to 
provide information on stylistic and pragmatic features of the text, while the latter give an 
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indication of the substantive topics addressed. 
Target-word collocations 
These are lists of words which co-occur in close proximity to selected word types, and can be 
used to describe the general lexical environment in which high-frequency word types occur. 
Collocation counts 
These are sorted lists of highly collocated types and provide a somewhat more 
comprehensive idea of the patterns of redundancy which characterise a text. While target-
word collocations require only that the collocational probability of a selected sample of types 
be computed, collocation counts are derived from a matrix of all possible collocations among 
word types in the text. This matrix is systematically examined, and the most highly related 
word pairs (calculated as described below) extracted. Although this would seem a natural 
extension to the idea of target-word collocations, I have not seen this method used in corpus 
studies. It is however ideal for use as a precursor to qualitative discourse analysis as it 
provides an overview of the entire text . hile imposing minimal assumptions about the types 
of themes or categories to be looked for. 
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Contextual markup 
This technique is also derived from the idea of collocation, although again I have not seen it 
used in corpus linguistics. It involves the modification of transcripts based on the 
collocational redundancy of words as revealed by a matrix of all possible collocations. The 
markup reveals the extent to which the lexical environment of each word token in a transcript 
is typical of the word type's positioning in the text as a whole. The procedure is to 
systematically determine the positional 'typicalness' of each word token by computing the 
average strength of association (described below) between the corresponding word type and 
the word types in its immediate vicinity. Thus if the types unable and struggle often occur in 
the vicinity of cope, then cope will be marked as being in a highly typical situation in a text 
fragment such as: "I am unable to cope - I struggle to survive." Each of the other words in 
the fragment will be similarly marked, depending on the extent to which they find themselves 
in a lexical neighbourhood which is typical of their occurrence in the transcript as a whole. 
Different forms of contextual markup have been developed for the studies presented 
in the next two chapters, the most sophisticated of which translates strength of association 
into font size. The program developed to perform this markup determines the font size of 
each token in a ranscript and then re-encodes the token in Rich Text Format, a protocol 
which is recognised by most word processing and desktop publishing programs. However, 
the resultant text tends to be quite cumbersome with some words printed in very large font 
while others appear in a very small font, and this form of markup is therefore probably best 
used sparingly for illustrative purposes. A markup method which proved more practicable 
was simply to capitalise all words for which the strength of association (described below) 
with any word within a certain span of surrounding words exceeds a certain minimum level. 
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Lexical nets 
Finally, lexical nets can be drawn using the information contained in the table of collocations. 
This is a newly developed method in which the collocational pattern in a text is graphically 
represented by manually drawing lines between pairs of words which are statistically related 
(as described below). Various forms of lexical net were experimented with, including ones in 
which the thickness or length of the lines between pairs of words reflected the strength of the 
relationship. However, this again proved impracticable and cumbersome, and in their final 
form lines ofuniform thickness were drawn between all words where the strength of the 
relationship exceeded a certain minimum. The way in which reasonable values for this and 
other parameters were established is described in greater detail in Appendix 2. The length of 
the line between words is arbitrary and depends on the way in which words are arranged for 
each net so as to produce a coherent picture with as few lines crossing each other as possible. 
Z-scores 
Target-word collocations, collocation counts, contextual markup and lexical nets are all 
based on some indicator of the strength of association between words. The statistical index 
used in this study was the z-score (Miall, 1992; Bradley, 1990). The z-score was chosen as 
this is the most frequently used index of collocation in corpus linguistics. Other measures, 
such as Yule's Y or mutual information have however also been proposed (Church, Gale, 
Hanks, Hindle & Moon, 1994; Church & Hanks, 1990). Given the total number ofwords in a 
text, the 'span' of words considered to be a target word's typical context (e.g., 5 words on 
either side), the frequency with which the target word occurs in the text, and the frequency 
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with which another word (or 'collocate') occurs within the target word's context, the z-score 
returns a coefficient of collocation which is significant at the 1% probability level when it 
reaches 2.57 or above. 
The formula used in the program used for the analyses in the next two chapters was 
taken from Bradley (1990), and is computed as follows: 
z 
c- (P XL) 
= 
sqrt((P x LX (1-P)) 
where C = 
L = 
p = 
the frequency with w; ;ch a collocate occurs in the same 
context as a target wo:d type; 
the total number of word tokens in the same context as the 
target word (at most the span x the total frequency of the target 
word); and 
the frequency with which the collocate occurs in the text as a 
whole divided by the total number of tokens in the text as a 
whole. 
It is worth noting that the z-score is not symmetrical, so that the probability of word a 
occurring as a collocate of word b is not the same as the probability of word b occurring as a 
collocate of word a. This may be illustrated as follows: If a occurs 500 times in the text, b 
occurs 3 times and the two words occur in the same context 3 times, then a is a strong 
collocate of b (since it is present whenever b is present), but b is unlikely to be a strong 
collocate of a (since it is only present in 3 of 500 cases when a is present). In practice, 
however, the discrepancy between the two z-scores is usually small and where the direction 
of the association· is not of importance the average is taken. 
In order to generate a comprehensive overview of the collocational patterns in a text, 
a matrix ofz-scores for each possible pair of the 1000 most common word types is computed, 
consisting of(1000 x 500)- 500 = 499500 (just less than half a million) individual z-scores. 
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This matrix can be computed separately for each section of text analysed, and using various 
different lengths for the 'span' of words constituting a context. This is described in greater 
detail in Appendix 2. While it may have been desirable to include all word types in the 
matrix, available computer resources did not allow for this. However, the 1000 most 
common types account for the majority of tokens in most texts. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter an overview was provided of various techniques used in corpus linguistics and 
related fields and ways suggested in which these could be adapted for use with discourse 
analysis. The use suggested for corpus techniques in discourse analysis goes beyond an 
adaptation of techniques however, but also encompasses a reversal of the usual quantitative-
qualitative sequence, with quantitative techniques employed as a precursor to further 
qualitative analysis. This is demonstrated in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 7 
'The unreturning stylus': 
Interviews with psychiatric patients 
A conversation begins 
with a lie. And each 
speaker of the so-called common language feels 
the ice-floe split, the drift apart 
as if powerless, as if up against 
a force of nature. 
A poem can begin 
with a lie. And be torn up. 
A conversation has other laws 
recharges itself with its own 
false energy. Cannot be torn 
up. Infiltrates our blood. Repeats itself 
Inscribes with its unreturning stylu~ 
the isolation it denies. 
- Adrienne Rich, 1978 
In this chapter I present an analysis of interviews conducted in 1993 with a group of patients 
at a mental hospital in what is now the Gauteng area. The 120-bed hospital, which I shall call 
Valhalla, was organised into 'bottom' and 'top' wards. The bottom wards were for the more 
well-defined psychiatric conditions - depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, dementia 
and mental retardation - while the top wards were for adolescents thought to have 
behavioural problems, those presenting as anorexics or bulimics, as well as a 
'psychotherapeutic' ward for adults thought to have adjustment problems. The patients 
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included in the study were all from this latter ward, commonly referred to as the 'personality 
disorder' or PD ward. These patients w~re chosen as subjects for the study not so much by 
design, but rather as a result of the process of gaining access to the hospital. 
Briefly, I was assigned to the hospital as part of the compulsory national service for 
whites then in operation in South Africa. My appointment was as a clerk, and much of my 
time was taken up with administrative duties. However, I was also at times, especially in the 
first two years, given an opportunity to assist psychiatric registrars and psychology interns 
wit1 their research work, and it was accepted that I could do some work on my own. On this 
basis I got to be on reasonably friendly terms with some of the key figures in the PD ward -
the psychiatrist, the psychiatric registrar, the matron and several ofthe nurses- and they 
allowed me access to ward rounds, and (after a formal proposal had been submitted to the 
medical superintendent) to individual patients. 
Valhalla hospital was at the time of the study still almost exclusively for whites, 
although legal constraints on admitting black patients had been lifted some time previously. 
In other respects also the hospital's demographics probably closely reflected that of similar 
hospitals for short-stay non-certified patients in 'western' countries. The mean age for 
patients in the PD ward was 31.59 (N=258, SD=9.9); and 37.53 (N=587, SD=19.92) for 
patients in the other wards. In common with most psychiatric institutions internationally, the 
great majority of patients in both the PD ward (70.3%) and the other wards (63.5%) were 
female. Almost a third (27%) of admissions were readmissions. The hospital did not cater 
for certified patients, although patients were occasionally certified and transferred to other 
institutions (mainly Sterkfontein and Weskoppies) inthe area. 
Although a state-funded institution, Valhalla was well equipped (pools, tennis courts, 
a creche, a nurses' residence, sports fields, spacious gardens) and it had an extremely 
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favourable staff to patient ratio. A newspaper article described it as looking "like a five-star 
hotel with well-groomed gardens and lawns, a nine-hole golf course, two tennis courts and a 
swimming pool" (Weekly Mail & Guardian, 1997). The hospital officially catered for 120 
patients, but in practice this rarely rose above 110. To cater for these patients' needs (as well 
as those of about 1000 outpatients) there were 3 0 or more full-time psychiatrists, psychiatric 
registrars, medical doctors, psychologists, psychology interns, psychiatric social workers and 
occupational therapists, more than 50 nursing staff, 15 to 20 administrative staff, and 80 
'general assistants' (low-pai.: black workers). This clearly compares very favourably with 
other institutions in South Africa where there are on average 501 beds, 1 psychiatrist per 133 
patients and 1 nurse per 31 patients. On an average weekday only 63% of South African 
psychiatric units have access to a doctor, 30% to a psychiatrist and 17% to a psychologist. 
Only 3% of patients have access to individual psychotherapy (Visser, Haasbroek & Bodemer, 
1989). 
Diagnostic categories at Valhalla hospital are detailed in Table 7.1, which is based on 
discharge data for an 18-month period. When patients are discharged from Valhalla, as when 
they are admitted, there is a flurry of official forms to be completed, such as the 'Clearance 
Certificate', which demands that "before discharge from this hospital, patients will obtain the 
necessary signatures from the undermentioned departments to the effect that they have been 
cleared", as well as forms to do with whether towels have been handed in, valuables 
collected, fees paid and so on. These forms all find their way into the patient file which, a 
day or so after the patient's departure, migrates back from the ward into the central registry 
where it awaits a possible readmission. Perhaps the most important part ofthis discharge 
process is the final diagnosis determined by the discharging physician. This diagnosis is used 
for various official purposes, such as for the Department of Health's annual statistics and for 
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medical aid reimbursement purposes. 
The information on discharge diagnoses presented in Table 7.1 was collected on a 
daily basis and reflects about 80% of admissions and discharges during the period. The 
remaining data were unavailable as a result of my sporadic absences from the discharge 
office and is unlikely to have resulted in any systematic sampling bias. These diagnoses are 
based on the anachronistic disease classification system then used by the Department of 
Health, and are replete with outdated terms such as organic, neurotic and reaction, but 
nevertheless represent the 'official' diagnosis with .rhich the discharging physician in each 
case released a patient into the world. 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, the most common diagnosis in both the PD and other 
wards was 'affective psychosis', with fully a third of all patients leaving Valhalla with this 
label. The next most popular diagnosis in the PD ward was 'adjustment reaction' (25% ), 
while in the other wards it was 'special symptoms not elsewhere classified' (13.8%). The 
relative blandness of these diagnoses, as compared to the third most popular categories -
Schizophrenia (1 0. 7% of discharges from the non-PD wards) and Personality Disorder (9.6% 
of discharges from the PD ward) - may provide one clue as to why they were so frequently 
used, and is in itself a commentary on the difference between psychiatry and other medical 
disciplines. 
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Table 7.1 Discharge diagnoses of patients at Valhalla hospital 
Diagnosis 
ORGANIC PSYCHOTIC CONDITIONS 
Senile organic condition 
Alcoholic psychosis 
Drug psychosis 
Transient organic psychotic conditions 
Other organic psychotic conditions 
OTHER PSYCHOSES 
Schizophrenic psychoses 
Affective psychoses 
Paranoid states 
Other non-organic psychoses 
Psychosis with childhood origin 
Other wards 
N % 
4 0.6 
3 0.4 
9 1.3 
2 0.3 
5 0.7 
78 10.9 
278 38.8 
4 0.6 
1 0.1 
1 0.1 
PDward 
N % 
2 
3 
81 
1 
0.8 
0.4 
1.3 
33.8 
0.4 
0.4 
NEUROTIC DISORDERS, PERSONALITY DISORDERS AND OTHER NON-PSYCHOTIC MENTAL 
DISORDERS 
Neurotic disorders 6 0.8 6 2.5 
Personality disorders 11 1.5 23 9.6 
Sexual deviations & disorders 4 1.7 
Alcohol dependence syndrome 3 0.4 4 1.7 
Drug dependence 7 1.0 1 0.4 
Non-dependent abuse of drugs 2 0.3 20 8.3 
Physiological malfunction due to mental factors 8 1.1 0.4 
Special symptoms not elsewhere classified 99 13.8 1 0.4 
Adjustment reaction 33 4.6 62 25.8 
No;:;-psychotic mental disorder due brain damage 14 2.0 2 0.8 
Depressive disorders not elsewhere classified 68 9.5 6 2.5 
Disturbance of conduct not elsewhere classified 14 2.0 
Hyperkinetic syndrome of childhood 2 0.3 
Specific delays in development 0.4 
MENTAL RETARDATION 
Mild mental retardation 2 0.3 0.4 
Other specified mental retardation 3 0.4 
Unspecified mental retardation 2 0.3 
DIAGNOSIS NOT SPECIFIED 58 7.9 19 8.0 
TOTAL 717 100.0 240 100.0 
Note: Diagnoses with a frequency of more than 10% are printed in bold. In cases of readmis~ion, the most 
recent diagnosis is given. 
Thus one interpretation of the fact that Personality Disorder was only the third most common 
diagnosis in the PD ward (well behind 'affective psychosis' and 'adjustment reaction') is that it 
reflects the invidious position medical personnel are placed in when the vocabulary they have 
to use reads like a dictionary of insults rather than diagnostic categories. As Kleinman (1988) 
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observes: 
Dysthymia will strike many as only a technical euphemism for unhappiness, 
hysterical personality disorder as a medical shorthand for uncooperation from 
aggressive or attention-seeking females, who might regard both the term and the 
doctors who use it as paternalistic and unempathetic (p. 61 ). 
More specific categories of personality disorder have an even "less empathetic flavour, the 
three broadly recognised (e.g., Yates, Seileni, Reich & Brass, 1989) personality clusters 
being: 
I. Paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal; 
II. Histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial, borderline; and 
III. Avoidant, dependent, compulsive, passive-aggressive. 
No wonder that psychiatrists and psychologists, although they make free use of such terms in 
their research reports and formal communications (in informal settings I as often heard the 
expression 'vrot1 personality'), prefer to use less damaging labels such as 'depression' when 
the diagnosis is meant for more general consumption. 
Another more straight-forward interpretation of the relative rarity of'personality 
disorder' diagnoses in the PD ward is that it confirms the sentiment repeatedly expressed by 
the psychiatrist in charge of the ward, namely that the ward was not for cases ofPersonality 
Disorder per se, but rather for all kinds of patients who were considered likely to benefit 
from psychotherapy and from the ward's therapeutic milieu. The evidence regarding 
diagnosis would thus appear to indicate that the patients in the PD ward were not necessarily 
considered less seriously ill than those in the bottom wards, but simply as more amenable to 
psychotherapeutic intervention. 
Afrikaans for rotten. 
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In the next section I describe the subset of PD ward patients I interviewed in more 
detail, both in terms of diagnosis and of other biographical data. 
'Subjects and sampling' 
I conducted a total of66 interviews with a group of38 patients in the PD ward (38 first 
interviews, 23 second interviews and five third interviews). Ofthe 38 patients, 25 (65.8%) 
w~1·e female, which compares well with the 70.3% females already reported for the PD ward 
as a whole and the 63.5% females for other wards. The mean age of the patients I 
interviewed was 29.11 (with a range from 18 to 39), which is somewhat lower than the mean 
age of31.59 for the ward as a whole and 37.53 for other wards. 
Ten of the 38 patients were readmissions to Valhalla at the time that I interviewed 
them, while a further four of the first admissions were readmitted within four years after the 
initial admission. Thus despite the relative youthfulness of the sample, 14 (36.8%) have now 
been readmitted at least once. Two patients had a total of six admissions each to Valhalla 
and together the 3 8 patients had accumulated 62 admissions. Several had also spent time in 
other mental institutions. 
Final discharge diagnoses making use of the Department ofHealth nosology 
described earlier were available for 24 of the 38 interviewees and are shown in Table 7.2. 
This can be seen to fairly closely match the overall figures presented in Table 7.1. In both 
cases Affective Psychosis and Adjustment Reaction are by fur the largest categories, while 
Personality Disorder and Non-dependent abuse of drugs are the only other categories above 
5%. 
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Table 7.2 Discharge diagnoses of interviewees and of the ward as a whole 
Diagnosis N % Ward% 
Affective psychosis 10 42 34 
Adjustment reaction 7 29 26 
Non-dependent abuse of drugs 3 13 8 
Personality Disorder 2 8 10 
Depressive disorders not ~lsewhere classified 1 4 3 
Paranoid states 1 4 0 
TOTAL 24 100 81 
Note. The last column indicates the rounded percentage (from Table 7.1) for the PD ward as 
a whole. The percentages for the ward as a whole do not sum to 100 as only those 
diagnoses presented in the interviewee sample are listed. 
The diagnostic labels assigned to patients were not however as unequivocal as these tables 
may suggest. In addition to diagnoses coded in terms ofthe official Department ofHealth 
nosology, the psychiatrist or registrar would normally also note his or her final diagnosis in 
an open-ended format in the patient file, thus allowing greater scope for the notorious 
indeterminacy of psychiatric diagnosis to emerge. The various discharge diagJ;loses assigned 
to the 38 interviewees are recorded in Table 7.3. However, even the relatively complex 
situation depicted in this table does not begin to do justice to the variety of diagnostic labels 
which may be used before a more definitive picture emerges and the patient is ready for 
discharge. 
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Table 7.3 Biographical details and discharge diagnoses of interviewees 
ID Gender Age Diagnosis 
I F 27 a, b & c. Bulimia 
5 M Dependent Personality Disorder 
8 F 24 Major Depressive Episode 
9 F 36 Substance abuse 
10 F Alcohol Dependence 
11 F 25 a. Adjustment Disorder (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
b. Depressed mood/ cannabis abuse 
13 F a. & b. Borderline Personality Disorder 
c. & d. Psycho-active Substance Abuse (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
e. Anxiety State f. Deferred 
14 M Alcohol Abuse I Adjustment Disorder 
16 M 23 Dysthymia (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
17 F a. Major Depression Single Episode (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
b. Major Depression Recurrent I J ·llimia (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
18 M 23 Adjustment Disorder with Depress~ Mood (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
19 M 25 Atypical Depression I Substance Abuse (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
20 F 18 a .. Adjustment Disorder b. Deferred I Bulimia c. Deferred 
21 F Adjustment Disorder I ?Anorexia 
22 M 39 a. Dysthymic Disorder (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) b. Major Depression 
23 M 20 Adjustment Disorder 
24 F 25 a. Organic Hallucinosis b. Organic Delusional Disorder c. Schizoid Traits 
27 F 25 Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood 
28 F 26 Adjustment Disorder (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
34 F Panic Disorder I Major Depression I Dysthymia (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
35 M 39 Alcohol Dependence (NON-DEPENDENT ABUSE OF DRUGS) 
36 F 19 a. & b. Schizophrenia (DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS NOT ELSEWHERE 
CLASSIFIED) 
c. Substance Abuse I Schizophrenia 
37 M 30 Paranoia I Delusional Disorder (PARANOID STATES) 
38 F 33 Alcohol Abuse I Agoraphobia (NON-DEPENDENT ABUSE OF DRUGS) 
39 F 27 a. Borderline Personality Disorder b. Depression 
40 M 24 Bipolar Disorder rapid cycling 
41 F 21 Borderline Personality Disorder 
42 M 18 Substance Abuse I Major Depression 
43 F Adjustment Disorder (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
44 F 21 a. Major Depression Seasonal (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
b. Atypical Depression (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
45 F 22 a & b Depression 
46 F a. Dysthymic Disorde( b. & c. Major Depression (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
d. Dysthymic Disorder (PERSONALITY DISORDER) e. Panic Disorder I 
Agoraphobia 
47 M 35 Substance Abuse 
48 F 26 Substance Abuse 
49 F 22 a. & b. Dysthymic Disorder (PERSONALITY DISORDER) 
51 F 20 a. & b. Substance Abuse (ADJUSTMENT REACTION) 
52 F 23 Substance Abuse (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
54 M 22 Substance Abuse I Anxiety Disorder (AFFECTIVE PSYCHOSIS) 
Note. I. ID refers to the interview number. 2. Where diagnoses have been labelled a, b, c etc. these indicate 
readmissions. Department of Health diagnoses are in capitals and brackets. A slash indicates alternative 
diagnoses 
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While it may therefore be useful to try and describe the subjects from whom the raw material 
for analysis was collected in terms of traditional biographical indices such as sex, age and 
diagnosis, it is also apparent that these matters are themselves part of the swirl of discourse 
which accompanies each patient in her passage through the institution, and that it is at best 
difficult (and at worst contradictory) to maintain a distinction between subjects on the one 
hand and the discourse which produces them as subjects on the other. It is likely that it is 
considerations such as these which have prompted Potter and Wetherell (1987) and others to 
question traditional notions of sampling. However, reporting on diagnost ,~ and other details 
such as those in Table 7.3 does have a certain utility, if only in conveying an impression of 
how the producers (or conduits) of the discourses to be analysed were themselves positioned 
in the official discourse of the institution. 
In trying to locate the transcripts analysed below, it would certainly have made a 
difference had the subjects all had iron-clad diagnoses of Personality Disorder, or if all were 
from one of the bottom wards, just as my own role in co-producing the discourse would have 
had to be differently regarded if my position in the institution had been different. 
In addition to background details on the subjects, information on the conditions 
within which data was collected is crucial in making sense of any text (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Van Dijk, 1987a) and this is discussed more fully below. 
The interviewing process . 
I conducted interviews at irregular times when not engaged in other duties at the hospital. 
Nursing staff had agreed to inform me of all new arrivals in the ward, but in practice this 
almost never happened. In order to obtain subjects for the study I therefore visited the ward 
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office as often as possible, identified recent admissions (maximum one night on the ward) 
from the patient register, and then asked a nurse on duty to call the patient for me. While this 
may appear to be a relatively straight-forward process, patients were often extremely difficult 
to track down at such short notice, and due to the nature of my position at the hospital I was 
unable to institute a more regular system. As a consequence roughly every third patient 
admitted to the ward was interviewed. I am not aware of any systematic bias resulting from 
this selection process. 
Interviews were conducted in an office near the ward and were tape recorded. I 
informed patients of the scope (two hour-long interviews) and nature ofthe study ("a project 
investigating the language people use to describe their difficulties"), emphasising that 
participation was voluntary and that the ward staff would not be informed of the patient's 
decision. Two patients declined participation. One (a middle-aged man) had been brought to 
the hospital against his will and was under the impression that Valhalla was a commitment 
facility. His expressed intention was to escape, rather than to participate in hospital 
procedures, and he was some days later recorded as discharged, coded RHT2• The other (a 
woman in her late twenties) started crying incessantly as soon as she came into the office and 
I did not feel able to continue with the interview. She was subsequently subjected to a 
lengthy series ofECT treatments, the outcome of which was described by ward staff as 
reasonably favourable. 
My impression of the emotional state at the start of the interview of those patients 
who did participate was that it varied widely. Some seemed melancholy, others withdrawn~ 
the majority seemed in reasonably good spirits at the time of the interview, although many 
spoke of a more general sense of gloom. One woman was in an overly exuberant mood, and 
2 Refused Hospital Treatment 
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one man seemed at first not to be talking at all coherently. Both subsequently participated in 
the interview without much difficulty. 
Once patients had verbally agreed to being interviewed, they were asked to sign a 
consent form (Appendix A) which reiterated the points already made as well as giving 
assurances of confidentiality. I then asked for permission to switch on the tape recorder and 
start the interview. 
Interviews were between 20 and 90 minutes in duration. A predetermined set of 
• 'Pics (derived from a small pilot study involving five unstructured interviews) were covered 
in a relatively set sequence, but with considerable scope for digression. The strategy was to 
introduce a topic, trying to get the interviewee to pursue that (using minimal encouragers, 
reflection, and follow-up questions), and only introducing a new topic when the interviewee 
had run out of steam. There were also a small number of questions which I put almost 
verbatim to each interviewee. The ideal interview structure (although no single interview 
fully achieved this) was as follows: 
Reason for admission. I started off by asking each interviewee directly why she was 
at Valhalla, typically using a phrase such as: "The first thing that I usually ask people is if 
they could just tell me why they're here." [ 17/1 ]3 
Events leading to admission. In answering the previous question, many interviewees 
alluded to events in the weeks immediately prior to admission. If not, I asked about this, 
using a formula such as: "If you could maybe just tell me the past two, three weeks- what's 
been happening, how did it. .. ?" [34/1] 
Professional opinions. Interviewees would often mention one or other professional 
3 The numbers in square brackets identify the interview from which the extract was 
taken. The code 11 indicates that it was a first interview. 
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person (such as a GP, psychiatrist or psychologist) in talking about these events. If not, I 
would try to establish if they had had dealings with such a person and how this person had 
defined the interviewee's problem. E.g., "What does your GP think about your difficulty, 
how does he see it?" [10/1] 
Lay opinion: Interviewees often dwelt on the process of coercion and persuasion that 
led up to admission. If they did not raise the topic spontaneously, I would ask directly what a 
family member or friend made of their situation. E.g., "What about a family member or a 
friend or something? I'n 'itill kind of fishing for opinions of other people." [24/1] 
Defining and managing depression. 'Affective Psychosis' (which in most cases 
appears to mean depression) was by far the most common diagnosis at Valhalla as a whole, in 
the PD ward, as well as in the sample of patients interviewed, and most interviewees 
mentioned depression in talking about the reasons for their admission. In addition, an earlier 
study involving patients at Valhalla hospital (Strong, 1987) found depression to be the most 
commonly given reason for admission to the PD ward. I therefore asked them to explain what 
they meant by the term. In the two instances in which depression was not mentioned by the 
patient, I introduced the topic by asking if they considered depression to be part of their 
present difficulties. I asked for the interviewee's definition of depression using a formula 
such as the following: "I wonder if you could describe depression to me as ifl really had no 
idea [ mmm ], as you experience it?" [34/1] I also asked a further 3 standard questions relating 
to managing depression and the purpose of depression. The depression-related questions were 
not used in the current study. 
Short-term prognosis. I closed the interview by arranging for a follow-up interview 
in two weeks' time and asking interviewees how they saw things changing in that period. 
E.g., " .. .ifyou could perhaps predict now how things will have changed for you between now 
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and then." [ 43/1] 
In part due to the practical constraints already mentioned, only 23 of the original 3 8 
interviewees could be located for re-interview two weeks later. An additional reason for the 
attrition was early discharges (which occur in 20% ofPD-ward admissions) and patients who 
are discharged with an RHT code. 
The second interview format was very similar to that of the first. 
Reason for admission. Interviewees were again asked to explain their admission to 
Valhalla. E.g., "To start off sort ofthe same as 1. st time uh ifyou can this time just give me 
sort of for the record a summary of why you are here." [23/2] 
Last two weeks. Interviewees were again asked to recount events over the past two 
weeks, but this time with reference to their stay at Valhalla. E.g., "If you can sort of fill me 
in about the last two weeks since I saw you last, what's been happening around here?" [23/2] 
Depression. The same questions regarding depression asked in the first interview 
were repeated in the second interview. 
Prognosis. Interviewees were again asked how they saw things turning out during 
the next two weeks. E.g., "So if we assume say two weeks from now, uh if you could predict 
how things will change for you between now and then." (23/2] 
Finally, third interviews were conducted shortly before discharge with five 
individuals. These took the form of informal discussions and were not intended to be used as 
part of the formal analysis, but to provide background material. Similarly, although this is not 
an ethnographic study, I also drew on my experiences for background and to illustrate 
particular points. 
The purpose of all interviews was to encourage interviewees to talk as freely as 
possible about the nature ofthe problem which brought them to Valhalla while still retaining 
214 
a measure of comparability across interviews and ensuring that certain themes were covered 
in each interview. The structure of the interviews was not as obtrusively apparent as the 
above description perhaps makes it appear. The format is perhaps most similar to that used by 
Van Dijk (1987a) in his classic discourse analytic studies of racism, i.e., relatively free-
ranging one-on-one interviews in which particular topics are either deliberately introduced or 
allowed to emerge 'spontaneously'. Importantly, I would in retrospect have preferred to 
conduct more informal interviews with less concern for comparability across 'subjects'. A 
complete sample interview is reproduced as Appendix 4. 
Group interviews, as used in Levett's (1988) discourse analytic study have many 
advantages and may also in retrospect have been preferable. However, there is a particular 
reason why individual interviews may have been more appropriate in this case, namely the 
individual nature of the psychotherapeutic interventions used with these patients. Although 
there was a fair amount of group work, for instance in occupational therapy sessions and 
much taik about the beneficial effects of the ward milieu, patients clearly understood that, 
apart from medication, one-on-one therapy was the centrepiece of their treatment. Many 
patients came to Valhalla while in psychotherapy, often as long-standing clients of one of the 
numerous therapists in private practice in the Johannesburg area. Once in the ward they were 
interviewed at length in the course of obtaining a history, followed by weekly therapy 
sessions with a psychologist, psychiatrist or psychiatric social worker, and more frequent 
informal one-on-one chats with a nurse-therapist assigned to their case. Thus the interviews I 
conducted could to an extent be seen as analogous to the one-on-one therapy sessions in 
which interviewees were already accustomed to exploring their emotional and relationship 
difficulties, despite the fact that it was repeatedly emphasised that these interviews were 
purely for research purposes. These interviews were therefore arguably analogous to the 
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kinds of confessional or therapeutic conversations commonly engaged in by those who have 
become part of the psychiatric system. 
Transcription 
I transcribed the tape recordings as soon as possible after each interview, usually within a 
week. Following Levett (1988), Potter & Wetherell (1987) and Van Dijk (1987a), the 
transcription format was relatively straight-forward, registering the speaker (myself or the 
interviewee), indicating pauses by means of dots, and demarcating inaudible and comment 
sections with square brackets. More complex notations of paralinguistic features such as 
elapsed time, inflection, and overlap in speaking turns were not used. 
Despite the relative simplicity of the transcription task, tlus nevertheless proved to be 
one of the most tirile-consunling aspects of the study, fully bearing out Potter & Wetherell's 
( 198 7) rule of thumb that the ratio of recorded to transcription time can be as much as 1: 10. 
The sheer labour involved in transcription is a constraint often mentioned by researchers 
attempting to analyse relatively large samples of verbal material, such as Levett (1988) who 
found transcription time to be 10 to 14 hours per tape. In the next chapter the utility of a data 
source not dependent on such extensive transcription input is investigated. For the present 
study I transcribed a total of just less than 100 000 words. The transcribed te~ was spell-
checked, which aided greatly in correcting typos and nlisspellings and in standardising the 
spelling of unusual word forms. A word count before and after spell-checking revealed that 
around 300 pseudo-types (typos etc) were removed in the process. 
Contractions such as don't, I've, could've were left as is, and not expanded to their 
original form. In most cases contractions involved two words only, although at least one 
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colloquial form (dunno) sometimes used in the transcription consists ofthree words (do not 
know) in its expanded form. The text was annotated using the COCOA format as described 
in the previous chapter. Identifiers used were SPEAKER (with values SELF or 
INTERVIEWEE), INTERVIEWNO (FIRST or SECOND) and TOPIC. Values used for 
TOPIC related to the different sections of the interview as set out above. 
Analytic strategy 
The analysis consisted of qualitative discourse analysis, informed by quantitative indices as 
set out in the previous chapter. The analysis was concerned with highlighting recurrent 
patterns of talk about mental illness, chronicity and readmission, rather than to look for the 
causes of readmission in possible individual differences in language use. The purpose of the 
analysis was also not to highlight psychiatric patients' experiences of serial incarceration, but 
rather to reveal something of the architecture of the 'prison house of language' within which 
they were temporarily or permanently resident. Thus no attempt was made to test for 
significant differences among different diagnostic groups or between readmissions and first-
time admissions. 
The text analysed consisted, for the most part, of those sections of the transcripts 
representing the interviewees' speech. My own contribution was only include~ where it was 
necessary for making sense of sample extracts. Although the general tendency to exclude the 
interviewer's speech from discourse analytic studies can be seen as a weakness ofthe 
approach, this is mitigated in this case by the fact that the interviewer's contributions have 
been described in considerable detail above, so that the context within which interviewees 
spoke is relatively clear. 
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The analysis is presented in two parts. First, I analyse the entire first interviews, 
excluding the sections in response to the standard questions on depression. Second, I 
compare the first and second interviews in terms of the sections that follow after the standard 
question on why interviewees were at the hospital. This section, which is at the start of each 
interview and follows a more-or-less standard question from me, most closely approximates 
responses obtained under controlled experimental conditions and could therefore more 
legitimately be used for comparison than the rest of the interviews, which often differed 
markedly from the first to the second occasion4. 
Each of the two parts of the analysis were done in two phases. First, quantitative 
indexes and lexical nets (as described in Chapter 6) were calculated. Second, these were used 
as a starting point and backdrop for qualitative analysis. As discussed previously, I have 
throughout excluded my contribution to the conversation from the quantitative indexes, but in 
the qualitative analysis I have in places included it as part of illustrative extracts to help 
provide a context for what is said. I have also, towards the end of the analysis, included a 
number of extracts from third interviews for illustrative purposes, although these were not 
part of the main analysis. 
Each section of qualitative analysis typically starts with a discussion and 
interpretation closely associated with a particular quantitative index, e.g., part of a lexical net. 
The procedure followed in constructing this qualitative analysis was as follows. First, I 
located all extracts containing the collocational pairs (or longer sequences) contained in the 
part of the net being analysed. Second, I examined these extracts with a view to 
understanding the typical functions of the collocational pairs or sequences and to identify 
4 It could be argued, however, that in limiting the comparison to this standard part of 
the interview I have been unduly influenced by ideas of 'spontaneous' versus induced speech. 
This point is taken up again later in the dissertation. 
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types of talk that repeatedly occur in close proximity to the collocations. Third, I selected 
what appeared to me to be representative extracts and presented these as illustrative material 
together with the analysis. Finally, I in some cases extended the qualitative analysis to 
consider thematically, but not necessarily statistically, related issues. No attempt was made to 
systematically pursue different levels of analysis, such as topics, metaphors, story elements 
and rhetorical devices separately. Instead, whichever features appeared from the quantitative 
data to be prominent in the text were brought into the discussion. 
Preliminary quantitative overview of the first interview corpus 
The corpus of first interviews consists of33 644 tokens, 2 729 types, 12 377lexical tokens 
and 2 545 lexical types. The type-token ratio is 1:12.33 and the lexical density 36.79%. The 
60 most common types, representing 18 943 tokens or 56% ofthe corpus, are shown in Table 
7.4. 
Table 7.4 Sixty most common types in the first interview corpus 
I 2227 and 1257 to 988 the 774 a 643 that 623 
of 522 it 519 was 514 you 512 uh 503 my 503 
know 458 me 439 m 380 just 307 I'm 300 because 286 
but 274 it's* 273 they 273 don't 260 Ja 244 she 244 
like 242 so 224 for 217 lS 214 I've 214 not 206 
at 202 with 187 very 182 what 175 had 169 think 166 
he 165 have 163 on 161 been 158 no 155 well 154 
this 154 then 153 about 146 got 141 all 139 do 136 
here 134 be 127 get 127 go 119 there 116 really 115 
one 113 if 112 out 110 time 109 that's 108 as 107 
Note. Frequencies are shown next to each type. * it's = it is (its did not feature among the 
first 60 types) 
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As can be seen from Table 7.4, by far the most common type used is the pronoun/, which is 
almost twice as common as the next most frequent type. In fact, no fewer than 5 of the 60 
most common types refer to the first person singular (/, my, me, I'm, I've) and, despite 
representing only 0.18% oftypes, together account for 10.95% oftokens. Every tenth word 
uttered by interviewees directly indicated the first person singular. Although this may seem 
a trivial fact, it underscores the extent to which interviews ofthis sort constitute what 
Foucault calls 'confessions' about the self 
Turning to lexical types (Table 7.5), several clusters can be identified. The only types 
that appear to be directly related to psychological problems are depressed (N=646) and 
depression (N=43). A separate count revealed that 66% of interviewees gave depression as 
the primary reason for their admission, with an additional 15% mentioni;~g suicide attempts 
or suicidal thoughts as the primary reason, giving a total of81% (as opposed to 42% who at 
one time or another were assigned a diagnosis of depression or dysthymia). It is perhaps not 
surprising that interviewees should be unaware or avoid direct mention of the other common 
diagnoses (alcohol or substance abuse, adjustment disorder and personality disorder7). What 
is remarkable is that none of the many other more moderate 'lay' and professional terms for 
mental illness figured in the top 60 lexical types. An examination of the full list oflexical 
types revealed that types such as neurosis, neurotic, psychosis, psychotic and nervous 
breakdown are all absent. Types such as nerves (N=5), nervous (N-1 ), anxiety (N=6), and 
stress-related types (stress N=9; cope N=l2; support N=4), are nowhere near as frequent as 
depression-related types. In these interviews depression appears to have almost completely 
supplanted other shorthand formulations as an explanation for being in a mental hospital, 
possibly because it connotes extreme mental anguish while avoiding any implication of 
insanity, but also because it has considerable medical and scientific legitimacy. 
5 Of course words like you and one are also often used to indicate the first person 
singular. 
6 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all frequencies in this chapter refer to number of 
types or tokens, not number of subjects. 
7 Personality appears 7 times, although inspection of the transcripts revealed that 2 of 
these were not in conjunction with disorder, while the remaining 5 came from an interview 
with a single patient (a nurse), who repeatedly identified herself as suffering from personality 
disorder. 
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Table 7.5 Sixty most common lexical types 
know 458 just 307 think 166 well 154 
got 141 get 127 really 115 time 109 
things 105 thing 100 people 93 say 88 
said 86 now 82 feel 75 see 74 
lot 69 come 68 work 65 depressed 64 
back 63 actually 62 mean 61 help 59 
two 58 sort 55 day 54 last 54 
much 52 went 51 take 51 problem 51 
always 51 getting 49 way 47 quite 45 
even 44 life 44 problems 43 depression 43 
years 42 good 41 bit 41 started 40 
used 40 Valhalla 39 home 38 thought 37 
feeling 37 better 36 a gam 36 talk 35 
whole 35 look 34 three 33 understand 33 
Note. Frequencies are shown next to each type. 
In addition to depression and other illness-related words, another group of nouns could be 
read as specific and non-specific indicators of the difficulties patients describe themselves as 
having to deal with: things, thing, people, work, problem, problems, life, Valhalla and home. 
Another group of verbs and adverbs appear to refer to epistemological concerns: know, think, 
really, see, actually, mean, thought, understand and possibly feel and feeling. These will be 
discussed in the context of the collocational pattern among types in the corpus, reproduced in 
Appendix 3. 
The span of 8 ( 4 on either side ot the target word) used in calculating collocations is 
the same as that for Figure A2.3 (Appendix 2), as this appeared to represent a fair 
compromise between more extreme possibilities. This span is likely to highlight typical word 
pairs and phrases, as well as connections among words that tend to occur in fairly close 
proximity without being part of the same repetitive phrase. A minimum collocation frequency 
of 15 was set to ensure that identified collocations would occur on average at least once in 
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every second interview. To limit the complexity of the web, the first 218 collocations to a 
minimum z-score of 11 were used. The collocational information in Appendix 3 was used to 
draw up the lexical net (as discussed in Chapter 6) shown in Figure 7. 1. Before discussing 
Figure 7.1, however, a brief section of text is subjected to contextual markup to provide a 
foretaste of the types of redundancies that are identified by this method. 
Getting into the text 
Below is a more or less randomly chosen extract from the first interview with participant 
number 34, a young woman in her first admission to Valhalla: 
M: Ja, maybe a bit of that, who knows? 
I: I don't know. Because you know I explain it to my 
doctors but what, the thing is there, we, we get our 
tablets from Valhalla [ja] . Every time you go you just 
start getting used to a new doctor, you know doctor, then 
a new one comes [ja, ja]. And she'll have her [-s], you 
know her say, and then you get used to her, and then 
another one will come [ja, ja]. And there's this one who 
keeps on pressuring me I must go and work, I must go and 
work. And like last year I got an after-school job, you 
know looked after children after, in the afternoons 
[yes]. And these attacks, I started getting these 
attacks in class, you know [ag] . And at the end of this 
year, December last year, they said to me look you know 
they, look you know [inaudible]. Ja. That's 
embarrassing for me. I'd love to go and work. And I do, 
do you think I like sitting at home and things like that. 
It's embarrassing. 
A hie-psychiatric interpretation of this woman's difficulties would probably depend on 
collateral information regarding the nature of the attacks and the treatment received, and if 
these suggested no organic or major psychiatric problem she would be consigned to the 
wastebasket of 'personality disorder'; a psychological reading would similarly probably want 
to place the woman as a histrionic personality with passive-aggressive and dependent traits; 
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while a sociological reading would perhaps try to relate aspects of her form of post-
deinstitutionalised existence to classic themes from older forms of institutionalisation (e.g., 
the ironic story of the long-time inmate having to educate the novice jail-keeper in the ways 
of the institution). A reading sensitive to issues of power would want to highlight the subtle 
(although ultimately perhaps self-defeating) ways in which the woman both colludes with 
and subverts the demands of institutional authority. 
All such readings would tend to focus on the semantically rich portions of the account 
- getting tablets frorr. Valhalla, having to explain things to a succession of new doctors, being 
pressured into going to work, the embarrassment of an attack, sitting at home - and largely 
ignore the apparently unremarkable linguistic commonplaces which link the 'purple patches'. 
It is precisely these normally almost invisible redundancies which are foregrounded when the 
extract is subjected to contextual mark-up based on the collocational information in 
Appendix 3: 
1 don' t know because you know I 
explain it t 0 my doctors but what the thing is there we we get 
our tablets from valhalla every time you go you just start 
getting used to a new doctor you know 
doctor then a new one comes and she' 11 have her 
you know her sa; and then you get used to her 
and then another one will come and there's this o~e who keeps 
on pressuring me I must go and work I must go and 
work and like last year I got an after school jOb YOU 
know looked after children after 
in the afternoons and these attacks I Started 
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getting these attacks in class you know and at 
the end Of this year December laSt year they said 
to me look you know they look you .know 
ja that's embarrassing for me i'd love to go and work and 
I do do Y9U think I like sitting at horne and 
things 1 ike that it's embarrassing 
The collocational data used for the markup in a sense represent those patterns of speech 
closest to the surface. It will be shown, however, that these verbal gestures can be used as a 
good start for understanding what goes on in 'psychological' conversations. Figure 7.1 is a 
lexical net of the most prominent connections between words in the interviews, incorporating 
all the collocations listed in Appendix 3. 
Despite the tragic circumstances that the interviewees find themselves in, there is 
something almost comical about the textual universe shown in Figure 7.1, with all the 
embarrassing little indispensabilities of everyday talk (sort-of, and-then, last-year, that's-
why) set out for display. As a (sort-of) sentence generating machine, it can be used to crank 
out any number oflittle confessions: My-mother-and-1-don't-want-to-talk, She-told-me-to-
say-what-1-don't-understand, And-then-1-would-have-wanted-to-go-home ... At the same time 
as facilitating discourse, however, this 'technology of the self sends it along certain 
predetermined paths- misquoting Foucault, these are 'stammered, imperfect words with very 
fixed syntax'. 
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Figure 7.1 Lexical net of the first interview corpus 
tuo ~eeks 
Getting to know you • 
~her 
~e ~eople 
"-• ~· 
~-:II 0, 
At the centre of the net in Figure 7.1 is_ of course the first person singular, with a myriad 
possibilities radiating from this cardinal point: I know, think, suppose, mean feel, felt, want, 
can, can't, didn't, don't, and so forth. However, the most prominent collocate in Appendix 3, 
8 I have given somewhat flippant titles to sections of the analysis as a comment 
on the banal and rehearsed nature of much of the interaction between myself and the 
interviewees. In doing this I do not, however, intend to deny the very real suffering behind, 
and in, what was said. 
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you know, does not involve the first person, but the second- which is connected to the first 
only through the verb know. Some extracts help to give the flavour ofthe ubiquitous you 
know sequence: 
[17/1] 9 
[20/1] 
[44/1] 
[48/1] 
[54/1] 
[48/1] 
so I DIDN'T really THINK YOU KNOW it necessary 
I DIDN'T WANT to live any more and uhm YOU KNOW 
AND THEN 
to discover why YOU KNOW I FEEL the way I do 
and the post mortem and the YOU KNOW all the 
other things 
phoned just at the wrong time YOU KNOW 
and the police investigation and YOU KNOW 
With contextual markup reflected in font size, you know screams out from every page of the 
transcript, as in the following short extract: 
[2811] 
M: I see, so it's all mixed together? 
1: yes and even just to be in the ward depresses you 
kn 0 W even just to see what those people go through 
you know that you can actually that a human 
being can go through such hard times then you 
realise that you your problems are minor compared to 
you know 
You know, although I have not seen it referred to in the discourse analytic literature, is very 
common in spoken discourse and has been extensively studied in corpus linguistics. It has, 
amongst other things, been referred to as a 'verbal filler', 'fumble', 'softening connective', 
'cajoler', 'compromiser', 'hedge', 'plea for cooperation' and 'conversational greaser' (Holmes, 
1986) and may have any of these functions depending on the context. However, Holmes 
maintains that you know has a core meaning which leads speakers to choose it over other 
9 Figures in square brackets refer to interviewee number (before the slash) and 
interview number (after the slash). 
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possible 'fumbles' such as sort of or kind of (present in the bottom left comer of the net). This 
core is an allusion to the relevant knowledge of the addressee in the context of the utterance -
i.e., "you know the kind of thing I mean". 
You know may not be more common than usual in the present interviews. Holmes 
(1986) reports that it accounts for 1.3% of a small (30 000 words) New Zealand corpus of 
transcribed informal conversation, while it comprises just over 1% of the present corpus. 
Irrespective of whether you know has a special meaning in these interviews over and 
above its usual role in interpersonal interactions, it does serve as a reminder that not only 
myself as the interviewer, but also interviewees were actively engaged in fabricating a sense 
of mutual understanding, in charging the conversation with what Adrienne Rich called 'its 
own false energy', and in fostering the illusion of a 'so-called common language'. 
At the same time you know is also a subtle form of resistance to the tyranny of the 
confessional. While on the one hand it affirms the existence of a shared understanding 
between speaker and listener and perhaps even implies the listener's privileged claim to 
understanding ("you know more than I do"); on the other, by allowing for certain things to 
remain unsaid, you know is also an effective information-withholding device. 
Two other collocational pairs at the centre of the lexical net, I don't and I know, 
which are often part of the longer I don't know sequence, form an apparent mirror image to 
you know but in some ways may have an almost identical function. Extracts featuring I don't 
know as a more-or-less overt knowledge-withholding device are listed below: 
[ 1 I 1 J 
[ll/1] 
[10/1] 
[ 2/1] 
[8/1] 
I DON'T I DON'T really KNOW, really 
I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW how TO answer that 
question, it confuses me 
I DON'T KNOW what you mean 
I DON'T KNOW BECAUSE I'VE NEVER I'VE NEVER 
really. I DON'T KNOW ja, anyway. 
YOU KNOW it's very difficult to tell the truth 
sometimes. I DON'T KNOW. 
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[19/1] 
[ 4 6/1] 
I DON'T KNOW IF I CAN be more detailed than 
that 
Anyway I DON'T KNOW 
These sorts of utterance could of course have many functions (and perhaps often have them 
simultaneously) - withholding knowledge, incitement to instruction, stalling. The interview is 
an intricate dance around the precious commodity of knowledge, which starts with my 
assuring the interviewee of the confidentiality of the material they are about to divulge and 
ends with snippets of that material being publicly released (as for example in this 
dissertation). This tr::tding and withholding of confidences occur in the minutiae of sentence 
construction, as is visible in the lexical net, as well as on a larger scale with the sharing or 
otherwise of factual information and self-understanding. In a sense the binary tension 
between revealing and withholding is what keeps the interview, and perhaps the 
hospitalisation, going. 
Apart from the merely linguistic constraints visible in the lexical net, there are of 
course many other kinds of rules concerning how the flow of information frc:n private to 
public should be managed. When these are transgressed the interview grinds to a halt and the 
therapeutic value of the hospitalisation is brought into jeopardy. One patient, for example, 
scandalised the therapeutic staff by taking photographs around the ward and insisting on 
tape-recording her therapy sessions (something habitually done by trainee therapists). When 
-
she resisted gentle persuasion to stop these activities, legal sanctions against bringing 
cameras and tape recorders into state mental institutions were invoked. 
Although I consciously tried not to encourage interviewees to reveal sensitive 
information (partly because I was fearful of upsetting them and partly because I did not want 
to be seen as usurping the role of therapist), I felt inordinately pleased when such information 
was volunteered. One young man, for example, signalled early in the first interview that he 
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could potentially make an important confession: 
[23/1] 
M: Ja [laughs]. Uh, how do you predict will things 
have changed for you by then? 
I: Well, as I'm not here out of my own will, uh I've 
got to try my best, I can only gain something, I 
can't lose anything [ja]. So I can only gain 
something, and go out, and give the world another 
bash, you know [ja]. See how it goes. Maybe, maybe 
this place would have helped me, and maybe I don't 
tell them anything. 
M: How do you mean by that? 
I: Maybe I don't want to tell them. Maybe, maybe it's 
too ... personal for me to tell. 
M: Right. I don't kncv to what extent they'll try and 
dig it out of you. 
I: Maybe they haven't got a spade! [laughs] 
By the second interview, he seemed much more willing to accept the therapeutic value of 
confession: 
[23/2] 
Well I get a lot of things that have been bothering me 
from maybe when I was in my teen, when I was in my teens, 
and getting that out, all my worries, and all that, and 
why I'm really here, because I tried to commit suicide 
and all that ... And I think [thera] therapists 
[inaudible] lot of things out that I've wanted to get out 
for a long time, but I just haven't had the ... right 
person to talk to about it, in a way, you know ... 
When I saw him again shortly before discharge, he finally presented me with the gift of his 
confidence. I felt both pleased and quite ashamed of having so easily slipped into the role of 
psychological father confessor: 
[23/2] 
I: The main thoughts that occupied my mind before 
trying to commit suicide ... to do with my problems 
at work and financial problems ... Uh I was still 
worried about my parents' divorce as well as other 
things that had been bothering me since my teens 
Mmm ••• Like ... What, can I just say something 
else? 
M: Yes. 
I: [inaudible] ... Since my teens. What bothered me 
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was .... 
M: Do you find it hard to talk about? 
I: In a way ja. What bothered me was, my relationship 
with my friends ... and getting girlfriends. 
Like all my friends had girlfriends and not me 
[mmm] . 
Despite resorting to therapeutic tricks such as "do you find it hard to talk about?", I at times 
thought myself more straight-forward and authentic than the hospital's therapeutic staff, many 
of whom seemed to have cultivated a certain clinical distance. Of course this show of 
openness (and sometimes collusion) on my part, could equally be construed as just another 
technique for eliciting disclosure, different in kind but not in effect from that produced by 
more accomplished therapeutic agents. The following extract both describes the kind of 
disclosure elicited by therapists and in itself epitomises the type of collusion I sometimes 
managed to involve interviewees in: 
[54/1] 
Uh . . . my therapist is this very distant person who tries 
to outstare me all the time [laughs]. She's totally 
non-committal. She'd make an excellent politico [M 
laughs]. She nods knowingly all the time. And she could 
actually wear a mask or, you know, that type of thing. 
Come in wearing a, wearing a bloody, you know visor and 
that type of thing. And then she just nods sagely 
occasionally and, and, OK it's good if, if I'm really 
worked up and I can go in there and she asks me how I am 
and I give her like twenty minutes of how bad I am 
[laughs] and then tell her well you asked, type of, type 
of thing ... 
Unlike you know, I don't know and similar epistemological devices at the centre ofthe net 
(they don't know, I don't understand, they don't understand) in fact explicitly extend the 
problematic of shared knowledge beyond the dyadic interaction with the interviewer to all 
such figures of potential medical or psychological authority, at one and the same time 
acknowledging this authority and signalling a more or less tacit resistance to it: 
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[49/1] 
[8/1] 
[11/1] 
I DON'T KNOW I DON'T FEEL depressed 
I DON'T KNOW what they're gonna do, I DON'T 
KNOW. 
I DON'T necessarily KNOW what they mean but I 
take it to heart AND I CAN go and sit and cry 
and get totally depressed about it. 
Thus I don't know often functions with they don't know to construct a domain of privacy 
which both should and should not be penetrated by the gaze of official knowledge. The inner 
self should be sacrosanct: 
[8/1] 
I DON'T like peop~e knowing things that I DON'T WANT them 
TO KNOW. So in other words now, I HAVE nothing secret, 
nothing. AND I THINK it is very important for a person 
TO HAVE some secrets. So now I'M GOING TO HAVE TO make 
up another secret so that THEY DON'T KNOW that. 
And however hard they may try to know, they never will understand what is really going on 
with me: 
[17/1] 
[22/1] 
[39/1] 
[45/1] 
THEY DON'T live, THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND my 
world. THEY DON'T, THEY DON'T, you see 
I just feel I'm probably A BIT tired from work, 
A BIT irritable ... and well I [inaudible]. And 
thing, people around you DON'T UNDERSTAND 
[yes], THEY can't cope with it, THEY DON'T, 
THEY DON'T really WANT TO GET involved. 
THEY can't UNDERSTAND it. They tell me YOU 
KNOW, how, but why, YOU KNOW, the same old 
story [ja] AND THEN my mom's attitude now is 
just TO GET better. 
THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND moodiness, or how you 
can, stupid_things can worry you where, where 
it's nothing of consequence to them. 
Where "they" don't, can't or shouldn't know me, "I" don't necessarily understand them or 
myself either: 
[5/1] 
[8/1] 
I DON'T UNDERSTAND things people do and say, 
why they do them, what happens TO ME, why 
things happen TO ME [mmm] AND ... I tend TO BE 
over-sensitive AND I [runm] take things ... too 
seriously, I DON'T KNOW. 
Ja, it's it's I DON'T UNDERSTAND why. That's 
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[44/1] 
[48/1] 
the only thing I DON'T UNDERSTAND. 
Uh AS FAR AS I UNDERSTAND it I suffer 
depression. I'M NOT sure whether it's 
endogenous or whether it's reactive. 
I HAVE attempted to UNDERSTAND within myself 
... I FEEL very very deeply 
Thus what emerges from the epistemological tangle at the centre ofthe net (you-know -1-
don't-lmow-they-don't-understand-1-understand-they-understand) is the modern (private) 
self, both colluding in and denying the intersubjective moment of mutual understanding (you-
know), both wishing to be and resisting being understood - the sadly misunderstood, 
uncomprehending subject oftruth: 
[ 1/1] I really DON'T KNOW, YOU KNOW. I really DON'T 
KNOW. I'm sure that's why I'm here. Because 
I'M NOT sure how to cope. 
The blues 
Growing under this canopy of general 
incomprehension are of course numerous more 
specific ailments, but the only one sufficiently 
common to be caught up in the lexical net was 
the sequence I-was-very-depressed10 . This sequence rarely appeared as such, but in many 
cases the I was pair occurred in relatively close proximity to depressed, depression or very 
depressed. As already mentioned, depression appears to be the preferred way, in this group of 
patients, of accounting for being admitted to a mental hospital. Even where other issues such 
10 This is so even though the parts of interviews specifically relating to depression had 
been excluded. 
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as drug taking are mentioned, they tend to be subsumed under the depression label: 
[ 1/1] uh I WAS drinking far too much, uh I WAS VERY 
uh . . . DEPRESSED 
This was also sometimes the case even where the stereotypical I was and very depressed 
pairs did not occur: 
[11/1] 
[36/1] 
I'm here because I'm depressed and I I'VE BEEN 
taking cocaine. 
I smoked dope with him [mmm]. AND THEN, I 
DON'T KNOW, I just, then I started getting 
depressed again, I'm really depressed. 
However, once again a sub text of resistance is audible behind the pat answers regarding 
depression as the cause for hospital admission, frequently in association with knowledge-
withholding devices such as I suppose and I dunno discussed earlier: 
[8/1] 
[16/1] 
[34/1] 
[49/1] 
Uh, well its I DUNNO I I SUPPOSE I FEEL pretty 
depressed 
Uh, I DON'T really, I SUPPOSE depression. 
Ag I SUPPOSE I'm suffering from depression or 
something, I DUNNO, I just DON'T FEEL well. 
I'M HERE for a depression I THINK. [You think?] 
Ja [laughs]. I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T FEEL 
depressed. 
To further distance the self from this diagnosis, even while proclaiming it, the attribution of 
depression is also often imputed to professional others: 
[5/1] 
[52/1] 
[8/1] 
I DON'T KNOW ... Uh ...... I KNOW from WHAT THEY 
SAY, from what psychiatrists have said TO ME, 
uh ... THEY just SAY ... uh I suffer from 
depression ... I DON'T KNOW . 
Uh well I haven't been officially told but I 
guess for depression. 
So they think that by coming here I'M GONNA I'M 
GONNA come to the hospital. They gonna TELL ME 
that I'm depressed and uh they gonna make me 
all better. Well that's how they think it's 
gonna happen [mmm]. YOU KNOW I DON'T THINK 
THEY quite UNDERSTAND that it's ... I DON'T 
UNDERSTAND it myself, but ... I DON'T KNOW, JA. 
I DON'T KNOW what they think. I just ... I just 
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FEEL that they're doing this TO ME. THEY want 
ME TO be here, it's it's a good thing. I DON'T 
KNOW, it's strange. 
Depression, it would appear, is something which is inherently difficult to recognise and 
diagnose correctly. Either it is hidden so deeply in the inner core of the subject that others 
fail to notice it, or professionals flounder around looking for the correct way of diagnosing 
and treating it: 
[11/1] 
[39/1] 
[46/1] 
To a person who doesn't understand depression, 
and never FELT it [yes] - they thought I WAS 
just plain 1· zy. And I wasn't - I WAS really 
feeling depressed [ja] and my job was starting 
to suffer cause I wasn't [inaudible]. My 
bosses were starting to get upset. That's 
basically it. 
AND THEN I went for blood tests, AND THEN I 
went to my psychologist. And we were just 
talking, YOU KNOW. But I still couldn't get 
out of the depression. I WAS getting deeper 
into depression [yes]. And out, when people 
looked at me, I looked fine [ja, ja]. I looked 
fine. 
Uh this time I'm here BECAUSE I WAS VERY 
suicidal and VERY destructive. I used TO GET 
VERY angry with A LOT OF things. Uh originally 
I WAS here for a major depression, but now it's 
a dysthymia something, I'M NOT sure what. 
Thus depression, as the major symptom of a misunderstood and impossible to understand 
patient is itself mysterious: 
[17/1] 
[20/1] 
I've obviously been DEPRESSED, VERY DEPRESSED 
about four months back, really depressed. But 
I, it's, it's, you see I DON'T UNDERSTAND 
BECAUSE I. Uh does depression uh encompass the 
feeling of, obviously the feelings of like 
[inaudible] and all that, but I actually force 
my mind not TO WANT TO care, not TO WANT TO 
think, not TO WANT TO do, not TO WANT TO BE. 
Is that depression? 
Ja, uhm, when I WAS, it is funny like when I 
WAS really depressed, I, I DIDN'T really feel 
depressed. I WAS running all over the place 
getting anxious and, and doing crazy things. 
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[44/1] 
AND THEN I took anti-depressants AND THEN I 
felt better. And now, afterwards, I'M just 
FEELING low. I'M NOT even being crazy, I'm 
just low [ja]. 
Uh as far as I UNDERSTAND it I suffer 
depression. I'm not sure whether it's 
endogenous or whether it's reactive. I THINK 
it's A BIT OF both [ja], AND I become extremely 
suicidal. I DON'T HAVE a great love for life 
as it is [ja]. And that's basically why I'm 
here. And also to discover why YOU KNOW I FEEL 
the way I do about MY LIFE and my 
circumstances. 
I was although associated with very depressed is also frequently used in other contexts. 
Sometimes it is used to introduce long-standing problems ( [ 10 I 1 ~ it's been going 
on since I WAS a child) or more immediate precipitating conditions ( [52/ 1] IT 
WAS JUST I JUST DIDN'T do anything I couldn't work), butmostoftenit 
signals legitimation of the current admission in terms of previous psychiatric treatment: 
[16/1] 
[28/1] 
[36/1] 
[39/1] 
[43/1] 
[46/1]] 
ja uh I WAS at X-clinic ... I actually 
overdosed after I WAS AT THE X 
I WAS in the X-hospital before I came HERE 
well I I WAS HERE in 1987 and I WAS HERE FOR 6 
months 
uh I WAS HERE August September last year I'VE 
GOT temporal lobe epilepsy 
uhm the reason why i'm here WAS I WAS 
discharged from X-hospital 
uh originally I WAS HERE FOR a major depression 
... this time I'M HERE BECAUSE I WAS very 
suicidal 
It is interesting that even in the context of a superficial attempt to explain the reasons for 
admission to a mental hospital, previous admissions to the same or other institutions should 
play such a conspicuous role. Many of these interviewees seemed clearly embedded in a 
discourse of perpetual patienthood, as is exemplified in the following extract: 
[lOll] 
WELL uh I'M VERY DEPRESSED [mmm]. AND it's been GOING ON 
since I WAS a child [ja] and it's just over the years 
I'VE GOT to a point now where I MEAN I FEEL I need help 
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and they have TRIED TO treat ME over the years and 
nothing seems to help [really?]. ja. 
In my experience many patients do more than merely drift along in a state of serial 
chronicity, but often, at the very least, express an awareness of the ironies of their condition. 
For example, I asked one patient in an informal conversation how long she had been at the 
hospital during her previous admission. Her response was: "The first time ... two months. 
The second time ... my whole life." Another patient told me a funny (and perhaps somewhat 
rehearsed) story about a party for ex-patients that he had attended. At 6 o'clock everybod 
suddenly became restless and the next moment wherever you looked the little yellow packets 
in which the hospital's outpatient department dispenses medication appeared. 
Mommy daddy me 
From the epistemological never-never land of 
Y au-know-/ -don't-know-they-don 't-understand-1-
don 't-understand-that-1 -was-very-depressed-here-
before, into which the psychologised self is 
perpetually both readmitting and discharging 
herself, it is a relief to turn (reading the lexical net 
from left to right now) to the more clearly demarcated territory of the family (my-mother-my-
my-father-my-brother-my-sister-my-husband-my-family-and-me). As we have been told so 
often, there is a 'stigma' attached to being admitted to a mental hospital, and in its first 
incarnation the family indeed appears in these interviews as actually or potentially 
scandalised, or as uncomprehending and sceptical: 
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[23/1] 
[24/1] 
[34/1] 
Well ... Well the first time MY MOTHER, MY 
FATHER, and my mother's couple of friends knew 
about it ... Well most of my mother's friends 
knew about it, and my father's. But uh the 
second time I DON'T even THINK they wanted to 
tell their friends about it 
So I've told them its something to do with my 
drugs and they've got TO just GET the drugs 
back into balance. So I lied TO my grandmother 
and my aunt. MY MOTHER I DON 1 T KNOW what she's 
thinking, she's in X. MY FATHER thinks it's 
like protective custody. 
Like MY MOTHER, LIKE YOU KNOW if she comes out 
and I tell her I'm feeling sick, she says ah 
just forget about it, YOU KNOW, stop thinking 
about it, YOU won't feel LIKE it. I said I'M 
NOT thinking about it [ja]. Because I USED TO 
BE a very active person. 
Not only does the patient present her illness as an embarrassment for the family, but also as 
an occasion for expressing concern (echoing recent professional concerns about the 'burden' 
mentally ill people place on their families) that she may be negatively influencing this 
otherwise healthy family: 
[5/1] 
[17/1] 
I get VERY DEPRESSED and that, and upset [mmm] . 
And because they love me it affects them to 
... a very great extent to ... YOU KNOW they get 
... I just affect them A LOT and I'll land up 
pulling them down with me [mmm] which is not 
fair [mmm] . 
I've driven MY SISTER crazy, YOU KNOW. Because 
LIKE, instead of doing something constructive 
AND active AND positive, I DON'T. I dwell on 
it, YOU KNOW [ja]. 
There is also the older theme of the family, not as the victim, but as the cause of the mental 
illness, creating the conditions for all manner of psychological damage: Bereavement 
([11/1] when I WAS little MY BROTHER DIED; [38/1] I WAS crazy 
about MY FATHER and he died), abuse ( [ 43/1] MY HUSBAND can be very 
abusive and at times violent with me), family break-up ([23/1] MY MOTHER 
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and FATHER are divorced), and impoverishment ([17/1] MY FATHER and MY 
MOTHER, YOU KNOW, they have this very poor SORT OF background). 
This is the Freudian family, generator of traumatic childhood memories (irrespective of the 
objective significance of what happened) that come flooding back and threaten to engulf the 
present: 
[50/1] AND I CAN remember since I WAS small WE WERE 
living on a plot uh MY BROTHER actually said TO 
ME that, I WAS seven or five, I DUNNO I DIDN'T 
even start school yet, I WAS five, MY BROTHER 
said TO ME THAT I WAS sleeping with a little 
kaffir11 ••• I MEAN THAT hurts, YOU DON'T 
realise ... how much, it's a bottleneck, 
everything j~st goes in, and it hurts. It's 
hurting now, more, than I THINK it's hurt that 
time [j a] . 
However, far more prominent in the interviews than any ofthese stock images is that of the 
medicalised family: 
[34/1] [What's your mother think of the, of the whole 
... ?] Ag she's also under the doctors [laughs]. 
She's, also been here. [Is it?] Ja. [You mean 
she's also got difficulties of her own?] Ja, 
ja. And MY other SISTER, and MY other SISTER. 
We all, basically, you know suffer with our 
nerves [ja]. All of ~s. 
Even if not themselves patients, the families that emerge from these interviews approximate 
the ideal families of the psychiatric literature to a remarkable extent, working in close 
partnership with professional caregivers for the benefit of their errant members. 
11 
[5/1] Uh, I was just ... well I WAS I WAS staying down 
in X [mmm] and ... uh ... I DON'T KNOW ... just 
... I lost my job and everything went wrong and 
... uh my mom found out and she came down to X 
and fetched me and SAID it ... SHE thinks its 
time I should do something [mmm] . Between her 
and MY BROTHER they convinced me well to come 
Derogatory term for African. 
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[53/1] 
back with them AND TO ... try AND GET 
professional help [mmm] AND ... I agreed TO 
COME back with them and I ... went to see some 
people and I'VE BEEN referred here. 
I THINK MY MOTHER has been helpful. She ... 
YOU KNOW she just organises things for me, 
she'l~ always phone doctors and she had SORT OF 
spoken to people and she's found out about a 
certain psychiatrist and got me into hospital 
and uh ... that KIND OF thing. 
Not only do families assist patients to get connected up with the psychiatric system ( [ 8 I 1] 
Ja well uh, MY BROTHER phoned the crisis centre [mmm] and they 
sent us here), they also cooperate clcsely in the process of diagnosis, acting (although 
not always successfully) as interpreter between psychiatrist and patient: 
[22/1] 
[36/1] 
I KNOW they went to 
BROTHER AND MY mom, 
it WAS, AND I CAN'T 
psychiatrist said. 
[mmm] . 
see ... a psychiatrist, MY 
just TO GET an idea of what 
remember what the 
And they're still confused 
No they, they, the psychiatrist at the X-
hospital who saw me after I took my first 
overdose SAID that HE doesn't think, told MY 
MOTHER THAT he DIDN'T THINK I WAS 
schizophrenic, AND THAT they had actually made 
up a wrong diagnosis of me [ja], two years ago. 
As before, patients also describe themselves as resisting, often passively, the process of 
physical and mental incarceration through which the medicalised family tries to guide them: 
[17/1] 
[24/1] 
I DIDN'T WANT TO COME HERE [ja]. Uh, when my 
family, MY BROTHER, tell me [inaudible] you're 
sick and you need some help [ja]. And didn't 
believe THAT myself, I WASN'T interested in 
helping myself AT ALL. So that's why I'm here 
[laughs]. I'll do whatever I HAVE TO, but I'M 
NOT REALLY into it. 
She made me phone MY FATHER. AND uh tell him, 
YOU KNOW, THAT I should be HERE. I MEAN she 
was very for me coming, more than I WAS [oh is 
it] . 
When cooperation is given, it may be reluctantly, and to achieve extrinsic rather than intrinsic 
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objectives: 
[8/1] But uh ... I DUNNO, I DUNNO what they gonna do, 
I just. Look I'M GONNA give it a bash [ja] and 
if they, if the therapy starts helping. 
Because I'VE GOT to I'VE GOT to I'VE GOT to 
come right, YOU KNOW. I'M GOING overseas so, 
I'VE GOT TO GET my head together. ~nd you see 
this is a condition. You see MY MOTHER will 
not send me overseas unless I get this whole 
thing done TO ME [oh] . So IF I, IF I pull out 
of HERE, I won't go. 
At other times, the family itself comes to be presented as just another institution in the 
patient's listless migration from one facility to another: 
[36/1] I DUNNO. Unless I CAN live off MY MOTHER for 
the rest of MY LIFE, but I DON'T THINK I CAN. 
Or else I could GO TO X-Hospital, and just. 
But you see I DON'T WANT TO GO TO X-Hospital 
either [ja]. I DON'T WANT TO do anything. 
The final member of this extended family to rise to the level of visibility in the lexical net is 
of course the psychiatrist (my psychiatrist), and we would expect her to play an even more 
a(;tive role in getting the patient incarcerated than the rest. But instead we find her arguing, 
ineffectually, against entering or remaining in the hospital and having her ideas about the 
appropriate form of institutionalisation thwarted at every turn: 
[ 16/1] And HE SAID OK Monday you must go [i.e., leave 
the hospital]. And I said no I'M NOT ready, 
Wednesday. And HE SAID uh OK. Wednesday I 
said no I'M-NOT ready I'll go on Friday. HE 
SAID Friday that's it, finished. So Friday I 
went out. Uh, the weekend wasn't very good. 
An enjoyable Monday. The day was quite a good 
day. AND THEN the early hours of Tuesday 
morning, about half past two IN THE morning I 
took an overdose, about two hundred tablets. 
AND uh THEN I was in, YOU KNOW I woke up from a 
coma in X-hospital [ja], pipes coming out of 
me, all those machines on. AND THEN uh, the 
psychologist came, or psychiatrist, and SHE 
SAID uh Valhalla. 
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[19/1] 
[21/1] 
[39/1] 
The oracle speaks 
I raised the idea of Valhalla in therapy. Over 
the last TWO WEEKS I raised WHAT my state was 
AT THE MOMENT, and if he thought IT WAS a good 
idea. And ultimately HE SAID, yes, but uh 
... uh ... how CAN I express it, only in response 
to explicit questions. 
[What's the psychiatrist think of coming here?] 
He's very opposed to institutions. 
[So the work felt it would be a good thing to 
go to Valhalla?] Ja, MY PSYCHIATRIST didn't. 
[Is it?] Ja, because she thought I WAS doing 
fine. She sees me, but then the work see me 
every day. 
With one exception, I found it impossible to ascribe aid 
e 
more than syntactic functions to the remaining 
branches of the lexical net, i.e., the they-say-what-do ·ust 
sequence, the want-to and wanted-to sequences, the have-been sequence, the I'm-scared and 
I'm-going sequences, and the independent sub-net around the type-of-the sequence. The 
exception is the he-said-she-said-tell-me-told-me pattern near the top left of the net. My 
expectation was that this would typically involve blow-by-blow accounts of arguments, and 
in a few cases this was so: 
[11/1] AND I started accusing him of being with 
someone [mmm], of which the maid THE next DAY 
SAID that HE was. And HE SAID HE wasn't and 
that was basically the final straw. 
Much more commonly, he-said-she-said-told-me-tell-me signalled a pronouncement by a 
professional or lay counsellor regarding the true nature of the patient's illness, often followed 
by a ritual endorsement by the patient. 
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[11/1] 
[17/1] 
No, she, I told her about MY LIFE and SHE SAID 
could understand WHY I WAS DEPRESSED BECAUSE I 
HAD just come out OF A relationship where I 
HAD, where he, I found him in bed with 
somebody. And I freaked out because I was 
rejected [mmm] . 
Uh, HE SORT OF SAID that uh ... Well HE, HE, HE 
SAID THAT I obviously haven't made any 
improvement or any, I've just got worse and 
worse. And uh thought that my environment has 
been ... constantly [inaudible] and reinforces 
the whole negativity in me [mmm]. And the fact 
THAT I WANT TO stay alone and keep myself 
isolated is not good. AND I I know he's right. 
The ideal form of the oracular he-said-she-said pronouncement appears to be that of a deep 
insight (not necessarily by a professional) into the workings of the patient's mind: 
[11/1] 
[28/1] 
Ja, but this has been GOING ON like AS FAR AS I 
CAN remember. I remember an instance WHEN I 
WAS twelve years old AND ice skating AND I 
bought somebody some lip gloss. And SHE SAID 
you don't HAVE TO buy my friendship, YOU KNOW 
[mmm]. THAT I remember, THAT I remember as 
clear as daylight. 
YOU KNOW HE SAID TO me I KNOW exactly what's 
going through your mind, it's a place for the 
mad. 
The pronouncement following he-said-she-said-tell-me-told-me, when it involves suggestions 
regarding treatment, seems almost invariably to elicit assent, but of a rather passive or even 
lukewarm variety: 
[8/1] 
[16/1] 
[34/1] 
[39/1] 
-
She TOLD ME that she's uh helped me enough now 
and I'VE GOT TO GET MY LIFE together, YOU KNOW. 
So I said cool, that was it. 
And SHE SAID no SHE recommended Valhalla, so I 
said OK, anything that'll make me better. 
Well SHE SAID they'll send me off for a few 
days TO GET treatment, and they at least can 
put me on the proper treatment [ja], YOU KNOW. 
Because IT'S getting worse, I DUNNO. 
So down I WANTED TO commit suicide, which I HAD 
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a blade, and I WAS contemplating. So I went 
AND told MY PSYCHIATRIST [ja], and uh ... SHE 
SAID I must hand the blade in, which I DIDN'T. 
I handed the blade in here, in case I might 
need it, YOU KNOW. 
The help-me sequence, which is part of the same cluster on the net as he-said-she-said-tell-
me-told-me is thematically also strongly related, often taking the form of a formulaic 
expression of hope that hospitalisation may be of some use: 
[01/1] 
[02/1] 
[04/1] 
[Is there anything good about being here?] Like 
I said, I SUPPOSE Valhalla being better 
equipped to HELP ME. 
They're professional people and they ... can 
HELP ME more than what an outsider can. 
They couldn't get .. uh .. what is really my, my 
illness [mmm] and uh ... that is why she had to 
TELL ME that day they they will bring me here 
at va:halla [mmm] since I heard Valhalla is 
maybe more advanced in medication [mmm] to HELP 
ME with uh I [inaudible] 
As with other psychological and discursive traps of this sort, interviewees were not 
necessarily unaware of the ambivalence of the position they were being spoken into. One 
interviewee, for example, spoke at length of how his mother would always help him 
([05/1] She she also took ME to people for HELP, she never gave 
up ... right until she died she ... always TRIED TO get HELP 
for ME, YOU KNOW), while at the same time suggesting that: 
[05/1] Instead of helping us, she's always DONE 
everything FOR us [mmm], instead of helping us 
with it [mmm], YOU KNOW. IF I went to her with 
HELP, instead of helping ME, she would do it, 
and consequently I ... It comes to me going out 
on my own now, and I DON'T KNOW how to do it 
[mmm] . 
He also spoke wryly of how the same pattern would be repeated with a friend: 
[05/1] He would help me a lot ... You know where my 
mother left off he just carried on [mmm] . I 
told him not to. I said rather help me with 
something [ja], don't do things for me [ja, 
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jar. 
At other times, interviewees complained bitterly that the form in which the help was being 
offered was not sufficiently directive: 
[02/1] 
[08/1] 
THEY DON'T say much, YOU KNOW, THEY just ... 
THEY DON'T TELL ME what to do, which doesn't 
help much. I DON'T KNOW what to do myself. 
She [a previous therapist] was, she was OK, but 
she sort of betrayed my trust, which I won't go 
into. [Did she go back to the family?] She SORT 
OF she she helped me for like four years and 
then she didn't she like stopped helping me. 
She TOLD ME that she's uh helped me enough now 
and I've got to get my life together, YOU KNOW. 
So I said cool, that was it. 
We are back, therefore, in the land of the singular individual, who cooperates, does not 
cooperate, half-heartedly cooperates, with sovereign power; the private selfwhose inner 
being may be glimpsed only in moments of intersubjective understanding and oracular 
revelation. 
[5/1] 
[54/1) 
I DON'T KNOW what's wrong with myself. I'm 
just hoping they can TELL ME [mmm]. And I'm 
just hoping they can change it or TELL ME why 
I'm doing, what's wrong [mmm]. 
And that's everybody, that's absolutely 
everybody has TOLD ME that, YOU KNOW you've 
been through therapy because your face is wet 
[laughs]. So I'm A BIT apprehensive about 
that. 
Occasionally the ideal of the intense intersubjective moment is realised, when patient, 
therapist and official transcript (each in their allotted place in the hierarchy) all converge on 
the same truth, and the self is finally realised as a mobile form of chronicity: 
[43/1] 
Well yesterday morning he spoke TO ME from about a 
quarter to 10 to after 11 o'clock. Obviously he'd had my 
file from the other hospital [ja], but he'd read it 
thoroughly, because he was asking me questions, but HE 
could TELL ME the months and the years. Where I could 
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maybe just say the year, and he could say yes THAT WAS 
October or September or whenever. So, I felt as if he 
... he knew what was GOING ON. AND THEN immediately he 
pinpointed the three areas where I HAD HAD problems ... 
Uhm so I FELT that he was very aware of what was GOING 
ON. 
Before and after 
Admission to a mental hospital, like so many rituals of modem life, is an overtly 
interventionist step. Although the aims of hospitalisation are now often more modest than 
they once were - typically to stabilise medication, forestall suicide, or offer respite from 
unbearable circumstances rather than to embark on intensive therapy - the patient is 
nevertheless supposed to emerge a different, and hopefully a better, person. In getting a 
proposal to do this research project accepted by the hospital's management committee, I 
therefore found myself using phrases such as the "influence of hospitalisation on patients' 
speech patterns" and "the way in which hospitalisation affects patients' use oflanguage". It is 
difficult not to slip into causal and uni-directional formulations of this sort when dealing with 
diachronic material, which may be one reason why non-positivist approaches such as 
discourse analysis are (with the notable exception ofFoucaultian analysis) so rarely used to 
analyse changes over time (Levine, 199~). 
Although the comparison between the way patients talk about the reaspns for their 
admission shortly after being admitted, versus two weeks later, was meant to show how 
discursive patterns may have changed in that time, one should be careful not to ascribe this 
simply to the 'influence' of the hospital environment. The change or lack of change is also a 
function of the analytic technique of collocational analysis. While patients may have 
undergone profound changes at other levels, the stock collocations they draw on may in 
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many cases be typical of those that occur in all forms of informal talk and may therefore be 
impervious to rapid change; conversely, the technique may be particularly susceptible to 
rapid oscillations and any differences found may be unrelated to the two weeks of 
hospitalisation. 
More important, however, than uncertainty about the stability of the technique used, 
is the probability that patients do not merely passively absorb influences and then betray the 
signs of these in their speech, but actively negotiate particular discursive positions to contend 
with changed circumstances at the beginning and some way into hospitalisation. 
At the immediate level of their relationship with me, for example, the ostensibly 
standard stimulus to which interviewees were asked to respond (a request to explain why they 
were at the hospital) had a very different meaning on the first and second occasions. In both 
cases it was a fairly disrespectful question, although I of course attempted to soften this 
through my body language and the way in which I introduced the question. However, the 
question was disrespectful for different reasons on the two occasions. On the first occasion it 
was an intrusive question by a stranger relying on his position of relative power and expertise 
to oblige the interviewee to construct some form of reasonable response. On the second 
occasion the question was posed by someone with whom a degree of trust had been 
established, and who was thus even more strongly positioned to expect an answer. This was 
again demeaning to the interviewee - not so much because it was an overly intrusive 
question, but because asking a question that had already been answered implied that the 
interviewee was an experimental subject whose responses would not be taken at face value. 
I therefore tried to bear in mind the pitfalls of an overly simplistic stimulus-response 
interpretation in comparing the two sets of responses, but will not discuss this in detail again, 
and in what follows apparently causative and uni-directional remarks should be read as being 
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made in the context of the above caveats. 
Preliminary quantitative overview of the reason for admission corpora 
Since they represent only those sections of the interviews dealing with the reason for 
admission, the corpora12 used for the before-after comparison were much smaller than the 
first interview corpus thus far analysed, namely 1252 tokens and 1756 for the first and second 
corpora respectively. This is only 3.7% and 5.2% the size ofthe first interview corpus. The 
number of types used is also much smaller- 394 and 459 for the first and second corpora 
respectively, which is 14.4% and 16.8% of the first interview corpus. The type-token ratios 
are far larger- 1:3.17 and 1:3.83, as opposed to 1:12.33 for the first interview corpus-
indicating greater vocabulary richness (i.e., more different words per number of running 
words). However, as discussed in Chapter 6, higher type-token ratios can also be a 
consequence of smaller corpus sizes. 
The 20 most common types in the three corpora are shown in Table 7.6. As can be 
seen from the table, there is considerable stability among very high-frequency types such as/, 
and, to and the, irrespective of whether the whole interview or only the part dealing with 
reason for admission, and whether the first or second interview is considered. Of the 20 most 
common types in the first interview corpus only two do not occur among the ~rst 30 types for 
the reason for admission corpora. This is an indication that much of the basic materials used 
to construct meaning in these interviews remain relatively invariant across different 
situations. 
12 I labeled these the first and second reason for admission corpora. 
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Table 7.6 Rank order of common types in the first interview as a whole and in 
sections of the first and second interviews dealing with reason for 
admission 
Whole Interview Reason for Admission 
First Interview First Interview Second Interview 
1. I 1 1 
2. and 2 2 
3. to 3 4 
4. the 5 5 
5. a 6 8 
6. that 9 10 
7. of 11 9 
8. it 10 7 
9. was 7 3 
10. you 22 30 
11. uh 4 6 
12. my 14 13 
13. know 24 15 
14. me 28 12 
15. m 18 29 
16. just 21 14 
17. I'm 8 19 
18. because 19 17 
19. but 26 31 
20. it's 16 33 
Note. Numbers are ranked positions, with 1 being the most common type, 2 the second most 
common and so on. 
Lexical types in the first reason for admission corpus (Table 7.'7) also closely resemble those 
found in the larger first interview corpus (Table 7.4) of which it is a part, with similar clusters 
of depression-related types (depression, depressed, suicide, commit), diffuse problem-related 
types (things, people, life, drugs) and epistemological types (know, think, suppose, mean, 
basically). Because of the smaller corpus size there are also a number of unusual types (such 
as poison) that may have occurred in one or two interviews only. In common with the larger 
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first interview corpus of which it is a subset, types clearly related to anxiety or stress (with 
the possible exception of handle) is absent from the set of most frequent types. 
Table 7.7 Forty most common lexical types in the first reason for admission corpus 
depression 12 just 10 know 9 well 9 
things 8 get 7 depressed 6 think 6 
feel 5 time 5 people 5 life 5 
find 4 sure 4 suppose 4 first 4 
lot 4 scared ... better 4 problem 4 
said 3 take 3 way 3 bit 3 
suicide 3 drugs 3 handle 3 search 3 
mean 3 rationalise 3 tried 3 basically 3 
took 3 got 3 commit 2 therapy 2 
away 2 pOlSOn 2 come 2 Valhalla 2 
Note Numbers indicate the frequency with which each type occurs. 
The situation with regard to the second reason for admission corpus is somewhat different 
(Table 7.8). Although depression-related types (depression, depressed, suicide) are still very 
prominent, other forms of illness-talk is also evident, notably anxiety and a number of stress-
related types (cope, coping, and possibly pressure), suggesting that depression may be 
rivalled by other discursive formulations after two weeks of hospitalisation. This is discussed 
in greater detail below. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is also evidence of more treatment-
related talk (therapy, medication, treatment) as interviewees began to settle into the hospital 
routine. Epistemological types (know, dunno, basically, actually, really) remain prominent. 
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Table 7.8 Forty most common lexical types in the second reason for admission 
corpus 
just 19 know 18 time 17 got 11 
depression 11 a gam 9 lot 8 therapy 8 
working 7 get 7 depressed 6 sort 6 
medication 6 life 6 said 6 well 6 
better 5 quite 5 pressure 5 work 5 
treatment 5 back 5 dunno 5 last 5 
cope 5 sent 4 basically 4 actually 4 
suicide 4 anxiety 4 took 4 now 4 
big 4 too 4 copmg 4 really 4 
Note Numbers indicate the frequency with which each type o. curs. 
As a further comparison between the first and second reason for admission corpora, the 
collocational information in Appendix 5 was used to draw up the lexical nets in Figures 7.2 
and 7.3. From Appendix 5 and Figures 7.2 and 7.3 it is again clear that there is a considerable 
degree of robustness in the collocational patterns found, with many of those identified in the 
first interview corpus again evident in the first and second reason for admission corpora. 
Examples include the ubiquitous you-know and !-don't-know sequences (with some breaks in 
the link, possibly due to the smaller corpus sizes), the I'm-here-because sequence and the 
proliferation of links fanning out from the cardinal point I. There are also various unique 
features to each net. Due to the small corpus sizes, several of these proved, on investigation, 
to come from a single interview or from a small number of interviews. Examples include the 
it's-the-search-for pattern at the top of Figure 7.2 which comes from a single interview in 
which the interviewee repeated a phrase containing these words many times over ([ 48/1 ]), 
and the reference to medication in Figure 7.3, which comes from two interviews ([16/2] and 
[ 44/2]) in which the interviewees discussed issues of medication at length when asked about 
the reason for their being at Valhalla. 
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Figure 7.2 
Figure 7.3 
Lexical net of the first reason for admission corpus using a span of 
8 and minimum collocation frequency of 5 
s 
Lexical net of the second reason for admission corpus using a span of 
8 and minimum collocation frequency of 5 
I've . -----..J;~een 
~-
........___tlme 
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Apart from such spurious variations, a number of differences between the first and second 
reason for admission corpora were identified which appear to be more substantial. These are 
discussed below. 
Being there 
One of the patterns in Figure 7.2 which is not present in Figure 7.3 is the !-was-there-and 
sequence at the bottom left of the figure. Almost without exception this sequence is employed 
in the first reason for admission corpus to talk about admissions immediately preceding the 
current one, often comparing the previous admission favourably or unfavourably with the 
current admission: 
[16/1] 
[28/1] 
[47/1] 
DEPRESSION - UH, feeling down, I had an 
overdose [is it?]. Ja, UH, I WAS at X-Clinic 
and uh there they just [inaudible] you with the 
drugs [ja]. AND uh, THERE WAS no therapy [ja], 
AND I actually overdosed after I WAS at the X-
Clinic [really]. AND [inaudible] said, no, the 
drugs aren't gonna do you any good. 
I WAS in the X-hospital before I came HERE, but 
it definitely wasn't the place for me TO BE, 
YOU KNOW. Because the patients there are 
different cases completely. 
UH I'M HERE BECAUSE I first went to X Lodge, 
which is a centre for people that abuse alcohol 
and drugs, AND I WAS unsuccessful THERE BECAUSE 
I TRIED TO commit suicide and they decided 
[inaudible] to send me to Valhalla, which I 
sincerely doubt WAS, WAS the right alternative. 
Only a single case could be found in the second reason for admission corpus which made use 
of the !-was-there pattern, again to talk about an admission immediately preceding the 
current one: 
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[44/2] I WAS encouraged TO GO AND see a psychiatrist, 
AND I WAS put on medication, which worked 
initially, AND THEN it petered, well I DUNNO 
what happened, but I got depressed again AND I 
attempted suicide, AND I WAS admitted to the 
Gen, AND I WAS THERE. AND after discharge I 
WAS on other medication AND I GOT DEPRESSED on 
that as well AND THEN I came here ... 
That talk about institutions from which they had just been discharged should figure more 
promine:1tly immediately on admission than two weeks later is perhaps understandable in that 
interviewees were still very much in the midst of the decision to be transferred to Valhalla. 
By the second interview they would perhaps have become more preoccupied with issues 
around the current hospitalisation rather than the series of events leading up to it. There is 
some evidence, however, that interviewees were still equally concerned with pre-admission 
events, but were talking about them differently. This is discussed below. 
Working hard; stressed out 
Where a typical pattern in the first interviews when responding to a question about the reason 
for admission is to invoke the !-was-there sequence in relation to immediately preceding 
admissions, by the second interviews, a broader perspective is attained by invoking the 1-
was-working sequence to talk about work pressures preceding admission. This sequence is 
quite common in the second reason for admission corpus, but completely absent from the 
first. Some examples: 
[11/2] Ja, BECAUSE I couldn't handle my life, IT WAS a 
bit TOO heavy, I WAS WORKING, I WAS WORKING, I 
used to work in the X industry. And my 
workload WAS TOO much, AND in order to keep up 
WITH that I used to take cocaine - but it 
didn't, I in fact slowed down, to such an 
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[23/2] 
[54/2] 
extent that I almost stopped, totally. That's 
it. 
OK, I tried to commit suicide for my second 
time, and mostly because of work, pressure of, 
BECAUSE I WAS WORKING with a guy I didn't 
really like, he was giving me A LOT OF hassles 
and that 
Oh ja, I'M HERE as the result OF A suicide 
attempt ... Uh ... ja ... under, under, I'VE 
BEEN under A LOT OF pressure. I'VE BEEN 
working under a LOT OF pressure for, for quite 
a while. Uh ... AND I, I; while I WAS WORKING 
I had been SORT OF very bad, severely mugged, 
AND I felt that my nerve had sort of snapped. 
What is being drawn on here, of cours~, is what may be termed stress discourse, in which 
pressures are presented as building up inexorably until something snaps. Talk about stress is 
not completely absent from the first reason for admission corpus, twice surfacing in the 
vicinity of the !-was-there pattem(which, as discussed above, more commonly signals talk 
about preceding admissions): 
[24/1] 
[52/1] 
I'M not quite sure. I SUPPOSE the main thing 
IS THAT everyone, all my support was going 
away, and THERE WAS no way that, I WAS not 
coping. I WAS also feeling very depressed. 
THERE WAS just ... I just DIDN'T do anything. 
I couldn't work. I de-registered for my course 
at varsity ... 
However, the prototypical stress-related type, cope, is completely absent, while similar types 
such as coping (N=l) and stress (N=2) are very rare. By contrast there appears to have been 
an infusion of stress-talk between the first and second interviews. Interviewees still refer to 
depression to explain why they have been admitted, but now very frequently do so in 
conjunction with stress, making use of the !-wasn't and to-cope-with sequences at the bottom 
right ofFigure 7.3: 
[16/2] Uh to try and ... [interruption at door]. TO 
GET TO COPE WITH the DEPRESSION, or TO UH, or 
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[08/2] 
[19/2] 
[46/2] 
[28/2] 
TO maybe find ways of not having it at all. 
Uh well, as I SORT OF mentioned before IT WAS 
DEPRESSION, UH YOU KNOW I JUST lost control, 
ja. I DON'T want to go into detail, it's JUST 
repeating everything I said, BUT UH, BECAUSE I 
feel a lot better about a LOT OF things, BUT UH 
ja IT WAS just VERY severe depression, just 
losing control OF MY OF MY MY entire thoughts, 
ja, and my ability TO COPE in life. 
UH ... well, DEPRESSION UH ... inability TO 
COPE WITH therapy AND conduct a day-to-day 
life, uh periodic SORT OF intermittent 
periods OF of intensity. Uh, a desire to SORT 
OF engage in A process of therapy full time 
[mmm] . [inaudible] _ 
Uh ... THIS TIME I'm at Valhalla, it's the 
fifth time I'VE BEEN HERE, is BECAUSE I WAS 
VERY suicidal AND I WASN'T coping with anything 
at home. Everything WAS like TOO big AND too, I 
DUNNO, everything was just beyond me, AND I 
WASN'T coping WITH anything ... Uh so my 
psychologist decided IT WAS time for me to come 
back again ... Uh I DUNNO. 
UH, a bit of DEPRESSION, the majority of it 
stress. After the car accident - final touch to 
basically five years OF A build-up: separation, 
divorce ... uh pressure from family side ... So 
I DUNNO ... I, I DUNNO, I REALLY DON'T KNOW. 
I'm going have TO just COPE WITH it, that's 
all. 
It is remarkable that stress discourse as described by Young (1980) and Pollock (1988) could 
appear with such vigour where it had been almost completely absent two weeks previously, 
and doubly remarkable that it should almost invariably be used in the same breath as talk 
-
about depression. Wh~re patients arrived at Valhalla talking about depression and suicide 
when asked about their reason for being there, two weeks later this talk had become 
hybridised to include coping with the pressures of life, therapy and depression itself. 
Some of the dynamics which may have contributed to this process are the following: 
Firstly, stress as an explanatory construct and stress management techniques were explicitly 
taught in groups run by occupational therapists and social workers at the time of the study, 
and several patients are likely to have picked up the jargon from this source. Secondly 
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therapy, although very highly valued in the ward, was (often without this being made explicit 
to patients) of a 'supportive' nature, and warnings were continually issued to inexperienced 
therapists to avoid doing any 'uncovering' work in the hospital milieu (the phrase often used 
was to 'keep the lid on'). This kind of support is of course in many ways seen as a temporary 
replacement for the 'social support' which the patient is presumed to lack - and from social 
support it is a short discursive journey to the idea of stress. Thirdly, at the root of the official 
censure of'uncovering' therapy is a fear that patients may 'disintegrate' and become 
unsuitable for early discharge. Much of the acrimony between patients and staff, and among 
staff, thus centred around the issue of readiness firstly for weekend leave and then for 
discharge. Is the patient still too fragile to cope with being out of the ward? Will there be 
enough social support at home? These were the questions which concerned staff on a daily 
basis, and which inevitably impacted on patients' perceptions of the nature of their 
difficulties. 
I find it impossible to say whether sinking into depression or drowning in stress is 
preferable, nor even if rapid discursive shifts from the one predicament to the other is 
harmful or beneficial. It is likely, however, that both kinds of discourse fulfil similar 
functions and are merely inflections of a more fundamental form of speech which invokes 
causal and psychological language to both give an account of oneself, and resist (at many 
different levels simultaneously) being held accountable for oneself: 
[34/2] 
M: Uh first thing is if you could just sort of for the 
record again summarise why you're here. 
I: Why I WAS here? [laughs] 0 God. 
M: Can't remember? 
I: No! [laughs] Ja, I DON'T KNOW. I SUPPOSE I JUST 
got sick. My nerves cracked in or something [both 
laugh). Whatever. I DON'T KNOW. Pressure, I DON'T 
KNOW. Something like that. 
M: OK. I can't remember what you said last time. 
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I: I know [laughs]. My doctor sent me here. 
Breaking free 
If, as Rose (1990) and others have argued, the purpose of psychotherapy and other forms of 
moral orthopaedics is to "restore to individuals the capacity to function as autonomous beings 
in the contractual society of the self' (p. 227-228), it is clear why an individual such as 
interviewee number 34 quoted above should be thought to be in need of help. Even after two 
weeks of psychiatric hospitalisation the patients I spoke to continued to resist imperatives to 
be accountable, both in the immediacies of an interview with me and (it would appear) in the 
larger context to which the interview referred. Had I again conducted interviews with the 
same patients shortly before discharge, a more purposeful and optimistic discourse may have 
started to become evident. In each of the five cases where I did have an opportunity to speak 
to patients a third time, there seemed to be an expression of greater optimism, willingness to 
take responsibility and an eagerness, as Rose (1990) puts it, to "make a project of our 
biography [and] narrativize our lives in a vocabulary of interiority" (p. 254): 
[16/3] 
M: Could you maybe expand a bit on that. You know I'm 
not quite sure how it helped you. 
I: Ja [inaudible] actually a lot better, about myself 
uh, in certain situations. I mean take for example 
over the weekends [ja]. I mean I hadn't spoken to 
[my sister] for a long time. And uh, I just, I feel 
a lot better~ and uh I, I can actually cope with 
most of the problems that I come up with [yes]. 
Maybe now and again I'll feel a little bit-
stressed about it, but it doesn't get into a serious 
depression [ja]. 
However, even as these individuals took on the shackles of freedom, they maintained a 
connection to the institution: 
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[51/03] 
Ja. The therapy at Valhalla has been useful, 
especially with the nurse therapist who is my age 
and has been through similar experiences. I think 
it's basically up to you to do something about it. 
It's true, I mean most of us cause it ourselves. Uh 
at the moment I'm on an aggression management course 
learning to deal with problems as soon as I can 
instead of bottling it up. I hope to leave here with 
a more positive outlook and able to deal with the 
emotions I'm going through ... I expect to start 
working from here and to move into my own flat. 
Whether it is partial hospitalisation, attendance at an outpatients' clinic, rehospitalisation, 
seeing a private therapist, or simply keeping an eye on one's self, the former psychiatric 
patient, like the rest of us, is well advised to work at being a better person, while always 
maintaining contact with the therapeutic system in case of failure: 
[20/03] 
M: OK uh is there anything more that you want to say 
sort of in ... making things clear to me? 
P: Uh I think it's very important to keep having 
therapy, and keep in contact with, with people who 
know about it and can help you [ja]. Because, a lot 
has to do with your attitude [ja]. And, and even 
when you, when you're better you, you've got to 
still work at it. I think you've got to try harder 
than most people to, to keep yourself up. 
M: Ja, so it can easily happen that you just let it go 
if you don't have therapy and keep contact. 
I: Ja, you've always got to try and be optimistic uh 
and uh keep a positive attitude [ja]. 
As Rose (1990) puts it: 
It [psychotherapeutics] promises to make it possible for us all to make a project of our 
biography, create a style for our lives, shape our everyday existence in terms of an 
ethic of autonomy. Yet the norm of autonomy secretes, as its inevitable 
accompaniment, a constant and intense self-scrutiny, a continual evaluation of our 
personal experiences, emotions, and feelings in relation to images of satisfaction, the 
necessity to narrativize our lives in a vocabulary of interiority. The self that is 
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liberated is obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity (p. 254). 
Conclusion: No looking back 
To claim, as I have done in this chapter, that psychiatric patients use particular forms of 
speech recurrently is at once to invite comparison with the language-use of 'ordinary' people, 
and from there to ask whether psychiatric patients' peculiar speech is somehow implicated in 
causing or maintaining their recidivist tendencies. Following such a line of enquiry one might 
argue that the analysis demonstrates (although tentatively, as there was no non-psychiatric 
control group) that patients appear to be at the mercy oftheir language in the same way as 
they are at the mercy of their illness, being sucked, again and again, into self-defeating 
linguistic patterns just as they are sucked into repeated hospitalisation. 
However, language-use of necessity entails drawing on a system of conventions such 
as a common lexicon and syntax, idiomatic phrases, stock images, culturally recognised 
storylines, scripts, discourses, and so on, so that psychiatric patients can hardly be thought of 
as unique in this regard. One would have to prove that psychiatric patients, and particularly 
recidivist patients, are particularly stereotypical (or perhaps erratic) in how they apply the 
building blocks of language- or, more crudel), that they tend to use different building blocks 
(a peculiarly biased vocabulary, aberrant semantic forms) entirely. One may even propose 
new kinds of therapy in which individuals are supported and accompanied as they become 
differentially subjectified by psychiatric discourses, moving perhaps from robotic repetition 
to 'ownership' and elaboration, and finally to reflection and deconstruction. 
This kind of thinking is seductive, but tangential to the purposes of this dissertation. 
The challenge is not to discover variables, however subtly-defined, that differentiate 
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recidivists from non-recidivists - the sane from the mad - but briefly to disrupt the circuitry of 
power and knowledge of which this text is one relay, and to do it in such a way that the 
fluencies of what goes without saying take on a more staccato and machine-like quality. To 
present what passed between myself and the people I interviewed as part of a strictly 
regulated production line is not, however, to imply either that we were coerced by the power 
of psychiatry or that it would be possible to draw up a blueprint of the truth-factory in which 
we were labouring. Power and knowledge do not radiate formally from the centre, but seep 
back from the extremities of social interaction - a physical examination, a psychometric test, 
an interview. 
At the furthest end-points of these capillaries of power are perhaps those moments 
when linguistic redundancies such as those I have recorded here are passed between 
individuals to bring about the appearance of a common understanding. As Foucault (1967) 
recognised, there is no escape from these commonplaces of expression, as we now no longer 
have access to "all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the 
exchange between madness and reason was made" (p. xii-xiii). What is more, these micro 
regimes of true discourse are continually subsumed, as in Whorfs vision, into ever larger 
patterns of social intercourse, so that all of the social world of mental illness may at times be 
reflected in everyday i- ~rrases such as you-know, !-suppose, !-was-there. Just as it is no longer 
useful to speak of being outside the institution, there is also now no outside to the language of 
psychiatry. 
As Sophie, "a 27-year-old former office secretary" six weeks into her first admission 
at Valhalla, recently confided to a journalist: 
I believe there's a light at the end of the tunnel ... I know I have a very low self-
esteem and lack of confidence. The point of me being here is to get better so that I 
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never come back (Weekly Mail & Guardian, 1997). 
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Chapter 8 
'Apparently a known schizophrenic': 
From confession to surveillance 
For the relations of words are in pairs first. 
For the relations of words are according to their distance from the pair. 
-Christopher Smart, Jubilate Agno, c17601 
In the previous chapter I analysed texts cast in the form of spontaneous confidences shared 
between troubled individuals and an interested listener. In this chapter the focus moves from 
such confessions to the other side ofFmu~ault's disciplinary diagram- that of surveillance. 
At this level it is no longer the individual subject which is re-inscribed as truth by discourse 
under the guise of agentic and unpremeditated speech, but the individual subject created 
through a system of scientific visibility that enumerates, classifies and defines her in relation 
to other individuals. 
The material I use comes from a psychiatric ward of a general hospital in the same 
city as Valhalla hospital, and consists of case records entered on a computer data base over a 
5 year period in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not only does this source represent an 
exemplar of the rapidly proliferating forms of textual data now available in electronic form, 
as discussed in Chapter 6, but it is also representative of the form of superpanopticism 
predicted by Poster (1990), in which the technical limitations ofBentham's panorticon are 
Written while in 1v1r Potter's madhouse in Bethnal Green (quoted in Ingram, 
1991, p. 171-172). 
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overcome and surveillance becomes truly omnipresent. 
The hospital (which I shall refer to as 'Milfield') is a large general hospital in the 
greater Johannesburg area. I was given access to the records of the psychiatric ward for 
research purposes by the psychiatrist in charge of the ward, and for some months spent one 
day per week at the ward working on various research projects for the psychiatrist and some 
ofhis colleagues. Unlike at Valhalla, however, I did not attend ward rounds or conduct 
interviews with patients. 
Milfield, like Valhalla, is a state hospital and an academic training facility located in a 
former white suburb in Gauteng. However, it is very much larger than Valhalla, and the 
psychiatric ward is a small part of the hospital. Many of the patients accepted into the ward 
are 'acute' cases, hospitalised in the wake of a suicide attempt, because they had caused a 
public disturbance, or had suddenly become unmanageable to their families. Patients were 
also occasionally transferred from other wards in the hospital when their physical ailments 
were found to be due to or accompanied by psychiatric difficulties. There is no segregation 
into different classes of mental illness as at Valhalla, and the emphasis is on relatively short-
term crisis intervention followed either by discharge or by transfer to medium-term facilities 
such as Valhalla, private drug and alcohol rehabilitation centres, and the like. In some cases, 
particularly where there have been several previous admissions, patients ·re transferr-ed to 
long-term institutions where they are involuntarily committed. 
'Subjects and sampling' 
As in the previous two chapters, there is limited utility in thinking of the material used in this 
chapter in terms of individual subjects or cases, since subjects are the product as much as the 
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source of discourse. Some empirical data on subjects are nevertheless presented to help 
contextualise the linguistic material analysed. Two groups of individuals could qualify as 
subjects for the present study: The psychiatric registrars who composed the case histories and 
the patients about whom the histories were written. 
Registrar~. In all, 63 registrars contributed case histories, with a mean of 29.84 
histories written by each registrar (SD=25.35) and a range of 1 to 129 histories per registrar. 
Unfortunately no further data are available on the registrars as the database was of course set 
up with the view that patients rather than medical personnel constitute cases to be studied. 
From my observations at Milfield it appeared that the registrars were a diverse group in terms 
of age, gender and cultural background, but that nearly all were white. A list of the registrars' 
surnames includes one Indian but no African surnames. During their training registrars were 
placed for periods of six months at a time at various hospitals and clinics forming part of the 
academic system in and around the city. Placement centres included Valhalla, Milfield, an 
inner-city outpatients' clinic, a township day clinic and the psychiatric ward at a large 
township hospital. 
Patients. The case histories used for analysis refer to all 1883 psychiatric admissions 
at Milfield over a 5 year period in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first 43 5 of these 
admissions were fully coded on the computer da ll.base, but after this it was apparently 
decided to code only certain variables. Descriptive statistics for both fully and partially coded 
biographical variables are presented in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2. These show that patients 
were typically somewhat older than those at Valhalla, typically spent only about two weeks 
2 Registrars are medical doctors assigned to a psychiatric hospital (or a 
psychiatric ward in a general hospital) as part of their practical training to qualify as 
psychiatrists. Registrars make diagnoses, prescribe medication and do psychotherapy under 
the supervision of a qualified psychiatrist. 
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in the hospital, and were (at the time) overwhelmingly white. As at Valhalla, the majority 
were female. 
Table 8.1 
Table 8.2 
Age at admission and days spent in the psychiatric ward at Milfield 
Hospital 
Variable N Mean 
Age 1858 42.13 
Daysinward 1859 14.31 
SD Min Max 
17.10 12 
16.36 1 
85 
241 
Gender and race distribution of patients in the psychiatric ward at 
Milfield Hospital 
Gender 
Race 
Female 
Male 
Total 
White 
Black 
Coloured 
Indian 
Total 
N 
247 
175 
422 
416 
11 
4 
4 
435 
265 
% 
58.53 
41.47 
100 
95.63 
2.53 
0.92 
0.92 
100 
Of the first 422 patients in the database 33% (143) were coded as having had previous 
admissions, and 73.56% were recorded (Table 8.3) as having previously had psychiatric 
medication or electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) prescribed to them. The kinds of medications 
prescribed to patients are also listed in Table 8.3. No details regarding prior 
psychotherapeutic treatments were recorded. 
Table 8.3 Somatic treatments given to patients in the psychiatric ward at Milfield 
Hospital prior to admission 
Treatment 
Benzodiazepines 
Antidepressants 
Anti psychotics 
ECT 
: ;o somatic treatment 
One type of treatment 
Two types of treatment 
Three types of treatment 
Four types of treatment 
Total 
N 
254 
191 
173 
64 
115 
94 
126 
64 
36 
435 
% 
58.39 
43.91 
39.77 
14.71 
26.44 
21.61 
28.97 
14.70 
8.28 
100 
266 
Analytic strategy 
As in the previous chapter I started with a quantitative overview of the corpus, and moved 
from there to qualitative analysis. The quantitative techniques used are the same as for 
Chapter 7. Also as in the previous chapter, the qualitative analysis proceeded by first locating 
extracts containing collocational patterns identified from the lexical net, determining how 
these patterns function in the extracts and then presenting this interpretation together with 
illustrative extracts. The analysis in some cases continued on to issues thematically but not 
statistically related to the collocational patterns found. 
Getting into the text 
The case records in the computer database duplicated some of the information contained in 
patient files. These files are used at various points during a patient's stay at the hospital, for 
example by registrars prior to presenting the patient's case to a ward round, by 
psychotherapists for background information on the patient, to check on the patient's 
medication history where changes in medication are being considered, and when decisions 
are being made regarding home leave, transfer or discharge. In each of these cases existing 
information in the file is scanned and new data added. In cases of readmission old files are 
retrieved and placed inside the new file. 
The most intensive period of activity around the file occurs shortly after admission 
when an official'history' is taken from each patient (supplemented by 'collateral' information 
from family, friends and other medical staff), usually by a psychiatric registrar. This history 
includes a description of the events leading up to the patient's admission, information about 
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her current symptoms, biographical information and various other psychiatric 
indispensibilities such as the results of a brief 'mental status examination'. In this analysis I 
focus in particular on an open ended section of each patient's record headed 
"EVALUATION/ INITIAL IDSTORY: LEADING UP TO TillS ADMISSION" which 
contains a brief description of the presenting complaint, similar to the following (all case 
material in this chapter has been edited to ensure anonymity): 
[ 121] 3 29 ye.ar old unmarried female, no children, staying with 
parents in X-city, presenting in a psychotic state with 
tactile hallucinations, sexual delusions and delusions of 
misinterpretation, delusions of influence, that started 1 m 
ago and got progressively worse over last week. Delusions are 
directed towards father. Father is transmitting his "lust'' to 
her. Hypomanic features. Marked conduct disorder with 
substance abuse as child. 4 previous admissions - Weskoppies, 
Magaliesoord, Phoenix House and Milfield. Defaulted meds. 
While the ostensible purpose of a vignette such as this is informational, it is also, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, a linguistic ritual in which the beliefs and values of the medical world are 
reinscribed. For example, at least five epistemological strands, explanatory schemas, 
discourses, can be reconstructed from the short vignette quoted above: 
1. The old maid discourse: Having violated the 'normal' developmental path for a 
woman (getting married and having children), the patient is now sexually frustrated 
and projects her frustration onto the nearest male figure. 
2. The rotten apple discourse. Even as a child the patient was a delinquent who took 
drugs. Maybe she's fried her brains. 
3. The noncompliant patient discourse. She stopped taking her medication. That's why 
she's gone off the rails again. 
4. The schizophrenia discourse. She is deluded and has hallucinations. If I'm pressed 
3 Numbers in square brackets refer to patient numbers in the database. 
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for a diagnosis I'd say schizophrenia. But then on the other hand maybe it's mania. 
5. The recidivist discourse. She's been here four times before. Are you surprised she's 
back? 
While it is easy to imagine a similar analysis of 10 or even 100 such vignettes, it obviously 
becomes increasing difficult to sustain as the numbers increase. Given that the data available 
to me, which I shall call the initial history corpus, consisted of 1880 vignettes (68 939 tokens 
or 212 pages of single-spaced typescript), the idea of some form of preliminary quantitative 
parsing seemed even more appealing than for the interview transcripts used in the previous 
chapter. 
Preliminary quantitative overview 
As an initial step the corpus was spell-checked and 783 spurious types removed. There were 
numerous uncommon types, such as medical terms (surmontil, ativan, emdalin), 
abbreviations (LOA, ICU, IQ, psych), numerical indicators of various sorts (1, 2, 3, 1st, 
25mg, 50mg) and unusual constructions (RHTd,function++, 415). I left these unchanged so 
as to preserve the tenor of the case histories. Individuals' first names and surnames were 
replaced with X. 
The corpus consisted of68 939 tokens and 5 916 types, giving a type-token ratio of 
1:11.65, which is comparable to the 1:12.33 ratio found for the interview transcripts. 
However, the initial history corpus is approximately twice as long as the first interview 
corpus, and (as discussed in Chapter 6) vocabulary richness tends to be lower for longer 
texts. Taking only the first 33 644 tokens in the initial history corpus (the same length as the 
first interview corpus), 3753 types were found, giving a type-token ratio of 1:8.96. This 
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higher vocabulary richness is probably in part due to the telegrammatic style of the case 
histories, which in many cases dispense with high frequency grammatical tokens such as a 
and the. Table 8.4, which lists the 60 most common types in the initial history text, confirms 
this interpretation, with lexical types such as history, patient and admitted among the most 
frequently used types, outranking even the, usually the most frequent type in written or 
spoken English. 
The corpus contains 5768 lexical types and has a lexical density of 69.1 %, almost 
twice that of the first interview corpus. This can again be ascribed to the abbreviated style 
used in the case histories and to the numerous unusual types mentioned at the start of this 
section. 
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Table 8.4 Sixty most common types in the initial history corpus 
and 2194 of 2015 to 1589 with 1232 
in 1127 for 977 history 866 patient 786 
a 732 on 605 was 587 depression 585 
year 521 has 499 at 489 admitted 460 
had 437 from 432 her 430 2 401 
old 398 by 398 no 379 the 366 
she 364 years 360 admission 345 prevtous 345 
not 323 suicidal 317 3 316 abuse 305 
known 304 depressed 299 been 285 months 284 
alcohol 279 he 279 after 268 poor 265 
is 260 ago 256 weeks 241 suicide 237 
as 235 family 231 very 231 OD 228 
behaviour 226 paranoid 225 problems 223 features 220 
his 220 disorder 219 treated 211 Valhalla 208 
well 208 since 207 ward 202 also 191 
Note. Frequencies are to the right of each word type. 
t ot surprisingly, the two most common lexical types in the initial history corpus (Table 8. 5) 
are history and patient. The remaining types can tentatively be divided into a number of 
clusters. As with the interview corpus, depression and depression-related words (suicidal, 
depressed, suicide, OD) are particularly prominent, mirroring the frequency with which 
patients invoke depression to account for their hospitalisation. However, another finding 
from the interview corpus, that patients make some use of the discourse of social stress to 
explain their circumstances, at first glance appears to be absent from this corpus, with no 
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clearly stress-related types included in the table. Types such as cope (N=34), stress (N=34) 
and stressful (N=88) do occur in the full list of types, but with relatively low frequency. 
Other kinds of reference to psychiatric signs, symptoms and diagnoses are however plentiful 
(e.g., paranoid, disorder, hallucinations, ideation, bipolar, psychotic, aggressive, vegetative, 
and manic) reflecting the more scientific and objective tenor of the histories. 
Table 8.5 Sixty most common lexical types in the initial history corpus 
history 866 patient 786 depression 585 year 521 
admitted 460 2 401 old 398 years 360 
previous 345 admission 345 suicidal 317 3 316 
abuse 305 known 304 depressed 299 months 284 
alcohol 279 poor 265 ago 256 weeks 241 
suicide 237 family 231 OD 228 behaviour 226 
paranoid 225 problems 223 features 220 disorder 219 
treated 211 well 208 Valhalla 208 ward 202 
hallucinations 187 delusions 177 ideation 177 admissions 173 
bipolar 173 presented 172 psychotic 171 1 159 
past 158 4 157 last 155 week 155 
previously 154 referred 150 aggressive 147 pnor 147 
appetite 142 sleep 142 X 141 vegetative 136 
6 134 month 133 hospital 132 marne 131 
psych 130 treatment 130 auditory 125 home 125 
Note. Frequencies are to the right of each word type. 
The epistemological types prominent in the interview corpus are absent here, with the 
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exception of the word known- which will be discussed later. In the place of these types there 
is an array of numerals (1 - 6), again indicative of the more unequivocal and objective genre 
within which the case histories operate. There are also many time indicators, such as year, 
years, previous, months, ago, weeks, past, week, previously, prior and month, marking the 
corpus as a set of psychiatric histories. A final group of words, which may be related to the 
time cluster, appear to refer to the process of entering psychiatric care - admitted, admission, 
Valhalla and admissions. 
As previously discussed, frequency counts such as that in Table 8.5 provide an 
indication of the lexical content of texts, but are somewhat limited in their usefulness. As an 
example, one of the more prominent lexical items, abuse, is a case of homonymy and could 
(among other possibilities) refer either to substance/alcohol abuse perpetrated by the patient 
or to child/sexual abuse perpetrated upon the patient. 
In order to move beyond such ambiguities, collocation counts were therefore again 
computed for each pair of types in the text (reproduced in Appendix 5), and a lexical net 
drawn using this data (Figure 8.1). As before, the z-scores on which the net is based were 
calculated using a span of 4 words on either side of each target word (truncated at vignette 
boundaries), but given the large size of the corpus, a larger minimum collocational frequency 
of 20 was used. The most prominent collocations were plotted down to a z- c;ore of 18, at 
which point the resultant lexical net threatened to become too unwieldy. 
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Figure 8.1 Lexical net of the initial history corpus 
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Reading the lexical net from the top left, one finds a sub-net of terms relating to gender and 
age (man, woman, lady, year, age and so on). This reflects a stereotypical opening sentence 
used in many of the histories, as in the following short extracts: 
[4) 61 YEAR OLD Jewish divorced MAN 
[5) 43 YEAR OLD WOMAN WHO PRESENTED WITH nine MONTH HISTORY 
[11] 63 YEAR OLD widow for last 15 years 
[720] A 39 YEAR OLD LADY WHO teaches at ... school 
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[898] 60 YEAR OLD prisoner WHO PRESENTED WITH dehydration 
[900] 52 YEAR OLD woman with poor social circumstances 
These simple biographical statements appear unremarkable, but clearly have more than an 
information-giving function. Basic data such as age and gender are strictly superfluous as 
they are prominently recorded in the patient file and the computer database anyway. Rather, 
one could argue that they are an effective opening gambit for a history of which it is required 
that it should appear parsimonious, objective and factual. There are of course variations in 
the degree to which objective scientific language (male vs man, female vs woman/lady) is 
considered necessary, and how much additional information is immediately introduced (a 
Jewish man, an unmarried woman), but what is ubiquitous is the need to signal from the 
outset that what is being dealt with here is a 'case' - an entity which is in principle knowable 
and susceptible to being summarised in a few lines. 
Reading further downwards along the lexical net, it is evident that many of the 
vignettes proceed from an initial statement ofbiographical information to refer to the 
difficulty that the patient presented with. This 'presenting problem' can take many different 
forms: 
[34]49 YEAR OLD LADY, divorced two YEARS AGO after 28 YEARS of 
marriage. PRESENTED WITH symptoms of adjustment disorder 
with depressi0n. 
[74] 54 YEAR OLD Jedish WOMAN WHO PRESENTED WITH depression, 
poor response to Ludiomil with side-effects and medical 
problems. 
[1169] A 33 YEAR OLD MAN WHO PRESENTED WITH pseudoamnesia 
after having disappeared from his parents' home. 
[1862] 19 YEAR OLD MALE PRESENTED mute WITH intermittent 
tearfulness. 
As is the case with listing biographical information, describing a patient as 'presenting with' a 
set of problems, symptoms or a diagnosis draws on the idea that she or he can be objectively 
known as a case. The presenting problem is discursively marked as uncontroversial'raw 
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data', literally or metaphorically visible to the physician's eye, while at the same time it is 
signalled that these are preliminary observations and that further investigation may yield 
further data and more sophisticated interpretations. 
In the first instance psychiatric patients thus appear in these vignettes as humanist 
critiques of psychiatry might have predicted they would - objectified, dehumanised and 
subjected to a regime of scientific visibility. Where they are 'given voice', it is only in the 
context of professional scepticism, so that they are for example said to complain of various 
ailments (bottom left ofFigure 8.1) rather than to be in any position to diagnose: 
[912] COMPLAINS OF slurring, dry tongue, glassy eyes. 
[1380] Self referred after several non-suicidal overdoses. 
COMPLAINS OF a loss of identity. 
Other professional distance markers such as claims, denied, unreliable and the use of scare 
quotes also occur in the corpus, although not with sufficient frequency to be included in the 
net. Some typical examples: 
[174] Has felt a "power" within her which makes her pray and 
perform religious rituals. Also claims that her husband 
is confusing her by saying strange things to her. 
[798] Burnt all his belongings outside a ho~el. Assessed as 
being psychotic in casualty. Unreliable historian ++. 
Query history of substance abuse. 
[803] Patient denied recollection of interview. 
The psychiatric mode of dealing with its subjects, ~s revealed once again in the opening lines 
of many of the vignettes, continues to be something of a scandal in the modem, humanised 
world. However, one should not therefore assume that psychiatric patients are somehow 
being denied their full individuality. The kind of power that psychiatry now holds (or more 
accurately - is both a product and a relay of) does not suppress, but fabricates and reinscribes 
the uniqueness of individuals. Just as the lexical net and similar devices produce the 
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language of psychiatry as a particular kind of discourse, so that discourse is no more and no 
less than a grid for bringing into visibility the objects it produces - a never-ending series of 
individual subjects. In Foucault's words: 
In a system of discipline (such as that of modernity) the child is more individualized 
than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent 
more than the normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of 
these pairs that all the individualising mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and 
when one wishes to individualise the healthy, normal and law abiding adult, it is by 
asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, 
what fundamental crime he has dreamt ofcommitting(1979, p. 193). 
Histories of the present 
The objects created by the discourse of psychiatry, are specifically psychiatric subjects, and 
part of psychiatry's discursive work in vignettes such as those analysed here is to claim them, 
with due reference to signs, symptoms and histories, as its own. As can be seen from Figure 
8.1, symptoms, problems and diagnoses are most often not introduced directly after the 
presented/presenting/presents-with construction, but are accessed via the intervening key 
word history. Not only is this the most frequent lexical type in the corpus (Table 8.5), but it 
is also at the centre of a web of signification. Patients are portrayed as having a history of 
anxiety or depression (to the bottom of history), a family history of psychiatric illness (top 
right), a history of substance, cannabis or alcohol abuse (bottom left) or a history of previous 
suicide attempts and admissions (bottom right). 
In some cases, vignettes run the full sequence from biographical variables and the 
277 
presenting with construction, via history of to a diagnostic statement, as in the following 
extracts: 
[5] 43 YEAR OLD WOMAN WHO PRESENTED WITH nine MONTH HISTORY OF 
DEPRESSION 
[12] 48 YEAR OLD white FEMALE WHO PRESENTED on lOth Feb WITH 
HISTORY OF ONE week's manic symptoms 
[61] 24 YEAR OLD married WOMAN WHO PRESENTED WITH 6 MONTH 
HISTORY OF DEPRESSION and changes in her behaviour. 
[81] 46 YEAR OLD MAN WHO PRESENTED in casualty WITH 6 m 
HISTORY OF DEPRESSION 
More typically, however, history of is used interchangeably (rather than in conjunction with) 
presenting with, and appears to have much the same function - to locate initial observations 
of the patient in the realm of objective fact. Thus patients are said to have a history of 
deteriorating function [106], depression [164], poor concentration [430], or substance abuse 
[432]. To further 'factualise' the situation, the time frame of the history is sometimes 
quantified, as in a one month or one week history (middle left ofFigure 8.1). Patients are 
also sometimes said to have a strong history of one or the other kind: 
[117] STRONG FAMILY HISTORY OF AFFECTIVE DISORDER. 
[394] Past STRONG ALCOHOL HISTORY WITH antisocial personality. 
[837] STRONG schizophrenic FAMILY HISTORY. 
[976] STRONG HISTORY OF excessive intake of ALCOHOL. 
[1424] Recurrent depression ... STRONG FAMILY HISTORY. 
The kind of warrant being offered here goes a little further than the 'neutral .._ <Cts' placed on 
the table by means of biographical variables, the presenting with sequence and some forms of 
the history of sequence. What is being alluded to is mental illness as hereditary ([ 117], [83 7] 
and [1424] above) and as a recurrent chronic condition ([394] and [976]). Ironically, the 
strong history construction at the same time somewhat weakens the force of invoking 
historical data as it implies that history is not simply a matter of fact, but is open to 
evaluation. 
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Long, like strong, also functions to intensify history, but has a less obvious element of 
subjective evaluation and this may be why long history is a more popular construction (see 
Appendix 5). Long is used like strong to indicate chronicity ( [ 93] Has had a LONG 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY [515]; [1019] LONG HISTORY OF CANNABIS 
ABUSE; [1603] Patient WITH a LONG HISTORY OF chronic 
depression), but interestingly is not once used withfamiry to invoke hereditary factors. 
Family histories, it would appear are per definition long and need no further embellishment 
-
along that dimension. Instead, family histories are frequently elaborated on with reference to 
various diagnoses that family members have had, and as frequently the family is rather 
vaguely said to have a (positive) psych or psychiatric history, in which case further 
explanation appears to be optional: 
[62] FAMILY PSYCH HISTORY - mother depressed. 
[71] Patient has POSITIVE FAMILY HISTORY. 
[145] FAMILY PSYCH HISTORY POSITIVE for alcoholism. 
[672] Strong paternal FAMILY PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY. 
[794] POSITIVE FAMILY PSYCH HISTORY. 
[1124] POSITIVE FAMILY HISTORY - brother diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, currently functioning well. 
It is also thought necessary in some cases to indicate that in fact there appears to be no such 
history ( [ 957] No family psych history; [ 1111] No family 
psychiatric history; [ 1138] Family :1istory nil), with occasionally 
comical results: 
[1155] He denies a FAMILY HISTORY, SUBSTANCE ABUSE or 
homosexuality. 
In a few cases long and strong history is used in tandem to help qualify the nature of the 
patient's problems: 
[37] Patient PRESENTED WITH PARANOID DELUSIONS, concerning 
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black men who wanted TO KILL her. At time of admission was 
agitated and reported AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS. LONG prior 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY OF similar problem, STRONG HISTORY OF 
ALCOHOL ABUSE for 15 years, but had stopped drinking one month 
previously. 
Various of the sub-nets in Figure 8.1 appear to operate in much the same way as a 
long/strong/family history, namely as a kind of mental crossing off of items on an imaginary 
checklist. An example is the 'social stressors' sub-net (top left): 
[678] Multiple SOCIAL PROBLEMS. 
[755] FEELING DEPRESSED for 11 months. FINANCIAL and MARITAL 
PROBLEMS. Treated with Eglonyl and Lexotan. No 
improvement. 
Another example is the schizophrenic symptoms sub-net, which is connected to a suiCide risk 
sub·-net (bottom right): 
[3] marked DELUSIONS, AUDITORY AND VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS 
[492] Feeling VERY DEPRESSED AND SUICIDAL 
[908] Recently broke up with girlfriend AND expressed SUICIDAL 
IDEATION. 
[1396] Five day HISTORY OF paranoid ideation and VISUAL 
HALLUCINATIONS 
Perhaps most remarkable for its extreme enmeshment is the sub-net near the top right of 
Figure 8.1, which can be thought of as a vegetative features net. If the initial history is like a 
pinball game, the vegetativ;. features net represents an area where the ball bounces rapidly 
from side to side, setting lights flashing and bells ringing, before finally resuming a more 
linear, but not necessarily related, trajectory: 
[726] Depression for about ONE MONTH after stepson moved into 
home. UNABLE TO handle situation. Feels neglected and ignored. 
Feels stepson is encroaching the previous family life pattern. 
Doesn't see solution to problem of stepson. Also - increased 
SLEEP pattern. No ENERGY or libido. Bulimic. No WEIGHT LOSS. 
To the top right of the vegetative features sub-net is an unconnected sub-net relating to 
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similar information, but couched in everyday language. These constructions (e.g. not eating, 
not sleeping) are sometimes used interchangeably with the more formal terminology of the 
vegetative features sub-net, typically in the context of reporting on information supplied by a 
third party. The term vegetative features itself is not connected to the sub-net, but to the 
history of depression sequence (bottom left of Figure 8.1), indicating that a global reference 
to the presence or absence of vegetative features obviates the necessity of referring to 
individual signs and symptoms. The 'ordinary language' vegetative features sub-net also 
contains the only reference in Figure 8.1 to the discourse of coping, which is otherwise (as 
noted earlier) not prominent in the corpus. 
By discursively calling on these various sub-nets a sufficient initial case can be made 
to explain a patient's admission into the psychiatric system. In theory each history should 
refer to each possible sub-net just as a checklist would indicate the presence or absence of 
each possible complaint or symptom. However, in practice there appears to be a complex 
(and no doubt inconsistently applied) hierarchy in which for example mention of a 'strong 
family history' together with 'alcohol abuse' and 'financial problems' obviates the need for 
referring to the presence or absence of 'vegetative features'. 
Hh ~ories of the past 
History is not only used to 'place'. the individual as exhibiting a certain subset of psychiatric 
signs and symptoms (i.e., to account for the patient's illness) but also to give an account of 
the circumstances which led up to admission. Much of this has to do with the disturbed and 
disturbing behaviour for which hospitalisation is often seen as a (temporary) soiution. In 
places this information still functions as a psychiatric checklist, but elsewhere it starts to 
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operate as a narrative, as for example in the 'behavioural' sub-net at the bottom ofFigure 8.1 : 
[201] Chronic HISTORY OF BIZARRE BEHAVIOUR and functional 
decline. 
[632] Change in personality according to husband, including 
LOSS of WEIGHT (15 kg last year). Apparently neglecting 
house, INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOUR. 
[1251] AGGRESSIVE and BIZARRE BEHAVIOUR at a friend's house. 
Threatened 18 YEAR OLD girl with rape. Became abusive and 
stripped down to his underpants. 
Attempted suicide (to the bottom right of history) and drug overdoses (top right) also 
sometimes function as checklist items (e.g., [ 995] Several SUICIDE ATTEMPTS in 
past. DEPRESSED AND SUICIDAL), but as with the behavioural sub-net a slightly 
richer history of events leading up to the hospitalisation starts in many cases to emerge: 
[412] OD previous evening at 8pm of 20 Dormicum tablets. 
Following minor MVA at 7pm. He had had 2 double brandies 
PRIOR TO MVA. Spur of moment decision to take OD, because 
of cost of repair to car, inability to take children on 
holiday until car repair. No suicide notes. PREVIOUS 
SUICIDE ATTEMPT 2 and a half YEARS AGO. 
[1204] Referred to psychiatry by plastic surgeon following 
SUICIDE ATTEMPT by slashing his wrists and inhaling 
organophosphates. He was very delusional, blaming all 
problems on a pinched nerve in his neck for past 35 
years. 
Thus even though the grid of what is psychiatrically important and knowable (as reflected in 
the lexical net) reduces the variability in people's lived experience to a smaller subset of 
stereotypical possibilities, it at the same time causes individual trials and tribulations to stand 
out with even greater poignancy: 
[888] Brought in to casualty by colleagues. Had gone into 
Soweto to martyr himself for the black people. Friends 
report gradual decline in functioning over last few 
months. NO PREVIOUS PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY. 
[1540] COMPLAINS OF DEPRESSION and ANXIETY FOR 3 MONTHS. Had 
witnessed husband's murder in 1986. Never allowed herself 
to grieve. Bringing up 4 kids on own, living in poor 
downtown flat. Recently started recalling husband's 
death. Sometimes thinks she hears him calling her. 
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Familiar to the system 
An important theme in a great many of the vignettes has to do with the path traced by each 
patient through the psychiatric system. This is reflected in the net in the sections to the right 
of history dealing with being admitted to Mil.field Hospital, to (or via) a medical ward, to 
ward P (the psychiatric ward at Milfield Hospital) and having experienced an admission or 
admissions to Valhalla or Sterkfontein (a psychiatric institution for long-term patients). It is 
related (via the word admission) to a prior to admission sub-net which makes extensive use 
of quantified time constructions such as for 3 months and 2 weeks prior to. This sub-net is 
typically invoked to describe the patient's condition in the period immediately before the 
currentadmission([449] HAD not BEEN talking FOR 2 MONTHS PRIOR TO 
ADMISSION) or ([1234] physically assaulted by 2 men FEW DAYS 
PRIOR TO ADM! S S I ON). However, in most cases (multiple) prior/previous admissions 
and related constructs to the right of history are used not for purposes of story-telling, but to 
invoke a discourse of chronicity: 
[166] 33 YEAR OLD unmarried young MAN WITH a LONG HISTORY OF 
PSYCHIATRIC problems. Previously admitted at MILFIELD 
HOSPITAL, Valhalla, weskoppies, Sterkfontein. PRESENTED 
WITH unconvincing religious delusions. 
[382] Two ADMISSIONS TO VALHALLA 1986/1988. WARD r - 1988. 
Admission X-Hospi tal 1987. DIAGNOSED .AS a psychotic 
depression. 
[1306] Previous OD 1 MONTH PRIOR ADMISSION, admitted X-
Hospital. MULTIPLE ADMISSIONS VALHALLA, last in 1986 with 
depression. 
There is a ritualistic quality about many aspects of the vignettes, but it is particularly evident 
in the aJmost ceremonial reference made to previous admissions, with phrases such as the 
following being very common: 
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[12] 8 PREVIOUS ADMISSIONS for Bipolar Affective Disorder 
[35] MULTIPLE ADMISSIONS to nearly all hospitals in 
Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Pretoria etc. 
[464] HISTORY OF 3 PREVIOUS ADMISSIONS to Sterkfontein 
[1121] PREVIOUS ADMISSIONS for depression and ATTEMPTED 
SUICIDE 
These admission histories are typically very sparse, and seem to require little further 
elaboration. The idea that previous encounters with psychiatry explain her or his current 
status is quite central to making a case for why any particular person qualifies as a true 
patient. Reference to previous admissions frequently occur in the middle of vignettes where 
they appear to play a pivotal role in lending credibility to accounts: 
[44] 38 YEAR OLD WOMAN WITH 3 WEEKS HISTORY OF manic symptoms 
WITH disinhibition, promiscuity and grandiose delusions. 
MULTIPLE PREVIOUS ADMISSIONS to other psychiatric 
hospitals and DIAGNOSED AS rapid cycler BIPOLAR DISORDER. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE - poppers, CANNABIS, ALCOHOL. Stressors -
bad relationship with boyfriend, moved to X, new job, 
financial, divorce, parents deaths, infertility. 
[188] WELL KNOWN BIPOLAR lady admitted from Casualty in a 
manic state. Not compliant on meds. MULTIPLE ADMISSIONS 
TO VALHALLA and STERKFONTEIN since 1966. No stressors. 
This emphasis on previous encounters with authority is reminiscent of Spencer's (1988) 
studies of probation officers' reports, in which previous criminal convictions (analogous to 
previous brushes with institutional psychiatry) are always carefully reported, although much 
else may be selectively left out. 
Another form in which a previous psychiatric history is invoked is by means of the 
sub-net at the bottom-left of Figure 8.1. The constructions in this sub-net allow for reference 
to the role of other psychiatric staff earlier in the patient's career. Thus a patient may have 
been referred by or brought in by Dr X (all surnames were replaced with X), or may 
previously have been seen by him or her (another similar construction - under Dr X- occurs 
with some frequency in the corpus, but not sufficiently so as to be included in the net): 
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[28] HAS BEEN SEEN BY DR X regularly at OPD, treated for 
depression. 
[242] Had phoned DR X twice and was REFERRED by him TO the 
HOSPITAL. 
[650] REFERRED BY DR X after OD of hypnotics. 
[1423] SEEN IN the past BY DR X AND DR X. 
Interestingly the brought in sequence, although connected to the Dr X construction, does not 
refer to psychiatric staff, but to a range of other groups and individuals: the police, family, 
brothers, sisters, parents, work colleagues. Medical personnel 'see' patients and then 'refer' 
them, lay people simply 'bring them in'. Patients are also frequently (to the bottom of the 
sub-net) transferred from other hospitals and wards or discharged from such places before 
being admitted to the psychiatric ward at Milfield. 
The only sub-net not yet discussed, at the top right ofFigure 8.1 represents another 
method of accounting for the patient's current situation by positioning it as just another 
incident in a long psychiatric career. In terms of this sub-net (which is linked by sharing the 
word disorder to the commonly used phrase personality disorder), patients are said to have 
been previously diagnosed as having one or the other condition, to be a chronic 
schizophrenic or a known patient, known schizophrenic or known sufferer from bipolar 
affective disorder. Significantly, terms usually associated with schizophrenia such as 
delusions, hallucinations and inappropriate behaviour, are not statistically linked to 
schizophrenic, suggesting that if a person is already well known as a schizophrenic, further 
evidence regarding schizophrenic symptoms are considered superfluous, as in the following 
vignette: 
[77] Patient REFERRED FROM X-Clinic, where he HAS BEEN for 
three and a half years - apparently a KNOWN SCHIZOPHRENIC. 
Sent to Milfield hospital for treatment and management of 
aggression which is not possible at X-Clinic. 
By contrast, details of symptomatology are required where it is impossible to state 
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categorically that the patient is already known to the medical authorities as a schizophrenic or 
some other category of mental illness: 
[476] Sudden onset, AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS, PARANOID 
DELUSIONS, DELUSIONS of control. Inappropriate, disinhibition, 
insomnia. According to husband she gets these episodes up to 
three times a year. Includes BIZARRE BEHAVIOUR and 
disorganised speech. 
Again, the language is reminiscent of the criminal justice system, where offenders' accounts 
and those of their families have to be treated with studied scepticism, while previous 
convictions instantly qualify a person as a "known house breaker", a "well known child 
molester" and so on. The contrast between the scepticism accorded lay accounts on the one 
hand and the certainty provided by previous diagnosis on the other is illustrated in the 
phrases culled from randomly-selected vignettes in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6 Lay accounts versus previous diagnoses in the initial history text 
Lay account Previous diagnosis 
Acr"rding to wife patient has had aggressive outbursts Well known bipolar disorder 
According to wife, alcoholic habits in past Known alcoholic 
According to parents patient has been totally irrational Well known bipolar patient 
Change in personality according to husband Well known schizophrenic 
The known patient sequence and related constructs also form an interesting contrast with the 
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epistemological tangle at the centre of the lexical net of the interview corpus (Chapter 7). 
The uncertainties and equivocations of that net are here replaced with the fixed confidence of 
something that is already known. 
Conclusion: The timeless trajectory 
As a distillation of the initial history corpus, the lexical net in Figure 8.1 can be read in many 
different ways- as a map of the pathways open to the (recidivist) psychiatric patient, as a 
table of accounting practices used by psychiatric registrars to confirm the patient status of 
those they have been asked to treat, and so on. However, whatever reading is imposed on the 
net it is hard to escape the impression that what is shown is a peculiar kind of self-referential 
epistemology: A patient is a patient because s/he is a patient (has been previously 
treated/diagnosed/admitted) or because members of her/his family have previously attained 
patient status. What is revealed is a Kafkaesque world, governed by an insane circularity 
forever predicated upon itself, where admission explains readmission, where categories of 
madness are always already known, and where well-rehearsed symptom-checklists are 
recited over and over again as they ceaselessly confirm the actuality of the objects that are 
the effects of this psychiatric surveillance technology. 
To present the case history as a kind of machine, much as one-on-one interviews were 
in the previous chapter said to be. machine-like, is not however to claim that they are 'great 
satanic mills' which close upon the primordial innocence of psychiatric patients. Instead 
psychiatry labours, perhaps often 'in good faith', and always under difficult circumstances, to 
achieve what would count as a proper understanding of its subject: 
The impossibility of getting precise information arises in most instances from the 
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insuperable difficulties under which we are of knowing a person's character and 
history fully, intimately and exactly. We cannot go through the complex and often 
tangled web of his whole life, following the manifold changes of it, and seizing the 
single threads out of which its texture has been woven, unravel the pattern of it 
(Maudsley, 1899, p. 139). 
Although Maudsley's terms are perhaps now somewhat archaic, it applies equally to the 
difficulties of'writing up' a case history today. 'Character' (or what we might term 
'individuality~ is somehow immanent (although difficult to uncover) in the tangled web of 
epistemological labour, so that the quest for objective apprehension conceals the play of 
productive discipline at work as it manipulates 'character' as its object and effect. 
288 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion: The prison house of language 
- One difficulty, said Stephen, in aesthetic discussion is to know whether words are 
being used according to the literary tradition or according to the tradition of the 
marketplaee. I remember a sentence ofNewman's in which he says of the Blessed 
Virgin that she was detained in the full company of the saints. The use of the word in 
the marketplace is quite different. I hope I am not detaining you. 
- Not in the least, said the dean politely. 
- No, no, said Stephen, smiling, I mean ... 
-Yes, yes: I see, said the dean quickly, I quite catch the point: detain. 
-James Joyce, A portrait of the artist as a young man 
Squire ( 1990) suggests that different forms of social psychology can be understood as 
operating in terms of three kinds of popular narrative: Detective story, autobiography, and 
science fiction. Traditional empirical social psychology, intent on discovering the hard facts 
about individual and society, is structured as a detecti-.re story; alternative social psychology, 
of the sort which wishes subjects to express their views in their own words and engages in 
informal and participant forms of data-gathering, models itself after autobiography; while 
discourse-oriented social psychology, which is interested in collective as much as individual 
patterns of meaning, classes itself as science fiction. 
Discourse psychology is science fiction not only because of its still marginal position 
in academia, but also because its professed interest in deconstructing and re-constructing the 
289 
technologies of its parent discipline - and in grafting foreign apparatuses (borrowed from 
philosophy, sociology, linguistics, literary studies) onto the existing machinery for social-
psychological knowledge production - often serves as a pretext for extra-scientific 
commentary on society and subjectivity. 
In this dissertation I have taken apart various knowledge machines wl>ich have been, 
or could be, deployed in relation to the question of mental illness - quantitative and 
individualising empirical enquiry (Chapter 2), Whig history (Chapters 3 and 4), biopsychiatry 
(Chapter 5), and discourse analysis itself (Chapter 6) - and have used the parts to fashion 
fanciful new technologies of my own. Concurrently, I have presented a commentary on the 
form of subjectivity implied by recidivism, arguing with Foucault that the sporadic physical 
incarceration and liberation of the 'mentally disturbed' person occurs in the context of 
discourses of modernity which normalise and accommodate aberrant behaviour. 
Like the rest of us, except perhaps more so, the recidivist is made the subject of an 
implacable scientific determinism while at the same time having agency thrust upon her. 
Thus her oscillation between freedom and incarceration is merely one instance of the 
fundamental duality which is constitutive of modernity. I have tried to demonstrate this 
duality historically, in the disciplinary texts of modem psychiatry, in the moment-by-moment 
vacillations of the confessiona, and in psychiatry's technologies for discursive surveillance. 
Thus I have followed Foucault (1967) in claiming that "language is the first and last structure 
of madness, its constituent form; on language are based all the cycles in which madness 
articulates its nature" (p. 8). 
As with science fiction, however, the danger with the kind of text I have put together 
to warrant this claim is that it will end up "too far from conventional representations of 
reality to be taken seriously as an alternative to them, but also close enough to these 
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representations in some ways, to be co-opted into them" (Squire, 1990, p. 44). In particular a 
text such as this dissertation may become co-opted by what Michael (1991) refers to as the 
modem axis of clarification-stabilisation-practicality. In other words it may start using words 
as currency in the academic marketplace to answer questions such as: How can we 
understand readmission and its relationship to mental illness? How can we use this 
knowledge as a basis for further research? How can we practically intervene to make things 
better? I have tried not to engage with such questions, instead addressing the prior question 
on the status of the knowledge-making procedures used to constitute the objects on which 
modernist discourses fasten. Although I have also tried throughout to speak of my own 
procedures, even while allowing them to operate, some further reflection is required. 
Methodological commentary 
The techniques I have used in this dissertation could all broadly be classed as forms of 
discourse analysis. In earlier chapters I constructed a reading of the history of psychiatry 
designed to show how the twin projects of scientific progress and humanist reform are 
accompanied, as modernist projects are, by an extension of disciplinary power into, and from, 
the furt .. est recesses of the social world. I tried to show how psychiatry, which speaks 
continually of objective knowledge and of liberation from the distorting effects of power, 
stands mocked by the figure of the recidivist patient, who can never finally be grasped by or 
uncoupled from the system of knowledge and power ofwhich it is an effect. 
In moving from historical material to contemporary texts, I have continued with the 
same kind of analysis, namely to bring into visibility the discursive structures presumed to 
underlie the surface appearances of psychiatric practices - in this case the personal interview 
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and the psychiatric case history. 
Inevitably, the structuralist approach yielded the sorts of objects it is intended to, 
namely repetitive patterns of psychiatric writing and speech. These include depictions of 
patients as liberated into a 'community' which increasingly resembles the institution (Chapter 
3); preemptive appeals to imminent scientific breakthroughs (Chapter 4); and ultimately 
circular references to previous encounters with institutional psychiatry to account for the 
current hospitalisation (Chapters 7 and 8). When such structures are made visible it is easy to 
start believing that they operate to reduce diversity and to limit the scope of what it is 
possible to say and do, while in fact they are productive of diversity and are precisely the 
kinds of mechanisms through which it becomes possible to say and do anything at all: 
In that the analysis itself operates in and through language (although it also draws on 
an artificial language of statistical conjunctions), it can only point to those features of 
language which are already in the process of being supplanted by more nuanced 
formulations, much as humanist critiques of psychiatry are forever doomed to fasten onto a 
few remnants of its scandalous past rather than the productive realities of its present. 
Thus a structuralist approach must, to recall Cox's (1989) words quoted earlier, result 
in 'salt-flats of abstraction' from which all the 'beautiful specifics of culture' have been 
stripped. So with reference to the psychiatric case histories, for example, we are left with no 
way of knowing that patient #378 has in the past three weeks shown a tendency to fall over 
his own feet, that patient #1018 believes that Satan has taken over her boyfriend's 
personality, or that patient # 1465 is a political detainee who suffers from echolalia and 
suicidal thoughts and has been tearing holes in his clothes. It may be that meaning is 
contained not in frequent words and stereotypical formulations, but in everything that is 
infrequent, atypical and silent. 
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I have tried to show how the structuralist scaffolding on which for example 
psychiatric case histories appear to be built also forms a surface of visibility against which 
such singularities stand out all the more clearly, but in giving an account of the material for 
even minimally 'scientific' purposes it is impracticable to show more than a handful of such 
instances. Ironically, the case histories themselves appear to be caught in exactly the same 
tension, attempting in one gesture to give an account of patient histories and to account for 
them - to tell extraordinary stories while simultaneously showing how they should be 
understood. 
The numerical techniques developed to assist with the task of structuralist analysis, 
while certainly not providing an escape from this impasse, do offer possibilities for further 
experimentation. I have, for example, in the analyses presented in this dissertation 
consistently used the strongest sets of connections among words. This amounts to following 
an aggressively structuralist strategy. It would be instructive for future projects of the same 
kind to work with the kinds of semantic units that are produced when less powerful (but still 
statistically significant) connections among lexical items are plotted. Another possibility 
would be to exclude sequences of immediately adjacent words from the lexical nets so that 
longer-range connections become more prominent. 
Lexical nets are the result of a statistical projection of word distances in ~one­
dimensional string to a presumed many-dimensional discursive space (as reflected in the 
collocation matrix) and back to a_two-dimensional printed page. For the first projection I 
used z-scores, while the second projection is done manually. In both cases, other approaches 
would be worth considering, for example using the mutual information statistic to form the 
collocation matrix and multi-dimensional scaling to collapse this multidimensional space 
back to two dimensions. 
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One of the justifications offered for the use of quantitative indices (Chapter 6) is that 
they offer a backdrop against which the relative importance of particular discursive features 
can be assessed, unlike many discourse analytic studies which fail to show how prominent 
identified features are. Although frequency counts, lexical nets and the like did prove useful 
for this purpose, it is important to maintain a critical distance from the idea of such 
contextualisation. The nets did show how certain linguistic features fit into patterns found in 
the text as a whole, but the choice of what is defined as a 'whole' text remains that of the 
analyst. Thus in future analyses it may be useful to see if it is possible to draw up a 
combined net for interview transcripts and case histories together, or perhaps to combine 
these with similar material from other hospitals, or with standard psychiatric texts. 
Conversely it may be worth segmenting the texts in terms, for example, of admitting 
physician, sex, or diagnostic category and constructing separate nets for each cell. 
Some would argue that such experimentation would be pointless, as lexical nets and 
similar devices are simply overly literal interpretations ofthe idea of repetitive patterns (of 
which discourse analysts speak so repetitively), displaying as they do connections between 
mere words, while it seems more probable that God would have stocked our linguistic 
aquaria with larger, more shadowy creatures (phrases, sentences, natural meaning units), and 
that it is in the elaborate mating rituals which occur beh een these higher-level elements that 
we may witness the spawning of human subjectivity. Lexical nets, one might argue, are too 
fine-grained and too flimsy to catch anything bigger than the amorphous plankton of the 
discursive ocean. 
However, while it seems evident that no mechanical device could be used to 
'understand' all the levels of meaning encoded in language, the analyses in Chapters 7 and 8 
suggest that there may be some utility in employing su~h a device to assist with the initial 
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scanning of texts. Although, in truth, there may be nothing special about the little snatches of 
repetitive talk and writing identified in Chapters 7 and 8, and any connection between such 
micro events and larger systems of meaning and power may be entirely coincidental, it is also 
true, as Zipf (1935) observed, that: 
In concluding this introduction to a field of possible scientific enquiry, we may well 
be reminded that the actual speech-gestures, together with their meanings and 
patterns, are but accidents when compared to the close-knit relationships of the stream 
of events in the total universe of behavior (biological, psychological, sociological) in 
which these accidents occur. Yet, in their recurrences, these accidental 
speech-gestures have found acceptable use by human groups as time-saving 
representants of the larger universe of experience. A record of the recurrence of these 
gestures constitutes in fact the chief and almost the only record of human experience 
available for empirical study (p. 309, original emphasis). 
Afterword 
While writing this dissertation I received a copy of a letter from a certified psychiatric patient 
at one of the facilities catering i-.~r such people in the Gauteng area. The letter was addressed 
to heads of government, legal authorities, international organisations, and similar possessors 
of sovereign power, asking them to intervene on the patient's behalf as he was being held 
against his will by callous and uncomprehending psychiatrists despite being of sound mind. 
As evidence of his sanity, the patient attached a photographic brochure of extremely finely 
wrought furniture which he had manufactured before being detained. After asking for advice 
from friends and colleagues I turned the letter over to a group of mental health workers 
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concerned with human rights issues in psychiatry. 
They addressed several letters to the superintendent of the hospital and to officials in 
the department of health, but by the time they received a reply the patient (who had been 
hospitalised on several previous occasions) had already been released. 
It is in any case doubtful if the postmodern alternative (Michael's, 1991, 
transgression-accelerated turnover-consumption of spectacle axis) doomed to some form of 
coherence, however much stammered and colourless green ideas sleep furiously, however 
much pastiche, flagrant plagiarism, as again in Finnegan's case, doubtful if any escape is 
possible, whether voluntary or o dedi a dada orzoura detention house-arrest in the prison ich 
bin confus (see). 
My wud! The warped floor of the lair and soundconducting walls thereof, to say 
nothing of the uprights and imposts, were persianly literatured with bursts loveletters, telltale 
stories, stickyback snaps, alphybettyformed verbiage, ahems and ahahs, imeffible tries at 
speech unsyllabled, you owe mes, eyoldhyms, fluefoul smut, fallen lucifers, counterfeit 
franks, best intentions, curried notes, upset latten tintacks, painful digests, once current puns, 
quo shed quotatoes, messes of mottage, unquestionable issue papers, seedy ejaculations, to 
which, if one has the stomach to add the breakages, upheavals, distortions, inversions of all 
this cho nbermaid music one stands, given a grain of goodwill, a fair chance of actually 
seeing the whirling dervish, Tumult, son of Thunder, self exiled in upon his ego, a nightlong 
a shaking betwixtween white or reddr hawrors, noondayterrorised to skin and bone by an 
ineluctable phantom (may the Shaper have mercy on him!) writing the mystery ofhimsel in 
furniture. 
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APPENDIX l 
Interview consent form 
I------------------------(full name) 
hereby agree to taking part in a research project about the language used to describe 
emotional and mental difficulties. I understand that the -project will involve being 
interviewed for short periods on two occasions during my stay in hospital. The interviews 
will be audiotaped and the tapes will be used only be the researcher. Nothing that I may 
divulge in the course of the interviews will be passed on to ~ybody in such a manner as to 
compromise my right to anonymity. The research will have no bearing whatsoever on my 
treatment. 
Signed:-----------------
Date: 
------
Witness: 
------------------
Date: 
------
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Appendix2 
Choice of parameters in drawing up a lexical net 
In this appendix a short extract from one of the interview transcripts from Chapter 7 is used 
to illustrate the consequences of using different numerical parameters when drawing up a 
lexical net and to explain how particular parameters were decided on for the main analysis. 
The extract is from the first interview with interviewee number 44, a 21 year-old woman in 
her second admission to the hospital. The extract is from a part of the interview dealing with 
reasons for admission and has been annotated using the COCOA format: 
<topic why> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
The first sort of standard question that I ask people is if you could tell me why 
you're here - you know the obvious thing. 
Uh as far as I understand it I suffer depression. I'm not sure whether it's 
endogenous or whether it's reactive. I think it's a bit ofboth ua], and I become 
extremely suicidal. I don't have a great love for life as it is Oa]. And that's 
basically why I'm here. And also to discover why you know I feel the way I 
do about my life and my circumstances. 
What uh sort of form might that discovery take, do you think? 
Uh ... I have a lot of trouble expressing myself, especially my emotions, and it 
causes a lot of anger within me, and causes me to isolate myself from other 
people. It affects my life outside. And what I'm hoping to achieve here 
through therapy is to learn to express these emotions so that uh I can function 
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<pM> 
<pP> 
normally, outside and not find myself hiding away [yes], and find myself 
acceptable to those outside. 
But so you feel it's probably a kind of psychological thing really then. 
I'm inclined to think it's more psychological, personally yes. 
<topic preadmit> 
<p M> Uh to change the topic slightly, I'd like to come back to this later, if you could 
just kind of tell me what happened in the two three weeks prior to coming in 
this time. 
<pP> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
<pM> 
I was actually at X hospital before I came here [is it?]. I was there for five and 
a halfweeks. What happened was .. .I started getting very suicidal and I 
decided to actually do something [yes]. And I happened to talk to a friend of 
mine who eventually had me certified and sent to X hospital. 
Certified? 
Ja [gmmm]. Where I, I was locked up there for four weeks, and then I went to 
an open ward for a week and a half, and then I managed, I requested transfer 
here, because I find this environment more therapeutic. 
Much better, I'm sure ... Uh how did you feel about this certify business, were 
you so1 of[interruption at door]? 
It was a shock, it really was a shock [is it]. I had been threatened with it 
before, uh, but I had never sort of really thought I'd actually end up there, and 
it was, it was very difficult. I was very angry in the beginning [mmm]. But 
uh, that subsided. I don't hold it against my friend for certifying me. I would 
have, I would have done the same for her. She was worried. 
And it was the only way to kind of force you to come. 
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<pP> Ja[gmmm]. 
<topic helpprof.> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
OK ja, then I'd like to sort of hear the opinions of, or the opinion of some 
professional person that's, you feel has been helpful to you in the past. Uh or 
that you have felt close to, such as a psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, 
whatever. Uh if you could say who the person is, maybe not by name, and uh 
how he or she defines your problem . 
... One professional person? 
Preferably, but if you like, you could-
I've been seeing one of the psychologists here, a female psychologist, 
and ... she's seen me in my, my good states, my bad states Oa] and it, it makes it 
easier to discuss things with her because she knows ME, for what I am, 
without a mask I'm inclined to put on. And it's helpful that she's there to 
listen. She understands, she doesn't judge you. She's objective, she's not 
subjective. And ... you know they're able to read, sometimes read between the 
lines so to say Oa]. So that you find yourself, something you can't express 
[yes], with their prompting and their aid, it makes it easier to express things, 
and it increases an awareness within one. Sometimes one gets a bit tired of 
talking and talking and talking, but you know one gets to realise that it's got to 
come from you [yes]. Although you sometimes feel frustrated, because you'd 
like them to give the answer, you know right there, and say look this is what 
you must do [yes]. You do realise that they're there to help you, and it's got to 
come from you, yourself Oa]. And it, it's sometimes difficult to talk about 
things, but it helps knowing that they're not going to judge you, they're not 
339 
<pM> 
<pP> 
going to hold it against you, it's not going to go further than the professional 
team working here. And that in itself makes you feel a bit more comfortable, 
because sometimes things get a bit personal. 
Yes but it's kind of, they're not part of your friends circle or something. 
Ja, it's not as though you need worry about people finding out what you said, 
or how you feel about things Oa, ja]. And that, that in itself makes things a lot 
easter. 
<topic helplay> 
<p M> What about a non-professional, uh like family or an acquaintance or 
something. Ifyou could sort of pick on some person whose been helpful to 
you there . 
<pP> 
<pM> 
<pP> 
.... [sighs] I have a friend, who is also an X with me, and 
Are you an X? 
Ja. And she has been through much the same experience herself- she's 
actually the one that certified me - and I find that we're able to talk to one 
another quite freely, knowing that that person's not going to spread it, you 
know, around the whole group or whatever Oa]. And having been there 
herself, she's very understanding. And it's not of a case where she's trying to 
give advice. She might discuss her experience and one can learn from that. 
And it's, you know, it's helpful that you know the person and you feel 
comfortable with them. And they, OK it's subjective, but they know where 
you're coming from, they know what type of person you are, what lifestyle 
you lead, you know things like that, they know your background a bit better 
Oa, OK]. 
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A conventional qualitative analysis of this extract could focus on a variety of different 
themes, such as: The nature of the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee 
(which appears to be structured to allow for maximal talking by the latter, while the former 
presents himself as an empathetic listener despite the sometimes brutal topic changes); the 
interviewee's easy familiarity with (sometimes outdated) clinical jargon such as 'expressed 
emotion' and 'endogenous' versus 'reactive' depression; the ostensible high regard shown by 
the interviewee for others' opinions about her situation; or the interviewee's acquiescence 
with and resistance to various forms and degrees of incarceration. 
An analysis making use of a lexical net, by contrast, would start by identifying 
repetitive linguistic patterns (such as for example, the repetitive use of the "and ... and ... and'' 
structure in the last paragraph of the interview transcript) as a starting point for further 
qualitative analysis and interpretation. Lexical nets provide an automated, objective means of 
identifying patterns that depend on the repeated co-occun-ence of words. The following 
parameters affect what is counted as a significant co-occurrence: 
Span: The number of words on either side of a target word which are counted as co-
occurring with the target word. 
Minimum collocation size: 
The minimum strength of collocation (as calculated using the z-score) which 
is accepted as significant. Although all collocations with a z-score of above 
2.57 are statistically significant at the 5% level, in a large text inordinately 
many collocations reach significance and different (usually more stringent) 
cut-offs have to be set. 
Minimum collocation frequency: 
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In cases where words occur together consistently the statistical procedure will 
flag them as collocates even if they are used quite infrequently in a text. To 
prevent such rare words from becoming too prominent in a lexical net it is 
therefore necessary to exclude words that co-occur less frequently than a 
certain cut-off 
These three parameters are interdependent, such that a larger span will result in more 
statistically significant collocates and a consequent need to set more stringent cut-offs with 
regard to minimum collocation size and frequency. In addition, the number of statistically 
significant collocates also depend on the size of the text, with more significant co-
occurrences identified as the length of the text increases. At present there is no objective 
method of deciding on the minimum collocation size and frequency, and a pragmatic 
approach aimed at keeping the lexical net within reasonable levels of complexity has to be 
followed. 
The situation with regard to the first parameter, the collocation span, is somewhat 
different. In theory, a small span will result in the identification of lexical redundancies at the 
level of frequently used word-pairs and phrases, while a large span will result in the 
identification of co-occurrences which occur when words are frequently used in the same 
general context, but not necessarily next to eacl. other or as part of the same stock phrase. As 
a general rule, a small span can therefore be expected to throw syntactic relationships 
between words into relief, while a larger span will tend towards the identification of semantic 
contingencies. 
To illustrate this, three different lexical nets derived from the extract are presented 
below. The net in Figure 1 is based on a a span of four words (two on either side of the target 
word), which (as discussed above) can be expected to highlight stylistic redundancies such as 
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word pairs or short phrases. Figure 2, by contrast, uses a span of 40 words, which can be 
expected to show patterns of co-occurrence of words not necessarily in close proximity. 
Figure 1. Net for a span of 4, minimum frequency of 5 and minimum size of 1.64 
to 
~it 
al::es 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the shorter span does indeed reveal word pairs and 
phrases such as 'you know' (which occurs no fewer than 8 times) and a pairing between 'I' and 
'have' which occurs 6 times in short phrases such as 'I have', 'I don't have' and 'I would have'. 
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An extreme view would be that using a very short span simply leads to the rediscovery of 
grammatical rules at the syntactic level. (For example, 'I' and 'has', being a grammatical miss-
match, are unlikely to be significant collocates for any text when the span is set to two.) 
Nevertheless, the collocational patterns found when a small span is used will not be the same 
for all texts and do reveal something of the stylistic 'signature' of a particular text. The 'you 
know' locution shown in Figure 1, for example, rarely occurs in written texts. 
Figure 2. Net for a span of 40, minimum frequency of 8 and minimum size of 5.07 
At the other extreme from the lexical net based on a very short span shown in Figure 
1, is the net in Figure 2, which is based on a span of 20 words on either side of the target 
word. Thus, for Figure 2, words are taken to be in the same general area ofthe text if they 
occur within 40 words of each other. The first consequence of this, as is evident from Figure 
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2, is that many more word pairs are considered to be statistically related, despite the fact that 
far more stringent cut-offs have been set, with a minimum collocation size of 5 and a 
minimum collocation frequency of8. As can be seen, some ofthe stronger short-range (or 
syntactic) collocations such as 'I-was' and 'you-know' have been preserved in this net, to 
which have been added a profusion of longer-range collocations with a somewhat more 
semantic flavour. For example, we can see that the word 'suicidal' tends to occur with 
statistically significant regularity in the vicinity of'I', even though the two words do not form 
part of a stock phrase. 
Another effect of using a very large span is that high frequency words (such as in this 
case 'you', 'I' and 'to') are shown as high-frequency collocates of a large number of words that 
rarely co-occur with one another. Thus a word such as 'you' will tend to occupy a central 
position in a net, with a large number of collocations radiating out from it. Taken to 
extremes, very large word spans could thus result in lexical nets that do little more than 
reproduce the word frequency table for a text. 
Figure 3, with a span of8 and frequency cut-offs somewhere between those for 
Figures 1 and 2, represents a middle position. Strong short-range collocations such as 'I-was' 
and 'you-know' present in both the other figures are reflected here as well, as are some 
present in one of the figures only. The phenomenon of high-frequency words such as 'you' 
and 'and' occurring at the centre of a collocational web can also be observed, but is much less 
marked than in Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. Net for a span of7, minimum frequency of6 and minimum size of2.57 
of 
ave 
None of the three lexical nets is a more accurate reflection of the text than the others, 
but each presents a somewhat different view of the text. Which view is m, re useful depends 
on the analytic purposes for which the net is being used. If the purpose is to know which 
words co-occur in the same broad areas of text, a large span is indicated. An example of this 
may be where the text has been segmented into a number of'cases' and the analyst wishes to 
know which words tend to cluster together in the same case. A large span will ensure that all 
words in a case are counted as collocates, while words in different cases will not be counted 
as collocates (since case boundaries are not crossed). Different sections of the net will 
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therefore tend to represent different types of cases, each with its characteristic pattern of 
collocation. Although some of the collocations may be short-range locutions such as 
repetitively used word pairs, many will be long-range and possibly have a more semantic 
flavour. 
If, on the other hand the purpose is to identify typical turns of phrase in a text, a 
shorter word span is indicated. If the purpose is to identify a mix of stock phrases and longer 
range 'semantic' contingencies, a word span of intermediate-length is indicated. From the 
three lexical nets presented here it is in any case clear that the nets are reasonably robust and 
that at least some of the more prominent features of the lexical interdependencies in a text are 
identified despite wide variations in the parameters used. 
For the purposes of the analysis presented in Chapters 8 and 9 it was decided to use a 
word span of intermediate length. The data used for Chapter 8 consisted of a relatively small 
number of cases each containing a large number of words, thus precluding a case-wise 
analysis since even a very long word span would not have covered each case. Chapter 9, by 
contrast, made use of a large number of relatively short cases and using a longer word span to 
cover each case would have been feasible. However, the purpose was not to find clusters of 
similar cases (correlated, perhaps, with psychiatric diagnosis or with the registrars making 
the diagnosis), but to highlight typical forms oft, pression occurring in the text taken as a 
whole. A very short word span was also considered inadvisable as many of the relations 
among words identified in this manner would be likely to be of a trivial semantic nature. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, whatever the parameters used, lexical nets are 
not intended as an end in themselves, but as a starting point for further qualitative analysis. 
As a concise overview of a text, a lexical net can serve as a contextual backdrop for whatever 
analysis is perforn1ed with the text. 
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Appendix3 
Significant collocates in first interview transcripts 
Type (a) N(a) Type (b) N(b) C z 
you 512 know 458 339 62.13 
time 109 long 30 23 37.94 
two 58 weeks 33 15 34.75 
years 42 ago 20 10 34.75 
know 458 don't 260 132 33.16 
we 70 were 31 17 33.05 
i've 214 got 141 64 32.64 
of 522 sort 55 62 32.22 
i've 214 been 158 67 32.01 
at 202 moment 26 23 31.27 
2227 don't 60 312 31.05 
a 643 lot 69 71 29.89 
tn 380 terms 20 27 28.01 
2227 was 514 442 27.52 
a 643 bit 41 49 26.84 
my 503 mother 27 35 26.71 
as 107 far 26 15 26.14 
i'm 300 not 206 75 26.06 
i'm 300 scared 16 20 26.04 
to 988 want 60 67 23.61 
don't 260 understand 33 23 22.59 
my 503 brother 12 19 22.46 
and 1257 then 153 127 22.26 
of 522 kind 33 33 22.17 
of 522 lot 69 48 22.10 
i 2227 think 166 181 21.95 
it 519 was 514 149 21.75 
that's 108 why 44 16 21.36 
a 643 of 522 167 20.95 
to 988 me 439 188 20.28 
me 439 she 244 82 20.16 
i've 214 always 51 24 20.14 
i'm 300 gonna 30 21 19.56 
to 98~ go 119 84 19.55 
i 22:. know 458 314 19.10 
people 93 other 61 16 18.86 
my 503 life 44 31 18.45 
me 439 they 273 81 18.43 
what 175 do 136 32 113.28 
for 217 long 30 16 18.10 
my 503 sister 16 18 18.04 
of 522 type 17 19 17.90 
the 774 of 522 165 17.71 
to 988 used 40 42 17.61 
the 774 time 109 62 17.26 
of 522 terms 20 20 17.23 
i'm 300 here 134 39 17.00 
i 2227 to 988 514 16.91 
of 522 course 21 20 16.76 
i 2227 dunno 37 60 16.70 
the 774 in 380 129 16.61 
no 155 no 155 29 16.59 
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2227 feel 75 89 16.41 
my 503 husband 13 15 16.40 
a 643 long 30 26 16.32 
the 774 at 202 85 16.26 
at 202 look 34 15 16.21 
to 988 able 22 28 16.17 
i 2227 had 169 148 15.99 
the 774 moment 26 24 15.56 
the 774 last 54 38 15.55 
for 217 years 42 16 15.43 
2227 when 100 103 15.40 
on 161 going 80 20 15.37 
my 503 own 21 18 15.36 
i 2227 didn't 93 98 15.33 
they 273 don't 260 51 15.23 
my 503 father 21 18 15.20 
i 2227 that 623 343 15.10 
to 988 get 127 71 15.08 
he 165 said 86 21 15.04 
i've 214 never 56 19 15.02 
to 988 talk 35 33 14.83 
as 107 as 107 18 14.71 
to 988 be 127 69 14.60 
i 2227 mean 61 72 14.57 
to 988 do 136 70 14.46 
me 439 told 33 20 14.30 
well 154 as 107 21 14.04 
don't 260 want 60 20 13.94 
to 988 come 68 45 13.86 
they 273 understand 33 15 13.81 
you 512 like 242 65 13.71 
2227 can't 70 74 13.67 
was 514 very 182 55 13.66 
ifs 273 not 206 40 13.60 
i 2227 and 1257 564 13.55 
that 623 IS 214 67 13.54 
2227 because 286 189 13.52 
was 514 there ll6 42 13.46 
but 274 not 206 40 13.45 
he 165 he 165 27 13.34 
what 175 say 88 19 13.27 
of 522 out llO 40 13.26 
the 774 thing 100 47 13.21 
i 2227 just 307 194 13.15 
to 988 trying 17 20 13.09 
you 512 ifs 273 67 13.03 
and 1257 my 503 182 12.97 
i 2227 suppose 25 39 12.92 
i 2227 have 163 124 12.91 
you 512 are 50 25 12.91 
me 439 help 59 24 12.79 
2227 if 112 97 12.78 
2227 want 60 64 12.77 
my 503 psychiatrist 31 18 12.75 
to 988 have 163 72 12.62 
know 458 like 242 56 12.52 
a 643 for 217 65 12.51 
i 2227 felt 29 41 12.35 
very 182 depressed 64 15 12.34 
they 273 say 88 23 12.34 
i'm 300 going 80 23 12.29 
know 458 what 175 45 12.28 
my 503 family 26 16 12.28 
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i'm 300 feeling 37 15 12.27 
i 2227 here 134 99 12.27 
have 163 been 158 24 12.27 
she 244 she 244 39 12.22 
at 202 all 139 24 12.05 
the 774 first 27 21 11.98 
2227 what 175 122 11.93 
me 439 he 165 42 11.82 
to 988 going 80 44 11.81 
to 988 myself 90 46 11.81 
to 988 wanted 21 20 11.80 
the 774 same 19 17 11.76 
and 1257 was 514 175 11.73 
it 519 but 274 63 11.70 
me 439 tell 31 16 11.70 
and 1257 to 988 280 11.68 
and 1257 me 439 153 11.58 
was 514 when 100 34 11.53 
that 623 was 514 105 11.53 
not 206 really 115 21 11.47 
have 163 would 75 15 11.44 
to 988 tried 25 22 11.43 
they 273 are 50 16 11.42 
the 774 day 54 29 11.40 
the 774 way 47 27 11.39 
it 519 wasn't 45 21 11.36 
she 244 said 86 20 11.26 
all 139 time 109 16 11.25 
that 623 thing 100 36 11.23 
i 2227 can 106 84 11.15 
and 1257 try 19 21 11.09 
you 512 do 136 38 11.04 
and 1257 on 161 76 11.04 
Note. N(a) and N(b) are the frequencies of the corresponding types. C is the 
collocational frequency of the two types. z is the z-score. A span of 8 words ( 4 
at either side of the target word) and a minimum collocational frequency of 15 
was used. The first 218 significant word pairs (to a minimum z-score of 11) are 
shown. 
Significant collocates in first reason for admission corpus 
Type (a) 
for 
you 
the 
N(a) 
14 
9 
32 
Type (b) 
search 
know 
search 
N(b) 
3 
9 
3 
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c 
5 
6 
7 
z 
13.74 
12.63 
12.50 
i'm 23 here 14 11 10.00 
113 don't 9 17 8.32 
a 27 of 16 10 7.51 
the 32 you 9 7 6.92 
to 38 be 7 7 6.80 
i 113 feel 5 10 6.67 
that 22 be 7 5 6.61 
to 38 go 4 5 6.60 
113 suppose 4 9 6.48 
i'm 23 because 10 6 6.25 
i 113 was 25 26 5.99 
the 32 for 14 8 5.97 
i 113 but 9 13 5.59 
was 25 there 8 5 5.56 
and 47 my 13 9 5.54 
the 32. ifs 12 7 5.53 
and 47 was 25 13 4.98 
i 113 rationalise 3 6 4.87 
i 113 could 3 6 4.87 
the 32 know 9 5 4.85 
to 38 get 7 5 4.85 
i 113 think 6 9 4.79 
that 22 is 12 5 4.74 
113 because 10 12 4.56 
113 very 6 8 4.34 
113 have 4 6 4.26 
i 113 as 10 11 4.07 
to 38 is 12 6 3.92 
to 38 i'm 23 9 3.88 
113 when 3 5 3.88 
113 tried 3 5 3.88 
a 27 for 14 5 3.68 
and 47 no 8 5 3.68 
i 113 here 14 13 3.66 
uh 34 depression 12 5 3.58 
i 113 to 38 26 3.56 
and 47 there 8 5 3.54 
i 113 so 6 7 3.46 
i 113 uh 34 23 3.30 
uh 34 a 27 8· 3.10 
113 didn't 4 5 3.05 
113 well 9 8 2.98 
113 had 7 7 2.91 
113 i'm 23 16 2.85 
113 about 6 6 2.76 
Note. N(a) and N(b) are the frequencies of the corresponding types. Cis the collocational 
frequency of the two types. z is the z-score. A span of 8 words ( 4 at either side of the 
target word) and a minimum collocational frequency of 5 was used. All significant word 
pairs to a minimum z-score of2.76 are shown. 
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Significant collocates in second reason for admission corpus 
Type (a) N(a) Type (b) N(b) c z 
here 23 why 4 6 14.10 
know 18 you 10 9 13.52 
been 8 i've 8 5 12.74 
time 17 this 9 7 12.58 
got 11 depressed 6 5 12.54 
know 18 don't 8 7 11.74 
uh 38. anxiety 4 7 11.62 
a 37 lot 8 9 10.27 
me 23 they 14 9 10.17 
very 13 had 8 5 9.92 
here 23 i'm 16 9 9.83 
to 48 cope 5 7 9.55 
of 37 sort 6 7 9.50 
148 was 52 54 9.17 
i 148 dunno 5 12 8.84 
a 37 of 37 18 8.66 
was 52 working 7 8 7.99 
and 81 myself 4 6 6.86 
was 52 too 4 5 6.67 
of 37 lot 8 6 6.58 
and 81 to 48 27 6.46 
i 148 that 26 25 6.04 
here 23 because 17 6 6.00 
it 38 very 13 7 5.86 
148 don't 8 12 5.86 
i 148 because 17 19 5.83 
the 40 at 7 5 5.79 
to 48 with 17 9 5.53 
uh 38 depression 11 6 5.52 
here 23 they 14 5 5.50 
i 148 what 9 12 5.46 
i 148 wasn't 12 14 5.45 
a 37 had 8 5 5.34 
to 48 get 7 5 5.32 
was 52 it 38 15 5.30 
and 81 sent 4 5 5.29 
and 81 me 23 14 5.18 
148 working 7 10 5.14 
i 148 really 4 7 5.03 
and 81 then 11 9 5.00 
i 148 got 11 13 5.00 
to 48 go 7 5 4.98 
i 148 and 81 51 4.87 
and 81 was 52 24 4.86 
uh 38 but 10 5 4.72 
the 40 that 26 9 4.65 
uh 38 of 37 11 4.61 
was 52 very 13 7 4.54 
148 medication 6 8 4.35 
148 depressed 6 8 4.35 
a 37 for 15 6 4.33 
i 148 on 10 10 4.31 
of 37 my 20 7 4.24 
148 can't 4 6 4.14 
352 
and 81 the 40 18 4.14 
and 81 for 15 9 3.90 
a 37 very 13 5 3.84 
to 48 me 23 8 3.83 
i 148 last 5 6 3.70 
to 48 10 11 5 3.68 
and 81 a 37 16 3.67 
i 148 just 19 15 3.63 
and 81 with 17 9 3.50 
Note. N(a) and N(b) are the frequencies of the corresponding types. Cis the collocational 
frequency' of the two types. z is the z-score. A span of8 words (4 at either side of the 
target word) and a minimum collocational frequency of 5 was used. All significant word 
pairs to a minimum z-score of 3. 5 are shown. 
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[13/12/89b- first interview] 
<case 23> 
<diagn adjustment> 
<admit 01> 
<intno 01> 
<sexm> 
<age 20> 
<topic why> 
Appendix 4 
Sample interview 
<p M> OK, the obvious question that I always start off with is if you can just tell me why 
you're here. 
<p P> Uh ... because I committed [suici], I tried to commit suicide two times in two weeks, 
from the first one I did. Like the first time I did it, they let me out because I had to go and get 
my stomach pumped. 
<p M> Out from here? 
<pP>Uh ....... . 
<p M> Gen, JG_Strijdom? 
<topic preadmit> 
<p P> Uh, no ......... The South, I had my stomach pumped out at the South_Rand hospital. 
Uh, they put me on a drip. Then Thursday they let me home. Then two weeks later I did it 
again, but this time I did it even more amount...ofpills ua]. It was 31, no the second time I 
did it was 31 lithium carbonate, and there was 11 calmettes and 5 sleeping pills. And the first 
time I had my stomach pumped out it wasn't, wasn't so bad because I was mostly 
unconscious, but the second time it was very painful because I was mostly awake [shit]. I 
kept on trying to puke, and uh ... nothing came out. And afterwards I just sat up and I, it 
just all came out [gmm]. 
<p M> It doesn't sound pleasant in the least. 
<p P> No, it doesn't [laughs]. It's not very nice. 
<p M> ... Could you maybe fill me in on the sort of details a bit more, you know, apart from 
the suicides? What, what brought it on and so on, over the past two, three weeks. 
<p P> Uh, OK I was at College in X, because I was studying a X course, because my work 
sent me there. OK, and I was under a lot of pressure from that. I think that was one of, one 
of the reasons why I did it. And then I went back to, work, and then a guy that I was working 
with, they fired him, because he asked for a raise. He was a Black. And they put me with 
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this Portuguese guy who uh didn't suit me so good. I didn't really like him. And ... they still 
put me with him after the first time I did it [back again!]. And that even made me worse. 
And I even said to myself, here we go again. I couldn't handle it. Two days, and the third 
day again I cracked, I couldn't handle it. I went home, and took a overdose of pills, tried to 
kill myself. 
<topic other> 
<p M> ... Who have you been seeing, if anybody, like a psychiatrist or psychologist? 
<p P> Uh, it's a Dr C, it's a female doctor...She's not, I don't think she's here, but she's got 
something to do with Valhalla. 
<p M> Some connection with Valhalla. 
<p P> Ja, she, she pulled some strings. Her and this other doctor, my house doctor Dr V. 
<p M> I see. Uh, how long have you been seeing her? 
<p P> Well I only went there the first time I did it, I went there on a Thursday after I left the 
hospital, I went to see her. And they drew some blood from me, to see how my blood is, 
and ... they said I've probably got hepatitis, so [inaudible] a week. So she said to me I must 
come back on Thursday to check if I've properly got it. I went back. Uh .. .l, I had the 
symptoms of it, but I didn't have it [I see]. Because my eyes were all yellow, swollen up a 
bit, and all that. So I went there on a Thursday. So I've only seen her twice ... And it wasn't 
really, how would you say ... they didn't really get it all out at that time [ja], the first time, and 
the second time I went to her. 
<topic profess> 
<p M> What does she think of your difficulties, how does she sort of make sense of it? 
<p P> Uh, I wouldn't really know, because I didn't. Like I gave to her the main pointers, like 
I was under a lot of pressure from, from college, I was coming back and worried about my 
marks. And uh worried about work, especially this guy. [inaudible] Black was fine 
[inaudible] otherwise. And uh, and I was under a lot of pressure because I had just bought a 
new car ... and the payments, when I was at X the payments got a bit, like I was supposed to be 
saving, but I wasn't, because it was so boring, eventually you'd just spend your money. When 
I came back I was under a lot of pressure. Like I was about a week away from my ... my date 
of having to pay and I only had [inaudible] rand in the bank. And it was over R260 I had to 
pay back for the car, you know? That was also bugging me. And ... [inaudible] also because 
my mother and father are divorced .. .for the second, for the second time. Like the first time 
you think ah this is the pits man I haven't got a father man, I don't see him so often. You can't 
do the things you would like to do, you know [ja]. And uh ... then they got married again, and 
I thought great I've got him back [ja]. And you just starting to get, like I used to do cycling 
with him [mmm], I got into that, you know and broke up again, and got divorced [mmm]. 
And uh .. .it started all over again. I think that's also one of the reasons [ja]. That's it, that I 
can think of. 
<topic treat> 
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<p M> What do you hope, if anything, to get from being here? How do you think will it help 
you to be here? 
<p P> Well, put it this way, I didn't want to come here. For one I heard from a patient at 
JG_Strijdom who said this place was all barbed wires and guard dogs around it, and all that. 
Which I saw for myself is not, it's ... But I'd still rather be at home because I could, because I 
have to just finish something on my car which hasn't been finished. I must finish that. I 
would just like to get out, just get freedom you know [ja]. Like I'm not allow to, got to swim 
under supervision. Like if I swim I just swim you know, I'm a good swimmer. Uh .. .I'd like 
to go out, go to disco, movies ... socialise with my friends quite a lot. Like all of them are in 
the motor trade [mmm]. One is a panel beater, one does, you know, piston what do you call 
it.. .he like grinds the pistons, different valves and that... 
<p M> So over here you're kind of right out of that- away from everybody. 
<p P> Ja. I'd still prefer to be home. Be able to do what I want. 
<p M> If, if they do help you, how do you think will it happen? 
<p P> How do I think it would happen? I think the only way it would happen is ifl 
co-operate, and that's the only way I'm gonna get discharged from here quickly [ja]. So I'd 
rather co-operate. 
<topic treatprof> 
<p M> [laughs] Ja. What does uh the psychiatrist that you spoke to, what has she got in mind 
for you being here? 
<p P> I dunno .. .I dunno. For one she must think I'm mad because I committed suicide, tried 
to commit suicide. I must seem a bit of a loony ... And, I dunno .. .I dunno what she was 
thinking. I don't even know if she, I don't even think she knows I'm here. So ... 
<topic lay> 
<p M> What about your folks. How do they make sense of what's happened to you? 
<p P> ... Uh, how do you mean? 
<p M> How would they explain it? 
<pP> To me? 
<p M> Or to somebody else maybe. 
<p P> Well ... Well the first time my mother, my father, and my mother's couple offriends 
knew about it. .. Well most of my mother's friends knew about it, and my father's. But uh the 
second time I don't even think they wanted to tell their friends about it [inaudible]. And .. .I 
think that's more-or-less it... 
<p M> Are they in favour of your being here? 
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<p P> They're in favour but I'm not. 
<topic other> 
<p M> Ja. Uh, would you say that you have, or experienced depression. 
<p P> Yes, definitely. Uh ... because of work, changes, like ... going back, like at College we 
started at seven and finish off at two, and you relax the rest of the day, or study ... And then 
coming back to work is. You know like in a way going to College was like a holiday for me. 
And weekends we had free, didn't have to do, most of the week after College was free, except 
if we were studying. And then to go back to work, in a way made me so ... angry, being back. 
Like when I was at, when I was at College like sometimes I wished I was back at work. 
When I'm at, when I'm at College I wish I was at, you know at work. And at College, and 
vice versa, or versa visa. 
<topic define> 
<p M> [laughs] Whichever. The story of one's life ua]. Uh could you perhaps describe to 
me what depression is like, maybe pretending that I, I really have no idea. 
<p P> ... Mmm ... OK, uh, it's when, it's when, when all your ... all your thoughts about what 
happened in the past, and maybe about what's gonna happen in the future, like come together, 
and they start working, like uh, making like, how would you say, like energy ua]. And then, 
then you can't get rid of this energy and then working, and you, people moaning at you, that's 
going in also ua] 
[interruption for tea] 
<p M> Uh, I don't know if you could sort of pick up the thread. You were sort of describing 
depression to me. 
<p P> OK, it's when all like the energy builds up inside, inside your mind ... And then you 
start to ... you start to uh ... You start to wonder what to do with yourself, because you've got so 
much in your mind ... And you just eventually do something drastic, or, or you just walk out 
on the job, or you try to commit suicide like I did [mmm]. And it's ... especially if you don't 
have anybody to talk to, it even gets worse Oa], it st~ys in ua], you know. Then you can't get 
it out, let your feelings ... go out ua]. That's what I tl! '1k depression is [laughs]. 
<p M> Uh, very often people mention depression as at least one of the things that bother 
them and uhjust about everybody has got their, their own version of depression, you know. 
Uh, I'm sure there are some official versions, but I'm not very clued up on that [inaudible] 
what people say themselves [inaudible] unofficial versions as well. 
<p P> Ja. 
<p M> Uh when do you get depressed, when does this build-up start? 
<p P> Uh ... say when you've had a hard day at work, or you ...... or something tragic has 
happened in you family, like say someone died, or even an animal that you, that you loved, 
you know? ... 
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<topic measles> 
<p M> Uh ... OK, maybe I could ask you the sort of two gimmicky questions I have. The one 
is if you could tell me what's in your view, in what ways is depression the same as an illness 
like measles, and in what ways is it different? 
<p P> Uh ... Different to measles. OK, well measles is ... uh, kind of, well it's a disease that 
most children get...And it's, you've just got to like lay [sic] down and relax, and depression 
is different because you've got all this energy building up, and you want to get it out, and you 
want to talk to somebody ... Like when you've got measles, like everybody knows you're sick 
Oa], you've got measles and they come and visit you and, you know, but depression nobody 
knows you've got it Oa]. Nobody knows you're say depressed. That's what I think the 
difference is. 
<topic weight> 
<p M> OK, the second gimmicky thing is basically the same question, but to do with a 
chronic weight problem. 
<p P> [laughs] Uh ... well, for me that wouldn't be a problem, because I'm not fat, 
so ...... OK. .. depression, the difference between fat? 
<p M> Ja, and the ways in which it might be the same. 
<p P> OK well, OK, OK say, say I'm fat, right? And I'm trying to lose all this weight, but I 
know it's going to be hard, so it's starting to worry me. So, and then uh .. .in trying to lose it, 
I see shucks I haven't lost a kilo yet. And you keep on trying, and you still aren't losing, it's 
making you even angrier, and it's still building up inside of you, and, and you just want to, 
like, scream!, because you're trying to lose all this weight... and you're so, and you're starting 
to get depressed. So I'd say it's more or less, the same Oa]. Because you're trying to lose 
weight and the harder you're losing weight, you worried about losing weight also. And when 
you start to worry, you start to get depressed. 
<topic purpose> 
<p M> Uh, is there any point in being depressed? Can anything good come from it? 
<p P> Uh ...... I'd say yes, it c; n be good points, and there could be bad points. Because a 
good point is you can talk to somebody and get that information out. And you feel 
[ shwwwwww ], that's a relief to get that out ua, I see]. Then, a bad point of it is, if you don't, 
if you don't get it out, you don't talk to somebody, then you get more depressed, and more 
information goes into your brain. And if someone moans at you, you feel stuff them. Maybe 
they're right moaning at you. You know it, but you don't ... want to take it, take that person's 
advice [mmm]. 
<p M> So you're sort of saying that the goodness of depression might be that it forces you to 
bring things out which you otherwise wouldn't have? 
<p P> Ja, ifyou didn't have it. 
<topic other> 
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<p M> OK, well uh the last thing is, ifl see you again in two weeks 
<p P> Ifl stay here 
<topic prognosis> 
<p M> Ja [laughs]. Uh, how do you predict will things have changed for you by then? 
<p P> Well, as I'm not here out of my own will, uh I've got to try my best, I can only gain 
something, I can't lose anything Oa]. So I can only gain something, and go out, and give the 
world another bash, you know ua]. See how it goes. Maybe, maybe this place would have 
helped me, and maybe I don't tell them anything. 
<p M> How do you mean by that? 
<p P> Maybe I don't want to tell them. Maybe, maybe it's too ... personal for me to tell. 
<p M> Right. I don't know to what extent they'll try and dig it out of you. 
<p P> Maybe they haven't got a spade! [laughs] 
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Appendix 5 
Significant collocates in the initial history corpus 
Type (a) N(a) Type (b) N(b) c z 
hallucinations 187 auditory 126 123 110.16 
features 220 vegetative 136 134 105.69 
year 521 old 398 350 98.57 
X 141 dr 124 90 91.54 
suicidal 317 ideation 177 145 85.64 
hallucinations 187 visual 54 55 75.31 
loss 92 weight 44 35 74.39 
abuse 305 substance 111 99 74.22 
disorder 219 affective 80 70 71.79 
admission 345 prior 147 117 70.49 
bipolar 173 affective 80 59 66.55 
insomnia 94 initial 28 25 65.37 
abuse 305 alcohol 279 135 63.20 
disorder 219 bipolar 173 92 62.90 
of 2015 history 866 699 62.22 
auditory 126 visual 54 36 58.93 
suicide 237 attempts 95 62 56.27 
has 499 been 285 164 54.92 
problems 223 fmancial 62 46 54.82 
known 304 bipolar 173 94 52.59 
poor 265 concentration 61 49 52.41 
suicide 237 attempt 86 55 51.96 
as 235 diagnosed 109 61 50.15 
paranoid 225 delusions 177 74 50.11 
sleep 142 decreased 95 43 48.90 
ward 202 487 119 55 47.96 
previous 345 admissions 173 90 47.70 
years 360 ago 256 109 47.22 
appetite 142 energy 101 41 46.71 
old 398 woman 67 59 46.38 
behaviour 226 bizarre 59 39 46.17 
old 398 female 57 54 46.11 
appetite 142 decreased 95 40 45.88 
appetite 142 sleep 142 47 43.99 
by 398 brought 118 74 43.92 
suicide 237 attempted 48 35 43.62 
old 398 male 59 52 43.56 
appetite 142 loss 92 37 43.29 
presented 172 who 163 56 42.80 
problems 223 marital 39 29 42.66 
episode 119 first 64 28 42.62 
disorder 219 personality 101 47 42.59 
poor 265 appetite 142 61 41.74 
by 398 dr 124 71 41.44 
home 125 age 66 27 40.46 
year 521 woman 67 59 40.35 
year 521 male 59 55 40.16 
360 
year 521 female 57 54 40.14 
hospital 132 Milfield 53 25 40.09 
depression 585 features 220 109 39.88 
appetite 142 msomrua 94 34 39.67 
schizophrenic 107 chronic 99 31 39.55 
known 304 well 208 78 39.48 
not 323 coping 31 29 38.63 
energy 101 decreased 95 28 38.53 
od 228 took 80 40 38.42 
abuse 305 cannabis 54 36 38.33 
depression 585 vegetative 136 81 37.48 
known 304 schizophrenic 107 52 36.93 
2 401 weeks 241 87 35.45 
history 866 family 231 126 35.35 
behaviour 226 inappropriate 43 25 35.12 
to 1589 pnor 147 137 35.11 
with 1232 presented 172 131 34.47 
admissions 173 multiple 80 31 34.38 
poor 265 sleep 142 51 34.31 
by 398 referred 150 66 34.29 
depression 585 major 79 56 34.20 
days 119 few 88 26 33.98 
not 323 sleeping 70 39 33.88 
treated 211 previously 154 47 33.67 
poor 265 energy 101 41 33.62 
old 398 man 53 38 33.55 
family 231 psych 130 44 33.45 
old 398 who 163 68 33.35 
months 284 ago 256 69 33.33 
at 489 home 125 63 33.33 
not 323 eating 53 33 33.24 
manic 131 episode 119 31 33.16 
ward 202 medical 78 31 32.72 
from 432 discharged 79 47 32.61 
admissions 173 sterkfontein 117 35 32.52 
old 398 lady 33 29 32.48 
of 2015 depression 585 316 32.28 
to 1589 due 75 88 32.05 
one 139 month 133 33 31.32 
sleep 142 energy 101 28 31.31 
year 521 lady 33 32 31.28 
depressed 299 feeling 94 41 3: 27 
hallucinations 187 delusions 177 42 31.14 
for 977 years 360 153 30.79 
history 866 week 155 91 30.64 
for 977 months 284 133 30.60 
history 866 long 97 70 30.23 
at 489 work 95 49 30.20 
to 1589 be 85 89 29.99 
history 866 psych 130 80 29.64 
year 521 who 163 69 29.19 
year 521 man 53 38 29.13 
known 304 disorder 219 59 29.11 
3 316 weeks 241 64 29.09 
very 231 anxious 72 28 28.99 
as 235 well 208 50 28.89 
since 207 then 81 29 28.83 
family 231 positive 68 27 28.83 
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to 1589 admission 345 182 28.83 
of 2015 loss 92 101 18.77 
admission 345 before 91 37 28.46 
admitted 460 via 31 26 28.14 
m 1127 brought 118 84 28.13 
by 398 X 141 51 27.48 
referred 150 dr 124 29 27.45 
history 866 abuse 305 115 27.37 
known 304 affective 80 33 27.18 
to 1589 unable 58 66 26.96 
no 379 psychiatric 113 42 26.55 
week 155 one 139 30 26.23 
3 316 months 284 63 26.22 
problems 223 social 96 28 26.20 
history 866 psychiatric 113 65 26.15 
on 605 admission 345 97 26.15 
to 1589 487 119 92 25.99 
by 398 seen 70 34 25.89 
from 432 transferred 74 36 25.60 
Valhalla 208 admissions 173 37 25.15 
previously 154 diagnosed 109 25 25.00 
behaviour 226 aggress1ve 147 34 24.97 
old 398 presented 172 53 24.73 
on 605 lithium 78 41 24.19 
had 437 been 285 71 23.95 
months 284 few 88 29 23.75 
previous 345 attempts 95 33 23.64 
months 284 6 134 36 23.51 
1 159 week 155 29 23.38 
suicidal 317 depressed 299 57 23.19 
history 866 month 133 65 23.10 
old 398 age 66 29 22.88 
from 432 referred 150 47 22.77 
2 401 years 360 71 22.53 
od 228 following 103 27 22.28 
with 1232 history 866 228 22.09 
delusions 177 auditory 126 25 22.02 
weeks 241 prior 147 32 21.68 
of 2015 abuse 305 153 21.64 
patient 786 known 304 93 21.48 
ago 256 weeks 241 42 21.34 
of 2015 complains 38 48 21.33 
for 977 weeks 241 89 21.27 
od 228 an 140 30 21.19 
2 401 months 284 58 20.86 
history 866 strong 41 31 20.83 
suicidal 317 feeling 94 28 20.77 
previous 345 psychiatric 113 32 20.70 
history 866 depression 585 134 20.61 
in 1127 the 366 120 20.59 
with 1232 presents 44 39 20.56 
with 1232 presenting 33 33 20.37 
for 977 3 316 100 20.08 
admission 345 days 119 31 20.00 
depressed 299 mood 123 30 19.85 
and 2194 visual 54 56 19.79 
depression 585 anxiety 84 34 19.77 
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depressed 299 very 231 42 19.67 
-' 
history 
history 
and 
for 
history 
no 
months 
admitted 
to 
to 
been 
years 
to 
and 
to 
ago 
. previous 
to 
Note. 
866 positive 68 38 19.52 
866 no 379 99 19.35 
2194 hallucinations 187 110 19.34 
977 2 401 Ill 19.33 
866 alcohol 279 82 19.30 
379 psych 130 34 19.21 
284 over 98 25- 19.02 
460 following 103 34 18.99 
1589 kill 31 33 18.97 
1589 admitted 460 161 18.94 
285 treated 211 38 18.76 
360 10 86 26 18.73 
1589 Valhalla 208 96 18.72 
2194 suicidal 317 148 18.61 
1589 hospital 132 73 18.52 
256 6 134 27 18.46 
345 psych 130 31 18.11 
1589 tried 37 36 18.08 
N(a) and N(b) are the frequencies of the corresponding types. Cis the collocational 
frequency of the two types. z is the z-score. A span of 8 words ( 4 at either side of the 
target word) and a minimum collocational freq~_ency o~ 5 was used. All significant 
word pairs to a minimu z-score of 18.08 are shown. 
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